

THE  
TARKABHĀSĀ  
OR  
KEŚAVAMISRA

*Edited with an Introduction, Translation into English  
and Notes ( explanatory and critical )*

BY

**A B Gajendragadkar**

*Professor of Sanskrit, Elphinstone College, Bombay*

AND

**R. D. Karmarkar**

*Principal and Professor of Sanskrit  
Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona*

1934

Price Rupees Two and Annas Eight

Printed by A. V. Patwardhan, at the Aryabhushan Press,  
936/3 Bhamburda Peth, Poona 4

AND

Published by R. D. Katarkar, Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona

## P R E F A C E

This edition of the Tarkabhāṣa is specially prepared with a view to meet the needs of students studying for University examinations. The English Translation of the entire text has been printed just below it for ready reference. In the Notes all points which an ordinary student requires to be explained are explained. The notes are to the point and sufficiently exhaustive. The Introduction deals with questions like the date and life of the author, a general review of the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika systems, a critical appreciation of the Tarkabhāṣa etc. Care is taken ~~not~~ to swell the volume of the book by the addition of irrelevant matter or by the inclusion of unnecessary details which bewilder the student instead of helping him.

This edition is thus on the same lines as those which we followed in our edition of the Tarkasamgraha which we are glad to state met with unstinted approval from the students and professors alike. In the Notes is incorporated most of the important matter from the Tarkasamgraha. The text is divided into suitable sections and is presented in a form which would enable the student to grasp the subject matter easily.

We have to offer our grateful thanks to the Managers of the Āryabhāṣya Press for the efficient printing work done in a short time.

Sir Parashurambhau College  
POONA 2  
20th August 1934

}

A. B. G.  
R. D. K.

# INTRODUCTION

## I THE AUTHOR

### HIS LIFE AND DATE

Beyond the fact that the name of the author of the Tarkabhāsa is Kesavamisra, we have no definite knowledge about the author. Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana says that Kesavamisra "was a native of Mithila and a preceptor of Govardhana Misra who wrote a commentary on the Tarkabhāsa, called Tarkabhāsa Prakāsa." Kesavamisra quotes Udayana in his work<sup>1</sup> from which it is clear that he must have lived after Udayana. Now Udayana (or Udayanacarya or Ācarya as he is often reverentially called), the author of the well known works, Kusumāñjali, Kirāṇavali, Lakṣanavali etc, is definitely known to have lived about 950-1000 A. D., as is clear from the colophon to his Lakṣanavali which gives 984 A. D. (Saka year 906) as the date of its composition. So Kesavamisra could not have lived before 1000 A. D.

Now, Cinnabhatta a commentator on the Tarkabhāsa is definitely proved to have lived about 1350 A. D., by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar<sup>2</sup>. Cinnabhatta lived about 1350 A. D. at the court of Harihara, brother to Bukkaraya of Vijayanagar, and was thus the contemporary of the famous Sayanacarya and Madhvacarya, so Kesavamisra's date could not be later than 1350 A. D. The most probable date for Kesavamisra therefore would be about 1250 A. D.

About Kesavamisra's personal history we know nothing. Whether he wrote any other work or works is also a sealed book for the present.

## II NYĀYA AND VAISESIKA SYSTEMS

The student of a manual like the Tarkabhāsa is certainly not expected to be acquainted with the history of the develop-

---

(1) A History of Indian Logic, P. 381

(2) P. 104, अत्रोदयनेन स्वतन्त्र हेतौ पञ्चमर्थतया प्रतीतिः सिद्धस्तद्भावात्सिद्धिरपि सिद्धिरसंगतुष्यन् ।

(3) Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1882-83

ment of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. But it is worth his while to know the salient features thereof. Both these systems originated independently about the beginning of the Christian era but it was found soon afterwards that their tenets had nothing irreconcilable about them, and long before writers like Śivāditya came into the field expressly for the purpose of blending the two systems the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems had come to be grouped together, like the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems.

Like all other Darśanas or systems of philosophy, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems have their own Sūtras which must be regarded as the basis of their doctrines. The Vaiśeṣika system is also known as the system of Kanada or Aulūka (son of Ulūka). Kanada (probably a nick name due to his having propounded the theory of Kanās or atoms) was the son of Ulūka, of Kāśyapa gṛtra. He is said to have been so called (Kanada or Kanabhakṣa), because he maintained himself on rice grains fallen in streets like a pigeon. According to another tradition God revealed himself to Kanada who was practising penance, in the form of an owl to expound the six Padārthas, hence the system received the name Aulūkyadarśana. Kāntilya does not mention the Vaiśeṣikas by name, but Nāgarjuna and Āryadeva (about the 3rd century A. D.) criticise their doctrines. The Vaiśeṣikasūtras may therefore be said to have been composed about the first or second century A. D. It is possible that these Sūtras may have been revised from time to time, before they assumed their present form.

There is no Atomic theory in the Upaniṣads, though the word Anu occurs many times. The Buddhās had something of an Atomic theory and the Vaiśeṣikas may have been indebted to them for that doctrine. There is no direct evidence to show that the Vaiśeṣikas had come under Græc influence in the beginning.

As regards the Nyāya system, Gautama is said to be the author of the Nyāyasūtras. In the *Pratimānūṭaka* of Bhaṣa, the Nyāyasāstra of Medhatithi is referred to. According to the *Mahābhārata* Gautama and Medhatithi refer to the same person. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣana regards this Medhatithi as the founder of Anvikṣikī, and thus quite a

different person from Gautama Aksapāda' (hence the name Aksapādadarśana for the Nyāya system) the founder of the Nyāya system. The identification of Gautama Aksapāda with the Gautama of the Gautama Dharmasūtras is without any basis. Vātsyāyana wrote his famous commentary on the Nyāya sūtras about the fourth century A. D. It is therefore safe to say that Gautama Aksapāda must have lived at least a century or two earlier than Vātsyāyana. Gautama's date cannot be pushed further back than that.

The Vaiśeṣikasūtras contain ten Adhyāyas or books. Book I discusses the five Padārthas that enter into the Samavāya relation. In Book II there is the discussion about Dravyas. Book III discusses the nature of Ātman and Manas. Book IV deals with the nature of the body and the Atomic theory. Book V deals with Karman. Book VI with the Srauta-dharmas and Aśramadharma. Book VII with Guṇa and Samavāya. Book VIII with Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perceptio. Book IX with Buddhi and Book X with causality and Anumāna. (Read the following from the Sarvadarśanasamgraha: तत्राहिरुद्रनामने प्रथमे याये समवेताशपपत्वावयवमकारे । तत्रापि प्रथमाहुरे चान् मनिरुपम् । द्वितीया हुरे जाताकापर्यायैरुपम् । आहुरुद्रययने द्वित्वायाये इ या + रुपम् । तत्रापि प्रथमाहुरे भूतास्वापल एवम् । द्वितीय इकाप्रानपादनम् । आहिरुद्रय युक्त तृतीय आमन्त एवम् । तत्रायामरुपण प्रथमे । द्वित्वेत्त - करण एवम् । आहिरुद्रययने चतुथ शरगतपुपयाय एवचनम् । तत्रापि प्रथम तदुपर्याय विवेचनम् । द्वितीये शरीरैरुचनम् । आहिरुद्रयवत एवम् कप्रानपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे शरीरैरुचनम् विवेचनम् । द्वितीये मानममचिन्तनम् । आहिरुद्रयशाल न एव धमानुपम् । तत्रापि प्रथम दानप्रतिप्रथमावेव । द्वितीये चान्प्रथमयचित्तमानरुपम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे गुणममकायप्रानपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथम बुद्धिनरुपे एवम् नपादनम् । द्वितीये तन्माय एवम् प्रानपादन समवायप्रतिपादन च । अष्टमे तन्निर्विकल्पकपरिपमप्रत्य एवम् प्रमाणाचनम् । नवमे बुद्धिविप्यप्रतिपादनम् । दशमे तन्मानमेप्रतिपादनम् । )

The Nyāyasūtras contain five Adhyāyas or Books. Book I deals with the sixteen Padārthas. Book II with the four Pri

1 Aksapāda literally means having eyes on the feet. Absurd traditions are in vogue to account for this appellation. One tradition says that Gautama was given a second pair of eyes on the feet by God as he happened to fall on his face and was abandoned to the mad dog. According to another account Gautama once looked at his pupil Vyāsa with the eyes on his feet!

mānas and Samsaya and the rejection of Arthāpatti etc. as independent Pramānas, Book III with Ātman, body, sense-organs, objects of senses, Buddhi and Manas, Book IV with Pravṛtti, Dosa, Pretyabhāva, Phala, Duhkha, Apavarga and the theory of Dosas, and Book V with the divisions of Jāti and Nigrahasthāna (Read the following from the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Nyaayasūtraḥ cā paryāyavākyam. । तत्र प्रत्ययमाहिकद्रयम् । तत्र प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमाहिके भगवता गौतमेन प्रमाणादिपदार्थनवरत्नक्षणनिरूपणं विधाय द्वितीये वादादिसप्तपदार्थरत्नक्षणनिरूपणं कृतम् । द्वितीयस्य प्रथमे संज्ञयपरीक्षणं प्रमाणचतुष्टयाप्रामाण्यज्ञाननिराकरणं च । द्वितीये प्रथापच्योदेरन्तर्भावनिरूपणम् । तृतीयस्य प्रथम आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये बुद्धिमनःपरीक्षणम् । चतुर्थस्य प्रथमे प्रवृत्तिशेषप्रत्यभावकत्वादु स्थापयपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये शोषनिमित्तकत्वनिरूपणमन्यन्यादिनिरूपणं च । पञ्चमस्य प्रथमे जातिभेदनिरूपणम् । द्वितीये निग्रहस्थानभेदनिरूपणम् । )

It will be seen that the Nyāyasūtras are more properly and systematically arranged than the Vaiśeṣikasūtras. The Nyāyasūtras declare in the very first sūtra that the study of the sixteen Padārthas or topics mentioned therein is to lead to Nihareyas. They are obviously intended to make the student fit for carrying on controversies and therefore explain in detail the Jātis and the Nigrahasthānas etc. The Vaiśeṣikasūtras are more concerned with the nature of the Padārthas or categories (the Padārthas of the Nyāyasūtras are mere topics for discussion and should not have been so called at all) than with anything else, though they too bring in the Āsramadharmas and Śrautadharmas so as to make their system as complete as possible. It is now usually conceded that the Vaiśeṣikasūtras are older than the Nyāyasūtras.

We shall now merely mention some of the great writers of both the systems, who have played an important part in their development. As regards the Vaiśeṣikadarśana, the following authors should be noted—Prasastapāda (the writer of Kanādasūtrabhāṣya, 500 A. D.), Udayana (the author of Kirāṇāvālī, a commentary on Prasastapādabhāṣya, 1000 A. D.), Śrīdhara (the author of Nyāyankandallī, 991 A. D.), and Sankarāmīra (the author of Kanādarāhasya and Upaskāra, about 1425 A. D.). As regards the Nyāyadarśana, the following are the writers of note—Vātsyāyana (the author of Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya about the fourth century A. D.), Uddyotakara (the author of

Nyayabhasyavartika 7th century A D ) Vācaspatimīśra ( the author of Nyayasūtrōddhāra 9th century A D ) and Gaṅgēs opādhyaya ( the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi, 12th century A D )

After the doctrines of the two systems had been more or less stabilised by the above writers by their commentaries on the Sūtras or sub commentaries on the commentaries there arose about the 10th century a class of writers who made it their business to show how the two systems were really complementary to each other and their tenets easily reconcilable ( such a tendency was visible it must be confessed even earlier to some extent ) Kesavamīśra belonged to this class of writers who claimed no originality but whose works [are none the less important Bhasarvajña ( the author of Nyayasāra about 1600 A D ) Annambhatta ( the author of Tarkasamgraha about 1700 A D ) Sivāditya ( the author of Saptapādārtha about the 11th century A D ) Laugakṣibhaskara ( the author of Tarkakaumud 17th century A D ) are some of the authors belonging to what may be called the Syncretist School Bhasarvajña and Kesavamīśra were Naiyāyikas and the last three Vaiśeṣikas

### III THE TARKABHĀSA A CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Kesavamīśra wrote his Tarkabhāsa with the express purpose of furnishing an easy text book or manual for a beginner desirous of studying the tenets of Nyāya and it can be easily proved that he has admirably succeeded in his attempt There is also another purpose which he has in view namely to reconcile the tenets of Nyāya with those of the Vaiśeṣika system While dealing with Arthas<sup>2</sup> he mentions the six padārthas of the Vaiśeṣikas as Arthas instead of the gandha rasa etc<sup>3</sup> mentioned in the Nyāyasūtras and being fully conscious of the disturbance<sup>4</sup> in the original arrangement involved in equating the Vaiśeṣika padārthas with the Naiyāyika arthas he

1 वा ? ए जी अथर्व प्रवेशपदेन का उक्तस्य अनेन । etc the opening sloka

<sup>2</sup> P 63 section 4 अथ अथर्व । ते च द्रव्यगुणकर्मसंज्ञासंज्ञासंज्ञायाः ।

<sup>3</sup> अथर्वस्य पदार्थानां सूत्रेण वाच्यताः । ( Nyāyasūtra I 1 11 )

<sup>4</sup> Thus Atman etc have to be discussed twice ( Atman sections 44 and 57 Buddha 74 87 Duhkha-76 94 Manas-46 58 89 Iecha and Dve a 77-78 and once again under Do in 91 Vipar yaya under Buddha in 87 and again under Dosa in 91 )



justifies his action by saying that he has done it on purpose<sup>1</sup>. And that purpose is obviously to show that there is no conflict between the Nyaya system and the Vaiśeṣika system. We have pointed out that this purpose, however laudable it might be, is bound to fail in the very nature of things<sup>2</sup>. But writers of the Syncretist school deliberately shut their eyes against the inherent absurdity of such a procedure and Kesavamisra is no exception to them. Truly is it said that none are so blind as those who will not see.

Kesavamisra begins his work with quoting the first Nyaya sutra where the sixteen padarthas are mentioned, thus showing that he is a Naiyāyika (Annambhatta begins his *Tarka-samgraha* with the mention of the seven Padarthas of the Vaiśeṣikas, which shows that the *Tarka-samgraha* is a Vaiśeṣika treatise). He then quotes the *Vātsyayanabhaṣya* to show the procedure he is going to adopt in his work viz. Uddesa, Lakṣana and Parikṣa. After defining these terms, he takes the sixteen topics, one by one and while closely following the Nyaya-sūtras goes on discussing all relevant matters in a very systematic manner. Kesavamisra himself tells us at the end of his work what procedure he has followed in the presentation of the subject matter of his work. He says—'Here [in this treatise] there is treatment again and again of most useful [or important matters] in their nature and varieties that what is not most serviceable is not defined is no fault. By so much only is accomplished the training of beginners'.<sup>3</sup> We shall presently show how the above statement by the author himself describes the actual state of things —

Thus for a Naiyāyika the important topics in the Nyāya system are undoubtedly the Anumāna-pramāṇa (with the fallacies) that pramāṇas are four and the nature of samavāya (or intimate relation). Kesavamisra treats the Anumāna topic in great detail. He is not tired of repetition. Whenever some important point is to be discussed he proceeds to do it step by step always beginning his treatment with *tathāhi*<sup>4</sup>.

(to explain the same thing in detail) which expression occurs no less than a dozen times in sections 18-32 that treat of anumana. The fallacies or hetvabhāsas with their divisions and sub-divisions are expounded twice—once as a part of Anumāna (sections 28-32) and again as an independent topic (sections 106-114). Here there is much of repetition but Kesavamisra risks it to make the beginner understand the nature of fallacies thoroughly as the detection of fallacies is undoubtedly the most important thing in the eyes of a Nyāyika. Similarly Kesavamisra describes in detail the nature of Karana and Karana the six fold contact of sense organ and object the undesirability of admitting non perception and presumption as independent pramanas the nature of vākya pratīti and pada pratīti and so on. The self validity of knowledge also is described as an independent topic with considerable acumen. Unimportant topics such as Chala Jāti Nigrahasthana Vada Jalpa etc. are simply referred to and no detailed treatment is given as they are useful only for one who has thoroughly mastered the Nyaya technique and not for a beginner.

It will be clear from the amount of space devoted to the treatment of different topics what topics are regarded as important by the author. Thus of the sixteen padarthas treated in the Tarkabhāsa in 121 pages

Pramāna is described in 58 pages ( 1—58 )

Prameya                                 38             ( 58—95 )

Hetvabhāsas are                         15             ( 104—118 )

( and also in 35—40 ) under Pramāna.

The three topics Pramāna Prameya and Hetvabhāsas together have 111 pages devoted to them while the remaining thirteen topics are dismissed in ten pages! The last topic Nigrahasthana has one whole section devoted to it in the Nyāyasūtra ( V 2 ) where all the twenty two varieties are mentioned. Kesavamisra just mentions only seven of them. He also mentions only two varieties ( out of twenty four ) of Jāti and only one of Chala ( out of three )

It will thus be seen that the Tarkabhāsa is an admirable manual for a beginner. It is also complete in itself and compares favourably with the Tarkasamgraha in this respect. The Tarkasamgraha is more scrappy in its treatment ( even when read along with the Tarka dīpikā ) it

might be said to ignore altogether some of the topics of the Naiyayikas. The Tarkabhāṣā on the other hand, pays due attention to the controversy about the self-validity of knowledge, non perception and presumption as independent pramanas and other interesting matters. The treatment in the Tarkabhāṣā almost takes the form of lecture-notes in a class room. The views of the opponent are mentioned clearly and fully the argument is advanced step by step even a similar topic is treated independently and the device of referring the reader to other topics described before *mutatis mutandis*, is rarely resorted to. Consequently there is much of repetition, but the interests of the reader are thoroughly guarded.

Kesavamisra writes clearly and there is hardly any ambiguity about his statements. There is some looseness about his syllogism or anumānavākya. Thus he says अनित्य शब्द in place of शब्द अनित्य, sometimes the उदाहरणम् is given as यो यो धूमवान् sometimes as यत्र यत्र धूम etc. But such lapses are very few, and on the whole, the Tarkabhāṣā can be justly described as an excellent manual of logic complete in itself, and doing full justice to the Nyāyanāya which it professes to expound.

#### IV THE NAIYAYIKAS AND THE VAISESIKAS THEIR DIVERGENT VIEWS

- It is necessary that the student should have a general idea about the points on which the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas differ. We give below in parallel columns the views of both on some important topics (The list is not exhaustive)

Vaisesikas	Naiyāyikas
(1) पदार्थs are seven, द्वयम् गुण र्मे साक्षात्कृतम् विशेष समवाय अभाव इति ( or six if अभाव is not admitted )	(1) पदार्थs are sixteen प्रमाणम् प्रमेयम् मदाय प्रयोजनम् ह्यन्त मिदन्त अवयव तर्क निगम वाद उप विद्वान् हेत्वाभास छद्मजाति and निग्रहस्तम्
(2) विशेषs are admitted as a पदार्थ	(2) नव्यनैयायिकs do not admit विशेषs as a पदार्थ.
(3) समवाय is अर्णद्विय and only अनुमेय.	(3) समवाय is प्रत्यय by the द्वादश-संयत्तविशेषणतामनिरूपे

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>(4) The Vaiśeṣikas are पीडुवाण वादिन्स (पीडय परमाणव एव स्वतन्त्रा पच्यन्ते । तेनैव पूरुह्य नादाधिमहपायुपत्ति । वाणमुण प्रक्रमेण चावयासि हपायुपयान् )</p> <p>(5) द्विःवादि is regarded as अनेका बुद्धिः नान्य</p> <p>(6) The Vaiśeṣikas admit विना गतनिर्माण</p> <p>(7) अत्मन् is अप्रयक्ष and only अनुमानगम्य</p> <p>(8) There are only two प्रमाणः प्रथमम् and उत्तमम् ( शब्द and उपमान are included in अनुमान and should not be regarded as separate प्रमाणः )</p> <p>(9) Only 3 हेतुभावाः are admitted (सम्बन्धिवार or सादृश्य इत्यद्व and आगद)</p> | <p>(4) The Naiyāyikas are पितृ-पात्रवादिन्स (कार्यकारणममुदाय एव पच्यते न तु पीडय पच्यते )</p> <p>(5) द्विःवादि is regarded as अनेका बुद्धिः नान्य</p> <p>(6) The Naiyāyikas do not admit विनागतनिर्माण</p> <p>(7) अत्मन् is मानसप्रयत्नविषय</p> <p>(8) Pramanas are four — प्रयक्षम् अनुमानम् उपमानम् and शब्द</p> <p>(9) Five हेतुभावाः are admitted.</p> |
|---|--|

[The Naiyāyikas are sometimes divided into two schools the ancients and the moderns. But these terms are often very loosely used. Sometimes the Vaiśeṣikas are meant by the term 'the ancients' and sometimes older Bhāṣyakaras Prasastapada Vātsyayana and others.]

Kesavamisra accepts all the tenets of the Naiyāyikas except Nos. 4-6. He admits the पीडुवाणवाद when he says about एव सत्त्वानित्यं पृथिवीमात्रे regards द्विः as अनित्य everywhere and mentions the विनागतनिर्माण variety. He refers to the Vaiśeṣika padārthas under अर्थ.

Kesavamisra generally follows the ancients. In his treatment of Karana he accepts the ancient view (अवाक्यस्य कारण कारणम्) as regards प्रयक्ष for he mentions the अवाक्यस्यकारण in the case of the three कारण (इन्द्रियम्, इन्द्रियार्थनिर्णय and गानम्). He follows the modern view (कलायोग पच्यते कारणम्) as regards अनुमान for he gives लिङ्गपरमर्त (and not लिङ्ग) as its कारण. In the case of उपमान he again seems to follow the ancient view as the कारण is given there as the सादृश्यता (and अनिदेशात्प्रयत्नस्मरण as the अवान्तर व्यापार).

## विषयानुक्रमणी

	पृष्ठसंख्या	Page of Notes
( १ ) उपादानश्लोक	१	123
( २ ) षोडशपदार्थानाम् उद्देश ।	१	124
( ३ ) उद्देशोपलक्षणपरिभाषिचार ।	२	124
( ४ ) प्रमाणरूपेण प्रमाकल च ।	४	126
( १ ) प्रमाणम्		
( ५ ) प्रमानितरणम् ।	३	127
( ६ ) कारणनिरूपणम् ।	३	128
( ७ ) समवायिकारणनिरूपणम्	५	132
( ८ ) अयुतमिद्धो क्व इति निरूपणम् ।	६	132
( ९ ) घट-स्रगतरूपादे समवायिकारणम् इति सिद्धान्तप्रस्थापनम् ।	७	134
( १० ) असमवायिकारणनिरूपणम्	९	136
( ११ ) निमित्तकारणनिरूपणम् ।	१०	137
( १२ ) अभावस्य निमित्तमात्र कारणम्	११	137
( १३ ) अनभिगताध्यागनुमानम् इत्यस्य प्रमत्तलक्षणस्य सण्डनम् । इति रूपागादि प्रमाण न प्रमात्रादि	११	137
( १४ ) प्रमाणचतुष्टयम् ।	१३	139
( १५ ) प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणनिरूपणम् । कदा इन्द्रिय करणम् कदा इन्द्रियार्थमनिरूप करणम् कदा ज्ञान करणम् इति विचार ।	१३	139
( १६ ) अन्वेष इन्द्रियधत्तानन्वेष	१५	141
( १७ ) भविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षम् इति प्रस्थापनम्	१६	143
( १८ ) लक्षणपरमार्थ (धूमस्य ज्ञाना नृताव ज्ञानम् ) अनुमानम् ।	२०	144
( १९ ) स्वाध्यानुमानम् पराध्यानुमान च	५	149

( २० )	अन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणम् । ..	२७	154
( २१ )	अन्वयव्याप्तेरेव किमर्थं प्रदर्शनम् । ...	२८	156
( २२ )	केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु । ...	२९	156
( २३ )	केवलान्वयी हेतु । . ...	३१	
( २४ )	अन्वयव्यतिरेकहेतो पञ्चरूपाणि । ...	३१	156
( २५ )	अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे ऋषि पक्ष- धर्मता च । ..	३३	157
( २६ )	केवलान्वयी तथा च केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु चतुरूपोपपत्ता । ...	३४	157
( २७ )	पक्षसपक्षविपक्षनिरूपणम् । ...	३४	157
( २८ )	पञ्च हेवामामा । अभिद्वहेत्वाभास- निरूपणम् । ...	३५	158
( २९ )	विरुद्धहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् । ...	३८	161
( ३० )	अनेकान्तिकहत्वाभासनिरूपणम् । ...	३८	164
( ३१ )	प्रकरणसमहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् । ...	३९	168
( ३२ )	कालात्ययापदिष्टहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् । ...	४०	168
( ३३ )	उपमानविचार । ...	४१	169
( ३४ )	उपमान प्रमागान्वयम् । ..	४१	171
( ३५ )	शब्दविचार । आकाङ्क्षायोग्यता- सन्निधिनिरूपणम् । ...	४२	171
( ३६ )	कथं पदानि माकाङ्क्षाणि । ...	४३	173
( ३७ )	कथं पदप्रतीतिः वाच्यप्रतीतिर्वा । ...	४४	174
( ३८ )	शब्दप्रमाणलक्षण लोके वेदे च समानम् । ...	४५	175
( ३९ )	अर्थापत्तिर्न पृथक्प्रमाणम् । ...	४६	176
( ४० )	न प्रभावाख्य पृथक्प्रमाणम् । ...	४७	178
( ४१ )	असत्त्वद्वाभावस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं कथं संभवति इति विचारः । ...	४८	178
( ४२ )	ज्ञानस्य खन प्रमाण्य परतः प्रमाण्य वा इति विचारः । ...	५२	181

## ( २ ) प्रमेयम्

( ४३ )	प्रमेयाणि । ..	५८	185
( ४४ )	आत्मनिरूपणम् । .	५९	185
( ४५ )	शरीरनिरूपणम् । ...	६१	188

( ४ )

पृष्ठसंख्या	Page of Notes
-------------	---------------

( ७२ ) दु स्तनिरूपणम् ।	८६	209
( ७३ ) इच्छालक्षणम् ।	८७	209
( ७८ ) द्वयलक्षणम् ।	८७	209
( ७९ ) प्रयत्नलक्षणम् । बुद्ध्यादीनां मानसप्रयत्नलक्षणम् ।	८७	209
( ८० ) धर्माधर्मनिरूपणम्	८७	210
( ८१ ) सस्कारविचार ।	८८	210
( ८२ ) कर्मविचार ।	८८	211
( ८३ ) सामान्यविचार	८९	212
( ८४ ) विशयाविचार ।	९०	214
( ८५ ) समवायविचार	९०	21०
( ८६ ) अभावविचार	९१	21०
( ८७ ) बुद्धिविचार ।	९	218
( ८८ ) ज्ञान निराकारमेव ।	९२	219
( ८९ ) मनोलक्षणम् ।	९५	219
( ९० ) प्रवृत्तिविचार ।	९५	21३
( ९१ ) दापलक्षणम् ।	९५	219
( ९२ ) प्रयत्नानिरूपणम् ।	९५	219
( ९३ ) फललक्षणम्	९५	219
( ९४ ) दु स्तलक्षणम्	९६	220
( ९५ ) अपवगविचार ।		
( ३ ) सशय	९७	220
( ९६ ) सशयनिरूपणम् ।		
( ४ ) प्रयोजनम्	९९	221
( ९७ ) प्रयोजननिरूपणम् ।		
( १ ) दृष्टान्त	९९	2०1
( ९८ ) दृष्टान्तनिरूपणम् ।		
( ६ ) सिद्धान्त	९९	222
( ९९ ) सिद्धान्तानिरूपणम्		
( ७ ) अवयवा	१००	224
( १०० ) अवयवनिरूपणम् ।		

## (५)

	पृष्ठसंख्या	Page of Notes.
(८) तर्क		
(१०१) तर्कविचार ।	१०१	२२४
(९) निर्णय		
(१०२) निर्णयनिरूपणम् ।	१०२	२२६
(१०) वाद		
(१०३) वादनिरूपणम् ।	१०३	२२६
(११) जल्प		
(१०४) जल्पनिरूपणम् ।	१०४	२२६
(१२) वितण्डा		
(१०५) वितण्डानिरूपणम् ।	१०५	२२६
(१३) हेत्याभासा		
(१०६) द्वावाभासा । अमिद्धिविचार ।	१०६	२२६
(१०७) आश्रयासिद्धिविचार ।	१०७	२२७
(१०८) स्वरूपासिद्धिविचार । भागासिद्ध स्वरूपामिद् एव ।	१०८	२२८
(१०९) स्वरूपासिद्धभेदविचार ।	१०९	२२८
(११०) व्याप्यवासिद्धिविचार ।	११०	२२९
(१११) विरुद्धविचार ।	१११	२२९
(११२) अनेकान्तिकविचार ।	११२	२२९
(११३) प्रकरणसमविचार ।	११३	२३१
(११४) कालावस्थापदिष्टविचार । लक्षणदोषविचार ।	११४	२३१
(१४) छलम्		
(११५) छलविचार ।	११५	२३२
(१५) जातय		
(११६) जातनिरूपणम् ।	११६	२३३
(१६) निग्रहस्थानानि		
(११७) निग्रहस्थाननिरूपणम् ।	११७	२३३
Introduction		Pages
Text and Translation		1-121
Notes		123-135
Index		237-239



॥ श्री ॥

## तर्कभाषा

उपोद्घातश्लोकः ।

वालोलपि यो न्यायनये प्रवेश-  
नरूपेन वाऽऽत्यलसं श्रुतेन ।  
संक्षिप्तयुक्त्यन्विततर्कभाषा  
प्रकास्यते तस्य कृते मयेषा ॥ १ ॥  
षोडशपदार्थानाम् उद्देशः ।

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त सिद्धान्त अद्ययव तर्क निर्णय-  
वाद जल्प चितण्डा हेत्वाभास चञ्चल जाति निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञा ।  
नास्ति श्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायस्यादिमं सूत्रम् (न्या सू. १ १ १) । अस्यार्थः ।  
प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्मोक्षप्राप्तिर्भवतीति ॥ २ ॥

### TARKABHASA

#### [ EXPOSITION OF REASONING ]

( 1 ) For the sake of him who though a man of immature understanding (*būlak*) and lazy desires entrance into the system of Nyaya [ philosophy ] with a little study is brought out by me this Tarkabhāsa [ Exposition of Reasoning ] concise, and accompanied by arguments [ or accompanied by brief arguments, or having brief arguments and consistent, or in such a way as to give brief arguments, O wise one (*aruda*) ] . .

( 2 ) ' The acquisition of the highest beatitude [ is ] from the true comprehension of ( 1 ) Proof [ or, Means of right knowledge ], ( 2 ) Object of knowledge ( 3 ) Doubt, ( 4 ) Motive, ( 5 ) Instance, ( 6 ) Tenet [ or Demonstrated truth ] ( 7 ) Member of syllogism ( 8 ) Hypothetical reasoning, ( 9 ) Conclusion, ( 10 ) Discussion ( 11 ) Wrangling, ( 12 ) Cavilling, ( 13 ) Fallacy, ( 14 ) Perversion, ( 15 ) Futility, and ( 16 ) Ground for confutation ' —this [ is ] the first aphorism of the Nyāya [ —sūtras of Gautama ] The meaning of this [ is ] that there would be the attainment of final liberation from the true comprehension of the sixteen categories proof etc

## तर्कभाषा

उद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षाविचारः ।

न च प्रमाणादीनां तत्रज्ञानं सम्यग् ज्ञानं तावद्भवति यावद्विषया-  
मुद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षा न त्रियन्ते । यदाह भाष्यकारः-त्रिविधा चास्य  
शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिरुद्देशो लक्षण परीक्षा चेति । ( शं० भा० १०० )

उद्देशस्तु नाममात्रेण यस्तुर्मर्कतिनम् । तशास्त्रिमग्रय सूत्रे कृतम् ।

लक्षणं त्वसाधारणधर्मवचनम् । यथा गोः सास्त्रादिमन्वम् ।

यथालक्षितस्यैतत् लक्षणमुपपद्यते न चेति विचार परीक्षा ।

तेनैते लक्षणपरीक्षे प्रमाणादीनां तत्रज्ञानार्थमत्रस्य कर्तव्ये ॥ ३ ॥

( १ ) प्रमाणम् ।

प्रमाणलक्षण प्रमाणं च ।

तत्रापि प्रथममुद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य तावद्दक्षणमुच्यते प्रमाकरणं

( ३ ) Add further (or) true comprehension—right know-  
ledge—of proof etc, would not take place so long as Enu-  
meration, Definition [ or Characterization ] and Examina-  
tion of these are not made, as says the author of the Bhāṣya  
[ Vātsyāyana, who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-  
sūtras ]—the procedure in this science, again, [ is ] three-  
fold—Enumeration, Definition, and Examination

As for ( or ) Enumeration [ it is ] the statement of things  
[ or topics ] merely by name and that has been done in this  
very aphorism

Definition again, [ is ] the statement of a peculiar charac-  
teristic, as the possession of a dew lap etc [ in the case ] of  
a cow

Examination [ is ] the investigation as to whether the  
definition in question ( etat ) of [ a thing ] defined in a parti-  
cular way ( yathā ) is applicable or not

Therefore [ owing to Uddesa having been already made  
in the first aphorism ] these two Definition and Examina-  
tion must needs be gone through for the sake of true compre-  
hension of [ the categories ] proof etc

( 4 ) And therein too the definition of proof [ which is ]  
enumerated first is now stated—proof [ is ] the instrument of

## कारणनिरूपणम्

प्रमाणम् । अत्र च प्रमाणं लक्ष्यम् प्रमाकरणं लक्षणम् ।

ननु प्रमायाः करणं चेत् प्रमाणं तर्हि तस्य फल यत्कथञ्चिद् करणस्य फलवच्चनियमात् । सत्यम् । प्रमेव फलं साध्यमित्यर्थः । यथा छिदा-  
करणस्य परशोऽच्छिदेव फलम् ॥ ४ ॥

प्रमानिरूपणम् ।

का पुनः प्रमा यस्याः करणं प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा । यथार्थ इत्ययथार्थानां संग्रहविपर्ययतर्कज्ञानानां निरासः । अनुभव इति स्मृतेनिरासे । अनुभवो नाम स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानम् ॥ ५ ॥

वक्ष्यन्निरूपणम्

किं पुनः करणम् । साधकतमं करणम् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतमं प्रकृतं कारणमित्यर्थः ।

right cognition Here again proof [ is ] what is defined, instrument of right cognition [is] the definition

I say [ says the objector *nānu* ] if proof [ is ] the instrument of right cognition, then its result [ or effect, fruit ] deserves to be stated, for an instrument is as a rule possessed of [ that is, associated with ] a result [ The siddhāntin replies—that is ] true, right cognition itself [ is ] the result—what is to be accomplished, this [ is ] what is meant, as of the axe—the instrument of cutting [ is ] the cutting itself the result

( 5 ) What again [ is this ] right cognition of which the instrument [ is ] proof ? It is answered [ as follows ]—Right cognition [ is ] the apprehension of a thing as it is (*yathārtha*) By [ the expression ] 'of a thing as it is' [ is effected ] the exclusion of cognitions—Doubt, Error and Hypothetical reasoning, [ which are ] not in accord with their objects By [ the expression ] 'apprehension' [ is effected ] the exclusion of Remembrance [ For ] apprehension indeed (*nūna*) [ is all ] cognition other than remembrance

( 6 ) What again [ is ] the Instrument ? Instrument [ is ] the most effective [ agency ] Most effective [ means ] exceedingly effective ; that is to say (*atyarthah*) the most efficient [ or principal ] cause

१ निरासः । ज्ञातविषय ज्ञान स्मृति । २ साधकतम कारणम् ।

ननु सार्धक कारणमिति पर्यायस्तदं न ज्ञायते किं तत् कारण-  
मिति । उच्यते । यस्य कार्यात् पूर्वभावो नियतोऽनन्यथासिद्धश्च  
तत् कारणम् । यथा तन्तुवेमादिकं पटस्य । यद्यपि पटोत्पत्तौ  
देवादागतस्य रासभादे पूर्वभावो विद्यते तथापि नास्ती नियतः ।  
तन्तुरूपस्य तु नियत पूर्वभावोऽस्त्येव किंत्वन्यथासिद्ध पटरूपजननो-  
पक्षीणत्वात् । पटं प्रत्यपि कारणत्वे कल्पनागौरवप्रसंगात् ।

तेनानन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्वभावित्वं कारणत्वम् । अनन्यथासिद्ध-  
नियतपश्चाद्भावित्वं कार्यत्वम् ।

१२ यत्तु कश्चिदाह कार्यानुकृतान्प्रयव्यतिरेकित्वं कारणत्वमिति

I say *adhaka* [effective] and *karana* [cause] [are but] synonyms and it is not yet known what that 'cause' is. We reply—That whose antecedent existence to the effect [is] invariable and not established [or proved] to be otherwise [that is, for another purpose than that of producing the effect] [is] the Cause—as for instance, threads loom etc [that are the cause] of cloth. Even though, in the case of the production of cloth, there does exist the antecedent existence of a donkey etc come [there] by chance, yet that [antecedent existence is] not invariable [hence, a donkey and other things can not be regarded as the cause of cloth]. There does indeed obtain the invariable antecedent existence of the thread-colour but [that is] proved to be [there] for another purpose, owing to [its] being exhausted in producing the colour of the cloth, [in regarding the thread colour] as the cause of cloth also there would arise the undesirable contingency of a complicated assumption.

Therefore, the state of being a cause [is] the state of being an invariable antecedent not proved to be [there] otherwise [or for another purpose], the state of being the effect [is] the state of invariably following [the cause] and not proved [to have come into existence] otherwise [that is, through another cause].

As regards what some one contends [viz] the state of being a cause [is] the state of having the presence and

## समवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

तदयुक्तम् । नित्यविभूनां व्योमादीनां कालतो देशतश्च व्यतिरेकासम्भवे  
नाकारणत्वप्रसंगात् ॥ ६ ॥

समवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

तद्य कारण त्रिविधम् । समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । तद्य  
यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत् समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तव पटस्य  
समवायिकारणम् । यतस्तन्तुष्वेव पटः समवेतो जायते न तुर्यादिषु ।

नतु तन्तुसंबन्ध इय तुर्यादिसंबन्धाऽपि पटस्य विद्यते तत् कथं  
तन्तुष्वेव पटः समवेतो जायते न तुर्यादिषु । सत्यम् । द्विविधं संबन्धं  
संयोगः समवायश्चेति । तत्रायुतसिद्धयो संबन्धं समवाय । अन्य  
योस्तु संयोग एव ॥ ७ ॥

absence [of a thing] corresponding to [the presence and  
absence of] the effect, that [is] improper, for [if the above  
view is accepted] owing to the impossibility of [their] absence  
in point of time and space eternal and all-pervading [things  
like] ether and others, could not be a cause, which is an un-  
desirable contingency

(7) That cause again [is] of three-kinds on account of the  
distinction of Intimate [or Material or Constituent or Substan-  
tial or Inherent] Non-intimate [or Non-constituent] and  
Instrumental [or Efficient] Of these (*tatra*) Intimate cause  
[is] that in inseparable [or intimate or inherent] relation with  
which an effect is produced as for instance, threads [are] the  
intimate cause of [a piece of] cloth, for cloth is produced  
in intimate relation with the threads alone [and] not in  
[intimate relation with] shuttle and others

I say, there does exist, like the connection with the  
threads, a connection also with the shuttle and others of the  
cloth, then how is the cloth produced in intimate relation  
with the threads alone [and] not in [intimate relation with]  
the shuttle and others? Right [in a sense is your state-  
ment] Connection [is] two fold—Conjunction and Inherence  
Of these, the connection of two [things that are] known to be  
never dissociated or separated [or joined, that is, which are  
permanently connected] [is] Inherence, that again between  
other two [things is] simple Conjunction

‘ अयुतसिद्धौ कौ ’ इति निरूपणम् ।

कौ पुनरयुतसिद्धौ । ययोर्मध्ये एकमविनश्यद<sup>१</sup>पराश्रितमेवावतिप्रते  
तावयुतसिद्धौ । तदुक्तम् ।

तावेवायुतसिद्धौ द्वौ विज्ञातव्यौ ययोर्द्रव्यो ।

अविनश्यदेकमपराश्रितमेवावतिप्रते ॥

६ यथा अवयवावयविनीं गुणगुणिनीं क्रियाक्रियावन्तो जातिव्यक्ती  
विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चति । अवयव्यादयो हि यथाममवयवाद्याश्रिता  
एवावतिप्रन्तेऽविनश्यन्त । विनश्यदवस्थास्त्वनाश्रिता एवावतिप्रन्ते ।

७ यथा तन्तुनाशे सति पट । यथा वा आश्रयनाशे सति गुण ।  
विनश्यत्ता तु विनाशकारणसामग्रीसानिध्यम् ।

तन्तुपटावप्यवयवावयविनीं । तेन तयोः संबन्ध समवायोऽयुत

( 8 ) Which again {are} the two {things which are} known to be never dissociated ? Those [two things are] known to be never dissociated [or are permanently connected] between which two the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other As [ it ] is said—

Those two [ things ] alone should be understood to be Ayutasiddha between which two the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other

Thus—parts and the whole quality and the qualified or substratum action and [ its ] possessor class-characteristic and individual and particularity and eternal substance For the whole etc as long as they are not destroyed continue to be just dependent upon the parts etc in order [ or respectively ] But [ when they are ] in the state of being destroyed, [ they ] remain just not resorting to anything as for instance, the cloth [ does not remain resorting to anything ] when there is the destruction of the threads or the quality when there is the destruction of [ its ] substratum. The state of being destroyed again [ means ] the presence of the totality of causes of [ that is conducive to ] destruction

Threads and cloth again [ are in the relation of ] parts and the whole Hence the connection between them {is} in herence owing to [ their ] being known to be not dissociated .

सिद्धत्वात् । तुरीपटयोस्तु न समवायोऽयुतसिद्धत्वाभावात् । न हि १२  
 तुरी पटाश्रितैवावतिष्ठते नापि पटस्तुर्याश्रितोऽनस्तयो सन्नः  
 संयोग एव ।

तदेवं तन्तुसमवेत पटः । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत् समवायि- १५  
 कारणम् । अतस्तन्तुरेव समवायिकारणं पटस्य न तु तुर्यादिः । पटश्च  
 स्वगतरूपादेः समवायिकारणम् । एव सृत्पिण्डोऽपि घटस्य समवायि  
 कारणम् । घटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः ॥ ८ ॥ १८

‘घटः स्वगतरूपादेः समवायिकारणम्’ इति सिद्धान्तप्रस्थापनम् ।

ननु यदेव घटादयो जायन्ते तदेव तद्गतरूपादयोऽपि । अतः  
 समानकालीनत्वाद् गुणगुणिनाः सद्येनरगोविपाणयत् कार्यकारणभावः ३

[that] between the shuttle and cloth on the other hand ( *tu* ),  
 [is] not inherence, owing to the absence of the state of being  
 known to be not dissociated. Not indeed does the shuttle  
 remain resorting to the cloth alone nor the cloth, for the  
 matter of that, resorting to the shuttle [alone], ‘hence  
 the connection between them [is] conjunction alone [pure  
 and simple]

Therefore thus the cloth is in intimate relation with the  
 threads. Intimate cause [is] that in inseparable [or inti-  
 mate, or inherent] relation with which an effect is produ-  
 ced. Hence the thread alone [is] the intimate cause of  
 cloth, and not the shuttle etc. And the cloth [is] the intimate  
 cause of colour etc., belonging to itself. Likewise the clod  
 of earth [or clay] also [is] the intimate cause of the jar,  
 and the jar, of the colour etc. belonging to itself.

(१) I say [says the objector]—When indeed the jar  
 and others are produced, at the same time are produced also  
 colour etc. belonging to them. Therefore, owing to the  
 quality and [its] possessor being contemporaneous, there  
 exists not [between them] the relation of cause and effect  
 itself, as between the right and left horn of a cow, owing  
 to the absence of the relation of priority and posteriority.  
 Hence, the jar and others [are] not the intimate cause of  
 colour etc. belonging to them, owing to the intimate cause

एव नास्ति पौर्वाप्याभावात् । अतो न समवायिकारणं घटादयः स्वगत-  
रूपादीनाम् । कारणविशेषत्वात् समवायिकारणस्य ।

६ अत्रोच्यते । न तावद् गुणगुणिनो समानकालीन जन्म । किंतु द्रव्य  
निर्गुणमेव प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चात् तत्समवेता गुणा उत्पद्यन्ते । समान  
कालोत्पत्तौ तु गुणगुणिनाः समानसामग्रीकत्वाद् भेदा न स्यात् ।

७ कारणभेदनियतत्वात् कार्यभेदस्य । तस्मात् प्रथमे क्षणे निर्गुण एव  
घटो गुणेभ्य पूर्वभावीति भवति गुणाना समवायिकारणम् । तदा  
कारणभेदाऽप्यस्ति । घटो हि घट प्रति न कारणमेकस्येव पौर्वा

१२ पर्याभावात् । न हि स एव तमेव प्रति पूर्वभावी पश्चाद्भावी च ।  
स्वगुणान् प्रति तु पूर्वभावित्वाद्भवति गुणाना समवायिकारणम् ।

being [ only ] a particular cause [ and the rule of *paurva-*  
*parya* necessarily holding good in the case of a particular  
cause as in the case of a cause in general ]

To this we reply To begin with (*tāvat*) the production  
of the quality and [its] possessor [is] not contemporaneous but  
a substance void of qualities alone is first produced, [ and ]  
afterwards the qualities inherent in it are produced But if  
they [the quality and its possessor] were produced at the same  
time [ or contemporaneously ], there would be no difference  
between the quality and its possessor, owing to the sameness  
of the totality of the causal agencies (*sāmigrī*), for the differ-  
ence between effects is determined invariably by the differ-  
ence between causes. Therefore, the jar just void of qualities  
at the first moment becomes the intimate cause of qualities  
because it exists prior to the qualities And in this way  
(*tadū*) there would exist also the difference between the  
causes [ The objector now suggests that there need not still  
be *kāranabheda* he is prepared to admit that *ghata* is the  
intimate cause of its qualities, perhaps *ghata* may still be  
its own cause as well ] To this the siddhāntin replies ]  
The jar, for the matter of that (*hu*) [ is ] not the cause with  
reference to the jar owing to the absence of the relation of  
priority and posteriority in one and the same [object] Not  
surely [ can ] the same [ jar ] be existing before and existing  
after itself Owing to [ its ] existing before its qualities  
however, [ it ] becomes the intimate cause of [its] qualities



• नन्येवं सति प्रथमे क्षणे घटोऽचाक्षुष स्यादरूपिद्रव्यत्वाद् वायुवत् । तदेव हि द्रव्यं चाक्षुष यन्महत्त्वे सत्युद्भूतरूपवत् । अद्रव्यं च स्यात् १५ गुणाश्रयत्वाभावात् । गुणाश्रयां द्रव्यमिति हि द्रव्यलक्षणम् । सत्यम् । प्रथमे क्षणे परमसूक्ष्मो घटो यदि चक्षुषा न गृह्यते तदा कानो हानि । नहि सगुणीत्पत्तिवक्षेऽपि निमेषावसरे घटो गृह्यते । तेन व्यवस्थितमेत १८ त्तिर्गुण एव प्रथमं घट उत्पद्यते द्वितीयादिकक्षणेपु चक्षुषा गृह्यते । न च प्रथमे क्षणे गुणाश्रयत्वाभावादद्रव्यत्वापत्ति । समवायिकारण द्रव्यमिति द्रव्यलक्षणयोनात् । चोत्पद्यता गुणाश्रयत्वाच्च । दाम्येता च २५ गुणात्यन्ताभावाभाव ॥ ९ ॥

असमवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

असमवायिकारण तद्गृह्यते । यत् समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नमदधृत

I say,—such being the case the jar at the first moment would be invisible owing to its being [at that time] a substance void of colour, like air For, that substance alone [is] visible, which [is] possessed of a developed colour, the dimension being large And further [the jar] would be no substance, owing to the absence of being a substratum of qualities Substance [is] the substratum of qualities—this [is] the definition of a substance [The siddhantin replies]—True [what you say] [But] if the jar at the first moment being extremely subtle, is not apprehended by the eye, what then [is] the loss for us? Not indeed, even according to the theory of the production [of the jar] with qualities, is the jar apprehended in the time of the winking of the eye So [it is] well established that the jar just void of qualities is first produced [and] apprehended by the eye during the second and following moments Again, there would not be the [undesirable] consequence that [the jar] on account of the absence of being a substratum of qualities at the first moment would be no substance, owing to the application of the [following] definition of a substance—substance [is] an intimate cause, and further (ca) owing to [its] being a substratum of qualities, on account of [its] capability [of being such] Capability again [is] the absence of the absolute negation of qualities

(10) Now the Non intimate cause is explained Non-

१ निमेषावसरे । २ गुणाश्रयत्वं गुणात्यन्ताभावानपि कथयत्यम् ।

- ३ सामर्थ्यं तद्वसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणम् । तन्तुसंयोगस्य गुणस्य पटसमवायिकारणेषु तन्तुषु गुणिषु समवेतत्वेन समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्व  
६ भावित्वेन पटं प्राति कारणत्वाच्च ।

एवं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणम् ।

- ननु पटरूपस्य पट समवायिकारणम् । तेन तद्गतस्यैव कस्य-  
५ चिद्धर्मस्य पटरूपं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणत्वमुचितम् । तस्यैव समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् । न तन्तुरूपस्य । तस्य समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्न्यभावात् । मैवम् । तत्समवायिकारणसमवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नस्यापि परंपर्या समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

निमित्तकारणनिरूपणम् ।

√

निमित्तकारणं तदुच्यते । यन्न समवायिकारणं नाप्यसमवायिकार-

intimate cause [is] that which is proximate to the intimate cause and whose [causal] capacity is ascertained [or established], as for instance, the conjunction of the threads [is] the non-intimate cause of the cloth, for the quality, the conjunction of threads, being in intimate relation with the threads, the possessors of the quality, [and] the intimate causes of the cloth, is proximate to the intimate cause, and is the cause with reference to the cloth, being invariably antecedent [to it], and not known to be [there] for another purpose

Likewise, the colour of the threads [is] the non-intimate cause of the colour of the cloth

I say, [says the objector] the cloth [is] the intimate cause of the colour belonging to the cloth, hence it is proper that some quality belonging to itself [that is, to the cloth], should be the non-intimate cause with reference to the colour of the cloth, for that alone is proximate to the intimate cause, [and] not the colour of the threads, that being not proximate to the intimate cause [Do] not [say] so That which is proximate to the intimate cause of the intimate cause of that [effect] is also indirectly proximate to the intimate cause

( 11 ) Instrumental cause is now explained — Instrumental cause [is] that which is neither the intimate cause, nor again the non intimate cause and yet [is] a cause, as for

० णमथ च कारण तन्निमित्तकारणम् । यथा वेमादिकं पटस्य निमित्त  
कारणम् ॥ ११ ॥

अभावस्य निमित्तमात्र कारणम् ।

तदेतद्भावानामेव त्रिविधं कारणम् । अभावस्य तु निमित्तमात्रं तस्य  
कचिदप्यसमवायात् । समवायस्य तु भावद्वयधर्मत्वात् ॥ १२ ॥

‘अनधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणम्’ इत्यस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य स्पष्टनम् ।

इन्द्रियसयोगादि प्रमाण न प्रमाणादि ।

तदेतस्य त्रिविधस्य कारणस्य मध्ये यदेव कथमपि सातिशयं तदेव  
करणम् । तेन व्यवस्थितमेतल्लक्षणं प्रमाकरण प्रमाणमिति ।

यत्नधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणमिति लक्षणम् तत्र । एकस्मिन्नेव घटे  
घटोऽयं घटोऽयमिति धारावाहिकज्ञानानां गृहीतग्राहिणामप्रामाण्य-  
प्रसंगात् ।

न चान्यान्यक्षणादिशिष्टविषयीकरणादनाधिगतार्थगन्तुता । प्रत्यक्षेण

instance the shuttle etc [ are ] the instrumental cause of the  
cloth.

( 12 ) Now this three fold cause belongs to positive  
things [ or entities ] only As for negation [ or absence ] it  
has only the instrumental [ cause ], for there cannot be inti-  
mate relation of it anywhere, intimate relation again being  
a property of two positive things

( 13 ) Whatever [ cause is ] in some way pre eminent  
amongst these three fold causes [ is ] itself the instrument  
Hence well-established [ is ] this definition—Proof [ is ] the in-  
strument of right cognition

As regards the definition—Proof [ is ] that which makes  
known an object not known before, it [ is ] not [ right ] [ For if  
this definition is regarded as correct ], serial [ or continuous ]  
cognitions in the form ‘this [ is ] a jar, ‘this [ is ] a jar’ with refer-  
ence to one and the same jar, which apprehend something al-  
ready apprehended, would not be right knowledge, which is  
undesirable

Neither [ can ] the character of making known what  
is not known before [ be said to exist in each of the

- १ सूक्ष्मकालभेदानाफलनात् । फालभेदमहं हि क्रियादिसंयोगान्तानां चतुर्णां योगपद्याभिमानो न स्यात् । क्रिया क्रियातो विभागो विभागात् पूर्वसंयोगनाशस्ततोत्तरसंयोगोत्पत्तिरिति ।
- १२ ननु प्रमाया कारणानि यत्नि सन्ति प्रमावृत्तमेयार्थानि तान्व्यपि किं करणानि उत नेति । उच्यते । सत्यपि प्रमातरि प्रमेय च प्रमानुत्पत्तं इन्द्रियसंयोगादीं सत्याविलम्बेन प्रमोत्पत्ते इन्द्रियसंयोगादिर्य
- १३ करणम् <sup>प्रमाया</sup> साधकत्वादिशेषोपपत्त्यनेनैवोत्कर्षणास्य प्रमात्रादिभ्योऽतिशयितत्वात् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतमम् तदेऽकरणमित्युक्तम् । अत इन्द्रियसंयोगादिर्य प्रमाकरणत्वात् प्रमाणं न प्रमात्रादि ॥ १३ ॥

above serial cognitions ] on the ground of referring to objects characterised by different moments successively for the comprehension of minute divisions of time [ such as a moment ] can not be had by direct perception. If [ it were supposed that ] there is the comprehension of [ the minute ] divisions of time, then there would not arise the apparent conception about the simultaneity of the four [ actions ] beginning with motion and ending with conjunction, namely, motion, disjunction through motion, destruction of the former conjunction through disjunction, and then the production of the second [ or new ] conjunction

- I say [ says the objector ] there are many causes of right cognition, the knower, the object of knowledge etc [ are ] they also the instruments or not ? We reply — Even though the knower and the object of knowledge are present, there does not arise right cognition, [ while ] when there is the conjunction etc of the organ of sense [ with the object ], right cognition arises without delay, [ hence it follows that ] only the conjunction of organ of sense etc [ is ] the instrument for though the character of being the cause is the same [ in the case of Pramātr Prameya etc ] this [ Indriyasanyoga ] has superiority over the knower etc, on account of this very pre-eminence [ viz producing right knowledge without delay ] [ What is ] pre-eminently effective [ is ] most effective [ and ] that same has been termed the instrument Hence the conjunction of the sense organ etc [ is ] owing to [ its ] being the most effective cause of right knowledge the proof [ or means of right knowledge and ] not the knower [ or cognising agent ] etc

प्रमाणचतुष्टयम् ।

तानि च प्रमाणानि चत्वारि । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । प्रत्यक्षानुमानो-  
पमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति ॥ १४ ॥

प्रत्यक्षम् ।

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणनिरूपणम् । कदा इन्द्रिय करणम् कदा इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः  
करणम् कदा ज्ञान करणम् इति विचारः ।

किं पुनः प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्कारिप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्का-  
रिणो च प्रमा सर्वोच्यते येन्द्रियज्ञा । सा च द्विविधा सविकल्पकानि  
विकल्पकभेदात् । तस्याः करणं त्रिविधम् । कदाचिद्दिन्द्रियम् कदा च  
चिदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षं कदाचिज्ज्ञानम् ।

कदा पुनरिन्द्रिय करणम् । यदा निर्विकल्पकरूपा प्रमा फलम्  
तदैन्द्रियं करणम् । तथाहि । आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेण  
इन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियाणां वस्तुप्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् । ततोऽर्थ

( 14 ) And those proofs [are] four And to the same effect  
the Nyayasutra [ I 1 3 ] Perception, Inference, Analogy,  
and Word [ or Testimony ] [ are ] the proofs

( 15 ) What again [ is ] Perception ? Perception [ is ]  
the instrument of direct ( *saksatkari* ) right cognition, and  
that alone is called direct right cognition which is produ-  
ced by a sense-organ. It [ is ] again two fold, owing to the  
distinction of determinate [ or concrete ] and non-determinate  
[ or undifferentiated or abstract ] Its instrument [ is ] three-  
fold, sometimes an organ of sense, sometimes the contact  
between sense-organ and object, [ and ] sometimes cognition

When again [ is ] a sense-organ the instrument ? When  
right cognition of the form of non-determinate ( knowledge )  
[ is ] the effect, then a sense-organ [ is ] the instrument  
To explain ( *tathāhi* )—The soul is brought into contact  
with the mind, the mind with the sense organ, the  
sense-organ with the object, it being a rule that the  
sense-organs produce cognition [ or illumination ] after

संनिकृष्टेनेन्द्रियेण निर्विकल्पक नामजात्यादियोजनाहीन वस्तुमा-  
 १२ त्रावगाहि किंचिदिदमिति ज्ञानं जन्यते । तस्य ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियं करणं  
 छिदाया इय परशुः । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोऽग्रान्तरव्यापारः छिदाक  
 रणस्य परशोरिद्य दारुसंयोगः । निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं फलं परशोरिद्य  
 १५ छिदा ।

कदा पुनरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं करणम् । यदा निर्विकल्पकानन्तर  
 सविकल्पकं नामजात्यादियोजनात्मकं द्वित्योऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं इयामो-  
 १० ऽयमिति विशेषणविशेष्यावगाहि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः  
 करणम् । निर्विकल्पकज्ञानमवान्तरव्यापारः । सविकल्पकं ज्ञानं  
 फलम् ।

२१ कदा पुनर्ज्ञानं करणम् । यदोक्तसविकल्पकानन्तरं हानोपादानो-

having come into contact with [or reached] the thing. Then by the sense-organ coming in contact with the object is generated a cognition non-determinate, [which is] void of the connection with name, genus, [quality, action] etc, which comprises the thing alone, [and] having the form (it) 'this [is] something'. Of that cognition [is] the sense-organ the instrument, as of the cutting, the axe the contact between the sense-organ and object the intervening operation, as the conjunction of the wood and the axe [which is] the instrument of cutting, the non-determinate cognition [is] the effect, as the cutting, of the axe.

When again [is] the contact between the sense organ and object, the instrument? When after the non-determinate [cognition] is generated the determinate cognition embracing a connection with name, genus etc [and] comprising [the idea of] the qualification and the qualified, [and] having the form 'this [is] Dittha,' 'this [is] a Brahmana this [is] dark-coloured,' then the contact between the sense-organ and object [is] the instrument the non-determinate cognition the intervening operation, [and] the determinate cognition the effect.

When again [is] the cognition the instrument? When after the determinate [cognition] spoken of [above] are genera

पेशाबुद्धयो जायन्ते तदा निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं करणम् । सविकल्पक  
ज्ञानमपान्तरव्यापारः । हानादिवुद्धयः फलम् ।<sup>१</sup>

२४

अत्र कश्चिदाह । सविकल्पकादीनामपीन्द्रियमेव करणम् । यावन्ति  
त्वान्तरालिकानि संनिकर्षादीनि तानि सर्वाण्यथान्तरव्यापार इति  
॥ ६५ ॥

२७

पञ्चविध, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष ।

इन्द्रियार्थयोस्तु य- संनिकर्ष' साक्षात्कारिप्रसहेतुः स पाद्विध एव ।  
तत्रथा । संयोग संयुक्तसमवाय संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय- समवाय'<sup>३</sup>  
समवेतसमवायो विशेष्यविशेषणभावश्चेति ।

तत्र यदा चक्षुषा घटविषयं ज्ञान जन्यते तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं  
घटोऽर्थ । अनयो संनिकर्ष संयोग एवायुतसिद्धयभावात् । एव<sup>६</sup>

ted notions about rejection acceptance or indifference, then  
non-determinate cognition [ is ] the instrument determinate  
cognition the intervening operation, notions about rejection  
etc the effect

In this connection somebody says—The sense-organ it  
self [is] the instrument also of the determinate [ notion ] etc  
Whatsoever [ are ] the intervening contacts etc they [ are ]  
all the intervening operation

( 16 ) The contact of the sense-organ and object, which  
[is] the cause of direct right cognition [is] six-fold only, it [is]  
as follows Conjunction Intimate relation with what is in  
conjunction, Intimate relation with what is intimately  
associated with what is in conjunction Intimate relation  
Intimate relation with what is intimately related and the  
Relation of qualification and the qualified

Of these, when by the eye is generated cognition having  
the jar for [its] object, then the eye [is] the sense-organ [and]  
the jar the object the contact of these two [is] only conjunc-  
tion, owing to the absence of not being known to be separa-  
ted Likewise, when by the mind, the internal sense organ,

१ तज्ज्ञ-रस्तज्ज्ञ-वजनो-ज्ञानान्तरव्यापार । यथा कुटारजन्म कुटारदाहनयोगे  
कुटारजन्मशुद्धिदानवत् ।

मनसान्तरेणेन्द्रियेण यदात्मविषयकं ज्ञानं जन्यतेऽहमिति तदा मन  
इन्द्रियम् आत्मा अर्थः । अनयो संनिकर्षः संयोग एव ।

- १ कदा पुनः संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुरादिना घटगत-  
रूपादिकं गृह्यते घटे इयामं रूपमस्तीति तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं घटरूपमर्थः ।  
अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयुक्तसमवाय एव । चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य  
१२ समवायात् । एवं मनसात्मसमवेते सुखादौ गृह्यमाणे अयमयं  
संनिकर्षः ।

घटगतपरिमाणादिप्रहे चतुष्टयसंनिकर्षोऽप्यधिकं कारणमिष्यते ।

- १५ सत्यपि संयुक्तसमवाये तदभावे दूरे परिमाणाद्यग्रहणात् । चतुष्टय-  
संनिकर्षो यथा । इन्द्रियावयवैरर्थावयवानाम् इन्द्रियावयविविनाशार्थव

is generated cognition with regard to the soul [ or, having the soul for its object ], having the form ' I ', then the mind [ is ] the sense-organ, the soul the object, the contact of these two [ is ] only conjunction.

When again [ is ] the contact, intimate relation with what is in conjunction ? When by the eye etc, is apprehended colour etc, belonging to the jar, in the form ' There is dark colour about the jar ', then the eye [ is ] the sense-organ, the colour of the jar, the object, the contact of these two [ is ] just intimate relation with what is in conjunction, owing to the colour being in intimate relation with the jar that is in conjunction with the eye. Likewise, when by the mind are being apprehended pleasure etc that are in intimate relation with the soul, there [ is ] this very contact.

In the case of the apprehension of the dimension etc. belonging to the jar, a four fold contact is desired as a further cause, for, even though the [ contact of ] intimate relation with what is in conjunction be there, in the absence of that [ four fold contact ], there is the non-apprehension of the dimension etc from a distance. The four-fold contact [ is ] as follows—contact of the [ constituent ] parts of the object with the parts of the sense-organ, of the object as a whole with the sense-organ as a whole, of the



यदिनः इन्द्रियावयवैरर्थावयविनः इन्द्रियावयविनार्थोवयवानां संनिकर्ष इति ।

कदा पुनः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय संनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुषा घट-  
रूपसमवेतं रूपत्वादिसामान्यं गृह्यते तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं रूपत्वादिसा-  
मान्यमर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय एव । यतश्चक्षु- २१  
सयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवाय ।

कदा पुनः समवायः संनिकर्षः । यदा श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण शब्दो गृह्यते  
तदा श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं शब्दोऽर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः समवाय एव । २  
श्रोत्रस्याकाशात्मकत्वाच्छब्दस्य चाकाशगुणत्वाद् गुणगुणिनोश्च  
समवायात् । ८

कदा पुनः समवेतसमवाय संनिकर्षः । यदा शब्दसमवेत शब्दत्वादि- २०  
सामान्यं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यते तदा श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं शब्दत्वादिसामान्य-

object as a whole with the parts of the sense-organ [and]  
of the parts of the object with the sense organ as a whole

When again [is] the contact intimate relation with what  
is intimately associated with what is in conjunction?  
When by the eye is apprehended the generality, colourness  
etc. in intimate relation with the colour of the jar, then the  
eye [is] the sense-organ the generality colourness etc. the  
object, the contact between these two [is] just intimate rela-  
tion with what is intimately associated with what is in  
conjunction. For, the colour is in intimate relation with  
the jar which is in conjunction with the eye, and colour-  
ness has intimate relation with it [that is, the colour]

When again [is] intimate relation the contact? When  
by the organ of hearing is apprehended sound, then the ear  
[is] the sense-organ, sound the object the contact between these  
two [is] just intimate relation. For, the ear [is] constituted of  
the ether and sound is a quality of the ether and there  
is intimate relation between the quality and [its] possessor

When again [is] the contact, intimate relation with  
what is intimately related? When by the organ of hearing

मर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः समवेतसमवाय एव । श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे-

३० शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् ।

कदा पुनर्विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुषा  
संयुक्ते भूतले घटाद्यभावो गृह्यते इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति तदा विशे-  
३३ षणविशेष्यभावः संबन्धः । तदा चक्षु संयुक्तस्य भूतलस्य घटाद्यभावो  
विशेषणम् । 'यदा च मन संयुक्ते आत्मानि सुखाद्यभावो गृह्यतेऽहं सुखं-  
रहित इति तदा मन संयुक्तस्यात्मनः सुखाद्यभावो विशेषणम् । यदा  
३६ श्रोत्रसमवेते गकारे घत्वाभावो गृह्यते घत्वरहितो गकार इति तदा  
श्रोत्रसमवेतस्य गकारस्य घत्वाभावो विशेषणम् ।

तदेव संक्षेपत पञ्चविधसंबन्धान्यतमसंबन्धसद्वद्विशेषणविशे-

is apprehended the generality sound-ness etc in intimate relation with sound, then the ear [is] the sense-organ, the generality sound-ness etc the object. The contact between these two [is] just intimate relation with what is intimately related, owing to sound-ness being in intimate relation with sound which is in intimate relation with the ear.

When again [is] the contact between the sense-organ and object, the relation of the qualification and the qualified? When the absence of the jar etc., is apprehended on the ground in conjunction with the eye, in the form 'there is no jar here on the ground', then [there is] the contact, the relation of the qualification and the qualified. Then the absence of the jar etc [is] the qualification of the ground in conjunction with the eye. And when the absence of pleasure etc is apprehended in the soul in conjunction with the mind, in the form 'I [am] void of pleasure,' then the absence of pleasure etc [is] the qualification of the soul in conjunction with the mind. When the absence of gha-ness is apprehended in the ga-sound in intimate relation with the ear, in the form 'the ga-sound [is] void of gha-ness', then the absence of gha-ness [is] the qualification of the ga-sound in intimate relation with the ear.

Thus, in short, absence [or negation] is apprehended by the sense-organ through the contact of the sense-organ and

व्यभावलक्षणेनेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेणाभाव इन्द्रियेण गृह्यते ।

३१

एवं समवायोऽपि । चक्षुःसंबन्धस्य तन्तोर्विशेषणमृतः पटसमवायो गृह्यत इह तन्तुषु पटसमवाय इति ।

तदेवं षोढा संनिकर्षा वर्णितः । संप्रहृद्य ।

४२

अक्षजा प्रभितिर्द्वेषा सविकल्पाविकल्पिका ।

करणं त्रिविधं तस्याः सनिकर्षन्तु षड्विधं ॥

षट्तन्तुलीलनीलत्वशब्दशब्दत्वजातयः ।

४५

अभावसमवायो च ग्राह्याः सवन्धपदकतः ॥ १६ ॥

सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्षम् इति प्रस्थापनम् ।

ननु निर्विकल्पक परमार्थसत् स्वलक्षणविषय भवतु प्रत्यक्षम् ।

सविकल्पकं तु शब्दलिङ्गवदनुगताकारावगाहित्वात् सामान्यविषयं ,

object, characterised by the relation of the qualification and the qualified, based upon any one relation of the five kinds of relation [ mentioned above ]

Likewise [ is apprehended ] intimate relation also The intimate relation of the cloth in the form of a qualification, with the threads in conjunction with the eye is apprehended, in the form ' There [ is ] here in the threads the intimate relation of the cloth

Thus then [ is ] described the contact in six ways And [ there is ] the summing up [ as follows ]—

The cognition arising through the sense organs [ is ] two-fold, determinate and non determinate, its instrument [ is ] three fold and the contact [ is ] six fold

The jar, its blue [ colour ], [ the genus ] blue ness, sound, the genus sound ness, absence and intimate relation are to be apprehended through the six fold contact

( 17 ) I say [ says the objector ]—The non-determinate [ cognition ], referring as it does to an individualised object ( *svalakṣaṇam* ) which really exists may be [ regarded as ] sense perception determinate [ cognition ] on the other hand refer. to generality, comprising as

लिङ्गम् । यथा धूमोऽग्नेर्लिङ्गम् । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साह-  
चर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः । तस्या मृहीतायामेव धूमोऽग्निं गमयति ।  
अतो व्याप्तिलक्षणेनाग्न्यनुमापकत्वाद् धूमोऽग्नेर्लिङ्गम् । तस्य तृतीयं ज्ञानं  
लिङ्गपरामर्शः । तथाहि । प्रथमं तावन्महानसादौ भूयो भूयो धूमं पश्यन्  
वर्हिं पश्यति । तेन भूयोदर्शनेन धूमाग्न्योः स्वाभाविकं संबन्धमवधार  
यति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

यद्यपि यत्र यत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वं तत्र तत्र इयामत्यमयीति भूयोदर्शनं  
समानमवगम्यते तथापि मैत्रीतनयत्वइयामत्ययोर्न स्वाभाविकं संबन्ध  
कित्वापाधिक एव । शाकाद्यन्नपरिणामस्योपाधेर्विद्यमानत्वात् । तथाहि ।  
इयामत्ये मैत्रीतनयत्वं न प्रयोजकं किंतु शाकाद्यन्नपरिणामिभेद एव

atory mark [is that] which makes one comprehend an  
object by virtue of the invariable concomitance as for in-  
stance, smoke [is] the indicative mark of fire To explain —  
Where [there is] smoke there [is] fire this companionship  
as a rule [is] the invariable concomitance Only when that  
[vyapti] is apprehended the smoke brings about the know-  
ledge of the fire So the smoke [is] the indicative mark of  
the fire, as it brings about the inference of fire, by virtue of  
the invariable concomitance Its third cognition [is] the  
consideration of the indicative mark To explain —First,  
to start with, one seeing smoke again and again in the  
kitchen etc., sees [at the same time] fire by that frequent  
[or repeated] observation does one ascertain the natural  
connection between smoke and fire in the form 'where  
[there is] smoke, there [is] fire

Even though repeated observation in the form wherever  
[there is] the state of Maitri's son, there [is] also blackness'  
can be experienced in the same way [as in where there is  
smoke, there is fire] still [there is] no natural relation bet-  
ween the state of Maitri's son and blackness but only ad-  
ventitious [or 'accidental] owing to the existence of the  
limitation [or condition, *upadhi* viz] the effect [or diges-  
tion] of food such as vegetables etc To explain —Being  
Maitri's son [is] not the producing factor for blackness but  
the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc., alone [is]

कथं प्रत्यक्षम् । अर्थजस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अर्थस्य च परमार्थसत् एव  
तदजनकत्वात् । स्वलक्षणं तु परमार्थसत् । न तु सामान्यम् । तस्य  
६ प्रमाणनिरस्तविधिभावस्यान्यव्यावृत्त्यात्मनस्तच्छ्रुत्वात् । मैवम् ।  
सामान्यस्यापि वस्तुभूतत्वात् ।

तदेव व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १७ ॥

अनुमानम् ।

लिङ्गपरामर्श ( धूमस्य हेतोर् वृत्तिय ज्ञानम् ) अनुमानम् ।

३ अथ अनुमानं निरूप्यते । लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् । येन ह्यनुमीयते  
तदनुमानम् । लिङ्गपरामर्शन चानुमीयतेऽतो लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ।  
तच्च धूमादिज्ञानम् अनुमितिं प्रति करणत्वात् । अग्न्यादिज्ञानमनु  
६ मितिः । तत्करणं धूमादिज्ञानम् ।

किं पुनर्लिङ्गं कश्च तस्य परामर्शः । उच्यते । व्याप्तिवलेनार्थगमक

it does forms found in several objects ( *anugata* ), like word and inferential reason, how [ can ] it [ be ] sense perception ? [ The cognition ] produced by the object alone is perception, an object too produces [ it ] only when it really exists. An individualised object again [ is ] one that really exists but not the generality, because with its positive existence refuted by [ all ] proofs, it is unsubstantial, owing to its having the form of the exclusion of others [ Do ] not [ say ] so. The generality also has the nature of an object.

Thus then has been explained Perception

( 18 ) Now is expounded Inference. Inference [ is ] the consideration of the indicatory mark. That [ is ] inference by means of which [ something ] is inferred [ Something ] is inferred by means of the consideration of the indicatory mark. Therefore consideration of the indicatory mark [ is ] inference, and it [ is ] the knowledge of smoke etc., being the instrument with reference to inferential cognition. The knowledge of fire etc., [ is ] the inferential cognition, [ and ] the instrument thereof [ is ] the knowledge of smoke etc.

What again [ is ] the indicatory mark ( *lingam* ) and what its consideration ( *paramarsah* ) ? We reply. The indica-

दिणा प्रत्यक्षेणैव धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तिरवधार्यते । तेन धूमाग्नयोः स्वाभाविक एव संबन्धः । न त्योपाधिकः । स्वाभाविकश्च संबन्धो व्याप्तिः ।

तदनेन न्यायेन धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तौ गृह्यमाणाया महानसे यद् धूमज्ञानं ३० तन् प्रथमम् । पर्वतादौ पक्षे यद् धूमज्ञानं तत् द्वितीयम् । तत् पूर्वगृहीता धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तिं स्मृत्वा १ तत्रैव पर्वते पुनर्धूम परामृशति अस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निना व्याप्तो धूम इति । तदिदं धूमज्ञानं ३३ तृतीयम् । एतच्चावश्यमेवाभ्युपेयम् । अन्यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरित्येव स्यात् । इह तु कथमाग्निना भवितव्यम् । तस्मादिहापि धूमोऽस्तीति ज्ञानमन्वेपितव्यम् । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमिति प्रति करणत्वाच्चा ३५ नुमानम् । तस्मादस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरित्यनुमितिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ५

helped by the impressions caused by repeated observation Therefore the relation between smoke and fire [is] only natural and not adventitious, and a natural relation [is termed] invariable concomitance

Thus, when according to this procedure (*nyāya*) the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is being apprehended, what knowledge of smoke in the kitchen [is produced] that [is] the First [knowledge of smoke] what knowledge of smoke on the mountain etc. the subject [of the syllogism, is produced] that [is] the Second then having remembered the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, apprehended previously, once again one considers the smoke there on the mountain itself in the form there is here on the mountain smoke invariably concomitant with fire - this knowledge of smoke then [is] [the Third and this must needs be accepted, otherwise [the ultimate cognition] would be only 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire' [On the strength of this cognition only] how could the fire for the matter of that be existing here [on the mountain]? Therefore the knowledge in the form there is smoke here too' must be searched after This same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark, and [it is] inference, as it is the instrument of inferential cognition From it is produced the knowledge, the inferential cognition in the form there is fire here on the mountain'

१ व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । २ यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निमिति ।

१८ प्रयोजकः । प्रयोजकश्चोपाधिरित्युच्यते ।

न च धूमाग्नयो संबन्धे कश्चिदुपाधिरस्ति । अस्ति चेत् योग्योऽयोग्यो वा । अयोग्यस्य शङ्कितुमशक्यत्वाद् योग्यस्य चानुपलभ्यमान

१९ त्वात् । यत्रोपाधिरस्ति तत्रोपलभ्यते । यथाग्नेर्धूमसंबन्ध आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । हिंसात्वस्य चाधर्मसाधनत्वेन सह संबन्धे निषिद्धत्वमुपाधि । मैत्रोत्तनयत्वस्य च श्यामत्वेन सह संबन्धे शाकाद्यन्नपरिणति

२० भेदः । न चेह धूमाग्निसाहचर्ये कश्चिदुपाधिरस्ति । यद्यमविष्यत् तदाऽद्रक्ष्यत् । ततो दर्शनाभावात्स्तीति तर्कसहकारिणानुपलम्भसनायेन प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपाध्यभावोऽवधार्यते । तथाच सति उपाध्यभावग्रहणज

२१ नितसंस्कारसहकृतेन भूयोदर्शनजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेन साहचर्यप्रा

the producing factor and the producing factor [which produces the particular effect] is termed the limitation [or condition]

But in [the case of] the relation between smoke and fire, there does not exist any limitation, if there is [one] is it capable of being perceived (*yogyā*) or not capable of being perceived? It is not possible to suspect [the existence of a limitation] not capable of being perceived, and [a limitation] capable of being perceived cannot be found. Where there is a limitation, there [it] is found, as for instance, in [the case of] the relation of fire with smoke, the contact with wet fuel. In [the case of] the relation of 'the act of killing' with 'the state of being the producer of demerit' prohibition [by the Sastras is] the limitation and in [the case of] the relation of 'the state of Maitri's son with blackness' the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is the limitation]. But here in [the case of] the association of smoke with fire exists not any limitation, if there had been [one] one would have seen [it]. Therefore the absence of a limitation is ascertained by perception itself accompanied by non-observation and supported by hypothetical reasoning in the form 'it does not exist as it is not seen'. And this being the case, the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is ascertained by perception itself, apprehending their association helped by the impressions produced by the apprehension of the absence of the limitation, and

हिणा प्रत्यक्षेणैव धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तिरवधार्यते । तेन धूमाग्नयोः स्वाभाविक एव संबन्धः । न त्वौपाधिकः । स्वाभाविकश्च संबन्धो व्याप्तिः ।

तदनेन न्यायेन धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तौ गृह्यमाणायां महानसे यद् धूमज्ञानं ३० तत् प्रथमम् । पर्वतादौ पक्षे यद् धूमज्ञानं तत् द्वितीयम् । ततः पूर्वमृहीतां धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तिं स्मृत्या १ तत्रेव पर्वते पुनर्धूमं परामृशति अस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निना व्याप्तौ धूम इति । तदिदं धूमज्ञानं ३१ तृतीयम् । एतच्छाश्वमेजाभ्युपेयम् । अन्यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरित्येव स्यात् । इह तु कथमग्निना भवितव्यम् । तस्मादिहापि धूमोऽस्तीति ज्ञानमन्वेपितव्यम् । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमिति प्रति करणत्वाच्चा ३२ नुमानम् । तस्मादस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरित्यनुमितिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ५

helped by the impressions caused by repeated observation  
Therefore the relation between smoke and fire [is] only  
natural and not adventitious, and a natural relation [is term-  
ed] invariable concomitance

Thus, when according to this procedure ( *nyaya* ) the in-  
variable concomitance between smoke and fire is being  
apprehended, what knowledge of smoke in the kitchen [is  
produced] that [is] the First [knowledge of smoke] what  
knowledge of smoke on the mountain etc. the subject [of  
the syllogism, is produced] that [is] the Second then having  
remembered the invariable concomitance between smoke  
and fire, apprehended previously once again one considers  
the smoke there on the mountain itself in the form 'there is  
here on the mountain smoke invariably concomitant with fire -  
this knowledge of smoke then [is] the Third and this must  
needs be accepted, otherwise [the ultimate cognition] would  
be only 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire' [On the  
strength of this cognition only] how could the fire for the  
matter of that be existing here [on the mountain]? There-  
fore the knowledge in the form 'there is smoke here too,'  
must be searched after This same [is] the consideration of the  
indicatory mark, and [it is] inference, as it is the instrument  
of inferential cognition. From it is produced the know-  
ledge, the inferential cognition in the form 'there is fire  
here on the mountain.'



ननु कथं प्रथमं महानसे यद्भूमज्ञानं तन्नाग्निमनुमापयति । सत्यम् ।

३१ व्याप्तेरगृहीतत्वाद् गृहीतायामेव व्याप्तावनुमित्युच्यते ।

अथ व्याप्तिनिश्चयोत्तरकालं महानस एवाग्निः अनुमीयताम् । मैवम् ।  
अग्नेर्दृष्टत्वेन संदेहस्यानुदयात् । संदिग्धार्थोऽनुमीयते । यथोक्तं  
२ भाष्यकृता । नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयिष्ये न्याय प्रवर्तते किंतु संदिग्धे ।

अथ पर्यतगतमात्रस्य पुंसो यद्भूमज्ञानं तत् कथं नाग्निमनुमापयति ।  
अस्ति चात्राग्निसंदेहः । साधकवाधकप्रमाणाभावेन संशयस्य न्यायप्रा-  
प्तत्वात् । सत्यम् । अगृहीतव्याप्तेरिव गृहीतविस्मृतव्याप्तेरपि पुंसोऽ-  
नुमानानुदयेन व्याप्तिस्मृतेरप्यनुमितिर्ह्युच्यते । धूमदर्शनाच्चोद्भूय

I say [says the objector] how is it that which [is] the first-  
knowledge of smoke in the kitchen, does not make [one] infer  
fire? True [what you say, your objection is relevant, but  
the answer is], because the invariable concomitance is not  
apprehended [at that time] and it is only when the invari-  
able concomitance is apprehended that there can arise in-  
ferential cognition

Then, at a time after the ascertainment of the invari-  
able concomitance, let the fire be inferred in the kitchen it-  
self' [Do] not [say] so Because as the fire is [actually]  
seen, no doubt [about its existence] can arise And [only]  
a thing about which there is doubt is inferred. As is said  
[or laid down] by the author of the Bhāṣya—

Reasoning operates neither in [the case of] an unperceived  
[or unknown or unheard-of] object, nor in [the case of] an  
object definitely ascertained, but in [the case of] an object  
about which there is doubt

Then, how is it that the knowledge of smoke of a man  
who has simply gone to the mountain, does not make [him]  
infer fire? There is indeed here doubt about the fire, owing  
to the absence of arguments for or against [it], doubt is rea-  
sonably produced True [what you say] Because inference  
cannot arise in [the case of] that man also who  
has first apprehended but later forgotten the in-  
variable concomitance as in [the case of] one who has

सरकारो व्याप्तिं स्मरति यो या धूमगन् स सोऽग्निमात्रं यथा महानस  
 शतं । तेन धूमदर्शने जाते व्याप्तिस्मृतौ भूताया यद्भूमज्ञानं तत् तृतीयं  
 धूमवाद्यायमिति । तदेवाग्निमनुमापयति नान्यत् । तदेवानुमान स एव  
 लिङ्गपरामर्शः । तेन व्यवस्थितमेतद्विङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानमिति ॥ १८ ॥

स्वार्थानुमानम् परार्थानुमानं च ।

तद्यानुमानं द्विविधम् । स्वार्थं परार्थं चति । स्वार्थं स्वप्रतिपत्ति  
 हेतुः । तथाहि । स्वयमेव महानसादी विशिष्टेन प्रत्यक्षेण घमान्त्यो  
 व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्यतसमीपं गतस्नदूते चार्शो सद्विहानं पर्यतवर्ति  
 नीमवाचच्छमूलामभ्रलिङ्गा धूमलेखा पश्यन् धूमदर्शनाच्चोद्बुद्धस

not apprehended the invariable concomitance and so the  
 remembrance of the invariable concomitance also is a  
 cause of inferential cognition. And at the sight of the  
 smoke with the [latent] impressions aroused one remem-  
 bers the invariable concomitance in the form whosoever  
 [is] possessed of smoke [is] possessed of fire as for instance  
 the kitchen. Therefore that knowledge of smoke [which  
 takes place] when the sight of smoke has been produced  
 and the remembrance of the invariable concomitance has  
 taken place [is] the Third [knowledge] in the form this [is]  
 possessed of smoke and that alone make [one] infer the  
 [presence of] fire and none else. That same [is] inference  
 [and] that same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark.  
 Hence this [is] well established that inference [is] the consi-  
 deration of the indicatory mark.

(19) And that inference [is] of two kinds—Intended  
 for oneself and Intended for another. [The inference] in-  
 tended for oneself [is] the cause of one's own understand-  
 ing. To explain—Having just by himself apprehended by  
 means of qualified perception the invariable concomitance  
 between smoke and fire in the kitchen etc. [a man] goes  
 near the mountain and entertaining a doubt as regards  
 fire present (gata) on that [mountain] [and] seeing a  
 streak of smoke present on the mountain not cut away  
 from [its] source and reaching [it licking] the clouds [and]

६ स्कारो व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । ततोऽत्रापि धूमोऽस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते । तस्मादत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरप्यस्तीति स्वयमेव प्रतिपद्यते तत् स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

१ यन्तु काश्चित् स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितुं पञ्चावयव-  
वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तन् परार्थानुमानम् । तद्यथा

१ य पर्वतोऽग्निसन्निमान् ।

१२ धूमवत्त्वात् ।

यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः ।

३ तथा चायम् ।

१० १ तस्मात् तथा । इति

अनेन वाक्येन प्रतिज्ञादिमता प्रतिपादितात्पञ्चरूपोपपन्नाह्निद्वात्  
परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते । तेनैतत् परार्थानुमानम् ॥ १९ ॥

with the [latent] impressions aroused at the sight of the smoke remembers the invariable concomitance, namely (ii) 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire. Then [he] realises that here too is smoke [and] from that he by himself realises that here on the mountain, there is fire also—That [is] inference intended for oneself

But when [a man] having himself inferred fire from smoke, employ a five membered syllogism (*vākyam*) in order to make another comprehend [the same], that [is known as] inference intended for another. It [is] as follows—

This mountain [is] possessed of fire

Because [it is] possessed of smoke

Whatever [is] possessed of smoke, all that (*śah śah*) [is] possessed of fire, as the kitchen

And this [mountain] so [that is, possessed of smoke]

Therefore [it is] so [that is, possessed of fire]

From the indicatory mark endowed with the five qualifications [or characteristics] propounded by this syllogism possessed of assertion [or statement] etc, even another comprehends fire. Therefore this [is] inference intended for another

अन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणम् ।

अत्र पर्वतस्याग्निमत्त्वं साध्य धूमवत्त्वं हेतु । स चान्वयव्यतिरेकी  
अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमत्त्वात् । तथाहि । यत्र यत्र धूमवत्त्व  
तत्राग्निमत्त्वं यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्ति । महानसे धूमाग्न्योरन्व  
यसद्भावदर्शनात् । ए. यत्राग्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाहृद  
इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति । महाहृदे धूमाग्न्योर्व्यतिरेकस्य दर्शनात् ।  
व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेस्त्वय क्रम । अन्वयव्याप्तौ यद् व्याप्य तद्भावोऽत्र  
व्यापकी यच्च व्यापक तद्भावोऽत्र व्याप्य इति । तदुक्तम् ।

व्याप्यव्यापकभागे हि भावयोर्याद्विगम्यते ।

तयोरभावयोस्तस्माद्विपरीत प्रतीयते ॥

(20) Here the possession of fire by the mountain [is] what is to be established the possession of smoke the reason (*hetuh*) That [reason] again [is] positive-negative as it is possessed of invariable concomitance [with the *sadhya* both] positively [or affirmatively *anvayah*] and negatively (*vyatirekah*) To explain— Wherever [there is] possession of smoke there [is] possession of fire as for instance, in the kitchen —this [represents] positive invariable concomitance, as the existence of the positive association of smoke and fire is seen in the kitchen Likewise 'where [there] is no fire there smoke also exists not as for instance in the big pool—this [represents] negative invariable concomitance as the negative association of smoke and fire is seen in the big pool For [the representation of] the negative invariable concomitance again this [following] procedure [or order holds good]—The absence of that which is the pervaded in the positive invariable concomitance [is] the pervader here [in the *vyatirekavyāpti*] and the absence of what is the pervader [in the *anvayavyāpti*] [becomes] the pervaded here [in the *vyatirekavyāpti*] As has been said —

What sort of relation of the pervaded and the pervader between two positive entities is admitted the reverse of that is understood [to hold good] between the negations of them

अन्वये साधन व्याप्य साध्य व्यापकमिष्यते ।

साध्याभावोऽन्यथा व्याप्यो व्यापक साधनात्यय ॥

व्याप्यस्य वचन पूर्वं व्यापकस्य तत परम् ।

एव परीक्षिता व्याप्ति स्फुटीभ्रमति तत्त्वत ॥

१५ तदेव धूमवत्त्वे हेतावन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिरस्ति ॥ २० ॥

अन्वय-व्याप्तिरेव किमर्थं प्रदर्शनम् ।

यत्तु वाक्ये कवलमन्वय-व्याप्तिरेव प्रदर्शनम् तद्वैकेनापि चरितार्थ  
त्वात् । तत्राप्यन्वयस्यावकृत्वात् प्रदर्शनम् । ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतोऽर्थस्य  
वक्रेण साधनायोगात् । न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरभावात् ।

तदेव धूमवत्त्वे हेतुरन्वयव्यतिरेकी । एवमन्वयेऽप्यनित्यत्वादो साध्ये

In [the case of] positive association the reason (*sadha-  
nam*) is admitted [or desired] as the pervaded and what is  
to be established (*sadhya*) as the pervader in the reverse case  
[*anyatha* that is in *vyatireka*] the negation of what is to  
be established [is admitted] as the pervaded [and] the  
negation of the reason as the pervader

First the statement of the pervaded then afterwards  
[that] of the pervader Thus examined the invariable  
concomitance becomes explicit in its true nature

Thus then in [the case of] the reason the possession of  
smoke there is invariable concomitance [both] positively  
and negatively

(२१) As regards the showing of the positive invariable  
concomitance only in a syllogism [it is so] because [one's]  
purpose is served even by one [form of *vyapti*] and therein  
again the showing of the positive association [and not of  
the negative association is usually resorted to] owing to its  
straight forward [lit not crooked simple] nature—It is not  
proper to accomplish [one's] object that can be achieved in  
a straight forward [or direct] manner indirectly [or in a  
round about way]—but not on account of the non-existence  
of a negative invariable concomitance

Thus then the reason the possession of smoke  
[is] positive negative Likewise other reasons too such as

कृतकत्वादयो हेतवोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकिणो द्रष्टव्याः ॥ २१ ॥

केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः ।

काश्चिद्धेतुः केवलव्यतिरेकी । यथा सात्मकत्वे साध्ये प्राणादि-  
मर्त्य हेतुः । यथा

जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकम् । प्राणादिमत्त्वात् ।

यत् सात्मकं न भवति तत् प्राणादिमन्न भवति यथा अयं घटः ।

न चेद् जीवच्छरीरं तथा । तस्मान्न तथेति ।

अत्र हि जीवच्छरीरस्य सात्मकत्वं साध्यं प्राणादिमर्त्यं हेतुः । स  
च केवलव्यतिरेकी अन्वयव्यतिरेकभावात् । तथाहि । यत् प्राणादिमन्  
तत् सात्मकं यथामुक इति दृष्टान्तो नास्ति । जीवच्छरीरं सर्व-  
पक्ष एव ।

'being a product,' when what is to be established [is] 'non-  
-eternal nature' etc should be understood (*drastavyāḥ*) to  
be positive-negative

(22) Some [ kind of ] reason [is] purely negative, as for  
instance, the reason 'being possessed of breath etc,' when  
'being possessed of the soul is what is to be established  
Thus—The living body [is] possessed of the soul

Because [it is] possessed of breath etc

What is not possessed of the soul is not possessed of  
breath etc, as this jar

And this living body [is] not [so]

Therefore [it is] not [so]

Here again, 'being possessed of the soul' [is] what is to  
be established of the living body, [and] 'being possessed  
of breath etc' [is] the reason And it [the reason is]  
purely negative owing to the absence [or impossibility] of  
a positive invariable concomitance To explain—'What  
[is] possessed of breath etc [is] possessed of the soul,' as X-  
there can be no [such] instance Everything [whatsoever is]  
living body [is] the subject itself

१ यथा शब्दोऽस्ति कृतकत्वाद् घटवत् । यत्र कृतकत्व तत्रानित्यत्वम्  
यत्रानित्यत्वाभावस्तत्र कृतकत्वाभाव । यथा शतम् ।

लक्षणमपि केवलव्यतिरिक्तं हेतुः । यथा पृथिवीलक्षणं गन्धवत्त्वम् ।

विवादपदं पृथिवीति व्यवहर्तव्यम् । गन्धवत्त्वात् ।

यत्नं पृथिवीति व्यवह्रियते तत्र गन्धवत् । यथापि ।

प्रमाणलक्षणं वा । यथा प्रमाकरणत्वं । तथाहि ।

प्रत्यक्षादिकं प्रमाणमिति व्यवहर्तव्यम् ।

प्रमाकरणत्वात् ।

यत् प्रमाणमिति न व्यवह्रियते तत्र प्रमाकरणं यथा प्रत्यक्षा

भासादिः ।

न पुनस्तथेदम् ।

तस्मात्तथा इति ।

२१ न पुनरन्वयः । यत् प्रमाकरणं तत् प्रमाणमिति व्यवहर्तव्यं यथा मुकु-  
इत्यन्वयहृष्टान्तो नास्ति । प्रमाणमात्रस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् । अत्र च  
व्यवहारः साध्यो न तु प्रमाणत्वम् । तस्य प्रमाकरणत्वाद्धेतोरभेदेन

A definition also [is] a purely negative reason as for in-  
stance the definition of the earth being possessed of odour

The matter under dispute should be called earth

Because [it is] possessed of odour

What is not called earth [is] not possessed of  
odour as water

Or the definition of Proof as being the instrument of  
right cognition To explain

Perception etc should be called proof

Because [it is] the instrument of right cognition

What is not called proof [is] not the instrument of  
right cognition as fallacious perception etc

This again [is] not so

Therefore [it is] not so

But there [is] no positive association what [is] the  
instrument of right cognition that should be called Proof-  
there is no instance of positive association as for instance  
X the whole of proof being made the subject Here again  
what is to be established [is] the designation [or use of the  
term pramāna] and not the nature of proof for that [prama-  
natva] being identical with the reason [pramakarānatva]  
owing to its being the instrument of right cognition there

साध्यभेदद्वयोपसर्गात् । तदेवं केवलव्यतिरेकिणी दर्शिताः ॥ २१ ॥ २४

केवलान्वयी हेतुः ।

कश्चिदन्यो हेतुः केवलान्वयी । यथा

शब्दोऽभिधेयः । प्रमेयत्वात् ।

यत् प्रमेयं तदभिधेयम् यथा घटः ।

तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथा इति ।

अत्र शब्दस्य अभिधेयत्वं साध्यम् प्रमेयत्व हेतुः । स च केवलान्वयव्येव । यदभिधेयं न भवति तत् प्रमेयमपि न भवति ययामुरु इति व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्ताभावात् । सर्वत्र हि प्रामाणिक एवार्थो दृष्टान्तः । स च प्रमेयश्चाभिधेयश्चेति ॥ २३ ॥ ✓

अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतोः पञ्चरूपाणि ।

एतेषां चान्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिहेतूनां त्रयाणां

would arise the fault of the identity [of the reason] with what is to be established, which is an undesirable contingency (*prasangah*)

Thus then have been shown the purely negative [reasons]

(23) Some other [kind of] reason [is] purely positive. Thus—Sound [is] nameable

Because [it is] possessed of knowability

What [is] knowable [is] nameable, as a jar.

This again [is] so.

Therefore [it is] so

Here nameability [is] what is to be established about sound, [and] knowability [is] the reason. And it [is] only purely positive. What is not nameable is not also knowable, as for instance, X—there is the absence of an instance of negative association. In all cases an object which can be proved [to be existent] by means of some proof, [can] alone [be] an instance and that [must be] both knowable and nameable [as a matter of course]

(24) Of these three [kinds of] reasons, the positive-



३ मध्ये यो हेतुरन्ययव्यतिरेकी स पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव स्वसाध्यं साध्यितुं क्षमते । न त्वेकेनावि रूपेण हीन । तानि पञ्चरूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वं विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः अवाधिताविषयत्वम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति । एतानि रूपाणि धूमवत्त्वादावन्ययव्यतिरेकिणि हेतो विद्यन्ते तथाहि ।

१ धूमवत्त्वं पक्षस्य पर्वतस्य धर्मः पर्वते तस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।

२ एवं सपक्षे सत्त्वं सपक्षे महानसे सद् विद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

३ एवं विपक्षान्महाह्रदाद् व्यावृत्तिस्तत्र नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

४ एवम् अवाधिताविषयं च धूमवत्त्वम् । तथाहि । धूमवत्त्वस्य हेतोर्विषय

negative, purely positive, and purely negative, the reason which [is] positive-negative is able to establish what is to be established by it, only when endowed with the five characteristics, but not if void of even one [of them] Those five characteristics again [are]—Being an attribute of [or present in] the subject, Being present in a similar instance, Being excluded from a dissimilar [or contrary] instance, Not having its object [or sadhya] disproved [or contradicted by a stronger proof], Not having a rival [indicatory mark which proves the opposite of the sadhya] These [five] characteristics [again] are present in a positive-negative reason 'to be possessed of smoke' etc To explain—

'To be possessed of smoke [is] 'an attribute of the subject', the mountain, as it is present on the mountain

Likewise, 'being present in a similar instance'—in a similar instance—in the kitchen—existing, is present—this [is] the meaning

Likewise, 'from a dissimilar instance,'—from the big pool—'being excluded'—is not there—this [is] the meaning

Similarly 'being possessed of smoke has also its object not disproved' To explain the object of the reason 'being possessed of smoke [is] the quality which is to be esta-

साध्यधर्मस्तच्चाग्निमत्त्व तत् केनापि प्रमाणेन न बाधित न खण्डित १२  
मित्यर्थः ।

एवम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् असत् प्रतिपक्षो यस्येत्यसत्प्रतिपक्ष धूमवत्त्व  
हेतुः । तथाहि । साध्यविपरीतसाधक हेत्यन्तर प्रतिपक्ष इत्युच्यते । १५  
स च धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ नास्त्येवानुपलम्भात् ।

तदर्थं पञ्चरूपाणि धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ विद्यन्ते । तनेतद्भूमवत्त्वमग्निमत्त्वस्य  
साधकम् ॥ १४ ॥

१०

अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्ति पक्षधर्मता च ।

अग्नेः पक्षधर्मत्व हेतौ पक्षधर्मताबलात् सिध्यति । तथाहि । अनुमा  
नस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्ति पक्षधर्मता च । तत्र व्याप्त्या साध्यसामान्यस्य<sup>३</sup>  
सिद्धिः । पक्षधर्मताबलानु साध्यस्य पक्षसंबन्धित्व विशेष सिध्यति ।

blished and that [is] being possessed of fire Not by any  
proof is that contradicted not shattered this [is] the meaning

Similarly not having a rival the reason being possess-  
ed of smoke [is one] not having a rival that is for which  
there is no rival [or counter balancing rea on] To explain  
Another reason establishing the reverse of what is to be  
established is called the rival [reason] and that does not  
to be sure exist in [the case of] the rea on to be possessed  
of smoke because it is not found out

Thus then the five characteristics exist in the reason  
being possessed of smoke therefore this being po ressed  
of smoke establishes the being pos sessed of fire

(25) That the fire is an attribute of the subject is  
proved by virtue of the reasons being an attribute of the  
subject To explain Inference has two constituents—  
invariable concomitance and [the reasons] being an  
attribute of the subject Of them (*taira*) by the invari-  
able concomitance is established what is to be established  
in a general form by virtue of [the reasons] being an  
attribute of the subject is established the particular [fact  
viz] the connection of what is to be established with the  
subject From [the fact that] being possessed of smoke [is]

१ गमकम त्तमन्वस्य साधकम् ।

पर्वतधर्मण धूमवत्त्वेन वह्निरपि पर्वतसवद्ध एवानुमीयते । अन्यथा,  
साध्यसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिग्रहादेव सिद्धे कृतमनुमानेन ॥ २५ ॥

केवलान्वयी तथा च केवल्यतिरेकी हेतु चतुरूपोपपन्न ।

यस्त्वन्योऽप्यन्यव्यतिरेकी हेतुः स सर्वं पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव सद्-  
हेतुः । अन्यथा ह्यत्राभासोऽहेतुरिति यावत् । केवलान्वयी चतुरूपो  
पपन्न एव स्वसाध्य साध्यति । तस्य हि विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिर्नास्ति  
विपक्षाभावात् ।

केवल्यतिरेकी च चतुरूपोपपन्न एव । तस्य हि सपक्षे सत्त्वं  
नास्ति सपक्षाभावात् ॥ २६ ॥ ✓

पक्षसपक्षविपक्षनिरूपणम् ।

३ के पुनः पक्षसपक्षविपक्षा । उच्यन्ते ।

साधिधसाध्यधर्मा धर्मा पक्ष । यथा धमानुमान पर्वत ।

an attribute of the mountain it is inferred that the fire also is connected with the mountain itself. Otherwise, when what is to be established in a general form is established from the apprehension of the invariable concomitance itself no need of [the complex process of] inference [at all] !

(26) Other positive negative reasons also all of them [are] good reasons only if endowed with the five characteristics, otherwise [they are] fallacious reasons, that is no reasons. A purely positive [reason] establishes what is to be established by itself endowed only with four characteristics for there is no exclusion from a dissimilar instance in its case the dissimilar instance being absent [or impossible]

And a purely negative [reason is] endowed with only four characteristics for there is no presence in a similar instance in its case owing to the absence [or impossibility] of a similar instance

(27) What again [are] the subject similar instance and dissimilar instance? [They] are stated [as follows]—

Subject [is] an entity having a characteristic about which there is doubt and which is to be established [or having the characteristic of a doubted sadhya or referring to which

• सपक्षस्तु निश्चितसाध्यधर्मा धर्मा । यथा महानसस्तत्रैव धृमानुमाने ।  
विपक्षस्तु निश्चितसाध्याभासवान् धर्मा । यथा तत्रैव महाहृद् ६  
इति ॥ २७ ॥

पञ्च हेत्याभासा । असिद्धहेत्याभासनिरूपणम् ।

तदेवमन्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिणो दर्शिता । ३  
अतोऽन्ये हेत्याभासा । ते च असिद्धविरुद्धनैकान्तकप्रकरणसम  
कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदात् पञ्चैव ।

तत्र सिद्धत्वेनानिश्चितो हेतुरसिद्ध स चासिद्धस्त्रिभिध आश्रया ६  
सिद्ध सत्त्वासिद्धो व्याप्यत्यासिद्धश्चेति ।

आश्रयासिद्धो यथा ।

गगनारविन्द सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् ।

१ सराजारविन्दवत् ।

अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रय स च नास्त्येव ।

स्वरूपासिद्धौ यथा ।

१२ अनित्य शब्द । चाक्षुषत्वात् । घटवत् ।

अत्र चाक्षुषत्व हेतु । स च शब्दे नास्त्येव तस्य श्रावणत्वात् ।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्तु द्विविध । एको व्याप्तिमाहकप्रमाणाभावात् ।

१५ अपरस्तुपाधिसद्भावात् । तत्र प्रथमो यथा ।

शब्द क्षणिक । सत्त्वात् ।

यत्सत्क्षणिक यथा जलधरपटलम् ।

१८ तथा च शब्दादिरिति ।

न च सत्त्वक्षणिकत्वयोर्व्याप्तिमाहक प्रमाणमस्ति । सोपाधिकतया

The sky lotus [ 15 ] fragrant

Because [ it is possessed ] of the generality of lotus  
like a lake-born lotus

Here the sky lotus [ 15 ] the support and that exists not  
at all ( etc )

Unproven in its own nature [ 15 ] as follows —

Sound [ 15 ] non eternal

Because of [ its ] visibility  
like a jar

Here visibility [ 15 ] the reason and that exists not in  
sound at all ( etc ) because that [ sound ] is audible

Unproven in invariable concomitance again [ 15 ] of  
two kind. One [ 15 caused ] by the absence of a proof  
apprehending the invariable concomitance the other again  
by the existence of a limitation Of them the first [ 15 ] as  
follows —

Sound [ 15 ] momentary

Because of [ its ] existence

Who exists that [ 15 ] momentary as the culmine

And sound to [ 15 ] so

There is never ( etc ) no proof apprehending the  
invariable concomitance of existence and momentary

सत्त्वस्य व्याप्त्यासिद्धाबुच्यमानायां क्षणिकत्वमन्यप्रयुक्तमित्यभ्यु-  
पगतं स्यात् । ✓

२१

द्वितीयं यथा ।

कत्वन्तरयतिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम् ।

हिंसात्वात् ।

२४

ऋतुनाह्यहिंसायत् ।

अत्र ह्यधर्मसाधनत्वे हिंसात्वं न प्रयोजकं किं तु निषिद्धत्वमेव ।  
प्रयोजकमुपाधिरिति दाशत । तथाहि । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधना  
व्यापक उपाधिरित्युपाधिलक्षणम् । तच्चास्ति निषिद्धत्वे । निषिद्धत्वं  
हि साध्यस्याधर्मसाधनत्वस्य व्यापकम् । यतो यत्र यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं

ness If [ this reason ] existence were to be declared as [ an  
illustration of ] Unproven in-invariable concomitance due to  
the possession of a limitation [ that is the second variety of  
vyapyatvasiddha ] momentariness would have to be  
considered as having been caused by something else [ than  
existence, and would thus be as good as admitted, which  
would go against our own view about sattva ]

The second [ is ] as follows —

The killing existing inside a sacrifice [ is ] the  
means of demerit

Because [ it is possessed ] of the nature of killing  
like the killing out side sacrifices.

Here again the nature of killing [ is ] not the  
producing cause for the means of demerit, but 'being  
prohibited [ by the Sastras ] alone the producing  
cause, is the same as the limitation To explain —  
Limitation [ or accident is that ] which, while pervading  
the thing to be established [ that is, while being  
invariably present in all those places where the sādhyā is  
present ], does not pervade the reason [ that is, is not invariably  
present with the reason ] — this [ is ] the definition of limita-  
tion And that exists in 'being prohibited' For 'being  
prohibited' pervades what is to be established, [ namely ]  
the means of de-merit as wherever [ there is ] 'being

३० तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वमपीति । एवं साधनं हिंसात्वं न व्याप्नोति निषिद्धत्वम् । न हि यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वं यद्गीय पशुहिंसायां निषिद्धत्वाभावात् । तदेवं निषिद्धत्वस्योपाधेः सद्भा

३३ वात् अन्यप्रयुक्तव्याप्त्युपजीवि हिंसात्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धमेव ॥ २८ ॥

विरुद्धहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । स यथा ।

शब्दो नित्यः । कृतकत्वात् । द्योर्भग्नत् ।

अत्र कृतकत्वं हि साध्यनित्यत्वविपरीतानिःयत्वेन व्याप्तम् । यद् कृतकं तदनित्यमेव न नित्यमित्यतो विरुद्धं कृतकत्वमिति ॥ २९ ॥

अनेकान्तिकहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

सद्यभिचारोऽनेकान्तिकः । स द्विविधः साधारणानेकान्तिकाऽसा

the means of demerit' there surely [is] 'being prohibited' also, and further (*etiam*) the reason 'the nature of killing' does not pervade 'being prohibited'. For, wherever [there is] 'the nature of killing,' there [is] not necessarily 'being prohibited,' on account of the absence of 'being prohibited' in [the case of] the killing of sacrificial beasts. Thus then, owing to the presence of the limitation 'being prohibited,' [the reason] 'the nature of killing' depending upon the invariable concomitance caused by something else, is Unproven-in-invariable-concomitance itself.

(29) Contrary [fallacious reason] [is] the reason [which is] invariably associated with [or pervaded by] the reverse of what is to be established. It [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because of [its] being a product  
like the sky

Here being a product [is] pervaded by non-eternality, the reverse of eternality [which is] what is to be established. What [is] produced, that is non-eternal only [and] not eternal, hence [the reason] being a product [is] Contrary

(30) Inconclusive [or Discrepant fallacious reason] which does not possess one extreme only, that is which does not tend to establish one thing only but also its opposite [is that] which involves the violation (*tythhucra*)

धारणानेकान्तिकश्चेति । तत्र पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्ति साधारणा नैकान्तिक । स यथा ।

शब्दो नित्य । प्रमेयत्वात् । व्योमयत् ।

अत्र हि प्रमेयत्व हेतुस्तत्त्व नित्यानित्यवृत्ति ।

सर्पक्षाद् विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तो य पक्ष एव वर्तत सोऽनाधारणानेकान्तिक । स यथा ।

मूर्तिन्या । गन्धप्रचत्वात् ।

गन्धयत्त्व हि सपक्षाच्चित्याद्विपक्षाच्चानित्याद्यावुस भूपात्रवृत्ति  
॥ ३० ॥

प्रकरणसमहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

प्रकरणसमस्तु स एव यस्य हेतो साध्यविपरीतसाधक हेत्यन्तर विद्यते । स यथा ।

[ of the invariable concomitance ] It [ is ] of two kinds [ namely ] too-wide ( *sadhārana* ) inconclusive and too narrow inconclusive Of them the too wide inconclusive [ fallacious reason is that ] which exists in the subject in similar instances and in dissimilar instances It [ is ] as follows —

Sound [ is ] eternal

Because [ it is possessed ] of knowability

like the sky

Here again knowability [ is ] the reason and that exists in eternal as well as non eternal [ things ]

The too-narrow inconclusive [ fallacious reason is that ] which excluded from similar instances [ and ] dissimilar instances exists in the subject alone It [ is ] as follows —

Earth [ is ] eternal

Because [ it is ] possessed of odour

Being possessed of odour again excluded from similar instances [ viz ] eternal [ things ] and from dissimilar instances [ viz ] non eternal [ things ] exists only in earth

( 31 ) The Counter balanced [ fallacious reason ] again [ is ] that alone for which reason [ there ] exists another reason establishing the reverse of what is to be established. It [ is ] as follows —



- १) शब्दाऽनित्यं नित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् ।  
 शब्दो नित्यः । अनित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् । इति ।  
 अयमेव सारप्रतिपक्ष इति चोच्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

कालात्ययादिष्टैरेवाभासानिर्घणम् ।

- पक्षे प्रमाणान्तराद्यधृतमाध्यामायो हेतुर्वाधितविषयः कालात्ययाप-  
 दिष्ट इत्युच्यते । यथा

अग्निं अनुष्णं । कृतकत्वात् । जलम् ।

- अत्र हि कृतकत्वस्य हेतोः साध्यमनुष्णत्वं तदभावः प्रत्यक्षेणैवार्-  
 धारितः । स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेणैवोष्णत्वोपलम्भात् ।

इति व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ॥ ३२ ॥

Sound [ 14 ] not-et. nial

Because [ it is ] void of qualities of eternal  
 [ things or eternal qualities ]

[ and ]

Sound [ 14 ] eternal

Because [ it is ] void of quality of non-eternal  
 [ things or non-eternal qualities ]

This same is also (ca) called 'having a rival' [ or  
 neutralised or nullified or ambiguous ]

- ६ (32) The reason where the absence [ or negation ] of  
 what is to be established is ascertained in the subject by  
 another [ more powerful ] proof and the object of which is  
 [ thus ] contradicted is called the B lated [ fallacious  
 reason al o nullified or contradicted or refuted It stated  
 or adduced when the fit time for it has passed away, or  
 rejected owing to the lapse of proper time ] As

Fire [ 1 ] not-hot

Because [ it is ] produced  
 like water

Here again what is to be established by the reason 'being  
 produced [ 1 ] coolness its negation [ viz hotness ] is  
 ascertained by perception itself hotness being experi-  
 enced by the use of the perceptive cognition of touch

Thus has been expounded Inference

उपमानविचार ।

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृत गौसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानमुपमानम् । यथा गवयमजानन्नपि नागरिको यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्य ३  
कृतश्चिद्वारण्यकपुरुषान्द्रुत्वा चन गतो वाक्यार्थ स्मरन् यदा गोसा  
दृश्यविशिष्ट पिण्ड पश्यति तदा तद्वाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृत गौसादृश्य  
विशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् उपमानम् उपमितिकरणत्वात् । गौसादृश्यविशिष्ट ६  
पिण्डज्ञानान्तरम् अयमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य पिण्ड इति सज्ञासहित  
बन्धमतीतिरुपमिति । सद्य फलम् ॥ ३३ ॥

उपमान प्रमाणान्तरम् ।

इदं तु प्रत्यक्षानुमानासाध्यप्रमासाधकत्वात् प्रमाणान्तरमुपमान  
मस्ति ।

इति ध्यारयात्मुपमानम् ॥ ३४ ॥

(33) Analogy [is] the knowledge of an animal (*p ṛḡah*) characterised by resemblance with an ox helped by the remembrance of the meaning of the directing sentence (*at desa: akyaṃ*) As when a city man although not knowing the gavaya having heard from some forest-dwelling man the sentence As an ox so the gavaya going to the forest [and] remembering the meaning of the sentence sees an animal characterised by resemblance with an ox then the knowledge of the animal characterised by resemblance with the ox helped by [or in collaboration with] the remembrance of the meaning of that sentence [is] analogy on account of its being the instrument of analogical cognition Analogical cognition again [is] the apprehension of the connection between a name (*va ṛḡa*) and the object expressed by it (*va ṛḡa*) in the form This animal here [i] denoted by the word gavaya after the knowledge of the animal characterised by resemblance with the ox And that same [upamiti] [is] the effect

(34) This Analogy again is an independent [or different] proof as it brings about right cognition not capable of being established by perception and inference

Thus has been expounded Analogy

शब्दः ।

शब्दविचारः । आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिरूपणम् ।

३ आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु, यथाभूतस्यार्थस्योपदेशा पुरुषः । वाक्यत्वाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिमतं पदानां समूहः ।

अत एव गौरवः पुरुषो हस्तीति पदानि न वाक्यम् । परस्पराकाङ्क्षाविरहात् ।

अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न वाक्यं योग्यताविरहात् । न ह्यग्निसंक्रयोः परस्पराभ्ययोग्यतास्ति । तथाहि । अग्निनेति तृतीय्यं संकरूपकार्यं प्रति करणत्वमग्नेः प्रतिपादितम् । न चाग्निः संके करणीमवितु योग्यः । तेन न कार्यकरणसंभ्दाऽग्निसंक्रयोः । अयोग्यत्वात् । अतोऽग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न वाक्यम् ।

१२ एवमेकैकश प्रदरे प्रहरेऽसहस्ररितानि गामान्येत्यादिपदानि न

(35) Word [is] the sentence of one trustworthy And (tu) one trustworthy [is] a person who asserts things as [they] have happened And a sentence [is made of] a collection of words possessed of expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition

For this very reason (a/a etia) 'ox, horse, man, elephant' - these words [form] no sentence, because of the absence of mutual expectancy

'[One] should sprinkle with fire - this [is] no sentence, because of the absence of compatibility [between sprinkling and fire] Not indeed is there compatibility of mutual construction [or association] between fire and sprinkling To explain By the instrumental by the fire' is conveyed the instrumentality of fire with reference to the effect in the form of sprinkling fire [is] not, for the matter of that (ca), fit to become the instrument for the sprinkling Therefore [there is] no relation of instrument and effect between fire and sprinkling, on account of incompatibility So '[one] should sprinkle with fire' - this [is] no sentence

Likewise, words such as 'bring a cow' uttered at intervals (asa/a) every third hour, one by one [form] no

वाक्यम् । सत्यामपि परस्पराकाङ्क्षायां सत्यामपि च परस्परान्वय  
योग्यताया परस्परसान्निध्याभावात् ।

'यानि तु' साकाङ्क्षाणि योग्यतावन्ति सानिहितानि पदानि तान्येव १५  
वाक्यम् । यथा ज्योतिष्टोमिन् स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यादि । यथा वा नदी  
तीरे पत्र फलानि सन्तीति । यथा वा तान्येव मामानयेत्यादिपदान्य  
विलम्बितोच्चरितानि ॥ ३५ ॥ १८

कथं पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणि ।

नन्वत्रापि न पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणि किंत्वर्था । फलादीनामाध्याना  
तीराद्यापाराकाङ्क्षितत्वात् । न च विचार्यमाणस्य अपि साकाङ्क्षा ।  
आकाङ्क्षाया इच्छात्मकत्वेन चेतनधर्मत्वात् ।

सत्यम् । अर्थास्तावत् स्वपदार्थोत्तर्यन्योन्यविषयाकाङ्क्षाजनकत्वेन

sentence Because even though mutual expectancy is there  
even though the compatibility of mutual construction is  
also there there is no reciprocal juxtaposition

Only those words again that are possessed of expectancy  
have compatibility and are [uttered] together [or  
have juxtaposition] [as] a sentence as for instance  
'one desirous of [securing] heaven should perform the  
Jyotistoma sacrifice etc or as for instance on the river  
bank are five fruits or as for instance the same words  
'bring a cow etc uttered without any interval [or delay]

(36) I say [says the objector] Even here [it is] not  
the words [that are] possessed of expectancy but the things  
[denoted by them] because [it is] the fruits and others that  
are the supported [that are] possessed of expectancy with  
reference to the support the bank etc Considering [the  
matter] still further (37) [it is] not the things either [that  
are] possessed of expectancy for expectancy being of the  
nature of desire is an attribute of sentient [objects]

True [what you say] The things for the matter of  
that are said to have expectancy owing to [then] producing  
expectancy between them [or for different objects] in the

६ साकाङ्क्षा इत्युच्यन्ते । तद्द्वारेण तत्प्रतिपादकानि पदान्यापि साकाङ्क्षाणीत्युपचर्यन्ते । यद्वा पदान्येवार्थान् प्रतिपाद्यार्थान्तरविषया काङ्क्षाजनकानीत्युपचारात् साकाङ्क्षाणि ।

८ एवमर्थाः साकाङ्क्षाः परस्परान्वययोग्यास्तद्द्वारेण पदान्यापि परस्परान्वययोग्यानीत्युपचर्यन्ते । संनिहितत्वं तु पदानामेकेनैव पुस्तकभिलम्बेनोच्चारितत्वम् । तच्च साक्षादेव पदेषु संभ्रमति नार्थद्वारा ।

१२ तेनायमर्थः संपन्नः । अर्थप्रतिपादनद्वारा श्रोतुं पदान्तरविषयामर्थान्तरविषयां वाकाङ्क्षां जनयतां प्रतीयमानपरस्परान्वययोग्यार्थप्रतिपादकानां संनिहितानां पदानां समूहो वाक्यम् ॥ ३६ ॥

कथं पदप्रतीतिः वाच्यप्रतीतिर्वा ।

पदं च वर्णसमूहः । समूहश्चात्रेकज्ञानविषयीभावः । एव च वर्णानां

hearer of words denoting them, and through that agency, the words also denoting them are metaphorically described as having expectancy. Or, the words themselves [are said to be] possessed of expectancy figuratively because, after denoting [their] objects, they produce the expectancy with reference to other objects.

Similarly the objects that have expectancy [are] compatible for mutual construction, and through that agency, the words also are figuratively described as compatible for mutual construction. Juxtaposition, on the other hand (*tu*), [is] the uttering of words without any interval [between them or delay] by one and the same person and that is possible in the words themselves directly, not through the agency of objects.

∴ This then is the conclusion (*art'ah*) arrived at—A sentence [is] the collection of words that produce in the hearer through the agency of denoting the objects the expectancy referring to other words or referring to other objects that denote objects compatible for mutual construction and [are so] being comprehended [and] that have juxtaposition [that is, that are uttered without any interval between them].

( 37 ) A word again [is] a collection of letters [or syllables or sounds]. And a collection here [means]

कृमयतामाशुतरयिनाशित्वेनेकदानेकवर्णानुभवासंभवात् पूर्वपूर्ववर्णां ३  
 ननुभूयान्त्यवर्णश्रवणकाले पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृते-  
 नान्त्यवर्णसंबन्धेन पदव्युत्पादनसमयग्रहानुगृहीतेन श्रोत्रेणैकदेव  
 सदसदानेकवर्णावगाहिनी पदप्रतीतिर्जन्यते । सहकारिदाढ्यात् प्रत्य- ६  
 भिज्ञानवत् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षे ह्यतीतापि पूर्वावस्था स्फुरत्येव ।  
 ततः पूर्वपूर्वपदानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेनान्त्यपदविषयेण श्रोत्रे-  
 न्द्रियेण पदार्थप्रत्ययानुगृहीतेनानेकपदावगाहिनी वाक्यप्रतीतिः १  
 कियते ॥ ३७ ॥

सञ्चद्रमाणलक्षणं लोके वेदे च समानम् ।

तदिदं वाक्यमाप्तपुरुषेण प्रयुक्तं सञ्चुद्धनामकं प्रमाणम् । फल

being the object of one cognition Thus, because it is im-  
 possible to comprehend many letters at one and the same  
 time, owing to the letters coming in succession and being  
 quickly destroyed straight away (*tara*), there is produced  
 the comprehension of words comprising many letters, pre-  
 sent and absent, at one and the same time by the ear, which  
 is connected with the last letter which is helped by the  
 impressions caused by the apprehension of the various  
 preceding letters, at the time of the hearing of the last letter  
 after having apprehended the various preceding letters, and  
 which is favoured by the comprehension of the convention  
 (*samayah*) of explaining the word owing to the intensity  
 [or strength] of the auxiliaries, like recognition For, in  
 the apprehension (*pratyaksha*) of recognition the former  
 state, although past, does present itself Then is effected the  
 comprehension of sentence, comprising many words, by the  
 organ of hearing which has for its object the last word,  
 helped by the impressions caused by the apprehension, of  
 the various preceding words, and favoured by the appre-  
 hension of the meaning of the words [or of the objects  
 signified by the words]

(38) This [that is, such a] sentence, then, when put  
 forth by a trustworthy person [is] proof called Word, its  
 effect [is] the cognition of the meaning of the sentence And  
 this definition of word-proof [is] the same for worldly

३ त्वस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् । तच्चैतच्छब्दप्रमाणलक्षणं लोके वेदे च समानम् । लोके त्वयं विशेषो यः काश्चिदेवातो भवति न सर्वः । अतः किञ्चिदेव लौकिकं वाक्यं प्रमाणं यदास्यक्तृकम् । वेदे तु परमाप्तश्रीमहेश्वरेण कृतं सर्वमेव वाक्यं प्रमाणं सर्वस्यैवाप्तवाक्यत्वात् ।

एवं वर्णितानि चत्वारि प्रमाणानि । एतेभ्योऽन्यन्न प्रमाणम् । प्रमाणस्य सतोऽत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ॥ ३८ ॥

अर्थापत्तिर्न पृथक्प्रमाणम् ।

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति । तथाहि । पीनो देवइतो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा रात्रिभोजनं कल्प्यते । दिवा अभुञ्जानस्य पीनत्वं रात्रिभोजनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते । अतः पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतार्थापत्तिरेव रात्रिभोजने प्रमाणम् । तच्च प्रत्यक्षादिभ्यो भिन्नं

[matters] and Vedic [sacred texts] But in [the case of] the world, this [is] the distinction, some one or other only can be a trustworthy person, not everybody So, only some worldly sentence which has for its speaker a trustworthy person [is] proof [or authoritative], in [the case of] the Vedas, on the other hand, each and every sentence composed by the most trustworthy Lord Mahesvara, [is] proof [or authoritative] the whole itself being the sentence of a trustworthy person

Thus have been expounded the four proofs Anything else than these [is] no [independent] proof, being just included in these, if it is a means of right knowledge.

(39) I say [says the objector]-Presumption [or Implication] also is an independent [or separate] proof To explain When it is heard or seen that the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day eating by night [on his part] is presumed Fatness is not possible without eating by night in the case of one not eating by day Hence presumption itself arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the fatness, [is] the proof for eating by night [by Devadatta] And it [is] different from perception etc.

१ शब्दलक्षण प्रमाण । २ परमस्वरण । ३ अनुस्यमान भक्षतात् तदुपपादक ।  
मताथ न्तर्कन्यनन्तर्भापत्ति ।

रात्रिभाजनस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वात् । नतन् । रात्रिभाजनस्यानुमान ६  
विषयत्वात् । तथाहि ।

अथ देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते ।

दिवा अभुञ्जानत्व सति पानित्वात् ।

यस्तु न रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते नासौ दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पानि ।

यथा दिवा रात्रायभुञ्जानाऽपानि ।

न चाय तथा ।

तस्मान्न तथा ।

इति केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेन रात्रिभाजनस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात्  
किमर्थमर्थापत्तिं पृथक्त्वेन कल्पनीया ॥ ३९ ॥

न अभावाद्य पृथक्प्रमाणम् ।

नन्यभावाद्यमपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति । तच्चाभावमहणायाहकिर-  
णियम् । तथाहि । घटाद्यनुपलब्ध्या घटाद्यभावो निश्चीयते । अनुपल ३

because eating by night can not be the object of perception  
etc [ We reply ] not so because eating by night is the  
object of inference To explain

This Devadatta eats by night

Because [ he is possessed ] of fatness without eating  
by day

He who does not eat by night [ is ] not fat without  
eating by day as for instance [ X ] [ who is ] not  
fat not eating either by day or by night

And this [ Devadatta is ] not so

Therefore [ he is ] not so

—When by means of this purely negative inference can  
be comprehended eating by night for what purpose should  
presumption be regarded separately [ that is as an independ-  
ent pramana ] ?

( 40 ) I say [ says the objector ] there is a separate proof  
called non existence [ negation absence ] also And it  
deserves to be accepted for the apprehension of negation  
To explain Owing to the non apprehension of the jar,  
etc is ascertained the non existence of the jar etc And



द्विधयोपलब्धरेभाव इत्यभावप्रमाणेन घटाद्यभावो गृह्यते । नैतद् ।  
 यद्यत्र घटोऽमसिष्यत् तर्हि भूतलीमिवाद्रक्ष्यदित्यादितर्कसहकारिणा-  
 ५ नुपलम्भसनाथेन प्रत्यक्षेणैवाभावग्रहणात् किमभावप्रमाणेन ॥ ४० ॥

असंबन्धाभावस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं कथं संभवति इति विचारः ।

नन्विन्द्रियाणि संबन्धार्थमाहकाणि । तथाहि ।

३ इन्द्रियाणि वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारीणि ।

ज्ञानकरणात्वात् । आलोकयत् ।

यद्वा चक्षुःश्रोत्रे वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारीणि ।

६ बहिरिन्द्रियत्वात् । त्वगादिवत् ।

त्वगादीनां तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारित्वमुभयवासिसंमतमेव ।

न चेन्द्रियाभावयोः संबन्धोऽस्ति । संयोगसमवायी हि संबन्धो । न

non-apprehension [ means ] the negation of apprehension-  
 by this non-existence-proof is apprehended the negation of  
 the jar etc. [ We reply ]-[ It is ] not so; when the negation  
 is apprehended by perception itself, accompanied by non-  
 apprehension and helped by hypothetical reasoning in the  
 form -if the jar had been here, then [ one ] would have seen  
 [ it ], like the ground, what need of the non-existence-  
 ६० proof ?

( 41 ) I say [ says the objector ]-The sense-organs cognise  
 things which are connected [ with them ] To explain:

Sense-organs illumine an object after reaching it.  
 Because [ they are ] instruments of cognition.  
 ... like light.

Or, Eye and ear illumine an object after reaching it  
 ४ Because [ they are ] external sense-organs.  
 ... like the organ of touch etc.

And that the organ of touch and the like, illumine [ an  
 object ] after reaching [ it ], is, to be sure, agreed to by both  
 the partic. [ or disputants ]

Now there is no connection between a sense-organ and  
 negation. Conjunction and inference are indeed [ ( 41 ) ]

न तौ तयो स्त । द्रव्ययोरेव सयोग इति नियमात् अभावस्य च द्रव्य-  
त्वाभावात् । अयुतसिद्धत्वाभावात् समवायोऽपि ।

विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च सवन्ध एव न भवति भिन्नोभयाश्रितं  
कत्याभावात् । सवन्धो हि सवन्धिम्या भिन्नो भवति उभयसवन्ध्या १२  
श्रितश्च एकश्च । यथा भेरीदण्डयो स्यात् स हि भेरीदण्डाभ्या  
भिन्नस्तदुभयाश्रितश्चेकश्च । न च विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्तथा । तथाहि ।  
दण्डपुरुषयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न ताभ्या भिद्यत । न हि दण्डस्य १५  
विशेषणत्वमर्थान्तर नापि पुरुषस्य विशेष्यत्वम् अर्थान्तरम् अपि तु  
स्वरूपमेव । अभावस्यापि विशेषणत्वात् विशेष्यत्वाच्च । न चाभावे  
कस्यचित् पदार्थस्य द्रव्याद्यन्यतमस्य समय । तस्मादभावस्य १८

[two] connection and there can not be those two between them [conjunction can not be there] because of the rule that conjunction [takes place] only between two substances and negation has not the nature of a substance [There is] no inherence either owing to the absence of their being known to be not separated

The relation of qualification and qualified can no be connection at all because it is not different does not subsist in both [the connected things] and is not one A connection indeed is different from the [two] connected things does subsist in both the connected things and is one as for instance the conjunction between drum and stick It indeed [is] different from drum and stick does subsist in the two [viz drum and stick] and [is] one But the relation of qualification and qualified [is] not like that To explain The relation of qualification and qualified between stick and man is not different from them The character of being a qualification of the stick [is] not a different entity nor the character of being qualified of the man a different entity but [is] just its [of the stick of the man] own nature And non existence also [is] possessed of the character of a qualification and that of the qualified In negation again there can be no possibility [of the subsistence] of any one

स्वोपरक्तबुद्धिजनकत्वयत् स्वस्व तद्व विशेषणत्व न तु तदर्थान्तरम् ।

एव व्याप्यव्यापकत्वकार्यकारणत्वाद्याऽप्युक्त्या स्वप्रतिबद्धबुद्धि

२१ जनकत्वं स्वस्वमव हि व्यापकत्वमद्वादीनाम् । कारणत्वमपि कार्या

सुकृतान्वययतिरकिस्वस्वमव हि तन्त्वादीना न त्थान्तरम् ।

अभावस्यापि व्यापकत्वात् कारणत्वाच्च । न ह्यभाव सामान्यादि

२२ समय ।

तद्व विशपणविशप्यभावा न विशेषणविशप्यस्वस्वभावा भिन्न ।

नाप्युभयाश्रित । विशपणे विशपणभावमात्रस्य सत्त्वाद् विशप्य

२३ भावस्याभावात् । विशेष्य च विशप्यभावमात्रस्य सत्त्वाद् विशेषण

भावस्याभावात् । नाप्येक । विशपण च विशप्य च तयोर्भाव इति

द्वन्द्वात् पर श्रूयमाणो भावशब्द प्रत्यकमभिसंबन्धने । तथा च

category out of substance and others Therefore the character of being a qualification that belongs to negation [is] nothing but its own nature the character of producing a cognition tainted by itself and [it is] not a different entity

Similarly are to be regarded [ the relations of ] pervaded and pervader cause and effect and th like For the character of being a pervader of fir and oth r [ is ] but [ their ] very nature the character of producing a cognition [ of an object ] [ invariably ] associated with them The character of being a cause also that belongs to threads etc [ is ] but [ their ] very nature of being present and absent corresponding to the effect [ being present and absent ] and not a different entity And negation al o is possessed of the character of the pervader and that of the cause Again there is no possibility of generality etc [ subsisting ] in negation

Thus then the relation of qualification and qualified [is] not different from the natures of the qualification and the qualified nor [is it] subsisting in both for in the qualification exists only the nature of the qualification [and] the absence of the nature of the qualified and in the qualified exists only the nature of the qualified [and] the absence of the nature of the qualification. Nor [ is it ] one The word 'relation' heard [ or put in ] after the copulative compound [ dissolved ]

विशेषणभावो विशेष्यभावश्चेत्यापन्नम् । द्वावेता एकश्च सन्नन्ध । ३०  
 तस्माद्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न सन्नन्ध । एवं व्याप्यव्यापकभावाद्  
 योऽपि । सन्नन्धशब्दप्रयोगस्तूभयनिरूपणीयत्वसाधर्म्यणोपचारात् ।  
 तथा चासन्नन्धस्याभावस्यन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं न सम्भवति । ३३

[सत्यम् । भावावच्छिन्नत्वाद् व्याप्त । भाव प्रकाशयदिन्द्रिय प्राप्त  
 मेव प्रकाशयति न त्वभावमपि । अभाव प्रकाशयदिन्द्रिय विशेषण  
 विशेष्यभावमुखेनेति सिद्धान्त । असंबद्धाभावग्रहणप्रसंगे ३६  
 पस्तु विशेषणतयेव निरस्त । समश्च परमत ।

यत्रोभयोः समो दापः परिहारोऽपि वा समः ।

नैक पर्यनुयोक्त यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥ ( श्लोकवार्तिक ) ४१ ॥

ज्ञानस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं परतः प्रामाण्यं वा इति विचारः ।

इदमिदानीं निरूप्यते । जलादिज्ञाने जाते तस्य प्रामाण्यमवधार्य  
३ कश्चिज्जलादौ प्रवर्तते । कश्चित् सदेहादेव प्रवृत्तः प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाले जला  
दिप्रतिलम्बे सति प्रामाण्यमवधारयतीति वस्तुगतिः ।

अत्र कश्चिदाह प्रामाण्यमवधार्य पुरुषः प्रवर्तते स्वतः एव  
६ प्रामाण्यावधारणात् । अस्यार्थः । येनैव यज्ज्ञानं गृह्यत तेनेव तद्गतं  
प्रामाण्यमपि । न तु ज्ञानमाहकादन्यत्र ज्ञानधर्मस्य प्रामाण्यस्य ग्राह-  
कम् । तेन ज्ञानमाहकातिरिक्तानपेक्षत्वमेव स्वतस्त्वं प्रामाण्यस्य ।

१ ज्ञानं च प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेव गृहीतम् । कथमन्यथा प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-

Where the objection [or fault is] equal [that is equally stands applicable] to [the views of] both and the removal [or refutation thereof] also [is] the same one [party] should not be questioned [or taken to task] in a discussion of such a matter

(42) Here is now expounded [the following topic]—When the knowledge of water etc. is produced some one proceeds to [take] the water etc. after having ascertained the validity [or correctness] of it [the knowledge]. Someone again proceeding [to take the water etc.] on the strength of mere suspicion [about its presence] ascertains the validity [of the knowledge] when water has been found at a time after he has acted—this [is] the state of things

[Now] here some one contends—Having already beforehand ascertained the validity [of the knowledge] a man proceeds the validity [of the knowledge] being ascertained from [the knowledge] itself. The meaning [or idea] of this [is as follows]—By the same [process] by which indeed is apprehended some knowledge [is apprehended] the validity also thereof. Other than that which makes [one] apprehend the knowledge [is] not that which makes [one] apprehend the validity the attribute of the knowledge. Hence the self-sufficiency of the validity [of knowledge] [is] nothing but not being dependent on something different from what

सर्वेहोऽपि स्यात् । अनधिगते धर्मिणि सर्वेहानुदयात् । तस्मात् प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेव ज्ञाततान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्थापत्त्या ज्ञाने गृहीते ज्ञानगतं प्रामाण्यमप्यर्थापत्त्यैव गृह्यते । ततः पुरुषः प्रवर्तते । न तु प्रथमं<sup>१२</sup> ज्ञानमात्रं गृह्यते ततः प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाले फलदर्शने<sup>१</sup> जाते ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमवधार्यते ।

अत्रोच्यते । ज्ञाततान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्थापत्त्या ज्ञानं गृह्यत इति<sup>१५</sup> यदुक्तं तदेव वयं न मृष्यामहे । तथा प्रामाण्यग्रदस्तु दृष्ट एव । तथाहि । इदं किल परस्याभिमतम् । घटाद्विषये ज्ञाने जाते मया ज्ञातोऽयं घट इति घटस्य ज्ञातता प्रतिसधीयते । तेन ज्ञाने जाते<sup>१८</sup> सति ज्ञातता नाम कश्चिद्धर्मो जात इत्यनुमीयते । स च ज्ञानात्

makes [one] apprehend the knowledge. As regards the knowledge, it is apprehended, to be sure, before the activity. Otherwise, how could there be even the doubt about [its] validity or non-validity? Doubt can not arise as regards an object that is not apprehended. Therefore, prior to the activity itself, when the knowledge is apprehended by means of presumption arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the known-ness is apprehended the validity belonging to the knowledge also, by presumption itself, then the man moves on. But not that only the knowledge is apprehended first, and afterwards the validity of the knowledge is ascertained, when the sight of the result takes place at a time after the activity [is gone through].

To this we reply -- What has been said by you viz that knowledge is apprehended by means of presumption arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the known-ness--this itself we would not tolerate [that is admit to be true], as regards the apprehension of the validity by it, it [i. e. a question] still farther off [we admit that still less]. To explain. The following indeed [is] the view of [our] opponent. When the knowledge having for [its] object, a jar etc., arises, known-ness is recognised as belonging to the jar in the form 'This jar is known by me'. Hence it is inferred that when the knowledge is produced, some attribute

पूर्वमजातत्वाद् ज्ञाने जाते च जातत्वादन्यथैव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ज्ञानेन  
 २१ जन्यते इत्ययथार्थते । एवं च ज्ञानजन्योऽसौ ज्ञाततानाम धर्मो ज्ञान  
 मन्तरेण नोपपद्यते कारणभावे कार्यानुदयात् । तेनार्थापत्त्या स्वका  
 रणं ज्ञान ज्ञाततयगक्षिप्यते इति ।

२२ न चैतद्युक्तम् । ज्ञानविषयतातिरिक्ताया ज्ञातताया अभावात् ।  
 ननु ज्ञानजनितज्ञातताधारत्वमेव हि घटादेर्ज्ञानविषयत्वम् ।  
 तथाहि । न तावद् तादात्म्येन विषयता । घटज्ञानयोस्तादात्म्या  
 २३ नभ्युपगमात् । तदुत्पत्त्या तु विषयत्व इन्द्रियादिरपि विषय  
 त्वापत्ति । इन्द्रियादिरपि तस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्तेः । तेनेदमनुमीयते । ज्ञानेन

called known-ness is produced, and because it [jñatata] is not produced prior to the knowledge, and is produced when the knowledge is produced, it is ascertained that it is produced by knowledge, owing to the positive and negative association. And likewise, this attribute called known-ness arising out of knowledge could not be possible without knowledge, owing to the non-production of the effect in the absence of the cause. Therefore through presumption, is indicated knowledge, its own cause, by known-ness.

But this [argument of the opponent is] not proper, because known-ness exists not as different from the character of being the object of knowledge.

I say [says the objector]—The character of being the object of knowledge, of a jar etc is the same as being the substratum of known-ness produced by the knowledge. To explain. The character of being the object, [it] not, for the matter of that [produced] by identity, as identity is not admitted between the knowledge and the jar. If, again, [it be held that] objectivity [is due to the fact that the cognition] [is] produced by it [the object], then the sense-organs etc would have to be regarded as being possessed of objectivity, because that knowledge arises from the sense-organs etc., as well. Hence this is infer-  
 १३३३ — Something is produced in the jar by the knowledge.

घटे किञ्चिज्जनित येन घट एव तस्य ज्ञानस्य विषयो नान्य इति ।  
अतो विषयत्वान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्थापत्त्येव ज्ञातताभिद्धि न तु ३०  
प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण ।

मेवम् । स्वभावादेव विषयत्वोपपत्ते । अर्थज्ञानयोरतादृश  
एव स्वाभाविको विशेष यन्नानयोर्विषयविषयिभावः । इतरथाती ३१  
तानागतयोर्विषयत्व न स्यात् । ज्ञानेन तत्र ज्ञातताजननासम्भवात्  
अस्मति धर्मिणि धर्मजननायोगात् । किं च ज्ञातताया अपि स्वज्ञान  
विषयत्वात् तत्रापि ज्ञाततान्तरप्रसंगस्तथा चानवस्थाः । अथ ज्ञातता ३६  
न्तरमन्तरणापि स्वभावादेव ज्ञानविषयत्व ज्ञातताया । एव च तर्हि

by which the jar etc [is] the object of that know-  
ledge [and] not another so established knownness by  
presumption itself arising out of the impossibility of other-  
wise accounting for the character of being an object [and]  
not merely by perception

[Do] not [say] so. Objectivity can be accounted for  
by the very nature [of things]. Such indeed [is] the natural  
peculiarity of object and knowledge that [there exists]  
between these two the relation of object and possessor of the  
object. Otherwise there would be no character of an object  
in past and future [things]. For it is impossible for the  
knowledge to produce knownness in them owing to the im-  
possibility of the production of attributes [in a thing] when  
the thing [is] the possessor of attributes [is] non-existing.  
Moreover as knownness also is the object of its own know-  
ledge there also would [have to] be [admitted] another known-  
ness which is an undesirable contingency and thus [it  
would lead to] endlessness [regressum ad infinitum]. Well  
[to obviate the anavasthadosa if you were to say] even  
without a different knownness there would be the character  
of being an object of knownness by its very nature [then  
we would resort] if [that is] so then what need [is there] of  
[admitting] knownness in the case of [the knowledge of]  
the jar etc ?



घटादायपि किं ज्ञाततयेति ।

- ३९ अस्तु वा ज्ञातता तथापि तन्मात्रेण ज्ञानं गम्यते । प्रामाण्यं तु कुतः । अथ ज्ञाततया ज्ञानमात्रं गृह्यते प्रामाण्यं ज्ञातताविशेषेणेत्युच्यते तर्हि ज्ञाततया ज्ञानं गृह्यते ज्ञातताविशेषेण प्रामाण्य-  
 ४२ ज्ञानाद्यभिचारिणा प्रामाण्यमिति कुत एव ज्ञानग्राहकग्राह्यता प्रामाण्यस्य । अथ केनचिज् ज्ञातताविशेषेण प्रमाणज्ञानाद्यभिचारिणा ज्ञानप्रामाण्ये सहैव गृह्यते । एवं चेदप्रामाण्येऽपि शक्यमिदं  
 ४५ वक्तुम् । केनचिज् ज्ञातताविशेषेणाप्रमाणज्ञानाद्यभिचारिणा ज्ञानाप्रामाण्ये सहैव गृह्यते इति अप्रामाण्यमपि स्वत एव गृह्यताम् । अथैवमप्यप्रामाण्यं परतस्तर्हि प्रामाण्यमपि परत एव गृह्यताम् ज्ञानग्राह-  
 ४८ कादन्यत इत्यर्थः ।

Or, let the known-ness be [admitted to exist for the time being] still by that only is apprehended the knowledge, but whence [its] validity? Now [if you say that] knowledge alone is apprehended by means of known-ness, [and its] validity by means of a special known-ness then how indeed would the validity be capable of being apprehended by the same means which would make [one] apprehend the knowledge, inasmuch as [its] knowledge is apprehended  
 • by means of known-ness, [and its] validity by means of a special known-ness which never fails (*avyabhicāri*) in respect of correct knowledge? Now [if you were to say that] by means of some special known-ness never failing in respect of correct knowledge, are apprehended just together [both] knowledge and [its] validity, then likewise this could be said with respect to the invalidity [of knowledge] as well—by means of some special known-ness never failing in respect of incorrect knowledge knowledge and [its] invalidity are apprehended just together—so let the invalidity [of knowledge] also be apprehended from [the knowledge] itself! Now if thus [you are prepared to admit] that non validity [arises] from other means, then let the validity also be [accepted as] apprehended by other means that is, by other than what makes [one] apprehend knowledge

ज्ञानं हि मानसप्रत्यक्षेणैव गृह्यते प्रामाण्यं पुनरनुमानेन । तथाहि ।  
जलज्ञानानन्तरं जलार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिर्द्वैधा फलवत्यफला चेति । तत्र या  
फलवती प्रवृत्तिः सा समर्था । तया तज्ज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वलक्षणं ५१  
प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । प्रयोगश्च ।

दियादाध्यासितं जलज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।

समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् ।

५२

यत्र प्रमाणं न तत् समर्था प्रवृत्तिं जनयति यथा प्रमाणाभासः ।  
इति केवलव्यतिरेकी ।

अत्र च फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनकं यज्जलज्ञानं तत् पक्षः । तस्य प्रामाण्यं ५३-  
साध्यं यथार्थत्वमित्यर्थः । न तु प्रमात्यं स्मृत्या व्यभिचारापत्तेः ।  
हेतुस्तु समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वं फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वमिति यावत् ।

Knowledge, indeed is apprehended by means of percep-  
tion by the mind itself [ its ] validity on the other hand, by  
means of inference To explain After the knowledge of  
water, the activity of one desirous of water [ is ] of two  
kinds—fruitful and fruitless The activity which [ is ] fruitful  
[ is ] the successful [ or competent ] one, and from that is  
inferred the validity characterised by being in accord with  
the thing of that knowledge And the syllogism [ is  
follows ]—

The knowledge of water under dispute [ is ] valid

Because it produces successful activity

What is not valid, does not produce successful  
activity, as apparently valid knowledge

This [ is ] a purely negative [ hetu ]

And here, the subject [ is ] the knowledge of water,  
which produces fruitful activity What is to be established  
[ is ] its validity, that is, being in accord with its object, and  
not the character of being a direct cognition otherwise, there  
would be the violation [ of the vyapti ] owing to remembrance  
[ being samarthapravritujanaka though not a prama ] And  
the reason [ is ] 'producing a successful activity,' that is pro-  
ducing a fruitful activity

१ यथार्थमनुमीयते । २ समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकम् । ३ प्रमाकरणत्वम् ।

- ६) अनेन केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेनानभ्यासदशापन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्येऽप्रबोधिते तद्दृष्टान्तेन जलप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमपि तज्जातीयत्वेन लिङ्गेनान्यन्यतिरेक्यनुमानेनान्यस्य ज्ञानस्याभ्यासदशापन्नस्य प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । तस्मात् परत एव प्रामाण्यं न ज्ञानग्राहकेणैव गृह्यत इति ।

चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि युक्तिलेशोक्तिपूर्वकम् ।

- ६६ केशवो बालबोधाय यथाशास्त्रमवर्णयत् ॥ ४० ॥

## ( २ ) प्रमेयम् ।

प्रमेयाणि ।

प्रमाणाभ्युक्तानि । अथ प्रमेयाण्युच्यन्ते । आत्मदर्शिनोन्द्रियार्थबुद्धि

- When the validity of knowledge having no scope for previous experience, is ascertained by means of this purely negative inference, with that as an instance, is inferred, even before the activity [undertaken] for [securing] the water, the validity of other [later] knowledge having scope for previous experience, by means of a positive-negative inference, with the indicatory mark 'being of the same type' Therefore the validity is apprehended through another means alone, and not by what makes [one] apprehend knowledge itself

The proofs [that are] only four, Kesava has expounded, after stating in brief the arguments, and according to the treatises accepted as authority, for the understanding of beginners

( 47 ) The proofs have been explained, now are explained the objects of cognition Soul, body, sense-organ, object, [or categories], cognition, mind, activity, defect, transmigration fruit [or result of deeds], pain, and salvation

मन प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयमिति सूत्रम् १३  
(न्यायसूत्र १९) ॥ ४३ ॥

आत्मनिरूपणम् ।

तत्रात्मत्वसामान्यवानात्मा । स च देहन्द्रियादियतिरिक्त प्रति-  
शरीरं भिन्नो नित्यो चिभुध । स च मानसप्रत्यक्ष । विप्रतिपत्तो तु  
बुद्ध्यादिगुणलिङ्गकः । तथाहि ।

बुद्ध्यादयस्तावद् गुणाः ।

अनित्यत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । रूपवत् ।

गुणश्च गुण्याश्चित एव । तत्र बुद्ध्यादया न गुणा भूताना  
मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । ये हि भूताना गुणास्ते न मनसा गृह्यन्ते यथा  
रूपादयः । नापि द्विकालमनसा गुणा विशेषगुणत्वात् । ये हि दिगा १

[or final liberation] [these form] the object of cognition—so  
[runs the Nyaya-] Sutra

[44] Of them Soul [is that] which is possessed of the  
generality soul-ness And it [is] distinct from body sense-  
organs etc, different in each body all pervading and eternal  
It [is] again perceptible by the mind if there be disagree-  
ment [over the manasapratyakṣā] it has qualities, cogni-  
tion etc as the indicatory mark [to prove by inference its  
existence] To explain

Cognition etc to start with (soul) [are] qualities,

Because being non-eternal they are capable of  
being apprehended by one sense-organ  
like colour

And a quality must resort to a substance [its possessor  
of qualities] Now cognition etc [can not be] the quali-  
ties of material substances on account of their being per-  
ceptible by the mind For what [are] the qualities of material  
substances they are not apprehended by the mind  
[manasapratyakṣā] like colour and others not again  
[are they] the qualities of space time and mind owing to  
their being special qualities The qualities that belong  
to space etc —number etc [are] not special qualities,

दिगुणाः सरयादयो न ते विशेषगुणाः । ते हि सर्वद्रव्यसाधारणगुणा  
एव । बुद्ध्यादयस्तु विशेषगुणाः । गुणत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् रूपवत्  
१२ अतो न दिगादिगुणाः । तस्मादेभ्योऽष्टभ्यो व्यतिरेकी बुद्ध्यादीनां  
गुणानामौश्रयो वक्तव्यः । स एवात्मा । प्रयोगश्च ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः ।

१५ पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणत्वात् ।

यस्तु पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रितो न भवति नासौ  
पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणोऽपि भवति  
१८ यथा रूपादि ।

इति केवलव्यतिरेकी । अन्वयव्यतिरेकी वा । तथाहि ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः ।

they [ are ] indeed qualities common to all substances Cog-  
nition etc [ are ] on the other hand, special qualities, be-  
cause being qualities, they are capable of being apprehen-  
ded by one sense-organ like colour Hence [ they are ]  
not qualities belonging to space etc Therefore a substratum  
[ or resort ] for the qualities, cognition and others, distinct  
from these eight [ substances referred to above ] must be ad-  
mitted [ or stated ] that [ is ] just the Soul And the syllo-  
gism [ is as follows ] —

Cognition and others subsist in a substance distinct  
from the eight substances, earth etc

Because, not, subsisting in the eight substances,  
earth etc, they are qualities

That again, which does not subsist in a substance  
distinct from the eight substances earth etc is  
not a quality as well, not subsisting in the eight  
substances earth etc, like colour etc

This [ is ] a purely negative [ hetu ]

Or a positive-negative one To explain

Cognition and others subsist in a substance distinct  
from the eight substances earth etc

पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वं सति गुणत्वात् ।

२१

यो यदनाश्रितो गुणः स तदतिरिक्ताश्रितो भवति

यथा पृथिव्याद्यनाश्रित शब्दः पृथिव्याद्यतिरिक्ता-  
काशाश्रित इति ।

२२

तदेव पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्त नवमं द्रव्यमात्मा सिद्धम् । स च सर्वत्र कार्योपलम्भाद्विशुभुः । परममहत्परिमाणवानित्यर्थः । विशुभ्वाच्च निर्व्योऽसौ व्योमवत् । सुखादीनां वेचिभ्याम् प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नम् ॥४४॥ २७

शरीरनिरूपणम् ।

तस्य मोगायननमन्त्यावयवेषु शरीरम् । सुखदुःखान्यंतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः । स च यदवच्छिन्नं आत्मनि जायते तन्नोभायतनं तदेव ३

Because not subsisting in the eight substances, earth etc they are qualities

That which is a quality not subsisting in a particular [ substance ] subsists in [ a thing ] distinct from that as for instance sound which does not subsist in earth etc subsists in the ether distinct from earth etc

Thus then [is] established the soul the ninth substance distinct from the eight substances earth etc And owing to [its] function being found everywhere it [is] all pervading that is possessed of the highest large dimension And owing to its being all pervading it [is] eternal like the sky [ It is ] different for each body owing to the variation of pleasure etc

(45) Body [is] the abode of its enjoyments [ being ] a final product [ or ultimate composition ] Enjoyment [ is ] the experience of one or other of pleasure and pain [ and ], that [is] the abode of enjoyment, circumscribed by which is produced in the soul that [experience] [and] that it elf [is] the body Or body [is] the substratum of [physical] activity Activity again [is] the action intended for securing and avoiding

१ नत्वा च सुखदुःख पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्ताश्रया । २ न्यतनानुभवा ।

शरीरम् । चेष्टाध्रयो चा शरीरम् । चेष्टा तु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थं  
क्रिया न स्पन्दनमात्रम् ॥ ४५ ॥

षडिन्द्रियविचारः ।

शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणम् अतीन्द्रियम् इन्द्रियम् । अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रिय-  
३ मित्युच्यमाने कालादेरपीन्द्रियत्वप्रसंगः । अत उक्तं ज्ञानकरणमिति ।  
तथापि इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेऽतिप्रसंगः । अत उक्तं शरीरसंयुक्तमिति ।  
शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियमित्युच्यमान आलोकादेरपीन्द्रियत्व-  
६ प्रसंगः । अत उक्तमतीन्द्रियमिति ।

तानि चेन्द्रियाणि षट् । घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्यक्ध्रोत्रमनांसि ।

तत्र गन्धोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं घ्राणम् नासाग्रवर्ति । तत्र पार्थिवं  
१ गन्धवत्त्वाद् घटयत् । गन्धवत्त्वं च गन्धग्राहकत्वात् । यदिन्द्रियं

[ respectively ] the wholesome and unwholesome, [ and ] not mere motion

( 46 ) Sense-organ [ is that ] which is conjoined with the body, [ is ] the instrument of cognition, and [ is ] supersensuous. If it had been said [ that is, if the definition had been stated as ] sense organ [ is that which is ] supersensuous, then there would be the undesirable contingency, that time etc also would be sense organs so it is said [ in addition ] ' instrument of cognition ' Still [ even with this addition, the definition is faulty as ] there would be the undesirable contingency of [ the statement being ] too-wide in [ respect of ] the contact between sense-organ and object, so [ it ] is said [ in addition ] ' conjoined with the body ' If it had been said, sense organ [ is that which is ] conjoined with the body [ and is ] the instrument of cognition, there would be the undesirable contingency of even light etc, being sense-organs, so [ it ] is said [ in addition ] ' supersensuous '

And these sense organs [ are ] six—[ organs of ] smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, and mind

Of them, the organ [ which is ] the means of the apprehension of odour [ is ] the sense of smell, residing on the tip of the nose. And it [ is ] earthly, because [ it is ] possessed of odour, like a jar. Being possessed of odour, again, [ is there ] on

रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये यं गुण गृह्णाति तदिन्द्रिय तद्गुणसंयुक्तं यथा चक्षु रूपमाहकं रूपवत् ।<sup>१</sup>

रसोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रिय रसनम् जिह्वाग्रवर्ति । तद्याप्य<sup>१२</sup> रसवत्त्वान् । रसवत्त्व च रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये रसस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् लालावत् ।

रूपोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रिय चक्षु कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति । तच्च तेजस<sup>१५</sup> रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये रूपस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् प्रदापवत् ।

स्पर्शोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रिय त्वक् सर्वशरीरव्यापि त्वक्स्थानम् । तत्तु वायवीय रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये स्पर्शस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्<sup>१८</sup> अङ्गुलिसलिलशंत्याभिव्यञ्जकव्यञ्जनवातवत् ।

account of its making [one] apprehend odour What quality out of the five colour etc a [particular] sense organ apprehends with that quality is conjoined that sense organ, as for instance the eye making [one] apprehend colour, [is] possessed of colour

The organ [ which is ] the means of the apprehension of taste [ is ] the sense of taste residing on the tip of the tongue And it [ is ] watery because [ it is ] possessed of taste Being possessed of taste again [ is there ] on account of its manifesting taste alone out of the five colour etc like the saliva

The organ [ which is ] the means of the apprehension of colour [ is ] the sense of sight [ or the eye ] residing on the tip of the black pupil And it [ is ] of the essence of light [ or luminous ] on account of its manifesting colour alone out of the five, colour etc like a lamp

The organ [ which is ] the means of the apprehension of touch [ is ] the sense of touch pervading the whole of the body having for its location the skin And it [ is ] of the essence of wind on account of its manifesting touch alone out of the five colour etc like the breeze from the fan which manifests the cool touch of the water clinging to the body

१ गन्धग्राहकं च प्राणम् । अत्रो गन्धवत् ।



- शब्दोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं श्रोत्रम् । तच्च कर्णशङ्कुस्यवच्छिन्न-  
 २१ माकाशमेव । न द्रव्यान्तरं शब्दगुणत्वात् । तदपि शब्दग्राहकत्वात् ।  
 यदिन्द्रियं रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये यद्गुणग्राहकं तत्तद्गुणसंयुक्तम् यथा  
 चक्षुरादि रूपादिग्राहकं रूपादिसंयुक्तम् । शब्दग्राहकं श्रोत्रम् अतः  
 २२ शब्दगुणकम् ।

सुराशुपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्चाणुपरिमाणम् हृद-  
 यान्तवर्ति ।

- २३ ननु चक्षुरादीन्द्रियसद्भाव किं प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । अनुमानमेव  
 तथाहि ।

रूपाद्युपलब्धयः करणसाध्याः । क्रियात्वात् ।

छिदिक्रियाच्च ॥ ४६ ॥

The organ [ which is ] the means of the apprehension of sound [ is ] the sense of hearing [ or the ear ] And it [ is ] either itself limited by the tympanum [ or drum ] of the ear, not another substance, on account of having sound as a quality, and that too, on account of its apprehending [ or making one apprehend ] the sound. What quality out of the five, colour etc, a [ particular ] sense-organ manifests, with that quality is conjoined that [ sense-organ ] as for instance, the eye, etc making [ one ] apprehend colour etc, are conjoined with colour etc The ear makes [ one ] apprehend sound, therefore it has sound as a quality

The organ [ which is ] the means 'of the apprehension of pleasure etc [ is ] the mind and it has the dimension of an atom residing inside the heart

I say [ says the objector ]—What [ is the ] proof for the existence of the sense-organs, sense of sight etc ? We reply— [ It is ] inference itself To explain

Apprehensions of colour etc are fit to be  
 produced by an instrument  
 Because [ they are ] action  
 like the action of cutting

पदपदार्थाः । द्रव्यनिरूपणम् ।

अर्थाः पद पदार्थाः । ते च द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य विशेष-सम-  
वायाः । श्रमाणादयो यद्यप्यत्रैवान्नर्भवन्ति तथापि प्रयोजनवशाद् ३  
भेदेन कीर्तितः ।

तत्र समवायिकारणं द्रव्यम् । गुणाद्ययो वा द्रव्यम् । तानि च  
द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यन्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥ ४७ ॥ ६

पृथिवीनिरूपणम् ।

तत्र पृथिवीत्वसामान्यवती पृथिवी । काठिन्यकोमलत्वाद्यवयव-  
संयोगविशेषेण युक्ता । घ्राण-शरीर-मृत्-पिण्डपापणवृक्षादिरूपा । १४  
रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंज्ञापरिमाणपृथग् प्रसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरु-  
त्वद्रवत्वसंस्कारवती । सा च द्विविधा नित्या अनित्या च । नित्या  
परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या च कार्यरूपा । द्विविधायां पृथिव्या रूपर २

(47) Objects [ are ] the six categories. And they [are]—  
Substance, quality, action generality, particularity [ or in-  
dividuality ] inherence [ or intimate association ] Though  
proof and others [ mentioned in the first Nyayasutra ] are  
comprised just under here till they have been mentioned  
separately for the sake of [ some definite ] purpose

Of them, the material [ or constituent ] cause [ is ] sub-  
stance or the substratum of qualities. [ is ] substance. And  
those substances [ are ] only nine [ namely ] earth water, fire,  
wind ether, time space, soul and mind

(48) Of them, earth [ is that ] which is possessed of the  
generality, earth-ness [ It is ] associated with the peculiar  
combination of parts, [ giving rise to ] harshness softness etc  
[ It is possessed ] of the form of organ of smell body, lump of  
clay, stones, trees etc [ and ] is possessed of [ qualities ]  
colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension [ or magnitude ]  
severality, conjunction, disjunction remoteness nearness,  
gravity [ or heaviness ], fluidity, [ and ] impression. And it [ is ]  
of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. Eternal [ earth is ] of  
the form of atoms, and non-eternal [ is ] of the form of pro-  
duct [ The qualities ] colour, taste, odour and touch of the two-

सगन्धस्पर्शा अनित्याः पाकजाश्च । पाकस्तु तेज-संयोगः । तेन  
पृथिव्या पूर्वरूपादयो नश्यन्त्यन्ये जन्यन्त इति पाकजाः ॥ ४८ ॥

अन्निरूपणम् ।

अण्वसामान्ययुक्ता आपः । रसनेन्द्रिय-शरीर सरित्समुद्रहिमकर  
३ कादिरूपाः । गन्धघर्जस्नेहयुक्तपूर्वोक्तगुणवत्यः । नित्या अनित्याश्च ।  
नित्यानां रूपादयो नित्या एव । अनित्यानाम् अनित्या एव ॥ ४९ ॥

तेजोनिरूपणम् ।

तेजस्त्वसामान्यवत् तेज । चक्षु शरीर-सवितृसुवर्णवह्नियुदादि  
३ प्रभेदम् । रूपस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वद्र  
यत्वसंस्कारवत् । नित्यमनित्यं च पूर्ववत् । तच्चतुर्विधम् उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शम्  
अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शम् अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शम् उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शम्

fold earth [ are ] non-eternal and [ are ] produced by heat  
Heat [ is ] again the conjunction with fire [ or light ] Through  
it are destroyed the former colour etc of earth [ and ] others  
are produced—thus [ they are ] produced by heat

( 49 ) Water [ is that ] which is possessed of the genera-  
lity, water-ness [ It is ] of the form of organ of  
taste, body, rivers, oceans, snow, hail etc [ It is ] possessed  
of qualities mentioned above [ as possessed by earth ]  
except odour, and with the addition of viscosity [ It is ]  
eternal and non-eternal Colour etc of eternal [ water are ]  
eternal only, [ colour etc ] of non-eternal [ water are ] non-  
eternal only

( 50 ) Fire [ is that ] which is possessed of the generality,  
fire-ness [ It is ] divided into organ of sight, body, the sun,  
gold, [ terrestrial ] fire lightning etc [ It is ] possessed of  
[ the qualities ] colour touch, number, dimension [ or  
magnitude ] severality, conjunction, disjunction remoteness,  
nearness fluidity and impression [ It is ] eternal and  
non-eternal as above It [ is ] of four kinds—having [ both ]  
developed colour and developed touch, having [ both ] colour  
and touch undeveloped having undeveloped colour and  
developed touch, and having developed colour and undeve-  
loped touch That having [ both ] developed colour and deve-

चेति । उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं यथा सोरादितेज पिण्डीभूत तेजो बह्वचादिकम् । ६  
 चुर्णं तु उद्भूताभिभूतरूपस्पर्शम् । अनुद्भूतरूपत्वञ्चाधुप स्यात्  
 अनुद्भूतस्पर्शत्व त्वच्चा न गृह्येत । अभिमवस्तु बलवत्सजातीयेन  
 पार्थिवरूपेण स्पर्शेन च कृतं । अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं यथा चक्षुरिन्द्रियम् । ९  
 अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शं यथा तप्तप्रारिस्थ तेजः । उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं  
 यथा प्रदीपप्रभामण्डलम् ॥ ५० ॥

वायुनिरूपणम् ।

१) वायुत्वाभिसम्बन्धवान् वायु त्वगिन्द्रिय शरीर प्राणवातादिप्रभेदः ।  
 स्पर्शस्तरयापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्ववेगवान् । स च  
 स्पर्शानुमेयः । तथाहि त्रौऽत्र वाया वाति अनुष्णशीतस्पर्शं उप  
 लभ्यते स गुणत्वाद् गुणिनमन्तरेणानुपपद्यमानो गुणिनमनुमापद्यति ।

veloped touch [is] a- for instance the heat of the sun etc [and] fire formed in a mass—[terrestrial] fire etc Gold on the other hand has colour and touch developed but overpowered If it had undeveloped colour it would not be visible if it had undeveloped touch it could not be apprehended by the sense of touch The overpowering [of the tanjasa colour and touch in gold] again is effected [by the colour and touch of [the particles of] earth [in it] which belong to the same kind and [are more] powerful [Fire] having [both] undeveloped colour and touch [is] as for instance the organ of sight [fire] having undeveloped colour and developed touch—as for instance the heat residing in hot [or boiling] water [fire] having developed colour and undeveloped touch—as for instance the halo of the light of a lamp

(51) Wind [is that] which is associated with [the generality] wind n 5 [It L.] divided into organ of touch body vital airs breeze etc [It 1] possessed of [the qualities] touch number dimension [or magnitude] severality conjunction disjunction remoteness nearness and velocity And it 1 to b inferred from touch To explain This here not hot not cold touch that is experienced [or felt] when the wind blows being a quality and impossible to be accounted

कार्यवता रूपादयः स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणगतेभ्यो रूपादिभ्यो  
जायन्ते । कारणगुणा हि कार्यगुणानारभन्त इति न्यायात् । /

इत्थमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य घटादेरवयवेषु नोदनादभिघाताद्वा  
क्रिया जायते । तथा विभाग । तेनावयव्यारम्भकस्यासमवा- १२  
यिकारणीभूतस्य संयोगस्य नाशः । ततः कार्यद्रव्यस्य  
घटादेरवयवविनो नाशः । एतेनावयव्यारम्भकासमवायिकारणनाशेन  
द्रव्यनाशो दर्शितः । क्वचित् समवायिकारणनाशेन द्रव्यनाशो यथा १५  
पूर्वोक्तस्यैव पृथिव्यादेः संहारे संजिहीषोर्महेश्वरस्य सजिहीषा जायते ।  
ततो ह्यणुकारम्भकेषु परमाणुषु क्रिया । तथा विभागस्ततस्तयो-  
संयोगनाशे सति ह्यणुकेषु गटेषु स्वाश्रयनाशात् व्यणुकादिनाशः । एवं १८

क्रमेण पृथिव्यादिनाशः । यथा वा तन्तूनां नाशे पटनाशः । तद्गतानां  
रूपादीनां स्वाश्रयनाशेनैव नाशः । अन्यत्र तु सत्येवाश्रये विरोधिगु-  
२१ णप्रादुर्भावेण विनाशः । यथा पाकेन घटादौ रूपादिनाश इति ॥ ५२ ॥

परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् परमाणोरनारब्धत्वम् अणुकव्यणुकोत्पत्तिः ।

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । यदिद् जालसूर्यमरी-  
३ चिस्थं सर्वतः सूक्ष्मतमं रज उपलभ्यते तत् स्वल्पपरिमाणद्रव्यारब्धं  
कार्यद्रव्यत्वाद् घटवत् । तच्च द्रव्यं कार्यमेव महद्द्रव्यारम्भकस्य  
कार्यत्वनियमात् । तदेयं अणुकारस्य द्रव्यं सिद्धम् । तदपि स्वल्पपरि-  
६ णसमवायिकारणास्त्वं कार्यद्रव्यत्वाद् घटवत् । यस्तु अणुकार-  
म्भकः स एव परमाणुः । स चानारब्ध एवेति ।

thus in order [takes place] the destruction of earth etc. Or as for instance, the destruction of the cloth on the destruction of the threads, the destruction of colour etc belonging to it [takes place] through the destruction itself of their substratum. In other cases, on the other hand, destruction [takes place] through the appearance of contrary qualities, even though the substratum continues to exist, as for instance, the destruction of colour etc in the jar etc through heating

(53) What again, [is] the proof for the existence of atoms? We reply —What this [particle of] dust, the finest of all, is found existing in the rays of the sun coming from a lattice, that is produced by a substance possessing a smaller dimension [than its own], because it is a product-substance like a jar [And] that substance, in its turn (ca), [is] also a product, as it is a rule that what produces a substance of a large dimension is a product. Thus then the substance called the binary is established. And that too is produced by an intimate cause possessing a smaller dimension, because it is a product substance, like a jar. What again is the producing cause of the binary, that [is] the atom itself and that [is] verily, unproduced

ननु कार्यद्रव्यारम्भकस्य कार्यद्रव्यत्वाव्यभिचारात् तस्य कथम  
नारब्धत्वम् । उच्यते । अनन्तकार्यपरवराद्देवप्रसंगात् । तथा च  
सत्यनन्तकार्यद्रव्यारब्धत्वाविशेषेण मेरुसर्पवयोरपि तुल्यपरिमाणत्व  
प्रसंगः । तस्मान्नारब्ध एव परमाणु । १२

द्व्यणुक तु द्वाभ्यामेव परमाणुन्यामारभ्यते । एकस्थानारम्भकत्वात्  
इत्यादिकल्पनाया प्रमाणाभावात् । द्व्यणुक तु त्रिभिरेव द्व्यणुकेरारभ्यते ।  
एकस्थानारम्भकत्वात् । द्वाभ्यामारम्भे कार्यगतमहत्त्वानुपपत्तिप्रस-  
गात् । कार्यं हि महत्त्वं कारणमहत्त्वाद्वा कारणद्रव्यत्वाद्वा । तत्र प्रथम  
स्थानमत्राच्चरममपित्त्वम् । न च चतुरादिकल्पनाया प्रमाणमस्ति  
त्रिभिरेव महत्त्वारम्भोपपत्तेरिति ॥ ५३ ॥ १०

I say [says the objector]— How can it [the atom] have the character of not being a product owing to the invariable association of the producer [or component parts] of a product substance with the nature of a product substance? We reply Because there would be the undesirable contingency of an endless series of products. And in that case there would be the undesirable contingency of even [the mountain] Meru and the mustard seed having a similar dimension being equally produced by infinite product substances. Therefore the atom [is] verily unproduced.

A binary on the other hand is produced by two atoms only because one [atom] can not be the producer [or the component part] and there is no valid reason for admitting three etc [atoms as the arambhaka]. The triad again is produced by only three binaries because one can not be the producer. If two [binaries] were to produce [the triad] there would be the undesirable contingency [namely] the impossibility of accounting for the magnitude belonging to the product. For the magnitude in a product [arises] from the magnitude of the cause or from the plurality of the cause. [Now] here the first being impossible [as the binary, have no mahatva] the latter must be sought. And there is no valid reason for admitting four etc [binaries as the cause of a triad] on account of the possibility of accounting for the production of the magnitude by three [binaries] only.

## आकाशनिरूपणम् ।

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । शब्दसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागवत् ।  
 ५ एकं विभु नित्यं च । शब्दलिङ्गकं च । शब्दलिङ्गकत्वमस्य कथम् । परि-  
 शेषात् । तथाहि । शब्दस्तावद् विशेषगुणः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मद्वादि-  
 वाह्यैकेन्द्रियग्राहत्वाद् रूपादिवत् । गुणश्च गुण्याश्रित एव । न चास्य  
 ६ पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमात्मा च गुणी भवितुमर्हति । श्रोत्रग्राहत्वाच्छ-  
 द्दस्य । ये हि पृथिव्यादीनां गुणा न ते श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यन्ते यथा  
 रूपादयः । शब्दस्तु श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते । न च दिक्कालमनसां गुणः । विशेष-  
 ७ गुणत्वान् । अत एभ्योऽप्रभ्योऽतिरिक्तः शब्दगुणी एषितव्यः । स एवाकाश  
 इति । न चैकः । भेदे प्रमाणाभावात् एकत्वेनैवोपपत्तेः । एकत्वाच्चाका-

( 54 ) Ether [ is that ] which has sound for [ its special ]  
 quality [ It is ] possessed of [ the qualities ] sound, number  
 dimension, severality, conjunction and disjunction. [ It is ]  
 one, all pervading and eternal and has sound as the indi-  
 catory mark [ to prove its existence by inference ] How has  
 it sound as the indicatory mark ? Through [ the rule of ]  
 elimination [ or remainder, exclusion ] To explain Sound, to  
 start with, [ is ] a special quality, because while possessed  
 of a generality, it is fit to be apprehended by means of one  
 external sense organ of people like us [ that is, ordinary  
 people ], like colour etc And a quality must subsist in a  
 substratum Again, the four [ elements ] earth etc, and the  
 soul do not deserve to be the substratum of this [ quality ],  
 because sound is fit to be apprehended by the ear For what  
 [ are ] the qualities of earth and others they are not appre-  
 hended by the sense of hearing as for instance, colour etc  
 Sound, on the other hand is apprehended by the ear  
 [ Sound is ] not the quality of space time and mind either,  
 because it is a special quality Therefore a possessor of the  
 quality sound, distinct from these eight [ substances ] must  
 be sought And that [ is ] ether alone And it [ is ] one there  
 being no valid reason for [ admitting ] divisions, and [ every  
 thing being ] accounted for, by its being just one Because  
 it is one, the generality called ether-ness does not exist in



अत्र नाम सामान्यमाकाशे न विद्यते । सामान्यस्थानेकवृत्तित्वात् ।  
 विभु आकाशम् परममहत्परिमाणमित्यर्थः । सर्वत्र तत्कार्योपलब्धे ॥१२  
 अत एव विभुत्वान्नित्यमिति ॥ ५४ ॥

कालनिरूपणम् ।

कालोऽपि द्विग्विपरीतपरत्वापरत्वानुमेयः । सख्यापरिमाणवृत्तत्वं ,  
 सयोगविभागवान् । एको नित्यो विभुश्च । कथमस्य द्विग्विपरीतपरत्वा  
 परत्वानुमेयत्वम् । उच्यते । सनिहिते वृद्धे सनिधानादपरत्वाहं तद्विप  
 रीत परत्व प्रतीयते । द्यवहिते घूनि व्यवधानात् परत्वाह तद्विपरी ६  
 तमपरत्वम् । तदिदं दिक्कृतविपरीतपरत्वमपरत्व च काय सत्कारणस्य  
 दिगादेरसंभवात् कालमेव कारणमनुभावयति ।

ether because a generality exist in more than one Ether  
 again [is] all pervading that is having the high & large  
 dimension because [its] effect [or function] is apprehended  
 everywhere for this very reason [it is] eternal owing  
 to [its] all pervading nature

(55) Time also is to be inferred from the [notions of]  
 remoteness and nearness contrary to [those caused by]  
 space [It is] possessed of number dimension severality  
 conjunction and disjunction [It is] not eternal and all  
 pervading How is it to be inferred from the [notions of]  
 remoteness and nearness contrary to [those caused by]  
 space? We reply In [the case of] an old man near to  
 [us] and [though] fit for [being regarded as possessing]  
 nearness owing to proximity [the notion of] remoteness  
 contrary to it is apprehended [and] in [the case of] a youth  
 remote [from us] and [though] fit for [being regarded as  
 possessing] remoteness [is apprehended the notion of] near  
 ness contrary to it Now this remoteness and nearness  
 contrary to [that] caused by space being an effect makes  
 [us] infer time alone as [its] cause owing to the impossibi  
 lity of space etc being [its] cause

१ स चेकोऽपि वर्तमानातीतभविष्यत्क्रियांपाधिबशाद् वर्तमानादि-  
व्यपदेशं लभते पुरुष इव पद्यादिभ्योपाधिबशात् पाचक्याचका-  
दिद्वयपदेशम् । नित्यत्वविभुत्ये चास्य पूर्ववत् ॥ ५५ ॥

दिङ्निरूपणम् ।

कालविपरीतपरत्वापरत्वानुमेया दिगेका नित्या विम्बी च ।  
३ सख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसयोगविभागवती । सा च पूर्वादिप्रत्ययैरनु-  
मेया । तेषामन्यनिमित्तासभवत् । पूर्वस्मिन् पश्चिमे वा देशे स्थितस्य  
वस्तुनस्तादवस्थत् । सा चेकापि सचित्तस्तत्तद्देशसंयोगोपाधिबशाद्  
६-प्राच्यादिसहा लभते ॥ ५६ ॥

आत्मनिरूपणम् ।

आत्मत्वाभिसवन्धवानात्मा । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात् नानाभूत

And though one, it secures the appellation 'present'  
etc [that is 'past' and 'future'] owing to the limiting  
adjunct (*upādhi*) of present, past, and future actions, like a  
man the appellation of 'a cook,' 'a mendicant' etc owing  
to the limiting adjunct of the actions, cooking etc Its  
eternal nature and all pervading nature [are] as before  
[that is, like ether]

(56) Space inferrable from the [notions of] remote-  
ness and nearness contrary to [those caused by] time  
[is] one eternal and all pervading [It is] possessed of  
[the qualities] number, dimension severality, conjunction  
and disjunction And it is to be inferred from the notions  
of 'east' etc owing to the impossibility of any other cause  
for them because a thing remains just the same whether it be  
in the western or eastern region And though one it secures  
the name 'the east' etc by virtue of the limiting adjunct of  
the conjunction of the sun with those particular regions

(57) Soul [is that] which is associated with soul-ness  
[It is] indeed manifold, owing to the multiplicity [or  
variation] of pleasure, pain etc and it has been already

एव । च चोक्त एव । तस्य सामान्यगुणा सत्यादयः पञ्च बुद्ध्यादयो ३  
नव विशेषगुणाः । नित्यत्वविमुक्त्ये पूर्ववत् ॥ ५७ ॥

मनोनिरूपणम् ।

मनस्त्वाभिसंबन्धवन्मनः । अण्वात्मलयोग्यन्तरिन्द्रियम् । सुखाद्य-  
पलब्धिकारणं नित्यं च सख्याद्यष्टगुणवत् । तन्मयोगेन बाह्येन्द्रिय ६  
मर्थमाहकम् । अत एव सर्वोपलब्धिसाधनम् । तच्च न प्रत्यक्षम् अपि  
त्यनुमानगम्यम् । तथाहि ।

सुखाद्युपलब्धयश्चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तकरणसाध्या ।

असत्स्यापि चक्षुरादिषु जायमानत्वात् ।

यद्य तत् चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तम् कारण तन्मनः । नश्चाणुपरिमाणम् ।

इति द्रव्याण्युक्तानि ॥ ५८ ॥

१२

described It has five general qualities number etc and  
nine special qualities cognition etc Eternal nature and all-  
pervading nature [are in it] as above [as in space]

(58) Mind [is that] which is associated with mind  
ness [It is] atomic having conjunction with the soul [and]  
an internal sense organ [It is] the cause of the apprehen-  
sion of pleasure etc eternal and possessed of the eight  
qualities number etc Through conjunction with it the  
external sense organ makes [one] apprehend the object and  
for this very reason [it is] the means of all apprehension  
It again [is] not perceptible [directly] but is fit to be  
known by inference To explain

Apprehensions of pleasure etc are produced by an  
instrument distinct from the eye etc

Because [they are] being produced even when the  
eye etc are not present

And what is the instrument distinct from the eye etc  
that [is] the mind And [it is] of atomic dimension

Thus have the substance been expounded

१ यद्वन्तु यद्विनेवात्ययने तत्तदतिरिक्तकरणमाह यथा बुद्धार विनोत्पद्यमाना  
पञ्चक्रिया तदतिरिक्तबुद्ध्यादिरूपसाध्या ।

गुणानिरूपणम् ।

अथ गुणा उच्यन्ते । सामान्यवान् असमवायिकारणम् अस्पन्दात्मा  
गुणः । स च द्रव्याश्रित एव । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व-  
संयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेष  
प्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारभेदाच्चतुर्विंशतिधा ॥ ५९ ॥

रूपनिरूपणम् ।

तत्र रूपं चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो विशेषगुणः । पृथिव्यादित्रयवृत्ति । तच्च  
शुक्लाद्यनेकप्रकारकम् । पाकजं च पृथिव्याम् । तच्चानित्यं पृथिवीमात्रं ।  
आप्यतेजसपरमाण्वोनित्यम् । आप्यतेजसकोर्येव नित्यम् । शुक्लभा  
स्वरमपाकजं तेजसि । तदेवाभास्वरमप्सु ॥ ६० ॥

रसनिरूपणम् ।

रसो रसनेन्द्रियग्राह्यो विशेषगुणः । पृथिवीजहवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्या

(59) Now are expounded the qualities. Quality [is that] which is possessed of generality, [is] the non intimate cause, [and is] not of the nature of motion. And it subsists in a substance alone [It is] of twenty-four kinds through the division into colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension [or magnitude] severality, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, gravity [or heaviness] fluidity, viscosity, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, activity, merit, demerit, and impression.

मधुरादिपट्टप्रकारे पाकजञ्च । अप्तु मधुरोऽपाकज्ञो नित्योऽनित्यञ्च । ३  
नित्यं परमाणुरूपास्वप्सु । कार्यरूपास्वप्सु नित्यं ॥ ६१ ॥

गन्धनिरूपणम् ।

गन्धो घ्राणग्राह्यो विदोषगुणः । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः । अनित्य एव । स  
द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । जलादीनां गन्धप्रतिमानं तु सयुक्तसमवायेन ।  
दृष्टव्यम् ॥ ६२ ॥

स्पर्शनिरूपणम् ।

स्पर्शस्त्वाग्निन्द्रियग्राह्यो विदोषगुणः । पृथिव्यादिवत्प्रयवृत्तिः । स  
व त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतोभेदात् । शीतं पयसि । उष्णस्तेजासि ।  
अनुष्णाशीतं पृथिवीवाय्वा । पृथिवीमात्रं लानित्यं । आप्यतेजस  
वायवीयपरमाणुषु नित्यं । आप्यादिकार्येष्वनित्यं । एते च रूपाद  
यश्चत्वारो महत्त्वेकार्यसमवतत्त्वं सत्युद्भूता एव प्रत्यक्षा ॥ ६३ ॥ ६

In water [ it is ] sweet not produced by heating eternal  
and non eternal [ It is ] eternal in water of the form of  
atoms [ and ] non eternal in water of the form of a product

(62) Odour [ is ] a special quality to be apprehended by  
the sense of smell [ It ] resides in earth alone [ is ] only  
non eternal It [ is ] of two kinds—fragrant and non fra-  
grant The apprehension of odour in water etc is however •  
to be understood [ as caused ] by intimate relation with  
[ earth that is ] conjoined [ with it ]

(63) Touch [ is ] a special quality to be apprehended by  
the sense of touch [ It ] resides in the group of four earth etc  
And it [ is ] three fold through the division into cold hot not  
cold not hot [ It is ] cold in water hot in fire no hot not cold  
in earth and wind [ It is ] again non eternal in earth only,  
eternal in the atoms of water fire and wind non eternal in  
the products of water etc These four colour etc are directly  
perceptible only when they are developed and are in in-  
timate relation with an object possessed of magnitude

सम्यानिरूपणम् । द्वित्वम् अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यम् ।

सम्या एकत्वादित्यवहारोत्तु सामान्यगुण । एकत्वादिपराध  
पर्यन्ता । तत्रैकत्व द्विविध नित्यानित्यभेदात् । नित्यगत नित्यम्  
अनित्यगतमनित्यम् । एवाश्रयसमयाधिकारणगतैकत्वजन्यं च । द्वित्वं  
चानित्यमेव । तच्च द्रव्या पिण्डयोरेकमेकमिदमेकमित्यपेक्षाबुद्ध्या  
जन्यते । तत्र द्वौ पिण्डौ समवायिकारणम् । पिण्डयोरेकत्वसमवा  
यिकारणम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिनिमित्तकारणम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाद्  
द्वित्वविनाशः । एव नित्याद्युत्पत्तिर्विज्ञेया ॥ ६४ ॥

परिमाणनिरूपणम् ।

परिमाणं मानस्यवहारासाधारणं कारणम् । तच्चतुर्विधम् । अणु मट्ट  
दीर्घ ह्रस्व चति । तत्र कार्यगत परिमाण सम्यापरिमाणप्रचययेति ।

(64) Number [1s] a general quality the cause of the  
employment of words [regarding] one-ness [or the chara-  
cteristic of being one] etc [It] begins with one-ness and  
ends with parārdha. There one-ness [or conception of uni-  
ty] [1s] of two kinds on account of the division into eternal  
and non-eternal [It is] eternal [when] belonging to eternal  
[things] non-eternal [when] belonging to non-eternal  
[things] and produced by the one-ness belonging to the  
intimate cause of its substratum. Duality on the other  
hand [1s] non-eternal only and it is produced by the  
relative [and combined] notion about two objects in the  
form this [is] one this [is] one. Here the two objects  
[are] the intimate cause the two unities of the two objects,  
the non-intimate cause [and] the relative notion the  
instrumental cause. From the destruction of the relative  
notion itself [follows] the destruction of duality. Thus  
the production of three-ness etc. is to be understood.

(65) Dimension [1] the special cause of the employ-  
ment of words [regarding] measurement. It [1s] of four  
kind—minute large long and short. There the dimension  
belonging to a product is produced by number dimension or  
loose combination of part (prīṣṭāh) It [1s] as follows—

तद्यथा । द्व्यणुकपरिमाणमीश्वरापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यपरमाणुद्वित्वजनित-  
त्वात् संख्यायोनि । संख्याकारणकमित्यर्थः । त्र्यणुकपरिमाणं च  
स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणतत्त्वहुत्वसंख्यायोनि । चतुरणुकादिपरिमाणं  
तु स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणपरिमाणजन्यम् । तूलपिण्डपरिमाणं तु  
स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणावयवानां प्रक्षिप्तिलसंयोगजन्यम् । परमाणु-  
परिमाणं परममहत्परिमाणं चाकाशादिगतं नित्यमेव ॥ ६५ ॥

पृथक्त्वनिरूपणम् ।

पृथक्त्वं पृथग्व्यवहारान्नाधारणं कारणम् । तद्यं द्विविधम् । एक-  
थक्त्वं द्विपृथक्त्वादिकं च । तत्राद्यं नित्यमनं नित्यमनित्यमतमनि-  
यम् । द्विपृथक्त्वादिकं चानित्यमेव ॥ ६६ ॥

संयोगनिरूपणम् ।

संयोगः संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः । द्वाश्रयाऽऽद्याप्यवृत्तिश्च । स च त्रिविधः ।

The dimension of a binary is produced by number, being caused by the duality of atom produced by the relative notion of God, that is it has number for its cause. The dimension of a triad again has for its cause, number [viz] plurality belonging to the intimate cause of its substratum. The dimension of a quaternary etc., on the other hand, is produced by the dimension of the intimate cause of its substratum, the dimension of a mass of cotton, again, is produced by the loose combination of the component parts of the intimate cau of its substratum. The dimension of an atom and the highest large dimension belonging to ether etc [are] eternal only.

(66) Severality [1-] the [partial] cause of the employment of words [such as—'This thing is] different [from that'] It [is] of two kinds, severality in one and severality in two etc. Of them, the first belonging to eternal [things is] eternal, [and], belonging to non-eternal [things is] non-eternal. Severality in two etc [is] non-eternal only.

(67) Conjunction [1-] the [special] cause of the employment of words [such as 'The two things are] joined,'

१ स्वसंख्यावयवजन्ययोनि । परस्परव्यवहारानां स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणपरिमाणुद्वित्व-  
संयोगः । २ नित्यमनियम् । अनित्ये त्वर्थं पृथक्त्वादिकं तु द्विपृथक्त्वादिपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यम् ।

- ३ अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मज संयोगजश्चेति । तत्रान्यतरकर्मजो यथा क्रियावता श्येनेन सह निष्क्रियस्य स्थाणो संयोगः । अस्य हि श्येनक्रिया असमवायिकारणम् । उभयकर्मजो यथा सक्रिययोर्महयो-  
६ संयोग । संयोगजो यथा कारणाकारणसंयोगात् कार्याकार्यसंयोगः । यथा हस्ततरुसंयोगेन कायतरुसंयोगः ॥ ६७ ॥

विभागनिरूपणम् ।

- विभागोऽपि विभक्तप्रत्ययहेतुः । संयोगपूर्वको द्वाश्रय । स च  
३ त्रिविधः अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजो विभागजश्चेति । तत्र प्रथमो यथा श्येनक्रियया शैलश्येनयोर्विभागः । द्वितीयो यथा महयोर्विभागः ।

has two substratums and never covers them entirely [or reside, in them without pervading them altogether] It [is] of three kinds—arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums], arising from the action of both, and arising from conjunction. Of them, [that] arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums] [is] for instance, the conjunction of the motionless post with the moving falcon, the motion of the falcon [is] its non intimate cause [That] arising from the action of both [is] for instance, the conjunction [clash] of two active [or fighting] wrestlers. [That] arising from conjunction [is] for instances, the conjunction of the effect [body] and what is not an effect [tree] due to the conjunction of the cause [the hand] and what is not a cause [tree], as the conjunction of body and tree, through the conjunction of hand and tree

(68) Disjunction again [is] the [special] cause of the notion [such as These two things are] separated [or disjointed]'. [It] has a conjunction beforehand and has two substratums. And it [is] of three kinds—arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums] arising from the action of both, and arising from disjunction. Of them the first [is] for instance the disjunction of the mountain and the falcon, through the motion of the falcon. The second [is] for instance, the disjunction of [two]



तृतीयो यथा हस्ततरुविभागात् कायतरुविभाग ॥ ६८ ॥

परत्वापरत्वनिरूपणम् ।

परत्वापरत्वे परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे । ते तु द्विविधे  
दिक्रूते कालकृत च ।

तत्र विक्रूतयोरुत्पत्ति कथ्यते । एकस्यां दिव्यवस्थितयो पिण्ड  
योरिदमस्मात् सनिकृष्टमितियुद्धयानुगृहीतेन दिक्पिण्डसयोगेना  
परत्वं सनिकृष्टे जन्यते । विप्रकृष्टयुद्धया तु परत्वं विप्रकृष्टे जन्यते ।  
सनिकर्षस्तु पिण्डस्य द्रष्टुं शरीरापक्षया सयुक्तसयोगाल्पीयस्त्वम् ।  
तद्भूयस्त्य विप्रकर्ष इति ।

कालकृतयोस्तु परत्वापरत्वयोरुत्पत्ति कथ्यते । अनियतदिग्द-  
स्थितयोर्युवस्थविरापिण्डयोरयमस्माद्दत्तपतरकालस्ववन्धीति धिया

wrestlers the third [is] for instance the disjunction of body  
and tree through the disjunction of hand and tree

(69) Remoteness and nearness [are] the special causes  
of the employment of words [such as This thing is]  
remote [from or] near [to that] They again [are] of two  
kinds—caused by space and caused by time

Of them [now] is described the production of [remote  
ness and nearness] caused by space Out of two objects  
residing in the same quarter is produced in the nearer  
[object] nearness through the conjunction of space and  
object favoured by the cognition This [is] nearer than that  
in the farther [object] however is produced remoteness  
through the cognition of [its being] remote Nearness again  
[is] the [comparatively] smaller number of conjunctions of  
conjoined [things] of the object with reference to the body  
of the observer a larger number thereof [is] remoteness

And [now] is described the production of remoteness  
and nearness caused by time Out of two objects a young  
man and an old man sitting not in any particular direction  
[there arises] nearness in the young man owing to the

१ सद्रूप । २ स्वद् रूपेक्षाशुद्धयानुगृहीतेन कालपिण्डसयोगेनासमवर्ती  
कारणेन ।

यूनि अपरत्वम् । अयमस्माद् बहुतरकालसवन्धीति धिया स्थविर  
१२ परत्वम् ॥ ६९ ॥

गुरुत्वनिरूपणम् ।

गुरुत्वम् आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणम् । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति । यथाक्तम् ।  
३ संयोगवेगप्रयत्नाभावे सति गुरुत्वात् पतनमिति ॥ ७० ॥

द्रवत्वनिरूपणम् ।

द्रवत्वम् आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणम् । भूतेजोजलवृत्ति । भूते  
३ जसोर्घृतादिसुर्णयोरग्नि संयोगेन द्रवत्व नैमित्तिकम् । जले नैसर्गिक  
द्रवत्वम् ॥ ७१ ॥

स्नेहनिरूपणम् ।

स्नेहश्चिकणता । जलमात्रवृत्ति । कारणगुणपूर्वको गुरुत्वादिवत्  
३ यावद्द्रव्यभावी ॥ ७२ ॥

notion in the form This one is connected with a smaller [degree of] time than the other [and] remoteness in the old man owing to the notion in the form This one is connected with a higher [degree of] time than the other'

(70) Gravity [or heaviness weight] [is] the non intimate cause of the first [act of] falling [It] resides in earth and water As has been said The falling [of an object is] due to gravity in the absence of conjunction velocity or conscious effort

(71) Fluidity [is] the non intimate cause of the first [act of] flowing [It] resides in earth fire and water In earth and fire [as for instance] in ghee etc and gold etc, the fluidity due to the conjunction of fire [is] artificial [or occasioned] in water [there resides] natural fluidity

(72) Viscidity [is] greasiness [It] resides in water alone [It has the same] quality in the cause before hand [and] like gravity etc is present in the substance as long as it lasts

शब्दविचार । कथं शब्दस्य श्रोत्रेण ग्रहणम् । कार्यशब्दनाशविचार ।

शब्दं श्रोत्रग्राह्यं आकाशस्य विशेषगुणं । ननु कथमस्य श्रोत्रेण ग्रहणम् । यतो भेर्यादिदेशे शब्दो जायते श्रोत्रं तु पुरुषदेशेऽस्ति । ३  
स्तत्त्वम् । भेरीदेशे जातः शब्दो वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन  
या सतिहितं शब्दान्तरमारभते । स च शब्दः शब्दान्तरमिति क्रमेण  
श्रोत्रदेशे जातोऽन्त्यः शब्दः श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते । न त्वाद्यो नापि मध्यमः । ६  
यं वशे पाठ्यमाने दलद्वयादिभागदेशे जातः शब्दः शब्दान्तरारम्भ  
क्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशेऽन्त्यः शब्दः जनयति । सोऽन्त्यः शब्दः श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते  
नाद्यो न मध्यमः । भेरीशब्दो मया श्रुत इति मेतिस्तु भ्रान्तैव । ९

भेरीशब्दोत्पत्तो भेर्याकाशस्योर्गाऽसमवायिकारणम् । भेरीदण्ड

(73) Sound [ is ] the special quality of ether to be apprehended by the sense of hearing. I say [ says the objector ] - How [ can there arise ] its apprehension by the sense of hearing? For, the sound is produced in the region of the drum etc., while the sense of hearing is in the region of the man [ who hears ] True [ what you say ] The sound arising in the region of the drum produces another sound near by after the maximum of one wave producing another wave or after the maximum of the buds of the Kadamba [ tree, that come out in all directions as soon as rain begins to fall ] [ and ] that sound in its turn [ produces ] another sound [ and so on ] in this order the last sound arising in the region of the sense of hearing is apprehended by the sense of hearing. Neither the first nor the intermediate [ sound ] Likewise when a bamboo is being cleft asunder, the sound arising at the region of the parting of the two pieces by producing other sounds in [ due ] order, produces the last sound in the region of the sense of hearing that last sound is apprehended by the sense of hearing, neither the first, nor the intermediate. The notion namely The sound of the drum has been heard by me [ is ] but simply illusory.

In the [ matter of the ] production of the sound of the drum the conjunction of ether and drum [ is ] the non-inti-

- संयोगो निमित्तकारणम्<sup>१</sup> । एतं वंशोत्पादनाच्चटचटाशब्दोत्पत्तौ यश-  
 १२ दलाकाशविभागोऽसमवायिकारणम् । दलद्वयविभागो निमित्तकार-  
 णम् । इत्यमाद्यः शब्दः संयोगजो विभागजो वा । अन्त्यमध्यमशब्दास्तु  
 शब्दासमवायिकारणका अनुकूलयातनिमित्तकारणकाः । यथोक्तम्  
 १५ संयोगाद्विभागाच्छब्दाच्च शब्दनिष्पत्तिरिति । (वे. सू. २-२३१)  
 आद्यादीनां सर्वशब्दानामाकाशमेकमेव समवायिकारणम् ।

- कर्मबुद्धिवतित्रिक्षणावस्थायित्वम् । तत्राद्यमध्यमशब्दाः कार्यशब्द-  
 १८ नाद्याः । अन्त्यस्तूपान्त्येन उपान्त्यस्त्वन्त्येन सुन्दोषसुन्दन्यायेन  
 विनश्येते । इदं त्वयुक्तम् । उपान्त्येन त्रिक्षणावस्थायिनान्त्यस्य  
 द्वितीयक्षणमात्रानुगामिना तृतीयक्षणे चासतान्त्यनाशजननासंभवात्

mate cause, the conjunction of drum and stick, the instru-  
 mental cause Similarly, in the [matter of the ] production  
 of the cracking [catacata] sound, due to the cleaving of  
 the bamboo, the disjunction of the bamboo-pieces and ether  
 [is] the non-intimate cause [and] the disjunction of the  
 two pieces, the instrumental cause Thus the first sound [is]  
 produced by conjunction or produced by disjunction The  
 last one and the intermediate sounds, on the other hand, have  
 the sound as the non-intimate cause and favourable wind  
 as the instrumental cause As has been said--The product-  
 ion of sound [takes place] from conjunction, disjunction  
 and sound. Of all sound, the first one etc, ether alone [is]  
 the one intimate cause

[Sound] lasts for three moments [only] like action  
 and cognition Now the first one and the intermediate sounds  
 are destroyed by the sounds which are [their] products, the  
 last one, again, by the last but one and the last but one,  
 by the last one--[thus these two] are destroyed after the  
 maxim of Sunda and Upasunda [that is, mutually] This  
 [is] however, improper It is impossible for the penultimate  
 [sound] to cause the destruction of the last [sound] as it [the  
 penultimate sound] liable to last [only] for three moments and  
 accompanying only the second moment of the last [sound]  
 does not exist [at all] in the third moment of the last  
 [sound] Therefore, the destruction of the last [sound]

तस्मादुपान्त्यनाशादेवान्त्यनाश इति ।

२१

विनाशित्वं च शब्दस्यानुमानात् । तथाहि ।

अनित्यः शब्दः ।

सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् ।

२४

घटयत् इति ।

शब्दस्यानित्यत्वं साध्यम् । अनित्यत्वं च विनाशावच्छिन्न-  
रूपत्वं न तु विनाशावच्छिन्नसत्तायोगित्वम् । प्रागभावे सत्ता २७  
हीनानित्यत्वाभावप्रसंगात् । सामान्यवत्त्वं सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रिय-  
ग्राह्यत्वं हेतु । इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्तुच्यमान आत्मनि व्याभिचारः  
स्यादत उक्तं बाह्येति । एवमपि तेनैव योगिवाह्येन्द्रियेण ग्राह्ये ३०

[arises] from the destruction of the penultimate [sound] itself

The destructibility of sound, again, [follows] from inference To explain

Sound [is] non-eternal

Because while being possessed of a generality,  
[it is] to be apprehended by the external  
sense-organ of [people] like us

.. like a jar

[Here] the impermanence of sound [is] what is to be established Impermanence [means] having a nature characterised by [or liable to] destruction but not being connected with being [or existence] liable to destruction, otherwise there would be the undesirable contingency of the absence of impermanence in antecedent negation which is without being While being possessed of a generality, to be apprehended by the external sense organ of [people] like us [is] the reason If it were [only] stated 'owing to being fit to be apprehended by a sense organ' there would be the violation [of the rule] with reference to the soul [that would be comprised by the reason] therefore it has been said 'external' [sense-organ] Even so, there would be the violation [and unwarranted extension] with respect to atoms etc that are fit to be appre-

परमाण्वाद्दी व्यभिचार स्यादतो योगिनिरासार्थमुक्तमस्मदादीति ।  
किं पुनर्योगिसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते ।

३३ परमाणवः कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षा । भ्रमयत्वात् घटवदिति ।

यस्य प्रत्यक्षा स एव योगी ।

तथापि सामान्यादिना व्यभिचारोऽत उक्त सामान्यवत्त्वे सतीति ।

३६ सामान्यादित्रयस्य नि सामान्यत्वात् ॥ ७३ ॥

बुद्धिनिरूपणम् ।

अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः । नित्या अनित्या च । एषी बुद्धिर्नित्या । अन्य  
३ दीया त्वनित्या ॥ ७४ ॥

सुप्तनिरूपणम् ।

शीति सुखम् । तच्च सर्वात्मनामनुकूलवेदनीयम् ॥ ७५ ॥

दुःसुप्तनिरूपणम् ।

पीडा दुःसुप्तम् । तच्च सर्वात्मना प्रतिकूलवेदनीयम् ॥ ७६ ॥

hended by the very same external sense organ of the Yogin therefore it has been said of people] like us for the purpose of excluding the Yogin

What again [is] the proof for the existence of Yogins ?

We reply

Atoms must be directly perceptible to some one

Because [they are] objects of knowledge

like a jar

He to whom [they are] perceptible [is] just the Yogin  
Still there would be the violation with respect to generality  
etc therefore it has been said while being possessed of a  
generality the three generality etc having no generality

(74) Cognition [consists in] the illumination of an  
object [It is] eternal and non eternal The cognition of  
God [is] eternal other [cognition is] but non eternal

(75) Pleasure [is] joy and it [is that] which is to be  
experienced as favourable [or agreeable] by all

(76) Pain [is] suffering and it [is that] which is to  
be experienced as disagreeable by all

इच्छालक्षणम् ।

राम इच्छा ॥ ७७ ॥

द्वेषलक्षणम् ।

क्रोधो द्वेष ॥ ७८ ॥

प्रयत्नलक्षणम् । बुद्ध्यादीनां मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

उत्साहः प्रयत्नः ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पण् मानसप्रत्यक्षा ॥ ७९ ॥

धर्मो धर्मो निरूपणम् ।

धर्मो धर्मो सुखदुःखयोरसाधारणकारणे । तौ चात्मव्यंशव्यवस्थानु-  
मीयेते । तथाहि ।

देवदत्तस्य शरीरादिकं देवदत्तविशेषगुणजन्यम् ।

कार्यन्वे सति देवदत्तस्य भोगहेतुत्वात् ।

देवदत्तप्रयत्नजन्यवस्तुत्वात् ।

यश्च शरीरादिजनक आत्मविशेषगुणः स एव धर्मोऽधर्मश्च ।

प्रयत्नादीनां शरीराद्यजनकत्वादिनि ॥ ८० ॥

(77) Desire [is] attachment [or passion]

(78) Aversion [is] anger [or irritation]

(79) Effort [or activity] [is] energy

The six cognition etc [are] perceptible by the mind

(80) Merit and Demerit [are] the special causes of pleasure and pain. Though [they are] not for the matter of that perceptible [by the sense-organs] they can be inferred. To explain

The body etc of Devadatta must be produced by a special quality in Devadatta

Because while being a product they are the cause of enjoyment

like an object produced by Devadatta's effort

What is the special quality in the soul, which produces body etc, that itself [is] merit and demerit, because effort etc, could not be producing body etc

संस्कारविचारः ।

संस्कारस्त्रिविधो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्च । तत्र वेग  
 पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । स च क्रियाहेतुः । भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कारं  
 आत्ममात्रवृत्तिरनुभवजन्यः स्मृतिहेतुः । स चोद्बुद्ध एव स्मृतिं  
 जनयति । उद्बोधश्च सहकारिलाभः । सहकारिणश्च संस्कारस्य  
 सदृशदर्शनादयः । यथोक्तम् । साहस्र्याहप्रचिन्ताया स्मृतिर्गजस्य  
 बोधका इति । स्थितिस्थापकस्तु स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यविशेषवृत्तिः । अन्य  
 थाभूतस्य स्वाध्रयस्य धनुरादे पुनस्तादवस्थ्यापादकः ।

एतं बुद्ध्यादयोऽधर्मान्ता भावना चाऽमविशेषगुणाः ।

गुणा उक्ताः ॥ ८१ ॥

कर्मविचारः ।



अविमुद्रव्यपरिमाणेन मूर्तत्वापरनाद्या सहैकार्यसमवेतं विभागद्वारा  
पृथ्दिशसंयोगनाशे सत्युत्तरदेशसंयोगहेतुश्च । तच्च उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणा  
कुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् पञ्चविधम् । भ्रमणाददस्तु गमनग्रहणेनैव  
गृह्यन्ते ॥ ८९ ॥

सामान्यविचारः ।

अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुः सामान्यम् । द्रव्यादित्रयवृत्ति । नित्यमेकमने-  
कानुगतं च । तच्च द्विविधं परमपरं च । तत्र परं सत्ता बहुविधपयत्वात् ।  
सा चानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययमात्रहेतुत्वात् सामान्यमात्रम् । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि ।  
अल्पविधपयत्वात् । तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेष ।  
अत्र कश्चिदाह । व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तं सामान्यं नास्तीति । तत्र

essence of motion [It] resides like quality in substance  
alone [It] is in intimate relation with one [and the same]  
object, along with the non-all-pervading dimension of sub-  
stance, otherwise called corporeality [or bodily form], and  
[is] the cause of the conjunction with a latter region, when  
there is the destruction of the conjunction with the former  
region, through the agency of disjunction It [is] again, of five  
kinds, owing to the division into throwing upwards, throwing  
downwards, contraction, expansion, and going Revolving  
etc are apprehended by the apprehension of going itself

(83) Generality [is] the cause of the notion of conform-  
ity [It] resides in the three [padartha-], substance etc [that  
substance, quality and action] and [is] eternal, one, and  
conforming to many And it [is] of two kinds—wider  
(para) and narrower (apara) The wider [generality is]  
being [or existence], owing to [its] comprising many objects.  
And it [that is, being] owing to [its] being the cause of  
merely the notion of conformity [is] pure generality The  
narrower [generality is] the generality of substance etc,  
owing to [its] comprising fewer objects It, again, owing  
to [its] being the cause of exclusion as well, [is] parti-  
cularity, though continuing to be generality

Here some one contends—There is no [such thing as]  
generality distinct from the individual objects To this we

भ्रम । किमालम्बना तर्हि भिन्नेषु विलक्षणेषु पिण्डेष्वेकाकारा बुद्धि  
विना सर्वानुगतमेकम् । यच्च तदालम्बनं तदेव सामान्यमिति ।

- १ ननु अतद्व्यावृत्तिकृतेऽैकाकारा शुद्धिरस्तु । तथाहि । सर्वेष्वेव हि  
गोपिण्डेषु अगोभ्योऽश्वादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तिरस्ति । तेनागोऽव्यावृत्तिविषय  
एवायमेकाकार प्रत्ययोऽनेकेषु न तु विधिरूपगोत्वसामान्यविषय ।  
२ भवम् । विधिसुरेर्नैकाकारस्फुरेणान् ॥ ८३ ॥

विशेषविचारः ।

- विशेषो नित्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिः । व्यावृत्तिर्बुद्धिमात्रहेतुः । नित्य  
३ द्रव्याणि त्याकाशादीनि पञ्च पृथिव्यादयश्चत्वारः परमाणुरूपा ॥ ८४ ॥

समवायविचारः ।

अयुतासिद्धयोः सन्धः समवायः । स चोक्त एव ॥ ८५ ॥

नन्यवयवावयविनावप्ययुतसिद्धो तेन अनयो सवन्ध समवाय ।  
न चेतद्युक्तम् अचयवातिरिक्तस्यावयविनोऽभावात् । परमाणव एव  
बहवस्तथा सनिकृष्टा पटोऽय पटोऽयमिति गृह्यन्ते ।

अत्रोच्यते । अस्त्येक स्थूलो घट इति प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धि । न च सा  
परमाणुत्वनकेष्वस्थूलेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु भवितुमर्हति । भ्रान्तेय बुद्धिरिति  
चेत् । न । बाधकाभावात् ।

तदेव पट् पदार्थाद्रव्यादयो वर्णिता । ते च विधिमुखप्रत्ययवेद्यत्वाद्  
भावस्था एव ॥ ८६ ॥

अभावविचार ।

इदानीं निवेधमुखप्रमाणमन्योऽभाव सप्तमं पदार्थं प्रतिपाद्यते ।  
स चाभाव सक्षपत्तो द्विविधः । ससर्गाभावाऽन्यान्याभावश्चेति ।

I say [says the objector] [It has been said that] parts and  
the whole are also such as are known to be never separated  
and therefore the connection between them [is] inherence  
This however [is] not proper owing to the absence of the  
whole as distinct from the parts. Because the atoms them-  
selves in large numbers (*bahavah*) and brought together in  
particular ways are apprehended in the form This [is] a jar  
This [is] a cloth

To this we reply. There [is] the direct [or actual]  
cognition in the form. There is one gross jar. And  
it does not deserve to exist with reference to atoms  
(that are) many not gross and supersensuous. If (you argue  
that) this cognition [is] illusory [we reply] No owing to  
the absence of any contradictory [proof or knowledge]

Thus have been expounded the six categories beginning  
with substance. And owing to their being fit to be known by  
notions of a positive nature they [are] of a positive form only

(86) Now is described the seventh category non entity  
[or absence negation] fit to be known by a proof negative in  
form. That negation again [is] in brief of two kinds—Refa

१ तथाभूता सनिरुता ।

संसर्गाभावोऽपि त्रिविधः प्रागभाव. प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति ।

उत्पत्ते प्राक् कारणे कार्यस्याभाव प्रागभाव । यथा तन्तुपु पटा  
६ भावः । स चानादिरूपत्तेरभावात् । विनाशी च कार्यस्यैव तद्विनाश  
रूपत्वात् ।

उत्पन्नस्य कारणेऽभावः प्रध्वंसाभाव । विनाश इति यावत् । यथा  
९ मन्ने घटे कपालमालार्या घटाभावः । स च मुद्गरप्रहारादिजन्य  
स चोत्पत्तिमानप्यविनाशी नष्टस्य कार्यस्य पुनरनुत्पत्ते ।

त्रैकालिकोऽभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव । यथा वायौ रूपाभाव ।

१२ अन्योन्याभावस्तु तादात्म्यप्रतियोगिकोऽभाव । घट पटो न  
भवतीति ।

तदेवमर्था व्याख्यात ॥

tive negation and Reciprocal [or Mutual] negation Relative  
negation too [is] of three kinds—Antecedent negation,  
Negation by destruction, and Absolute negation

*Antecedent negation [is] the absence of the effect in  
the cause, before [its] production, as for instance, the  
absence of the cloth in the threads And it has no beginning,  
owing to the absence of origination, but (ca) has an end  
[or, is destructible] the effect itself having the form of its  
destruction*

*Negation by destruction [is] the absence of [the  
effect] produced in [its] cause, that is, [its] destruc-  
tion, as for instance, the absence of the jar in the mass of  
pot-sherds, when the jar has been broken It again, is  
produced by the strokes of hammer [or stick] e c And it,  
though having an origination [or beginning] has no end  
an effect destroyed not being originated again*

*Absolute negation [is] the negation belonging to [all]  
the three times [past, present and future] as for instance,  
the absence of colour in wind.*

*Reciprocal negation, on the other hand [is] the nega-  
tion which has for [its] counter-entity, con-substantiality  
[or identity of two objects] in the form 'A jar is not cloth.'*

Thus have been expounded the objects.

ननु ज्ञानाद् ब्रह्मणो वा व्यातिरिक्ता अर्था न सन्ति। मैत्रम् । अर्था- १५  
नामपि प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वेनाशक्यापलापत्वात् ॥ ८६ ॥

बुद्धिविचार ।

बुद्धिरूपलब्धिर्ज्ञानं प्रत्यय इत्यादिभिः पर्यायशब्दैर्यानिधीयते सा  
बुद्धिः । अर्थप्रकाशो वा बुद्धिः । सा च संक्षेपतो द्विविधा । अनुभव ३  
स्मरणं च । अनुभवोऽपि द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्चेति ।

तत्र यथार्थोऽर्थाविसंवादी । स च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेर्जन्यते । यथा  
चक्षुरादिभिरदुष्टैर्घटादिज्ञानम् । घृमलिङ्गकमग्निज्ञानम् । गोसाहस्य- ६  
दर्शनाद् गवयशब्दवाच्यताज्ञानम् । ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेते-  
त्यादिवाक्याज् ज्योतिष्टोमस्य स्वर्गसाधनताज्ञानं च ।

अयथार्थस्तु अर्थव्यभिचार्यप्रमाणजः । स त्रिविधः । संशयस्तर्को ५

I say [says the objector] There do not exist objects  
distinct from [or over and above] knowledge or Brahman  
[Do] not [say] so The objects also being established by  
means of direct perception etc it is impossible to deny them

( 87 ) Cognition [ is ] that which is denoted by synonyms  
uch as knowledge apprehension cognition notion, or  
ognition [ is ] the illumination of an object And it [ is ],  
riefly, of two kinds—apprehension and remembrance,  
Apprehension again [ is ] of two kinds—true [ in accord  
with the object ] and false [ not in accord with the object ]

Of them true [ apprehension ] [ is that ] which is not in-  
consistent with the object [ as it is ] and that is produced by  
proofs, perception etc as for instance, the knowledge of a  
jar etc by means of non defective eyes etc the knowledge of  
fire having smoke as the indicatory mark, the knowledge of  
[ an object ] being denoted by the word gavaya, at the sight of  
[ its ] likeness to an ox, and the knowledge of [ the sacrifice ]  
Jyotistoma being the means of [ securing ] heaven from the  
sentence ' one desirous of [ securing ] heaven should sacrifice,  
with the Jyotistoma [ sacrifice ] ' etc

False [ apprehension ] on the other hand, [ is ] not consi-  
sistent with the object [ as it is ] [ and is ] produced from what

विपर्ययश्चेति । संशयतर्कां वक्ष्येत ।

विपर्ययस्तु अतस्मिंस्तद्ग्रहः । भ्रम इति यावत् । यथा पुरोवर्तिन्य-

१२ रजते शुक्त्यादी रजतारोष इदं रजतमिति ।

स्मरणमपि यथार्थमयथार्थं चेति द्विविधम् । तदुभयं जागरे । स्वप्ने तु सर्वमेव ज्ञान स्मरणमयथार्थं च । दोषवशेन तदिति स्थान इदमि-

१५ त्युदयात् ॥ ८७ ॥

ज्ञान निराकारमेव ।

सर्वं च ज्ञानं निराकारमेव । न तु ज्ञानेऽर्थेन स्वस्याकारो जन्यते

३ साकारज्ञानवादनिराकरणात् । अत एव ज्ञानाकारेणार्थानुमानमपि निरस्तम् । प्रत्यक्षासिद्धत्वाद् घटादे । सर्वं ज्ञानमर्थनिरूप्यमर्थप्रतिबद्धस्येव तस्य मनसा निरूपणात् घटज्ञानवानहमिति । न तु ज्ञानवान-

is not a means of right knowledge It [is] of three kinds—doubt, guess [ or, hypothetical reasoning ] and misapprehension Doubt and guess would be explained [ later ]

Misapprehension [ or error ] [ is ] the apprehension [ of a thing ] as that which it is not, that is, illusory knowledge, as for instance, the superimposition of [ the notion of ] silver in the form this [ is ] silver " on the mother-of pearl etc, lying in front and [ which are ] not silver

७ Remembrance also [ is ] of two kinds, namely, true and false Both these [ arise ] during the waking state In dream on the other hand, all cognition without exception ( एव ) [ is ] remembrance and false [ not in consonance with the object ], because [ there the cognition ] this arises in place of ' that ' owing to [ some ] defect

( 88 ) All cognition is verily, formless [ It is ] not that by the object is produced its own form in the cognition, because the doctrine of the cognition possessing a form has been refuted For the same reason [ the doctrine of ] inference of the object through the form of cognition is [ to be ] brushed aside, because a jar etc are proved by direct perception. All cognition [ is ] object-determined as it is defined by the mind only when it is linked with the object, in the form ' I am possessed of the knowledge of the jar, '

१ नवधन जन्यत । न । २ घटज्ञानवानहमित्येतन्मात्रं गम्यते ।

इमित्येतायन्मात्रं ज्ञायते ॥ ८८ ॥

मनोरक्षणम् ।

अन्तरेन्द्रिय मन । तच्चोक्तमव ॥ ८९ ॥

प्रवृत्तिविवारः ।

प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्ममयी वांगाविक्रिया । तस्या जगद्यवहारसाध-  
कत्वात् ॥ ९० ॥

दोषलक्षणम् ।

दोषा रागद्वेषमाहा । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्थु क्रोध इति यावत् ।  
मोहो मिथ्याज्ञान विपर्यय इति यावत् ॥ ९१ ॥

प्रेत्यभावनिरूपणम् ।

पुनरुत्पत्ति प्रेत्यभाव । स चात्मन भ्रूवृद्धहादिसघातलाभ ॥१२॥  
फललक्षणम् ।

फल पुनर्भोगं सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कार ॥ ९३ ॥

and not only this much namely I am possessed of know-  
ledge is known.

(89) Mind [is] the internal sense-organ. And that  
has been already (eva) explained.

(90) Activity consisting of merit and demerit [is] the  
operation of tongue etc because it brings about [all] trans-  
actions in the world

(91) Defects [are] attachment aversion and infatua-  
tion Attachment [is] desire aversion [is] irritation that  
is anger infatuation [is] wrong knowledge that is mis-  
apprehension

(92) Transmigration [or] existence after death [lit  
departing from here] [is] Rebirth And it [is] the acquisition  
of the aggregate of a new body etc

(93) Fruit again [is] enjoyment the experience of  
one or the other of pleasure and pain

दुःखलक्षणम् ।

पीडा दुःखम् । तद्योक्तमेव ॥ ९४ ॥

अपवर्गविचार ।

मोक्षोऽपवर्गः । स चैकविंशतिप्रभेदभिन्नस्य दुःखस्यात्यन्तिकी  
३ निवृत्तिः । एकविंशतिप्रभेदास्तु शरीर पञ्चिन्द्रियाणि पञ्चविषया-  
पञ्चबुद्ध्य सुख दुःख चेति गौणमुख्यभेदात् ॥ सुख दुःखमेव दुःखानु-  
पगतत्वात् । अनुपगोऽविनाभावः । स चायमुपचारो मधुनि विषसयुक्ते  
६ मधुनोऽपि विषपक्षनिक्षेपवत् ।

स पुनरपवर्गः कथं भवति । उच्यते । शास्त्राद्विदितसमस्तपदार्थ-  
तत्त्वस्य विषयदोषदर्शनेन विरक्तस्य मुमुक्षोर्ध्यायिनो ध्यानपरिपाक-  
९ वशात् साक्षात्कृतात्मनः क्लेशहीनस्य निष्कामकर्मानुष्ठानादनागत-  
धर्माधर्मविनर्जयत पूर्वोपात्तः च धर्माधर्मप्रचयं योगधिप्रभावाद्

(94) Pain [is] suffering and that has been already explained

(95) Salvation [is] release [or emancipation] And it [is] the absolute cessation of pain divided into twenty one varieties The twenty one varieties being the primary and secondary divisions [are]—body, six sense-organs six objects of senses six cognitions [obtained through the six sense-organs] pleasure and pain Pleasure [is] pain itself being linked up with pain Being linked up [means] not being without And this [is] just a metaphorical application as when honey is mixed with poison honey also steps on to the side of poison

How again does that salvation take place ? We reply - In [the case of a person] who has realised the true nature of all categories through [the study of] authoritative text-books who has become disgusted [with the world] at the sight of the defects in the objects [of senses] [and hence] has become desirous of release [from Samsara] who has taken to meditation who has directly perceived the soul by virtue of the maturity [or perfection] of [his] meditation, who has been free from the afflictions who has not been



विदित्वा समाहृत्य भुञ्जानस्य पूर्वकर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्तमानशरीरा-  
पगमेऽपूर्वशरीरारम्भाभावाच्छरीराद्येकविंशतिदृ.खसंबन्धो न भवति  
कारणाभावात् । सेयमेकविंशतिप्रभेदभिस्रद्दृ.खहानिर्भोक्ष । सोऽप-  
वर्गः ॥ १५ ॥

( ३ ) संशयः ।

एकैरिमन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानार्थावमर्शं संशयः । स च त्रिविधं ।

तत्रैको विशेषादर्शने सति समानधर्मज । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो ३  
वेति । एकस्मिन्नेव हि पुरोवर्तिनि द्रव्ये स्थाणुत्वनिश्चायक वक्रकोटरा  
दिकं पुरुषत्वनिश्चायकं च शिर पाण्यादिक विशेषमपश्यत स्थाणुपुरु  
षयो समानधर्ममूर्ध्वत्यादिकं च पश्यत पुरुषस्य भवति संशयः किमर्थं ६

acquiring any further merit or demerit owing to the perform-  
ance of acts in a disinterested manner [or without a desire  
for the fruit], who having known by the power of efficaci-  
ous Yoga, the mass of merit and demerit acquired before,  
has been enjoying [the fruit] thereof together, there does  
not exist [any longer] on account of the absence of [any] cause,  
connection with the twenty one sorts of pain, body, etc  
owing to the absence of the production of a new body, on the  
departure of the present body when the previous actions  
have become extinct This the cessation of pain differen-  
tiated owing to twenty-one divisions, [15] release [and] that,  
[18] salvation

(66) Doubt [is] the consideration of many contradic-  
tory things with reference to one [and the same] object  
And it [is] of three kinds

The first [is that which is] caused by common qualities,  
when the distinguishing features ( *visesah* ) are not observed,  
as for instance '[it may be] the trunk or a man' When  
referring to one and the same substance near at hand [it  
lying in front] a person does not see the distinguishing  
features, crookedness, nests etc that would settle the nature  
of a trunk, and head, hand etc that would settle the nature of  
a man, but only sees the common quality between the trunk

१ हृदानीं सशयमाह । २ विशेषादर्शने सति समानधर्मदर्शनजो विप्रतिपत्तिजोऽ-  
साधारणधर्मजश्चेति ।

स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ।

द्वितीयस्तु संशयो विंशोपादर्शने सति विप्रतिपत्तिजः । स यथा ।  
१ शब्दो नित्य उतानित्य इति । तथाहि । एको हृते शब्दो नित्य इति ।  
अपरो हृते शब्दोऽनित्य इति । तयोर्विप्रतिपत्त्या मध्यस्थस्य पुंसो  
विशेषमपश्यतो भवति संशयः किमयं शब्दो नित्य उतानित्य इति ।

१२ तृतीयोऽसाधारणधर्मजस्तु संशयः । यथा नित्यादनित्याच्च  
व्यावृत्तेन भूमात्रासाधारणेन गन्धवत्त्वेन विशेषमपश्यतो भुवि  
नित्यत्वानित्यत्वसंशयः । तथाहि । सकलनित्यव्यावृत्तेन गन्धवत्त्वेन

१५ योगाद्भूः किमनित्या उत सकलानित्यव्यावृत्तेन तेनैव योगान्नित्येति  
संशयः ॥ ९६ ॥

and the man, tallness etc. there arises in him the doubt, namely, 'Is this a trunk or a man?'

The second [sort of] doubt, again [is that which is] caused by difference of opinion, when the distinguishing features are not observed. It [is] as follows— Whether sound [is] eternal or non-eternal. To explain. One says, sound [is] eternal, another says, sound [is] non-eternal. Owing to the difference of opinion between them, in a neutral person not seeing any particularity [of sound, which would settle the question one way or the other] arises the doubt— '[Is] this sound eternal or non-eternal?'

The third [sort of] doubt [is] again [that which is] caused by a property peculiar [to the thing in question] as for instance, the doubt whether earth is eternal or non-eternal in one not seeing any particularity [indicative either of *nityatva* or *anityatva*] owing to [the quality] being possessed of odour, which, excluded from eternal and non-eternal [things], is peculiar to earth alone. To explain. Doubt [arises] thus—Is earth non-eternal owing to [its] connection with 'being possessed of odour' which is excluded from all eternal [things], or is it eternal, owing to [its] connection with the same which is excluded from all non-eternal [things]?

( ४ ) प्रयोजनम् ।

प्रयोजननिरूपणम् ।

येन प्रयुक्तः पुरुषः प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम् । तच्च सुखदुःखावाप्ति-<sup>३</sup>  
हानी । तदर्थं हि प्रवृत्तिः सर्वस्य ॥ ९७ ॥

( ५ ) दृष्टान्तः ।

दृष्टान्तनिरूपणम् ।

वादिप्रतिवादिनाः संप्रतिपत्तिविषयोऽर्थो दृष्टान्तः । स द्विविधः ।<sup>३</sup>  
एकः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यथा धूमधस्त्वस्य हेतोर्महानसम् । द्वितीयस्तु  
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा तस्यैव हेतोर्महाहृद् इति ॥ ९८ ॥

( ६ ) सिद्धान्तः ।

सिद्धान्तनिरूपणम् ।

प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । स चतुर्धा सर्वतन्त्रप्रति-<sup>३</sup>  
तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तभेदान् ।

( 97 ) Motive [ is ] that, prompted by which a man acts  
-And it [ is ] attainment and abandonment [ respectively ] of  
pleasure and pain The activity of every body is indeed  
intended for that

( 98 ) Instance [ is ] a topic with regard to which there  
is agreement between both the disputants [ the objector and  
the siddhantin ] It [ is ] of two kinds One [ is ] an instance  
by similarity, as for instance, the kitchen, for the 'reason'  
'being possessed of smoke' The other, again, [ is ] an  
instance by dissimilarity, as for instance, the big pool, for  
the same 'reason'

( 99 ) Tenet [ is ] a matter which has been admitted as  
authorised [ or proved by means of regular proofs ] It [ is ]  
of four kinds, being divided into—tenet admitted by all  
systems, admitted by related systems, following from the  
matter in question, provisional admission

तत्र सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तो यथा धर्मिमात्रसद्भावात् । द्वितीयो यथा  
 १६ नैयायिकस्य मते मनस इन्द्रियत्वम् । तद्धि समानतन्त्रे वैशेषिके  
 सिद्धम् । तृतीयो यथा क्षित्यादिकर्तृसिद्धो कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वम् ।  
 चतुर्थो यथा जैमिनीयस्य शब्दनित्यानित्यत्वविचारे भवतु तावच्छब्दो  
 १ गुण इति ॥ ११ ॥

### ( ७ ) अवयवाः ।

अवयवनिरूपणम् ।

३ परार्थानुमानवाक्यस्यैकदेशा अवयवाः । ते च प्रतिज्ञाद्वयः पक्षः ।  
 तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूद्वाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवा इति ।  
 तत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्टधर्मिप्रतिपादकं वचनं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा पर्वतोऽयं  
 ६ वह्निमानिति ।

*Of these, the tenet admitted by all systems [ 13 ] as for instance, the existence of an entity as such. The second [ 13 ] as for instance—according to the view of the Naiyāyikas, the mind is a sense-organ and that is proved in the related Vaiśeṣika system. The third [ 13 ] as for instance, the omniscience of the creator, when the creator for the earth etc. is established. The fourth [ 13 ] as for instance, during the consideration as to whether [ sound is ] eternal or non-eternal [ the admission ] of a follower of Jaimini ' let then sound be a quality '*

( 100 ) Members [ of the syllogism ] [ are ] the parts of a sentence [ constituting a syllogism ] in an inference for the sake of another. And they [ are ] five, statement etc. To the same effect [ is ] the Nyāya-sūtra ' Statement [ or assertion of the proposition to be proved ] reason, illustration, application and conclusion [ are ] the members. ' [ 1 1 32 ]

*Of these, Assertion [ 13 ] the statement propounding the subject as qualified by the attribute that is to be established, as for instance, This mountain [ is ] possessed of fire '*

तृतीयान्तं पञ्चम्यन्तं वा लिङ्गप्रतिपादक वचन हेतुः । यथा धूम-  
वत्येन धूमवत्त्वादिति वा ।

सद्व्याप्तिकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । यथा यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽ ऽ  
ग्निमान् यथा महानस इति ।

पक्षे लिङ्गोपसंहारवचनमुपनयः । यथा वह्निद्व्याप्त्यधूमवांश्चायमिति  
तथा चायमिति वा ।

१२

पक्षे साध्योपसंहारवचनं निगमनम् । यथा तस्माद्ग्निसानिति  
तस्मात् तथेति वा ।

एते च प्रतिज्ञादयः पञ्चानुमानवाक्यस्यावयवा इव अवयवा न तु १५  
समवायिकारणं द्वादशस्याकाशसमवेतत्वादिति ॥ १८० ॥

( ८ ) तर्कः ।

तर्कविचार ।

तर्कोऽनिष्टप्रसंगः । स च बिद्धव्याप्तिकयोर्धर्मयोर्द्व्याप्यादीकारेण ३

Reason [ 15 ] the statement laying down the indicatory  
mark, either in the instrumental or in the ablative [ case ] as  
for instance ' by being possessed of smoke or from being  
possessed of smoke ' .

Illustration [ or example ] [ 15 ] the statement of the in-  
stance, along with the invariable concomitance as for  
instance ' Whosoever [ is ] possessed of smoke [ is ] possessed of  
fire, as for instance, the kitchen

Application [ 13 ] the statement of the summing up of  
[ the presence of ] the indicatory mark in the subject, as for  
instance, ' And this [ is ] possessed of smoke pervaded by fire ' .  
or ' And this [ is ] so ' .

Conclusion [ 15 ] the statement of the summing up of  
[ the presence of ] what is to be established in the subject,  
as for instance, ' Therefore [ it is ] possessed of fire ' or  
' Therefore [ it is ] so ' .

These five, assertion etc, members of the syllogism [ are ]  
as though members [ or parts ] but not the intimate cause [ ?  
[ of the syllogism ], because sound [ of which the syllogism  
is formed ] is in intimate relation with either

( 101 ) Hypothetical reasoning [ is the imposition of ] an

⋮

अनिष्टत्यापकप्रसन्नरूप' ।

स चायं तर्कं प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकः । तथाहि । पर्वतोऽयं साग्निरुता-  
नग्निरितिसदेहानन्तरं यदि कश्चिन्मन्यतानग्निरयमिति तदा तं प्रति  
यथयमनाग्निरभविष्यत् तदानग्निरत्वाद् धूमोऽप्यभविष्यदित्यधूमवत्त्वप्र-  
सन्नं क्रियते । स एष प्रसंगस्तर्क इत्युच्यते । अयं चानुमानस्य  
विषयशोधकं प्रवर्तमानस्य धूमप्रचलितकानुमानस्य विषयम-  
ग्निसमुजानाति । अनग्निरत्वस्य प्रतिक्षेपात् । अतः अनुमानस्य भवत्यनु-  
ग्राहक इति ।

१२ अत्र कश्चिदाह । तर्कं सशयं पदान्तर्भवतीति । तन्न । एककोटि-  
विषयत्वात् तर्कस्य ॥ १०१ ॥

undesirable contingency [ on the opponent ] And it [ is ] of  
the form of the contingency of [ admitting ] the undesirable  
more extensive [ or pervader ] by 'admitting [ for a moment ]  
the less extensive [ or pervaded ] out of two attributes between  
which invariable concomitance has been established

And this hypothetical reasoning favours [ or helps other ]  
proofs To explain If after the doubt whether this mountain  
[ is ] with fire or without fire some one were to opine that  
it is without fire then is made on him the imposition of the  
undesirable contingency of [ the mountain ] being not posse-  
ssed of smoke in the form If this [ mountain ] had been  
without fire then on account of being without fire it would  
have been without smoke also This above [ imposition of an ]  
undesirable consequence is called Hypothetical reasoning  
And it serves to clarify the conclusion of the inference and  
supports fire the object of the inference which is launched-  
having being possessed of smoke as the indicatory mark  
because not being possessed of fire is refuted [ or denied ]  
Therefore it favours the inference

Here some one says [ or objects ] Hypothetical reasoning  
is included in doubt itself [ We reply ] It [ is ] not [ so ]-  
for hypothetical reasoning refers to only one end [ or altern-  
ative while doubt refers to two ]

१ यथा यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत् तर्कं भूतलमिवाद्भवतीति २ अथ च साध्य-  
रूपाऽर्थो वर्तमानस्य तर्कस्य विषयः । अनात्मत्वस्य

( ९ ) निर्णयः ।

निर्णयनिरूपणम् ।

निर्णयोऽवधारणज्ञानम् । तच्च प्रमाणानां फलम् ॥ १०२ ॥

( १० ) वादः ।

वादनिरूपणम् ।

तत्त्वबुभुत्सो कथा वाद् । स चाष्टनिग्रहाणामधिकरणम् । ते च ३  
न्यूनाधिकापसिद्धान्ता हेत्याभासपञ्चक चेत्यष्टौ निग्रहा ॥ १०३ ॥

( ११ ) जल्पः ।

जल्पनिरूपणम् ।

उभयसाधनयती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स च यथासम्यक् सर्वत्र ३  
ग्रहाणामधिकरणम् । परपक्षे दूषिते स्वपक्षस्थापनप्रयागाय  
सान्द्र ॥ १०४ ॥

( १२ ) वितण्डा ।

वितण्डानिरूपणम् ।

स्वपक्षस्थापनार्हता वितण्डा । सा च परपक्षदूषणमात्रप ३

( 102 ) Conclusion [is] definite knowledge and it [is] the result [or fruit] of proofs.

( 103 ) Discussion [is] the talk of one [with another] desirous of arriving at the truth. And it [is] the abode of eight grounds of confutation [or clinchers rebukes] The eight clinchers again [are] —deficiency redundancy deviation from a tenet and the five fallacious reasons

( 104 ) Wrangling [is] the talk of [disputants] who are desirous of victory [over each other] containing arguments supporting both [the sides] And it [is] the abode of all clinchers according to circumstances And it concludes with the [statement of a] syllogism establishing one's own view after the view of the opponent has been demolished [or proved to be faulty]

( 105 ) Caviling [is] *vijigī ukatha* void of the establishment of one's own view And [it] concludes merely with the

यवसाना । नस्य घैताण्डिकस्य स्थाप्य- पक्षोऽस्ति ।

कथा तु नानावचकपूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः ॥ १०१ ॥

( १३ ) हेत्वाभासाः ।

हेत्वाभासाः । असिद्धिविचारः ।

- ३ उक्तानां पक्षधर्मत्वादिरूपाणां मध्ये येन केनापि रूपेण हीना अहे-  
तय । तेऽपि कतिपयहेतुरूपयोगाद्देतुवशाभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः । ते  
चासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिप्रभेदात् पञ्चैव ।
- ६ अत्रोदयनेन व्याप्नस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मतया प्रतीतिः सिद्धिस्तद्भावोऽ-  
सिद्धिरित्यसिद्धिलक्षणमुक्तम् । तच्च यद्यपि विरुद्धादिष्वपि संभव  
तीति सांकर्यं प्रतीयते तथापि यथा न सांकर्यं तथोच्यते । यो हि  
१ यत्र साधने दोष पुरः परिस्फुरति समर्थश्च दुष्टज्ञप्तौ स एव दुष्टज्ञप्ति-

demolishing of the opponent's view There is no view of  
his own, that is to be established, for a cavilling person.

Talk [ or interlocution, disquisition ] again, [ is ] a con-  
sistent group of sentences, setting forth the two sides of a  
question, for and against uttered by various persons

( 106 ) The non reasons [ are those ] lacking in some cha-  
racteristic or other, out of the characteristics ' being an  
attribute of the subject ' etc, that have been mentioned [ above ]  
They [ are ] also [ called ] fallacious reasons, looking like  
reasons owing to [ their ] connection with some characteristics  
of a reason And they [ are ] only five, on account of the  
[ following ] division,—the Unproven [ or Futile, Uncertain ],  
the Contrary, the Inconclusive [ or Non-cogent ] the  
Counter balanced [ or Neutralised ] and the B-lated [ or  
Annulled ]

Here, Udayana has stated the definition of ' non-  
proven nature as the absence of proven nature ' [ or  
reality, which is ] the apprehension of the reason pervaded  
[ by the sadhya ] as being the attribute of the subject Now  
though [ some ] confusion is felt as this [ definition of  
asiddhi ] is possible even in [ fallacious reasons ] ' the  
Contrary ' etc, still it is explained [ below ] how there  
could be no confusion—That defect alone which flashes  
up prominently [ or first ] in a reason and which is



एको दूषणमिति यावत् नान्य इति । तत्रैव पुरोवत्कृतिकेन दुष्टो  
 पितायां कथापर्यवसाने जाते तदुपजीविनोऽन्यस्यानुपयोगात् ॥२  
 या च सति यत्र विरोध साध्यविपर्यय-याप्त्याहयो दुष्टज्ञप्तिकारक  
 एव विद्वदो हेत्वाभास । एवं यत्र द्याभिवारादयस्तथाभूतास्तेऽ-  
 कान्तिकादयः । यत्र पुनर्व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताविशिष्टहस्तस्वरूपज्ञप्त्य १५  
 सोऽनेन पूर्वोक्ता असिद्ध्यादयो दुष्टज्ञप्तिकारका दूषणानीति यावत्  
 तथाभूत सोऽसिद्ध ॥ १०६ ॥

आश्रयासिद्धविचार ।

स च त्रिविध आश्रयासिद्धस्यरूपासिद्ध्याप्यत्वासिद्धभेदात् । ३  
 तत्र यस्य हेतोरश्रयो नाद्यम्यते स आश्रयासिद्ध । यथा

capable of producing the fallacious cognition is the cause  
 of the fallacious cognition that is a flaw and none else  
 And when by means of that alone which has flashed forth  
 Prominently, has been apprehended the fallacy and [con-  
 sequently] the discussion has come to an end it is no use  
 pointing out another [defect] depending upon that Under  
 these circumstances that alone [is] the Contrary fallac-  
 ious reason where the contradiction namely the invariable  
 concomitance with the reverse of what is to be established,  
 causes the fallacious apprehension Similarly where  
 [there flash forth] violation [of the invariable concomit-  
 ance] etc of that nature [the fallacies are] the Inconclusive  
 etc And where the unproven nature etc mentioned  
 above through the absence of cognition of the nature of the  
 reason characterised by invariable concomitance and being  
 an attribute of the subject [are] the cause of the fallacious  
 cognition that is [are] flaws that [fallacy is] the Un-  
 proven thus circumstanced

(107) And it [is] of three kinds on account of the  
 [following] division—Unproven in the support (or subject),  
 Unproven in [its] own nature and Unproven in invariable-  
 concomitance

Of them Unproven in the support [is] that reason the  
 support of which is not known as for instance

गगनारविन्दं सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् । सरोजारविन्दवत् ।

अत्र हि गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव ।

६ अयमप्याश्रयासिद्धः ।

घटोऽनित्यः । कार्यत्वात् । पटवदिति ।

नन्वाश्रयस्य सत्त्वात् कार्यत्वादिति हेतुर्नाश्रयासिद्धः । सिद्ध-

९ साधकस्तु स्यात् । सिद्धस्य घटानित्यत्वस्य साधनात् । भैवम् । न हि

स्वरूपेण कश्चिदाश्रयो भवत्यनुमानस्य किं तु संदिग्धधर्मत्वेन ।

तथा चोक्तं भाष्ये नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयित्यर्थं न्यायः प्रवर्ततेऽपि

१२ तु संदिग्धे । न च घटोऽनित्यत्वसदेहोऽस्ति । अनित्यत्वस्य निश्चितत्वात् ।

The sky-lotus [is] fragrant

Because [ it is possessed] of the generality of lotus-  
like a lake-born lotus

Here, the sky-lotus [is] the support and that exists not  
at all (*eva*)

This [ the following ] also is Unproven-in the support

The jar [ is ] non eternal

Because [ it is ] a product  
like the cloth.

I say [ says the objector ]-The reason ' Because [ it is ] a  
product [ is ] not unproven in the-support, owing to the  
existence of the support [ the jar ], [ it ] might however be  
[ an instance of ] proving what is [ already ] established,  
owing to [ its ] proving the non eternal nature of the jar,  
that is [ already ] established [ We reply ]-[ Do ] not [ say ]  
so For, nothing by its own nature becomes the support  
[ or subject ] in an inference, but only by being possessed  
of an attribute about which there is doubt To the same  
effect, has been said in the Bhasya [ of Vatsyayana ]-  
Reasoning operates neither in the case of an unperceived  
[ or unknown or unheard-of ] object, nor in the case of an  
object definitely ascertained but in the case of an object  
about which there is doubt There is to be sure, no doubt  
about the non eternal nature of the jar, the non eternal  
nature being definitely ascertained Therefore, though the  
jar exists in its own nature still owing to the absence of doubt

तेन यथापि स्वरूपेण घटो विद्यते तथाप्यनित्यत्वसंदेहाभावाच्चासाया  
अय इत्याश्रयासिद्धत्वादहेतु ॥ १०७ ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धविचार । भागासिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्ध एव ।

स्वरूपासिद्धस्तु स उच्यते यो हेतुराश्रये नैयावगम्यते । यथा  
सामान्यमनित्यम् । कृतकत्वात् ।

कृतकर्तृ हेतुराश्रये सामान्ये नास्त्येव । भागासिद्धोऽपि स्वरूप  
सिद्ध एव । यथा

पृथिव्यादयश्चत्वारः परमाणवो नित्याः । गन्धवत्त्वात् । इति ।

गन्धवत्त्वं हि पक्षीकृतेषु सर्वेषु नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तित्वात् । अत  
एव भागे स्वरूपासिद्धः ॥ १०८ ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धभेदविचार ।

तथा विशेषणासिद्धविशेष्यासिद्धासमर्थविशेषणासिद्धासमर्थवि-

about [ its ] non eternal nature it can not be the support so  
[ the hetu karyatva is ] no reason owing to its being unproven-  
in the support

( 108 ) That reason is called Unproven in-its-own-nature,  
which is not at all known [ to exist ] in the support, as  
for instance,

Generality [ is ] non eternal

Because [ it is ] a product

[ Here ] the reason ' Being a product ' exists not at all  
in [ its ] support, generality The partially unproven also [ is ]  
unproven in-its-own-nature itself, as for instance,

The four, earth etc [ of the form of ] atoms [ are ]  
eternal

Because [ they are ] possessed of odour

[ Here ] indeed ' being possessed of odour ' exists not in  
all [ atoms ] that are made the subject [ of the syllogism ] on  
account of its residing in earth alone. Therefore indeed  
[ it is ] unproven in its own nature with regard to a part  
[ of the subject ]

( 109 ) Similarly [ there are the following sub- ] divisions  
of Unproven-in-its-own-nature—Unproven-in-the-qualifi-  
cation, Unproven-in-the-object Unproven-in-impotent-

शेष्यासिद्धादयः स्वरूपासिद्धभेदाः ।

तत्र विशेषणासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्य । द्रव्यत्वे सत्यस्पर्शवत्त्वात् ।

६ अत्र हि द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टमस्पर्शवत्त्वं हेतुर्नास्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रम् । शब्दे च द्रव्यत्वं विशेषणं नास्ति गुणत्वादतो विशेषणासिद्धः । न चास्ति विशेषणे द्रव्यत्वे तद्विशिष्टमस्पर्शवत्त्वमस्ति । विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टस्याप्यभावात् । यथा दण्डमात्राभावे पुरुषाभावे वा दण्डविशिष्टस्य पुरुषस्याभावः । तेन सत्यप्यस्पर्शवत्त्वे द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टस्य हेतोरभावात् स्वरूपासिद्धत्वम् ।

७२ विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्य । अस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात् ।

qualification, Unproven-in-impotent-object, and others—  
Of them Unproven-in-the-qualification [ 19 ] as follows —

Sound [ 18 ] eternal

Because being a substance, [ it is ] not possessed  
of touch

Here, again 'not being possessed of touch, characterised by being a substance' [ is ] the reason [ and ] not 'being possessed of touch' only. Now (ca) the qualification 'being a substance' exists not in sound, on account of [ sound ] being a quality, hence [ the hetu is ] unproven-in-the-qualification. Not indeed, in the absence of the qualification 'being a substance,' can exist 'not being possessed of touch' characterised [ or qualified ] by it, because in the absence of the qualification, is there the absence of [ the object ] characterised [ by it ] also as for instance in the absence of the stick alone or in the absence of the man, is there the absence of the man qualified by the stick. Therefore even though 'not being possessed of touch' is there [ there is ] the nature of the unproven-in-its-own-nature owing to [ in this case ] the absence of the reason as qualified by 'being a substance'.

Unproven-in-the-object [ 19 ] as follows —

Sound [ 18 ] eternal

Because [ it is ] a substance, without being possessed  
of touch

अत्रापि विशिष्टो हेतुः । न च विशेष्याभावे विशिष्टं स्वरूपमस्ति ।  
विशिष्टश्च हेतुर्नास्त्येव ।

१५

असमर्थविशेषणासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । गुणत्वे सत्यकारणकत्वात् ।

अत्र हि विशेषणस्य गुणत्वस्य न किञ्चित् सामर्थ्यमस्ति ।<sup>१६</sup>  
विशेष्यस्याकारणकत्वस्यैव नित्यत्वसाधने सामर्थ्यात् । अतोऽसमर्थ-  
विशेषणता । स्वरूपासिद्धत्वं तु विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टस्याप्यभावात् ।  
ननु विशेषणं गुणत्वं तच्च शब्देऽस्त्येव तत् कथं विशेषणाभावात् ।<sup>२१</sup>  
सत्यम् अस्त्येव गुणत्वम् । किं तु न तद्विशेषणम् । तदेव हि हेतोर्विशेषणं  
मयति यदन्यदवच्छेदेन प्रयोजनवत् । गुणत्व तु निव्ययोजनमतोऽ-  
समर्थमित्युक्तमेव ।

२४

Here also there [ is ] a qualified reason Not indeed in the absence of the object can there be [its] qualified form So the qualified reason exists not at all

Unproven-in impotent qualification [ is ] as follows --

Sound [ is ] eternal

Because, being a quality, [ it ] has no cause

Here, again, the qualification 'being a quality' has no potency whatsoever, the qualified 'having no cause' alone, being potent to prove the eternal nature [of sound] Therefore, [ there is ] the impotency of the qualification, the character of unproven-in-its-own-nature, [ is ] again [ there ], because in the absence of the qualification, is there the absence also of the object characterised [ by it ] I say [ says the objector ] -- The qualification [ is ] 'being a quality,' and it, to be sure, exists in sound, so how [ can you say that there is ] the absence of the qualification? We reply -- True [ what you say ] there is, undoubtedly ( *eva* ), 'being a quality' [ in sound ], but that [ is ] not a qualification For that alone becomes a qualification of the reason, which serves the purpose in so far as it excludes others, while, it has been already said that 'being a quality' serves no purpose [ and ] so, [ is ] impotent

१ अतोऽसमर्थविशेषण स्वरूपासिद्धः । विशेषणाभावे ।

असमर्थविशेष्यो यथा तत्रैव तद्वेपरीत्येन प्रयोग । तथाहि ।

शब्दा नित्य । अकारणकत्वे सति गुणत्वात् ।

- २७ अत्र तु विशेषणमात्रस्यैव नित्यत्वसाधने समर्थत्वाद् विशेष्यस्य समर्थम् । स्वरूपासिद्धत्व तु विशेष्याभावे विशिष्टाभावाद् विशिष्टस्य च हेतुत्वेनोपादानात् । शेष पूर्ववत् ॥ १०९ ॥

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धविचार ।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्तु स एव यत्र हेतोर्व्यतिर्नावगम्यते । स द्विविधः ।

- १ एक साध्येनासहचरित । अपरस्तु सोपाधिकसाध्यसंबन्धी ।

तत्र प्रथमो यथा

यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम् यथा जलधर ।

- ६ सञ्च विवादास्पदीभूत शब्दादिरिति ।

अत्र शब्दादि पक्षस्तस्य क्षणिकत्व साध्य सत्त्वं हेतु । न चास्य

Unproven in impotent object [is] as for instance in the same [matter] the syllogism by the reverse To explain Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is] a quality without having a cause

Here again only the qualification alone being potent to prove the eternal nature the object [or the qualified is] impotent [There is] again the character of unproven in its-own nature because in the absence of the object is the absence of the [something] qualified and [something] qualified has been accepted as the reason The rest as before

(110) Unproven in invariable-concomitance again [is] that alone where the invariable concomitance is not apprehended from the reason It [is] of two kinds —The one [is] that which is not concomitant with what is to be established the other again [is that] which is connected with what is to be established by means of an adventitious circumstance.

Of them the first [is] as follows —

What exists is momentary as for instance the cloud.

And sound etc that form the matter under dispute exist.

Here sound etc [are] the subject momentariness what is to be established and existence the reason And there

रेतो' क्षणिकत्वेन सह व्याप्तो प्रमाणमस्ति ।

इदानीमुपाधिसहिता व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः प्रदर्श्यते । तद्यथा

स श्याम । मैत्रीतनयत्वात् ।

परिदृश्यमानमैत्रीतनयस्तोमवत् ।

अत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वेन श्यामत्वं साध्यते । न च मैत्रीतनयत्वं श्यामत्वे प्रयोजकं किं तु शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम एवात्र प्रयोजक । प्रयोजकश्चोपाधिरुच्यते । अतो मैत्रीतनयत्वस्य श्यामत्वेन संबन्धे शाकाद्यन्नपरिणामोपाधिः । यथा वा अग्नेर्धूपसंबन्ध आर्द्रन्धनसयोगः । अत एवोपाधिसंबन्धाद् व्याप्तिर्नास्तीति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽयं मैत्रीतनयत्वादिहेतुः ।

तथा परीऽपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । यथा

is no proof for the invariable concomitance of this reason with momentariness

Now is illustrated the unproven in invariable concomitance, accompanied by a limitation It [is] as follows —

He [is] black

Because [he is] a son of Maitri

like the group of Maitri's sons that are being seen

Here being black is established by means of being a son of Maitri. Not indeed is being a son of Maitri the producing factor in respect of being black but the [peculiar] effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is] the producing factor. And the producing factor [which produces the particular effect] is termed the limitation [or condition]. Therefore in [the case of] the relation of the state of Maitri's son with blackness the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is] the limitation. Or in the [case of the] relation of fire with smoke the contact with wet fuel [is] the limitation. So therefore this reason being Maitri's son etc [is] unproven in invariable-concomitance because there is no invariable concomitance owing to [its] connection with the limitation.

Similarly another also [is] unproven in invariable-concomitance [It is] as follows —

ऋत्वन्तर्वर्तिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम् । हिंसात्वात् ।

ऋतुवाह्यहिंसायत् ।

२१ अत्रापि न हिंसात्वमधर्मं प्रयोजकं किं तु निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिरिति पूर्ववदुपाधिसद्भावाद् व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽयं हिंसात्वं हेतुः ।

ननु साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापको यः स उपाधिरित्युपाधिलक्षणम् । तच्च निषिद्धत्वे नास्ति । तत् कथं निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिरिति । मैवम् । निषिद्धत्वेऽप्युपाधिलक्षणस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । तथाहि ।

साध्यस्य अधर्मजनकत्वस्य व्यापकं निषिद्धत्वम् । यत्र यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति निषिद्धत्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । न च यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वं ऋत्वद्वाहिंसाया

The killing existing inside a sacrifice [is] the means of demerit

Because [it] has the nature of killing like the killing outside sacrifices

Here also, the nature of killing' is not the producing cause of demerit but 'being prohibited' [by the Sastras] [which is] the limitation and so this reason 'the nature of killing owing to the existence of the limitation, as before [is] unproven in-invariable-concomitance

I say [says the objector]—Limitation [or accident is that] which while pervading the thing to be established [that is while being invariably present in all those places where the sadhya is present] does not pervade the reason [that is, is not invariably present with the reason] this [is] the definition of limitation And that exists not in [that is, is not applicable to] 'being prohibited' So, how can 'being prohibited' be the limitation? [We reply—Do] not [say] so, because the definition of limitation is applicable to [it present in] 'being prohibited.' To explain 'Being prohibited pervades what is to be established [namely] 'being the producer of demerit' Wherever [there is] 'being the means of demerit' there surely [is] 'being prohibited'—thus 'being prohibited' does exist But not wherever [there is] 'the nature of killing' there [is] necessarily 'being prohibited,' on account of the violation [of the vyāpti] with respect to



व्यभिचारात् । अस्ति हि कत्वद्रहिंसायां हिंसात्वं न तु निषिद्ध-  
त्वमिति ।

30

तदेवं त्रिविधोऽसिद्धो दर्शितः ॥ ११० ॥

विरुद्धविचार ।

संप्रति विरुद्धः कथ्यते । साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तौ हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । कृतकर्यात् ।

3

अत्र हि नित्यत्वं साध्यं तद्विपर्ययेण सान्निध्यत्वेन कृतकर्तव्यं  
व्याप्तम् । यतो यद्यत् कृतकं तत्तत्र स्वल्पनिश्चयमेव । अतः साध्य-  
विपर्ययव्याप्तत्वात् कृतकत्वं हेतुर्विरुद्धः ॥ १११ ॥

६

अनैकान्तिकविचार ।

साध्यसंशयहेतुरनैकान्तिक सः स्याद्विचार इति घोच्यते । स द्विविधः ।  
साधारणानैकान्तिकोऽसंसाधारणानैकान्तिकश्चेति ।

3

तत्र प्रथमं पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः । यथा

the killing [ which forms ] a part of the sacrifice For,  
there is the nature of killing in the killing [ which forms ]  
a part of the sacrifice but there exists not being prohibited  
there

Thus has been pointed out the Unproven of three kinds.  
( 111 ) Now is described the [ fallacious reason ] Contrary  
Contrary [ is ] the reason [ which is ] invariably associated  
with [ or pervaded by ] the reverse of what is to be establish-  
ed. [ It is ] as follows —

Sound [ is ] eternal

Because of [ its ] being a product

Here again eternal nature [ is ] what is to be established,  
[ and ] being a product [ the reason is ] pervaded by non-eter-  
nality, the reverse of it [ the sadhya ] because whatever [ is ] a  
product, all that indeed [ is ] non-eternal only Therefore, the  
reason being a product owing to [ its ] being pervaded by  
the reverse of what is to be established [ is ] the Contrary

( 112 ) That reason which produces doubt about what is  
to be established [ is ] called the Inconclusive or the Discrep-  
ant It [ is ] of two kinds namely, too-wide Inconclusive, and  
too narrow Inconclusive

Of them the first [ is that ] which exists in the subject,  
in similar instances, and in dissimilar instances [ It is ]  
as follows —

शब्दो नित्यः । प्रमेयत्वात् ।

१६ अत्र प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः पक्षे शब्दे सपक्षे नित्ये व्योमादौ विपक्षे चानित्ये घटादौ विद्यते । सर्वस्यैव प्रमेयत्वात् । तस्मात् प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः साधारणा नैकान्तिकः ।

१७ असाधारणानैकान्तिकश्च स एव यः सपक्षविपक्षाम्याम् व्यावृत्तं पक्ष एव वर्तते । यथा

भूर्नित्या । गन्धयत्त्वात् ।

१८ अत्र हि गन्धयत्त्वं हेतुः । स च सपक्षाक्षित्याद् व्योमादेर्विपक्षाच्चानित्याज्जलादेर्व्यावृत्तो गन्धयत्त्वस्य प्रथिमीमात्रवृत्तित्वादिति ।

व्यभिचारस्तु लक्ष्यते । संभवत्सपक्षविपक्षस्य हेतोः सपक्षवृत्तित्वे

१९ सति विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरेव नियमो गमकत्वात् । तस्य च साध्यविपरी

Sound [ is ] eternal

Because [ it is possessed ] of knowability

Here, the reason, 'knowability' exists in the subject, sound, in similar instances, eternal [things, such as] sky etc, and in dissimilar instances, non eternal [things, such as] a jar etc, because every thing without exception is knowable. Therefore, the reason, 'knowability' [ is ] too-wide Inconclusive

८ The too narrow Inconclusive, again, [ is ] that alone which, excluded from similar instances [ and ] dissimilar instances, exists in the subject alone [ It is ] as follows:—

Earth [ is ] eternal

Because [ it is ] possessed of odour

Here again, 'being possessed of odour' [ is ] the reason. And it [ is ] excluded from similar instances, eternal [things, such as] sky etc, and from dissimilar instance, non-eternal [things, such as] water etc, because 'being possessed of odour' exists only in earth.

Violation is now defined. The rule [ is ] that in the case of a reason for which [ both ] similar instances and dissimilar instances are possible, there should be exclusion only from dissimilar instances, while there is presence in similar instances,

१ पक्षे वर्तमान सपक्षे नित्ये विपक्षे चानित्ये वर्तते । २ निर्णयमासमत्वात् सपक्षविपक्षवृत्ते, हेतोः ।

ताव्याप्तस्य तन्नियमाभावो द्यभिचारः । स च द्वेषा चंभयति सपक्ष-  
विपक्षयोर्वृत्तौ ताभ्यां व्यावृत्तौ च ॥ ११० ॥

प्रकरणसमविचारः ।

यस्य प्रतिपक्षभूतं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स प्रकरणसमः । स एव सप्र-  
पक्ष इति चोच्यते । तथाथा

शब्दोऽनित्यो नित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः ।

शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः । इति ।

अत्र हि साध्यविपरीतसाधकं समानबलमनुमानानन्तरं प्रतिपक्ष-  
इत्युच्यते । यः पुनरतुल्यबलो न स प्रतिपक्षः । तथाहि ।

विपरीतसाधकानुमानं त्रिविधं भवति । उपजीव्यमुपजीवकमनुभयं  
चेति ।

as [ then it ] enables [ us ] to arrive at a conclusion The ab-  
sence of that rule [ in the case of a reason ] not pervaded by  
the reverse of what is to be established [ is ] violation And it  
is possible in two ways— when [ the reason ] exists in [ both ]  
similar instances and dissimilar instances [ and ] when [ it  
is ] excluded from both [ these ]

( 113 ) That [ reason ] which has another reason which  
has become a rival [ is ] the Ambiguous [ or Neutralised or  
Stultified ] The same is also called the Counter balanced  
[ or possessed of a rival ] It [ is ] as follows—

Sound [ is ] non-eternal

Because of [ our ] not finding [ in it ] qualities of  
eternal [ things ]

[ and ]

Sound [ is ] eternal

Because of [ our ] not finding [ in it ] non eternal  
qualities

Here again, another inference of equal efficacy, proving  
the reverse of what is to be established is called ' a rival ' .  
But that [ betw ] which is not of equal efficacy [ is ] not ' a  
rival ' To explain —

• An inference proving the reverse [ of the sādhyā ] is of  
three kinds — that on which is dependent [ the other in-  
ference, that is, the strong one ], that which depends on the

- तत्राय वाधक वदवत्त्वात् । यथा अनित्य परमाणुभूर्तत्वाद्  
घटवदित्यस्य परमाणुसाधकानुमान नित्यत्वं साधयदपि न प्रतिपक्षः ।  
१२ किं तु वाधकमेवोपजीव्यत्वात् । तच्च धर्मिमाहकत्वात् । न हि प्रमाणे  
नागृह्यमाणे धर्मिणि परमाणावनित्यत्वानुमाननिदं समवति । आश्रया  
सिद्धे । अतोऽनेनानुमानेन परमाणुमाहकस्य प्रामाण्यमप्यनुज्ञातम् ।  
१५ अन्यथा अस्योदयासमवात् । तस्मादुपजीव्य वाधकमेव ।  
उपजीवक तु दुर्बलत्वाद्वाध्यम् । यथा इदमेवानित्यत्वानुमानम् ।  
तृतीयं तु सत्प्रतिपक्ष समञ्जलत्वात् ॥ ११३ ॥

other [that is the weak one] and that which [is] neither

Of them the first [is] stultifying [or rendering nugatory] on account of [its] being strong as for instance

An atom [is] non eternal

Because [it is] possessed of corporeality [or tangible form]

like a jar

—this inference establishing [the existence of] the atom though proving [its] eternal nature is not [to be regarded as] the rival of this [the above inference] but [it is] the stultifying [reason] itself because on it depends [the above inference] and that such because it makes [us] apprehend the object [namely the atom] Surely this inference [intended to prove] the non eternal nature is not possible with respect to the object the atom which is not apprehended by means of a proof owing to the character of unproven in-support [in that case] Therefore by this inference is admitted the validity as well of that which makes [us] apprehend the atom otherwise it [itself] could not arise Therefore that on which depends the other [is] the stultifying itself

That which depends on the other [is] on the other hand the stultified on account of its weakness as for instance this same inference [intended to prove] the non eternal nature

The third [kind] again [is] one having a rival being of equal strength

कालात्ययापदिष्टविचारः । लक्षणदोषविचारः ।

यस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन पक्षे साध्याभावः परिच्छिन्नः स कालात्य-  
यापदिष्टः । स एव बाधितविषय इत्युच्यते । यथा

अग्निरनुष्णः । कृतकत्वात् । जलवत् ।

अत्र कृतकत्वं हेतुः । तस्य च यत् साध्यमनुष्णत्वं तस्याभावः  
प्रत्यक्षेणैव परिच्छिन्नः । त्वग्निन्द्रियेणाग्नोरनुष्णत्वपरिच्छेदात् ।

तथा परोऽपि कालात्ययापदिष्टः । यथा घटस्य क्षणिकत्वे साध्ये  
शायुक्तं सत्त्वं हेतुः । तस्यापि च यत् साध्यं क्षणिकत्वं तस्याभावोऽ-  
क्षणिकत्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षेण परिच्छिन्नम् । स एवायं घटो यो  
मया पूर्वमुपलब्ध इति प्रत्यभिज्ञया पूर्वानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृते-

( 114 ) That [reason] where the absence [or negation] of  
what is to be established is ascertained in the subject by  
[a more powerful] proof, perception etc [is called]  
the Belated [it stated or adduced when the fit time for  
it has passed away, or rejected owing to the lapse of  
proper time] The same is called [the reason] the object  
of which is contradicted [or refuted, annulled], as for  
instance,

Fire [is] not-hot.

Because [it is] produced  
like water

Here, 'being produced' [is] the reason That which is  
to be established by it [viz.] coolness, the negation of that  
has been ascertained by perception itself, because by the  
sense of touch, is fire ascertained to be possessed of hot-ness

Similarly another [sort of reason] also [is] the Belated,  
as for instance, when the transitoriness of the jar  
is to be established, the reason 'being existent' mentioned  
above In the case of that [reason] also, that which is  
to be established, [namely] momentariness, the negation of  
that, [namely] non-momentariness is ascertained by percep-  
tion leading to recollection. This [is] the same jar  
which had been apprehended by me before—by recollec-  
tion in this form arising from the sense-organ helped by im-  
pressions produced by former apprehension, is ascertained

न्द्रियप्रभवया पूर्वापरकालाकलनया घटस्य स्यायित्यपरिच्छेदादिति ।  
 १२ एते चासिद्धादयः पञ्च हेत्वाभासा यथाकथंचित् पक्षधर्मत्वाद्यन्य  
 तमरूपहीनत्वादहेतवः स्वसाध्यं न साध्यन्तीति ।

येऽपि लक्षणस्य केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतोस्त्रयो दोषा अव्याप्त्यतिव्या  
 ५ प्त्यसंभवास्तेऽप्यत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति न तु ते पञ्चभ्योऽधिकाः । तथाहि ।

अतिव्याप्तिर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः । विपक्षमात्रादव्यावृत्तत्वात् सौपाधि  
 कत्वाच्च । यथा गोलक्षणस्य पशुत्वस्य । गोत्वे हि सास्नादिमत्त्वम्  
 १८ प्रयोजकं न तु पशुत्वम् ।

तथा अव्याप्तिर्भागासिद्धत्वम् । यथा गोलक्षणस्य शाबलेयत्वस्य ।  
 एवमसंभवोऽपि स्वरूपासिद्धिः । यथा गोलक्षणस्येकदा  
 २१ फत्वस्येति ॥ ११४ ॥

the continuing [or permanence] of the jar, through the consi-  
 deration of former and later time

These five fallacious reasons Unproven etc [are] no  
 [valid] reasons because they do not prove what is to be  
 established by them, owing to [their] being void of some  
 one of the characteristics, 'being an attribute of the subject'  
 etc in some way or other

The three faults also of definition [which is] a purely  
 negative reason [namely] being too narrow being too  
 wide and being impossible, are comprised here too, they are  
 not indeed (*tu*) over and above the five To explain

Being too wide [is] being unproven in invariable-con-  
 comitance, on account of [the hetu] not being excluded from  
 all (*mūtra*) di- similar instances or on account of [its] being  
 possessed of a limitation, as for instance 'being a beast'  
 [as] the peculiar attribute of a cow For being possessed  
 of a dew lap etc is the producing cause with respect to cow-  
 ness but not 'being a beast'

In the same way, being too narrow [is] being partly-  
 unproven as for instance [the hetu] being variegated [as]  
 the peculiar attribute of a cow

Likewise being impossible too [is] being unproven-  
 in its own nature, as for instance, [the hetu] having undi-  
 vided hoofs [as] the peculiar attribute of a cow

( १४ ) छलम् ।

छलविचारः ।

अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य शब्दस्यार्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य दूषणाभिधानं छलम् । यथा नवकम्बलोऽयं देवदत्त इति वाक्ये नूतनाभिप्रायेण प्रयुक्तस्य नवशब्दस्यार्थान्तरमादाइत्यपि कश्चिद् दूषयति । नास्य नवकम्बला सन्ति इति द्रष्टव्यम् । न ह्यस्य ह्ययमपि संभाव्यते कुतो नयेति । स च वादी छलयादितया ह्येत्येते ॥ ११५ ॥

( १५ ) जातयः ।

जातिनिरूपणम् ।

असद्वृत्त जातिः । सा चोत्कर्षसमापकर्षसमादिभेदेन बहुविधा । विस्तराभिया नैह कृत्स्नोच्यते ।

तत्राव्याप्तेन दृष्टान्तगतधर्मेण पक्षे अयापकधर्मस्यापादनम्

( 115 ) Perversion [ is ] the pointing out of defect after having [ deliberately ] imagined another sense for a word which has been used ( by the opponent ) to convey a different idea. [ It is ] as follows In the sentence This Devadatta has a new blanket, ' some one taking for granted another sense for the word ' nava ' used to convey the idea of new ' finds fault [ with it as follows ] -- He has no new blankets, because he is poor, surely not even two could he possibly have, how [ then ] nine ? Such a disputant is known as one who uses perversion in discussions

( 116 ) Futility [ is ] futile rejoinder It [ is ] manifold [ having twenty four varieties ] through the division into Utkar-asama Apakar-asamā etc [ It ] is not fully ( *Artsnā* ) dealt with here, for fear of prolixity

There, Utkar-asama [ variety of ] futility [ is ] the attributing of a non pervading attribute to the subject, on the strength of the attribute belonging to an instance, which is

६ उत्कर्षसमा जाः । यथा

शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात् । घटवत् ।

इत्युक्ते कश्चिदेवमाह यदि कृतकत्वेन हेतुना घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्यः  
१ स्यात् तर्हि तेनैव हेतुना तद्वदेव शब्दः सावयवोऽपि स्यात् ।

अपकर्षसमा तु दृष्टान्तगतेन धर्मेणाव्याप्यतेनाव्यापकस्य धर्माभाव-  
स्यापादनम् । यथा पूर्वस्मिन् प्रयोगे कश्चिदेवमाह यदि कृतकत्वेन  
१२ हेतुना घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्यः स्यात् तर्हि तेनैव हेतुना घटवदेव हि शब्द-  
श्रावणोऽपि न स्यात् । न हि घटः श्रावण इति ॥ ११६ ॥

( १६ ) निग्रहस्थानानि ।

*निग्रहस्थाननिरूपणम् ।*

३ पराजयहेतुनिग्रहस्यानम् । तच्च न्यूनाधिकापसिद्धान्तार्थान्तरा-

not invariably concomitant [with the hetu] As for  
instance, when it is stated,

Sound [is] non-eternal  
Because [it is] produced  
like a jar

some one would argue thus—If through the reason 'being produced' sound would be non eternal like a jar, then by means of the same reason, exactly like it [the jar], would sound be possessed of parts also

Apakarsasamā [variety of] futility [is] the attributing of the negation of a non pervading attribute, on the strength of the attribute belonging to an instance, which is not invariably concomitant [with the hetu] As for instance, referring to the former syllogism, some one thus argues—If through the reason 'being produced' sound would be non-eternal, like a jar, then by means of the same reason, like the jar itself, sound would not be audible as well For, surely the jar [is] not audible

( 117 ) Occasion for reproof [is] what leads to defeat An though it [is] of various kinds, on account of the division into deficiency, redundancy, deviation from a tenet, a new object

१ पूर्वस्मिन्नेवानुमाने ।



प्रतिभामतानुज्ञाविरोधादिभेदाद्बहुविधमपि विस्तरभयाच्चेह कृत्स्न  
मुच्यते ।

यद्विवाक्षितार्थं किञ्चिदूनं तन्न्यूनम् । विवक्षितार्थं किञ्चिदधिकं ६  
तदधिकम् । सिद्धान्तादपध्वसोऽपसिद्धान्त । प्रकृतेनानभिसवन्धाय  
वचनमर्थान्तरम् । उत्तरापरिष्कार्तिरप्रतिभा । पराभिमतस्यार्थस्य  
स्वप्रतिकूलस्य स्वयमेवाभ्यनुज्ञान स्वीकारो मतानुज्ञा । इष्टार्थभङ्गो ९  
विरोधः ।

इहात्यन्तमुपयुक्तानां स्वरूपभेदेन भूयो भूयः प्रतिपादनम् । यदन  
तिप्रयोजन तदलक्षणमदोषाय । एतावतीव बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धे ॥११७॥ १२

इति श्रीकेशवमिश्रविरचिता तर्कभाषा समाप्ता ।

{ or digression }, fatuity consent [ to the opponent's view ]  
[self-] contradiction etc [ it ] is not fully dealt with here for  
fear of prolixity

That [ is ] deficiency when in a matter intended to be  
set forth something [ is ] wanting that [ is ] redundancy when  
in a matter intended to be set forth something [ is ] more  
[ than required ] deviation from a tenet [ is ] backing out of  
the tenet digression [ is ] the statement of an object not  
connected with the matter in hand fatuity [ is ] absence of  
inspiration to give an answer [ to the opponent ] consent to  
the view [ is ] approval acceptance of one's own accord of  
the matter sponsored by the opponent and opposed to one's  
own view contradiction [ is ] rejecting the desired view

Here [ in this treatise ] there is treatment again and  
again of most useful { or important matters } in their nature  
and varieties that what is not most serviceable is not  
defined, is no fault By so much only is accomplished the  
training of beginners

End of the Exposition of Reasoning  
composed by Kesavamisra

## Notes

(1) It is a curious, and altogether inexplicable fact that Kesavamisra begins his work without any Mangalashloka, against the established practice among Sanskrit writers not to begin a work without a verse or verses in honour of some deity, preceptor etc.

Sanskrit writers are very touchy on the question of the efficacy of such Mangala verses and cases where the Mangala has failed to be effective are often explained away in a very fantastic manner! Thus, in the case of a work which has been successfully brought to an end even in the absence of a Mangala verse, it is argued that the writer must have paid his homage to the gods in his mind or in some other way (प्र-याद चिद्दि), and if a work is left unfinished even though the Mangala is there, it is pointed out that the non-completion of the work was probably due to some other potent Dosas in the writer! 'But no word is to be uttered against the efficacy of the Mangala as such' Read the following comments of the Tarka dipika about the efficacy and necessity of the Mangala, which are so often quoted ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्व नास्ति । मङ्गल कृतेऽपि कादम्बर्यादी समाप्त्यदर्शनात् मङ्गलामात्रेऽपि शिष्टाण्यन्त्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनाद-व्यवपतिरेव समिक्तादिनि चेन्न । कादम्बर्यादौ विद्ययापुष्ट्या समाप्त्यमात्रेण । शिष्टाण्यन्त्यादौ तु ग्रन्थादवहितरेव मङ्गल कृतमनो न समिक्ता । ननु मङ्गलस्य कृत-व्यवपत्तेरि किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारान्तु मित्यन्तरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि । मङ्गल वेदवोधिन-कर्तव्यताकम् अलं किराविगीतशिक्षाचारो विद्ययात् । दर्शादित्यत् । मोक्षनादौ व्यभिचारवशात्त्याया लौकिकेति । शक्तिव्यवहारे व्यभिचरवाग्गयाविगीतनि । शिष्टपद स्वटोयम् । न कुर्यान्निष्फल कर्म इति जलनाडनादिविनि विविद्धादिति ॥


बालेऽपि—बाल here means a beginner, one who has not studied the व्याख्यान, but has studied शास्त्रज्ञ, व्याख्य etc. and is thus fit to comprehend the व्याख्यान, for instance, the Intermediate Arts or B A student' प्रवृत्तधाराण्यपुस्तकान् न तु रत्नस्य । अर्थात् पाठान्तरा-पठोपदेशनदीन-व्याख्यान । Kesavamisra says that his work is mainly intended for beginners who would not be able to grasp the more ponderous and difficult treatises on व्याख्यान. He has no idea what oever of trying conclusions with the great masters of व्याख्यान. His is a very humble mission, that of initiating the beginner into the vast domain of व्याख्यान अर्थात् सुनेन-सुत at hearing, study Kesavamisra means to say that he has tried to make the subject so easy to understand that even a beginner who is lazy by nature, need not work very hard to master it सक्षिप्तयुक्तमन्त्रिन may be explained in a number of ways—(1) सक्षिप्ता च युक्तमन्त्रिणा च (युक्ति-arguments, reasoning), (2) सक्षिप्तयुक्तिभिः अन्त्रिणा (where सक्षिप्त goes with युक्ति), (3) सक्षिप्तयुक्ति च अन्त्रिणा च (अन्त्रिणा consistent); (4) सक्षिप्तयुक्ति as an adv, and अन्त्रिणा as voc singular (O wise

one) तद्व्याख्यानं-वचनं प्रतिपादनं इति तत्र प्रमाणद्विवेकपदार्था (in explaining तद्व्याख्यानं, the Dīpikā explains तद्व्याख्यानं as द्रव्यादिस्वरूपदार्था) ते पाठ्येने अत्र इति or तद्व्याख्यानं (exposition) and then metaphorically, the work containing such an exposition or तद्व्याख्यानं might simply mean 'logical reasoning'. In section 101, तद्व्याख्यानं is used in the sense of argument by reductio-ad-absurdum method.

(2) प्रमाणप्रवेष्टव्यं - This is the first sūtra of the Nyayasūtras of Gautama Aksapada the traditional founder of the Nyaya system (see Introduction). The sixteen padarthas or topics mentioned therein are expounded in detail, one by one in the text. Though Keśava Misra belongs to the Syncretist school and so tries to reconcile the two systems, -Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika, -it is clear that he is by inclination a Naiyāyika, from the fact that he begins his work, by quoting the Nyayasūtra. On the other hand Śivaditya (the author of the Saptasūtra) Anandabhatta (the author of the Tarka-saṅgraha) also of the Syncretist school, are Vaiśeṣikas and so began their works by quoting the padarthas or categories from the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra (Line 2) - अन्वयज्ञानात् - It is a characteristic of the Hindus that all their activities are directed towards the one goal of securing Salvation, and all systems are agreed that Mokṣa can come only from Jñāna (though they differ as to the nature of this Jñāna and the means of securing it). A modern student would naturally be puzzled to know that the study of logic or physics is to secure salvation for him (see section 9), where the author tells what Mokṣa is and how it is secured) (Line 3) - तत्र अयं विद्यते अत्र अस्मात् - beyond which there is no further good the highest bliss salvation (Line 4) - तद्व्याख्यानं - The word is used here in the sense of 'a topic'. In section 47, it is used in its technical sense of categories or knowable things which are six or seven, according to the Vaiśeṣikas.

लक्षण is usually translated as 'definition'. This is not strictly correct, लक्षण does not point out the thing to be defined but to the differentia or the peculiar characteristic possessed by the thing alone and which is not common (असाधारण) to others. लक्षण thus more accurately means 'differentia', but as the word 'definition' is more easily understandable, and as the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika writers themselves are often loose in their use of this term (see section 9, line 16, where गुणश्च is said to be द्रव्यलक्षणम्, instead of गुणान्वयम्), we have generally translated लक्षण as 'definition' unless the context requires the more accurate sense. It is obvious that an accurate definition must refer only to the वस्तु it must neither refer to things which have no right to be included therein, nor exclude things that deserve to be included. In other words a definition must not be too wide or too narrow. Section 114 mentions the three faults to which a definition is liable, viz अस्यत्ति (being too narrow), अतिव्याप्ति (being too wide) and असम्भवं (impossibility).

An illustration would make this clear. Suppose, we want to define a cow and पशुत्व is proposed as the लक्षण. Now as the cow is a पशु, it undoubtedly possesses पशुत्व but पशुत्व is also found in horses, buffaloes, etc which are all पशु, but not cows. Thus the लक्षण, पशुत्व, is too wide, possessing the द्वेष of अतिव्याप्ति.



If we give कपिलत्व as the लक्षण, it would be seen that the definition becomes अशक्त or too narrow as all cows that are not कपिल would be thereby excluded.



(कपिलत्व may also be regarded as अति-वाच्य on the ground that कपिलत्व belongs to objects other than cows, but what strikes us here most is the अव्याप्ति Secondly, अतिवाच्य strictly speaking implies that the लक्षण covers the लक्ष्य completely and in addition extends to other objects Here कपिलत्व does not cover the whole of the लक्ष्य at all, hence it is properly a case of अवाप्ति )

If the लक्षण is एकशकत्व (having one hoof that is, undivided hoof ), the दोष is असम्बन्ध, as all cows without exception have no एकशकत्व




साम्नादिमन्त्र is a correct definition of गौ as साम्ना (dew lap) is possessed by a cow and cow alone Or to take a more familiar instance If we define 'a college student as 'one who is studying in the Vernacular fourth standard' the definition has obviously the fault of असम्बन्ध, if the definition is amended as 'who visits the cinema-shows, there is the fault of अतिवाच्य, as there are thousands other than college students who visit the cinema shows, the definition 'a college student is a University student who plays cricket' is अव्याप्त as those who play other games are excluded thereby A correct definition would be—A college-student is one who after passing the entrance examination to the University, pursues his higher studies in an institution recognised for that purpose (Some cynic may find fault with this definition also, on the ground that there are some students who join a college, without the slightest intention of pursuing any studies whatsoever ) (Line 8)—नेन Because उद्देश्य is already made in the first sutra so only लक्षण and परिष्कार are now to be dealt with

( 4 ) प्रमाण—means of right knowledge, proof प्रमाण is the लक्ष्य ( what is to be defined ) and प्रमाकरण (strictly speaking प्रमाकरणत्व which is an emendation made in one manuscript ) the लक्षण ( Line 4 )—ननु introduces the objector's point of view Here the objector is not finding fault with the definition itself, but only wants some further information, with a view to have a complete picture of the matter in question A कारण always suggests some कार्य or फल, so he wants to know what the फल of प्रमाकरण would be (Line 5)—सत्यम्—( इति अवगच्छीकारे ) that is, the siddhantin accepts the objector's view point in so

far as it goes, but he would not accept that as going against his fundamental stand point ( the definition of प्रमाण here )

( 5 ) Keśavamisra is now examining the definition प्रमाण  
Naturally he first wants to expound fully the two words in the defini-  
tion, प्रमा and ऋण ( The student would be able to understand  
this section properly, only when he reads sections 87, 96, and 101,  
where most of the terms occurring here, are explained in detail )  
The following table would make the idea in this section clear



That is, all cognition is first divided into अनुभव and स्मृति, अनुभव is further divided into right अनुभव and wrong अनुभव (In section 87, we are told that स्वप्रज्ञान is always अयथार्थ ) and wrong अनुभव is further sub-divided into संशय ( doubt ), विपर्यय ( error or misapprehension ) and तर्क

( Line 1 )-उच्यते-अप्रामि is understood, it is usually translated as ' we reply ' प्रमा is defined as यथार्थानुभव, and the author now shows how each and every word in the definition is significant ( that is what constitutes the परिज्ञा of the definition )

If we drop the word यथार्थ, and define प्रमा as only अनुभव, then the definition would be अनिष्पन्न as it would include संशय, विपर्यय etc which are wrong knowledge So to exclude them, यथार्थ must be put in the definition

If we drop अनुभव and read the definition as यथार्थ ( ज्ञानम् ) only, then the definition would be अनिष्पन्न, as it would extend to स्मृति, the word अनुभव thus excludes स्मृति.

यथार्थ -correct, grasping the object as it is प्रमा or यथार्थानुभव is defined as तद्वति तत्प्रमाणम्, रजने इद् रजतम् is a यथार्थानुभव, for it amounts to रजतत्वप्रमाणम् इति रजतत्वप्रमाणम् ज्ञानम्. In this ज्ञान, रजत is the विशेष्य

which being possessed of रजतत्व ( विशिष्य ), is known to have the same रजतत्व as the प्रकार or characteristic. If we know the रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यरजत as possessed of the characteristic शक्ति, it would be wrong knowledge यथार्थवद्विज्ञान would be घटत्ववद्विशेष्यरजत and also घटत्वप्रकारक, a wrong knowledge would be घटत्ववद्विशेष्यरजत but घटत्वप्रकारक. Thus whether a cognition is right or wrong would depend upon what kind of प्रकार it is associated with. The thing which is the object of cognition and the form in which it is cognised need not necessarily be related to each other by the विशिष्यविशेषणभाव ( as in the case of प्रमा, इदं रजतम् ) The सप्तम्य ( an तद्धित ) is not विशेष्यविशेषणभाव or the आधारधियभाव, but rather अवच्छिन्नत्व. By admitting अवच्छिन्नत्वे सप्तमी, we can show the ज्ञान, घटे घटत्वम् as प्रमा घटे घटत्वम् can be put in the form of तद्धित तत्प्रकारक thus—घटवति घटत्वे घटप्रकारक अनुभव. There घटत्व is the विशेष्य the object of cognition, ( while in अयं घट, घट is the विशेष्य and घटत्व the विशेषण ) and घट the विशेषण or प्रकार. Putting it more elaborately, the ज्ञान would be घटत्ववद्विशेष्यरजत and घटप्रकारक. But the difficulty is घट is not found in घटत्व ( घटत्व is found in घट ) Therefore if we take the सप्तमी to be आधारधियर्थे, the cognition घटे घटत्व which is undoubtedly प्रमा, would be अप्रमा. The answer is, we should interpret the सप्तमी to be अवच्छिन्नार्थे, so that the cognition would be घटवच्छिन्नघटत्वविदे वदक which is a correct statement. In cases where two or more things are cognised together, it is essential that each thing should be cognised with its correct प्रकार, it would not do to have an aggregate knowledge of such things. Thus if we are cognising रत्न and रजत, we must not have the knowledge of the two any how, we must know रजत as possessed of रजतत्वावच्छिन्नत्व and रत्न as possessed of रत्नत्वावच्छिन्नत्व. Then only we shall have यथार्थं नभव.

स्मृति is defined as ज्ञानविषय ज्ञानम्. Remembrance is a cognition referring to something which had been already known before ( under different circumstances ) Kesavamista does not elsewhere define स्मृति as such. Hence the reading ज्ञानविषय स्मृति seems to have been inserted here to make up for the deficiency (संस्कारभावजन्य ज्ञानम् is another definition of स्मृति. For संस्कार, see section 81 below here मानाख्यसंस्कार is meant संस्कार means the impressions formed when we see a thing ) If the definition were simple ज्ञान स्मृति ( that is, if we drop ज्ञानविषय ) it would extend to घटप्रत्यक्ष as well. The definition is however still faulty, as it would extend to प्रयामज्ञा ( recognition ) According to the ancient Naiyāyikas, प्रयामज्ञा is caused by संस्कार(जनिततत्त्वास्मृति) and not by सम्कार, ( स्मृतिं सम्कारं च प्रति अनुभवस्य अनयव इत्येव जनकत्वम् इति प्राचा मतम् । नवीनानां मत तु अनुभवस्य ज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वम् ) Others say that स्मृति is मनोतया and not संस्कारजन्या.

(6) (Line 3)—ननु The objector complains that he is being fooled by the siddhāntin who, instead of explaining the thing properly, is merely furnishing him with synonyms which are equally unintelligible, and throw no further light on the matter. Thus कारणम् = साधकनम् = अविशदित साधकम् = प्रकृत कारणम्, so साधकम् was explained as कारणम्, but this is hardly helpful in understanding the nature of कारणम्. The siddhāntin appreciates the point of view of the objector and defines कारणम् in detail. The reading साधकनम् कारणम् is faulty as it comes into conflict with the passage साधक कारणमिति पदम्, for then साधक and कारण do not become पदम्, साधक would be a विशेषण of कारण.

A कारणम् must satisfy three conditions —

(1) It must be antecedent to the कार्य, that is, it must exist before the कार्य is produced.

This seems to be an obvious condition. If we go to a potter's house when the potter is engaged in producing a jar, we shall come across a number of objects that exist prior to the jar that is to come into existence, such as clay, wheel, stick, the potter's house, Mrs. Potter, the ass etc. But all these could not be regarded as the cause of घट (We leave out of count what are called the सकारणकारणम्, which must exist before any thing that is produced, namely इतर नजानेच्छाङ्गनव प्राणमात्र काल दिक् अदृष्टम् (धर्मधर्म) प्रतियोगकसामान्यामात्र in addition, according to some.) So some other condition must be satisfied, which is—

(2) That the antecedence of the कारण to the कार्य must be invariable.

This would exclude many of the above non-essential things. Thus Mrs. Potter, the potter's house, the donkey, etc. all are eliminated. For, in the manufacture of a jar, the potter may not use the ass to bring the amount of earth required for it, he could have used a cart for that purpose, and so on.

Still some superfluous things do remain, so there is the third and most important condition, namely,

(3) The कारण must not be अ-व्यभिक्त. A कारणम् is अव्यभिक्त (proved or known to be otherwise or intended for another purpose that is, remote, not directly connected or essential) when it is proved that it is only remotely or indirectly connected with the cause, it may have नियतद्वयमात्र, but it is connected with the कार्य, only through the real कारण and not on its own merits.



The *Tārhadūpika* describes the three varieties of अवयव भिद्धि in detail—

(1) तन्तुः are known to be the cause of वस्त्रं. But can we say that तन्तुः and तन्तुत्व ( which are invariably antecedent to वस्त्रं, because they are in सदाशय relation with the तन्तुः ) are the cause of वस्त्रं ? The answer is no. Be cause तन्तुः and तन्तुत्व are अवयवभेदः. No doubt तन्तुः and तन्तुत्व are intimately related to the वस्त्रं but they are related to the वस्त्रं only through the तन्तुः and not directly. Hence they cannot be the कारण of वस्त्रं ( येन सहेव यस्मै य प्रति पुरुषुक्ति इत्यगम्ये त प्रति तेन तद् यथासिद्धम् । यथा त तुना तन्तुत्व च वस्त्रं प्रति । द्वैविका यथा त तुना may be elaborated thus—येन त तुना सहेव यस्मै तन्तुत्वस्य य पट प्रति पुरुषुक्तिव्यवगम्ये त वस्त्रं प्रति तेन त तुना तत् तन्तुत्वम् अन्यथासिद्धम् । )

(2) The potter has obviously नियतपूरमात्र to the घट manufactured by him. But what about the potter's father? He has also नियतपूरमात्र, for without the Senior potter, the Junior potter would not have been born. But the नियतपूरमात्र of the Senior potter is only indirect. Only on knowing that the Senior potter has नियतपूरमात्र with reference to the Junior potter, we understand his नियतपूरमात्र to the घट. His presence for the production of the घट is not certainly essential. The Senior potter may have been gathered to his fathers years before the घट came to be produced ( अवयव प्रति पुरुषुक्तिरे ज्ञाने एव यस्मै य प्रति पुरुषुक्तिव्यवगम्येन त प्रति तद् यथासिद्धम् । द्वैविका अवयव कुलात् प्रति पुरुषुक्तिरे ज्ञाने एव यस्मै कुलात्पितु य घट प्रति पुरुषुक्तिव्यवगम्येन त घट प्रति स कुलात् पिता अन्यथासिद्ध । )

(3) When the effect is capable of being produced by certain causes that are invariably antecedent to it, other things that come there incidentally or in addition along with those causes, are अवयवभेदः. Thus the रसभ्रम which is only incidentally connected with the production of a particular घट is अवयवभेदः. ( We have seen above that रसभ्रम is ruled out of order by the word नियत in the definition. So this variety of अवयवभेदः is not necessary to exclude रसभ्रम. Some however argue that नियत excludes रसभ्रमत्व in general which means any conveyance for bringing the earth, or any similar incidental thing, while this variety of अवयवभेदः excludes a रसभ्रम in the case of a particular घट ) Or to take another instance. When a jar is baked, it changes its रूप and गन्ध. Before the new रूप and गन्ध are produced, there are in the jar वाक्, गन्धप्रागभाव and रूपप्रागभाव. Now for the production of the गन्ध, वाक् and गन्धप्रागभाव are absolutely necessary, but रूपप्रागभाव is not. It is true that रूपप्रागभाव exists along with the गन्धप्रागभाव, but it is not necessary to produce गन्ध it is necessary to produce रूप. Therefore रूपप्रागभाव is अवयवभेदः with reference to the production of गन्ध ( अन्यत्र

कदमनियतपूर्ववर्तिनेव कार्यसमये तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पारुजगन्धो गन्धं प्रति रूपप्राग-  
भावस्य । वृत्तिरिति । It must be confessed that this is not a very happy  
instance For गन्धप्रागभाव 15 only the साधारण cause of गन्ध like इक्षर,  
आकाश etc) Thus a कारण 15 अनवयवासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्ति

Some regard अवयवासिद्धि to be five-fold

(1) यत्काय प्रति कारणस्य पूर्ववृत्तिरिति चैव रूपेण पृथगेन तत्कार्य प्रति तद्वत्स्वरूपमन्यथा  
सिद्धम् । यथा घट प्रति दण्डरूपम् ।

(2) यस्य स्यात्तन्नेवैवावयवस्य तिरेकी न सन् किंतु स्वकारणमादाधानस्य तिरेकी पृथगेन  
तदवयवासिद्धम् । यथा घट प्रति दण्डरूपम् । These two correspond to the 1st  
variety in the *Dīpikā*

(3) अन्य प्रति पूर्ववृत्तिरिति पृथगेनैव यस्य तत्कार्य प्रति पूर्ववृत्तिरिति पृथगेन तस्य तत्कार्य  
प्रति अन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घटादिकं प्रयाजाशस्य ।

(4) यत्कायजनस्य प्रति पूर्ववृत्तिरिति पृथगेनैव यस्य तत्कार्य प्रति पूर्ववृत्तिरिति पृथगेन  
तस्य तत्कार्य प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घट प्रति कुलादिकम् । Varieties 3 and 4 corres-  
pond to the second variety of the *Dīpikā*

(5) अवयवकल्पननियतपूर्ववृत्तिरिति एव कार्यसमये तद्विन्नमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घटादिकं  
प्रति रासभादीनि । This corresponds to the 3rd variety of the *Dīpikā*

परे तु अत्र अवयवकल्पनत्व लघुनियतपूर्ववृत्तिरिति बोध्यम् । तेन पारुजगन्धोदनिं प्रति  
अवयवकल्पनपूर्ववृत्तिरिति वाक्यरूपप्रागभावस्य कारणत्वनिरासं गन्धप्रागभावस्यान्यथासिद्धत्वनिरास-  
श्चेत्याह । एतेषु पञ्चस्यवयवासिद्धेषु पञ्चममात्रमवयवम् । अथैषां वस्तुतामिदं पञ्चमवयवासिद्धेनेव  
समहादिति बोध्यम् । (सायकोश pp 42-43)

The problem of causality is one of the most important problems  
in philosophy From a common sense point of view, the view about  
कारण given above, seems to be sound enough But it has got a  
number of serious flaws Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, the कार्य  
is absolutely a new thing produced, in समवाय relation with the कारण  
But how can we say that घट is an altogether different thing from  
वृत्तिरिति ? Simply because घट has a different form and shape, form  
वृत्तिरिति, it cannot be regarded as different from वृत्तिरिति Surely Deva-  
datta standing is not altogether different from Devadatta sitting or  
Devadatta lying down It would be more correct to say therefore,  
that the कार्य is a mere transformation (परिणाम) of the कारण, or to go  
one step further, an illusory change (विकल्प) of the कारण, etc The  
Naiyāyikas are असत्कार्यवादिन्ः (The Bauddhas say that सत् comes out  
of nothing, the वैशेषिकी in saying उत्पत्ते पूर्वमवियमान कार्यं सत् कारणज्जायते  
practically regard the कार्यव्यापार as not being based upon सत्, hence  
they are called अर्थनेनाशिकः The Advaitavedāntins regard व्यावहारिक  
सत् as the कार्य of सत्, according to the Sāṃkhyas the कार्य is पारमार्थिक  
सत्. Both the Vedāntins and the Sāṃkhyas are सत्कार्यवादिन्ः, the

Advaitavedantins are rather सत्कारणवद्भिः ) SanĀarācārya attacks the असत्कारणवाद in his Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya ( II 1 18 ) mercifully. There cannot be any कारण-कार्य so essential to the production of the कार्य if the कार्य does not exist before. If the कारण belongs to मूर्त्तिज्ञा, then we should say that मूर्त्तिज्ञा is being produced and not the घट which ought to exist throughout the whole व्यापार. If घट is a wholly new thing produced, why should not घट be produced from मूर्त्तिज्ञा, because घट is equally a wholly new thing etc. ( The student is recommended to read the Sankarabhāṣya passage in this connection )

( Line 12 )—कारणानुवृत्ता, अद्य-प्रसङ्ग-व्यतिरेक-अवस्था. The objector suggests a simpler definition. A कारण is that whose presence and absence are invariably followed by the presence and absence of the कार्य. Thus if मूर्त्तिज्ञा is present, घट is present, if मूर्त्तिज्ञा is absent, घट is absent. Hence we conclude that मूर्त्तिज्ञा is the cause of घट. The siddhāntin's objection to this definition is that it could not apply in the case of all pervading objects, which being eternal can never cease to exist. For instance we know that आत्मज्ञान is the cause of शब्द, but the definition proposed by the objector would not do in this case. We can say, if आत्मज्ञान is present शब्द is present but we cannot say ( or visualise ) ' If आत्मज्ञान is absent शब्द is absent ' for आत्मज्ञान can never be absent. The definition thus is faulty when applied to विद्यमान objects otherwise it is all right.

( 7 ) समवायिकारणम्—the material cause or the उदात्तकारण out of which the कार्य is made. यत्समवेतम्—एस्मिन् समवेतयेन सत्त्वं सत् कार्यमुत्पद्यते, that being in समवाय relation with which the effect is produced. तन्तुः is the समवायिकारण of घट which is in समवाय relation with the तन्तुः ( अवयवावयविनो संयन्त्र ), similarly मूर्त्तिज्ञा is the समवायिकारण of घट and घट of घटकारण ( गुणगुणिनो संयन्त्र ). A द्रव्य can alone be the समवायिकारण.

( 8 ) अयुक्तसिद्धया संयन्त्र-समवाय-समवाय is explained by the Vaiśeṣika sūtras as इहेतुमिति यत् कार्यकारणया संयन्त्राय । That by which we are able to say of the cause and the effect that the one is in the other is समवाय. Thus that the घट ( कार्य ) is in the तन्तुः ( कारण ) is due to the समवाय relation. From this it is clear that the Vaiśeṣikas admitted the समवाय relation in order to account for the very close relationship of cause and effect only. But later on the sphere of समवाय was extended to other close relations also that could not be regarded as mere संयन्त्र which is an अनियम-संयन्त्र relation. Thus Keśavamisra explains समवाय as अयुक्तसिद्धयः संयन्त्र । अयुक्तसिद्ध means ' proved to be not joined ' ( if यु means ' to join ' ) or ' proved to be not separated ' ( if व्यु means ' to separate ' ) that is things that are always together until one of them

is destroyed. The *nityatva* of the *samavāya* is to be understood only in a secondary or relative sense. *samavāya* is *nitya* as long as one of the things where it inheres is not destroyed. The five pairs of *avyutthita* things are (1) *āyazāvayavinī*, *tanu*s and *pat*, (2) *gūṇagūṇinī*, *pat* and *śukṛgūṇ* in a white *pat*, (3) *krīyākrīyāvinnī* a moving cow, (4) *janitavyaktī*, *pat* and *pat*, (5) *viśeṣavinyadṛṣyē*, *viśeṣa*s and the *parमाणु*s. Now the *samavāya* between *tanu* and *pat*, or *pat* and *pat* is not mere accidental like the relation *śeyog* between *hast* and *gustak*. The *hastgustak* *śeyog* can vanish away even though *hast* and *gustak* remain in tact, but the relation between *pat* and *pat* vanishes only when *pat* is destroyed. Thus *samavāya* is different from *śeyog*. The original *कार्यकारणयोः समवाय* admitted by Kanada is to be included in the first division, that of *अवयवावयविनौ*. It is clear that Kanada's intention in admitting *samavāya* was to explain the theory of causation only. His followers however wanted to make *samavāya* more comprehensive so as to admit of all cases of very close relationship. The followers of Prabhakara and the modern Naiyayikas regard *samavāya* to be *ज्ञाना* and also *अनित्य*. The Naiyayikas regard *samavāya* as *प्रत्यक्ष* ( *samavāya* *प्रत्यक्ष* इति इन्द्रियसंबन्धविशेषणतासतिस्त्वं हेतु । इह ज्ञाने षट्समवाय इति प्रत्यक्ष विशेषण सतिस्त्वंैव भवति । ) According to the Vaiśeṣikas *samavāya* is *अतीन्द्रिय* and only *अनुभेय* ( *samavāya* *अतीन्द्रिय* चेतनान्यत्वे सति असमवेतभावत्वात् नानात् आकाशादिवत् । ) The relation between two objects can be perceived only if both those objects are perceived, we cannot perceive *षटाकाशसंयोग*, for *आकाश* is not *प्रत्यक्ष*. Some of the *अश्वय*s of *samavāya*, viz *parमाणु*s are not *प्रत्यक्ष* ( but the opponent might retort by saying that such cases may be treated as exceptions or that they are *प्रत्यक्ष* to the *Yogins* ) *samavāya* has *nō jānī*, for there is the *बारू*, *असंबन्ध*. Only *द्रव्य*, *गुण* and *कर्म* can be in *samavāya* relation with others ( even if *samavāya*s are held to be many there is still this *असंबन्ध* ) Again *samavāya* is a peculiar kind of relation and so must be regarded as *one only*. If *samavāya* is taken to be produced by some *samavāyīkaraṇ* like other objects ( with which it is in the *samavāya* relation ) we shall have to postulate the existence of another *samavāya* and thus there would be *अनन्तरा*. The Vedantins and the Sāṃkhyas do not regard *samavāya* as a *पदार्थान्तर*, for according to them the relation between the five *avyutthita* pairs is nothing but *स्वरूप* or *तादात्म्यसंबन्ध*. If *samavāya* is able to connect itself with the two objects which are intimately connected with each other, without the assistance of another *samavāya*, what need is there of the *samavāya* relation itself? Why should we not be satisfied with the *स्वरूपसंबन्ध* between, say, *pat* and *pat*, the *tanu*s and the *pat*? Sāṅkharācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on II 2-17 launches a fierce attack on the *samavāya* relation showing how the supposition is

absurd and unnecessary (The passage is too long to be quoted here, but the student would do well to read the same carefully)

(Line 6)—For जानि and विदेश, see sections 83 and 84 below

(Line 10)—विनायना this statement is made to explain what विनायद्वय (referred to in line 8) is, (it being understood that there is no प्रतिबन्ध factor)

(9) It was said in the last section (lines 16-18) that घट is the intimate cause of घटरूप and घट is the intimate cause of घटद्वय (the सव घ between घृण and घृणिन् being समवय) The objector now wants to point out that this could not be the case

### OBJECTOR

घट cannot even be the cause, much less the समवायिका of घटरूप because both घट and घटरूप are produced at the same time and it is a patent fact that there must be पीर्याय between कारण and कार्य (कारण must be antecedent to कार्य) In the absence of पीर्याय, no कार्य कारणभाव can exist There can be no कार्यकारणभाव between the left horn and the right horn of a cow, as both the horns are produced simultaneously

### SIDDHĀNTIN

Our reply to your objection is of the घृले कुटार type We do not accept your statement that घट and घटरूप are produced at the same time Our position is this घट is first produced and it remains without any qualities for the first moment, and then the qualities are produced in intimate relation with it

This is exactly as it should be, for that ensures different effects being produced from different causes

Cause Effect

घृ निजा—घट

घट—घटरूप

If घट and घटरूप were produced at the same time, there would be no difference between them, the cause घृ निजा being the same for both of them Perhaps you might say that घट might be accepted as the cause of both घट and घटरूप (if घृ निजा cannot be their cause), but this would be still more absurd, as घट can not be its own cause, there being no पीर्याय

If we accept the position that a द्रव्य is निर्गुण at the first moment, a serious complication arises viz

(1) वस्तु at the first moment would not be visible, for the rule is that a द्रव्य having a developed colour and touch can alone be visible

(2) वस्तु could not at that moment be called even द्रव्य (for you define द्रव्य as a substratum of qualities and वस्तु at that time has no qualities at all)

(1) What harm is there if वस्तु at the first moment is invisible? Even if we suppose that वस्तु along with the qualities is produced at the first moment, it can be visible only at the second moment (for during the first moment the वस्तु comes into existence and one moment is required for our eye to come into contact with it)

According to our view the situation would be

1st moment—	निर्गुण वस्तु
2nd	सगुण वस्तु
3rd	वस्तुत्व

According to you वस्तु would be वस्तुत्व at the second moment. This is no fundamental difference

( ) When we say that a द्रव्य is गुणधर we do not mean that a द्रव्य is always possessed of qualities as a matter of course. We simply mean that it has the capacity of being a substratum of qualities. It does not matter in the least if at a particular time, it is not actually possessed of qualities

If you are still not satisfied, we present you with another definition of द्रव्य, that it is a सगुण विरक्षण which does apply in the case of निर्गुण वस्तु as well. Perhaps the objector might retort that a निर्गुण वस्तु can not be सगुण विरक्षण either, at the first moment for there are no qualities at that time. But this


would be hyper-critical We call *मूर्ति* the cause of *घट* in the sense that given the necessary auxiliaries, it produces *घट* ]

(Line 15)—महत्त्वे मूर्ति-महत्त्व magnitude, any dimension between अणुपरिमण and निःपरिमण (both of which are not वास्तव) is महत्त्व which is necessary to make an object वास्तव उद्भूतत्वं is also essential for that purpose (Line 1)—For वास्तवता there is another (and perhaps a better) reading गुणाभयत्वं गुणाभयताभावान्निकरणत्वम् (because it is गुणाभयत्व (referred to) by the objector in his definition of द्रव्य in line 16) that deserves to be explained and not योग्यता—being a substratum of qualities means not being the abode of the absolute absence (like महाशून्य) of qualities that is the absence of qualities is not there for all time If the qualities are not there now they would be coming into existence later on This does not affect the position of a द्रव्य as a द्रव्य

(10) असमवायिकारणम्—This is admitted only by the Nyāyikas, in order to connect कारण and कारण which are regarded as distinct The Vedantins and others admit only two कारण, उत्पादन and निमित्त The असमवायिकारण can only be a गुण or शक्ति, it can never be a द्रव्य The name असमवायिकारण which literally means not a समवायिकारण and hence would refer to the निमित्तकारण as well, is to be understood in a special sense to denote a कारण which is द्रव्य सूत्र to the समवायिकारण The समवायिकारण may be direct or परस्पर असमवायिकारण is thus two fold It is described in the Tarkasamgraha as

(1) which has an intimate relation (समवाय) with a thing with which the ज्ञान also is intimately related कार्येण सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवन्तव सति य कारणम् (कार्येण पदेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे ततो समवन्तव तत्तुल्ययोग पदस्य कथस्य असमवायिकारणम्) thus तत्तुल्ययोग is an intimate relation with तत्तुल्य with which the कार्य is also intimately related Therefore तत्तुल्ययोग is the असमवायिकारण of कार्य

(2) the which is an intimate relation with a thing with which the समवायिकारण of the कार्य is also intimately related—कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवन्तव सति य कारणम् (परस्परसायमवकायिकारणेन यत्न सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे ततो समवेन तत्तुल्य परस्परस्य असमवायिकारणम्) thus तत्तुल्य is an intimate relation with तत्तुल्य with which कार्य the समवायिकारण of the कार्य परस्पर is also intimately related Therefore तत्तुल्य is the असमवायिकारण of परस्पर The following diagrams would make this clear



The first असमवादिनाम् is called तन्तु ( लघुप्रतिपत्तिनात् ) and the second मत्तु ( मुहुप्रतिपत्तिनात् )

( 11 ) निमित्तकारणम्—All causes ( satisfying the definition of कारण properly ) other than the समवाय and the असमवायि कारण are classed as निमित्तकारणम् तूरी, वेप etc are the निमित्तकारण of पट, and इष्ट, चक्र, etc of पट. समवायिकारण and निमित्तकारण correspond respectively to the material cause and the efficient cause of Aristotle. The formal cause of Aristotle is the सामान्य, the Naiyayikas have nothing similar to his final cause

( 12 ) अभावस्य=प्रभृत्सामान्यम्, for the other kinds of अभाव can not be produced ( see section 86 ) समवायस्य तु नापह्नपरमत्वम्—This sentence tells us why अभाव can not stand in समवाय relation to anything and furnishes a reason for the statement made in the last sentence. A conjectural reading here is कारणद्वयवर्धनात्. Since समवाय is a characteristic feature of both समवायि and असमवायि कारण, as shown above, अभाव which does not possess that characteristic, viz the समवाय relation, can not obviously have those कारण

( 13 ) प्रथमम्—the most potent cause, ब्रह्म कारणम् कारण is the सतिशयकारण among the three causes, समवायि, असमवायि and निमित्त. According to the ancients, this सतिशयकारण must be व्यापारवत् ( व्यापार is defined as तज्जान्यत्वे सति तज्जान्यजनन the operation which is itself produced by the cause and which in turn produces the effect produced by the cause. Thus the axe falls a tree. Here चोदनक्रिया is the कार्य of the पटम्. But unless the व्यापार viz पटम्प्रसवण takes place, the चोदनक्रिया would not take place. पटम्प्रसवण is जन्य of पटम् and is itself the जन्य of चोदनक्रिया which is also the जन्य of पटम् ) Thus कारण is a potent operative cause. The moderns describe कारण as कदाचान्भवकचिद्वत् ( which is most proximate to the effect, without whose appearance the effect would



not be produced) or यद्विलम्बा मङ्गलकावातुत्वाद् According to the moderas therefore परमप्रसङ्गयोग itself would be the प्रमाण

In section 14, Kesavanisra describes इन्द्रिय, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिध्य and ज्ञान as करण under different circumstances. He therefore does not stick to any one view in particular. What could be strikingly regarded as a potent cause, should be regarded as the प्रमाण, according to him.

(Line 3)—यत् The author now shows how the definition of प्रमाण as अनधिगताद्यन्तु is wrong.

#### OBJECTOR

By means of a Pramana we cognise something which we had not known before, so why should not Pramana be defined as अनधिगतपदम् ?

In the case of a series of cognitions about the same jar, we might argue that वृत् 1 is different from वृत् 2, वृत् 2 from वृत् 3 etc, so that every time we do apprehend something not apprehended before, so our definition is correct.

We see no objection why we should not be taken to cognise the minute divisions of time.

#### SIDDHANTIN

If we accept your definition of a Pramana, a series of cognitions about the same jar, for instance, in the form of 'this is a jar' 'this is a jar' would be invalid, which is manifestly absurd, so your definition is wrong. The first knowledge of the वृत् would be valid, but the knowledge of the वृत् at the second, third, fourth moments etc is invalid as it is a *knowledge of the वृत् already apprehended*. For according to you, Pramana makes known things not apprehended before.

Your supposition is vitiated by actual experience. Who has ever been able to cognise such minute divisions of cognitions representing the jar in successive moments ?

Our actual experience is otherwise. We feel that we cognise one *single whole movement* (strictly speaking this is an inaccurate apprehension, but that is another matter) and *not four different actions compressing* it.

It is better always to be guided by fact and so we reject your definition.

(Line 6)—*घटसंवाहिकज्ञान*—cognition in the form of घट (or series, serial or continuous cognitions. This is postulated, because the supposition is that no cognition lasts for more than one moment. This is so akin to the Buddhist doctrine सर्वं सत् क्षणिकम्. That is why the Naiyāyikas are called अववैवाहिकः (Line 8)—*अत्रापि*, the objector suggests that घट 1 (घट at the first moment of cognition) may be regarded as different from घट 2, घट 2 from घट 3 and so forth (Line 10)—*योगपदानभिमान*—This shows that the कान्तेद is not comprehended किय (this is dropped in Paranjpe's edition perhaps rightly. It seems to be an explanation by some copyist of the expression कियदिसकण्ठाम्). Let us see what happens when Devadatta is on the move. We say that he has taken one step, but that one step is really made up of four operations—(1) There is first किय or movement in his foot (2) then there is disjunction of the foot from the ground where it was placed through this movement, (3) as a result of that there is the destruction of the former conjunction of the foot with the ground, (4) and lastly the production of the conjunction of the foot with the next spot. It would perhaps appear that (2) कियतो विभाग and (3) घृतयोगनाश are not different, but according to the Vaiśeṣikas, they are different (Annambhatta, in his Tarkasamgraha defines विभाग as अयोगन प्रकृतम्) (Line 14)—*अद्वैतत्वेन प्रयोगे*—This is in accordance with the view of the moderns about काल (viz कालविभागात्वाच्चतुस्रं करणम् see above)

(14) The Vaiśeṣikas admit only two independent Pramāṇas, प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the Naiyāyikas admit four

(15) प्रत्यक्षम्—the means of direct perception and प्रत्यक्षज्ञान is ज्ञान produced by the contact of the sense organs with the objects of knowledge. The Nyayasūtras define it as इन्द्रियवदसानुसर्षान्तरं ज्ञानमवपदेशमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायान्तरम् (अल्पपदेशम् २३ निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम् अव्यभिचारि-अवमिन्नम्, and अव्यवसायान्तरम्-नविकल्पकम्) प्रत्यक्षम् is derived as अवमत्तं प्रती ये पश्यन् इति (असापि इन्द्रियणि प्राणासक्तव्यप्राणरुचिभोगमनसि पद्) The definition in the text of course only applies to the ज्ञानप्रवह and not to the प्रत्यक्ष of ईश्वर, which is निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षम् is thus produced—(आत्मम्—यत्—इन्द्रियम्—अर्थ) Ātman is connected with Manas, Manas with Indriyas and Indriyas with Artha, thus there are three सानुसर्ष of which the first two are common to other ज्ञान as well, only the last is peculiar to प्रत्यक्ष निर्विकल्पकम् is निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञान (विशेषणविशेष्यरूप-कारणरुद्धि सप्रकार-व्यभिचारमहितम्) that is, where no note is taken of the relation of the विशेष्य and its qualities and attributes, knowledge in the form इदं निश्चितम्. The निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम् is thus ननु इन्द्रियवदप्रत्यक्षम्. The Bauddhas regard निर्विकल्पकज्ञान alone as प्रमाणम्

The existence of निर्दिक्करज्ञान is proved by अनुमान ( ननु निर्दिक्करज्ञानं विप्रमाणमिति चेन्न । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञान विशेषणजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् दुर्णिति ज्ञानवै-  
 त्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशिष्टज्ञानाभ्यां सविद्यत्वेनैवैतद्व्यभिचारिण्यसिद्धि-  
 द्वापिना) सादकत्पक—having विचार or प्रकृतता constituted of जाति, गुण,  
 क्रिया and सत्ता according to the well-known dictum of the  
 Mahabhasyakara चतुर्थी दाद्वानां प्रकृति Read the following from  
 Kavyaprakasa II in this connection, गो चतुर्थीये स्थि इयादे  
 चतुर्थी दाद्वानां प्रकृति इति पदामान्यतर । उपाधिश्च द्विविध । चतुर्थीये  
 चतुर्थीयत्वात्तन्निवृत्तश्च । चतुर्थीये द्विविध । सिद्ध सत्त्वश्च । सिद्धोपि द्विविध ।  
 पदावस्य प्राणप्रदो विशिष्टाद्यानडेनुश्च । तत्राद्या जाति । उक्तं हि चतुर्थीयं न हि गो रत्नरुप  
 गोनाप्यगो गोत्वमपिसाधयानु गो इति । द्वितीयो गुण । चतुर्थीयां हलन्वयत्वात् तस्य विशिष्टत्वे ।  
 साध्य उपाधिसाधनवयव क्रियास्य ॥—all these are explained in the text further  
 on The सविद्यत्पज्ञान about गो would be गान्तव्यमित्याम् चतुर्थीयात् चतुर्थी  
 साधनं द्विविधत्वात् पदाद्य It is thus नामजातिविशेषण विप्रमाणत्वात्प्राणात् इत्यम्  
 According to the Vedantins ज्ञानरूपमेतद्दर्शनं ज्ञानम् is सविद्यत्पक प्रयत्न  
 is also divided into नियम and अनियम, the latter being further divided  
 into लौकिक and जलौकिक, लौकिक is sixfold, प्राणज, यमन, अक्षुण्ण, स्वप्न  
 शोष and मानस अलौकिक is three-fold, सामान्यकरण ज्ञानरक्षण and यमज  
 Out of the sense-organs (including mind) that are चतुर्थीयत्पक चतुर्थी  
 लक and मनम् are द्रव्यप्रहक, the rest are द्रव्यप्रहक The इन्द्रिय are the  
 कारण of प्रयत्नजन्य according to Annsambhatts Another view is सुदृश्ये  
 द्रव्यप्रकमदिप्रयत्ने इन्द्रियमेव कारणम् । विषया द्रव्यतया इन्द्रियमेव हेतुर्गो वा व्यापार ।  
 द्रव्यप्रकम इत्यस्य फलम् । ( म्यायकांश P 542 )

( Line 8 )—कदा पूर्वनिर्दिष्ट कारणम्—

- ( १ ) ( कारणम् ) इन्द्रियम् ( चतु )—यत् ( च )—फलम् ( निर्दिक्करप्रमा )  
 इन्द्रियावसिद्धय ( अत्रानव्यवहार )
- ( २ ) , पादु—यत्—फलम् ( उक्त )  
 पादुशकतया ( अत्रानव्यवहार )

( Line 16 )—( 1 ) ( कारणम् ) इन्द्रियमेव यत्—फलम्  
 निर्दिक्करज्ञानम् ( सविद्यत्पक ज्ञानम् )  
 ( अत्रानव्यवहार )

( Line 21 )—( 1 ) ( कारणम् ) निर्दिक्करज्ञानम्—फलम्  
 सविकारकज्ञानम् इत्येवम् न तदादुष्टम्  
 ( अत्रानव्यवहार )

( Line 10 )—चतुर्था पादु चतुर्थीया द्रव्ये चतुर्थीयत्पक ज्ञानरक्षणत्वात् न  
 नञ्ज्ञानेति इति । अथवा चतुर्थीया द्रव्ये सविद्यत्पक ज्ञानं ज्ञानेति इति । The Naiyaya  
 has held that senses produce cognition only after coming into  
 contact with the object. The sense of sight is actually supposed to  
 travel over to the object and to come into contact with it before it  
 is seen ( Line 11 )—सामान्यतयादे-यम न हि, गुण and क्रिया ( Line 21 )

इनेपादानो , after perceiving an object in all its bearings, we might think of having it or rejecting it or we might choose to remain indifferent about it The reading नञ्जयत्नञ्जय etc explains what व्यापार is. If it is genuine, it ought to come with propriety in line 13, where the अतान्तरव्यापार is first mentioned See notes on section 6 for व्यापार ( Lane 25)—अत्र कश्चिद्ग्रह—The objector suggests that it would be simpler to regard इन्द्रिय as the करण in all cases, and what ever intervenes between the कारण (इन्द्रिय) and the फल is the intermediate operation Thus according to this view, when the फल is इन्द्रियबुद्धय , the position would be

अतान्तरव्यापार


कारणम् ( इन्द्रियम् ) ————— फलम्  
 चक्षु [ ( 1 ) इन्द्रियापसरिकष ( 2 ) निरिक्तपक्ष ज्ञानम् ( इन्द्रियबुद्धय )  
 ( 3 ) सविकल्पक ज्ञानम् ]

Kesavamisra simply refers to this view, he neither accepts it nor rejects it


( 16 ) The इन्द्रियापसरिकष which is the cause of प्रयत्नज्ञान is six fold, that is, taking into consideration the peculiar nature of the various इन्द्रिय, and of अभाव ( which can not be the direct object of perception ) we find that the इन्द्रियापसरिकष takes place in six ways श्रोत्र ( which is nothing but अकारा circumscribed by the cavity of the ear ) can perceive only शब्द with which it can have only समवाय relation ( as शब्द is the peculiar गुण of अकारा ) सयोग is not at all possible ( रूपेण समवाय is possible in the perception of शब्द ) In the case of other इन्द्रिय, as they can have सयोग relation with their object, सयोग, सयुक्तसमवाय and सयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय सम्बन्ध are possible ( for the perception respectively of घट, घन्त्व, and घन्धत्व by the eye ) The following diagrams would make this clear

( 1 ) A चक्षु — सयोग — घट  
 B मन — " — आमा  
 घट ( आमा )

( 1 ) सयोग



( 2 ) सयुक्तसमवाय



The sixth *सन्निरूपे* is necessary for the perception of *अमान*, and of *समवाय* also, according to the *Nāyayikas* as expressed in the form *इह कपले घटसमवाय*, the *Vaiśeṣikas*, on the other hand regard *समवाय* as अनुमेय only. How can we perceive *घटाभाव*? If there had been *समवाय* between *घट* and *घटाभाव*, there would have been no difficulty in the matter. But neither *सयोग* nor *समवाय* can exist between *घट* and *घटाभाव*, hence we must find a round about way of perceiving *घटाभाव*. We leave aside *घटाभाव* and concentrate our attention on the *भूतल* where the *घट* would have been if it had been existing. Thus in perceiving *घटाभाव*, we as a matter of fact are expected to perceive *भूतल* (the *विज्ञेय*) characterised by (the *विशेषण*) *घटाभाव*. *घटाभाववत् भूतलम्* is the nature of our perception. *भूतल* is of course *सयुक्त* with the eye. To be quite accurate the *सन्निरूपे* should be called *सयुक्तविशेषणविशयमवार*. According to the *Tarkadīpikā* the perception can be expressed as *भूतले घटाभाव* also. Here *घटाभाव* becomes the *विज्ञेय* and *भूतले* the *विशेषण*. Though ultimately the idea is the same, this view is not correct as *घटाभाव* there becomes the *विज्ञेय* which obviously it can not be. The *Dīpikā* also incidentally remarks that this way of perceiving *अमान* dispenses with the *अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण* which is recognised by some as an independent *प्रमाण* (एतेनानुपलब्ध प्रमाणं तत्र निरस्तम्। यद्यत्र घटोऽप्रविष्यन्नहि भूतलमिवाद्भस्यत्। दशनाभावात्कस्तीति तस्मिन्प्रतिषेधेऽपि सन्निविष्टोऽनुपलब्धिप्रमाणान्तरात्। अतिक्रान्ताभावमपेक्षार्थोऽद्वयत्वेऽपि कारणत्वोपपत्त्यानुपलब्धेः कारणत्वस्य युक्तत्वात्।) See also notes on sections 40 and 41 (Line 14)—*वस्तुसन्निरूपे*. The necessity of this four-fold contact in the case of the perception of

the dimension of an object is proved on the ground that the perception of the dimension depends on the perception of each single constituent part of the object, as well as of the object as a whole. This however is not the case in the perception of the colour. For, if we saw only one side of an object, we should be able to perceive what its colour is. If we are very near the object, we might be able to perceive its dimension without the additional four-fold contact, but this contact is absolutely necessary, when the object is at a distance (Lane 24)—The reading *वर्णरूपरूप* is unnecessary here. It is in its right place in section 46 (Lane 31)—*मन सयुक्त*, the *सुखाद्यभाग* is perceived in the form *सुखाद्यभावात् मन* (Lane 31)—the *घटाभावात्* is perceived in the form *घटाभावात् मनसः* (Lane 38)—*वञ्जित* the *सदिकर्ष* which gives us the *प्रत्यक्ष* of *अभावात्* is the *विशेषणविशेष्यभाव* (or *विशेषणता*) *सदिकर्ष*, and as this *विशेषणता* is based upon any one of the five relations mentioned before, it is of five kinds. These may be stated as follows—

(1) *बहु सयुक्ते मूलस्य घटाद्यभावात् यत्ते संयुक्तविशेषणता*. in the form *घटाभावात् मनसः*

(2) *बहु सयुक्तघटसमवेतरूप एतद्यथाप्रत्यक्षे सयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणता* in the form, *एताद्यथावत् घटरूपम्*

(3) *बहु संयुक्तधर्मसमवेतरूपसमवेतस्वप्नसाधये एताद्यथावत्प्रत्यक्षे सयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणता* in the form *एताद्यथावत् घटरूपम्*

(4) *शेषसमवेतगणकरी अनासद्यथावत्प्रत्यक्षे समवेतविशेषणता* in the form *घटाभावात् मनसः*

(5) *शेषसमवेतगणकरी समवेतगणकसाधये एताद्यथावत्प्रत्यक्षे समवेतसमवेतविशेषणता* in the form *घटाभावात् मनसः*

*विशेषणविशेष्यभावविशेषणता* which would be the possible sixth variety for the perception of *घटाभावात्* on *घटाभावात्* is apparently not admitted as after all it is only a double *विशेषणतासदिकर्ष*

(Lane 40)—*एव समवायोरपि*, the rule is *वेदेन्द्रियेण यद् गृह्यते तेनन्द्रियेण तद्वैत साधन्यम्*, तद्वैत अथवा, तद्वैत अभावश्च शक्यते ।

(Lane 45)—The verse *घटतत्कलि* etc. is dropped in some manuscripts

(17)—*अनु विदित्कथक*. This is an objection set forth by one who is a follower of the Buddhist system of philosophy. According to the Buddhists, everything that exists is momentary, *सत् सत् तद् क्षणिकम्*. Now *सामान्य* or generality is *द्वित्य* according to the Naiyayikas, but according to the objector, *सामान्य* is *असत्*, because it follows from *सत् सत् तद् क्षणिकम्*, that *एव क्षणिकत्वाभावात्* (that is, *निवृत्त*) *सत् असत्*. Secondly *सामान्य* is absolutely of no use, it is *तुच्छ*, having no positive nature

For according to the Bauddha गौर ( the सामान्य in गौ ) does not tell us anything about गौ, but is useful only in enabling us to exclude what is not गौ. It has therefore only a negative nature. The 'objector' puts forward his objection, taking for granted that it is proved that ( 1 ) सामान्य is not वस्तुयुत and ( 2 ) it serves no useful purpose.

The objector says —I can understand that the निर्विकल्पकज्ञान in the form इदं किञ्चित् can be had by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण, for there the sense of sight comes into contact with the वस्तु वस्ति. But how can we have सर्ववस्तुज्ञान by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण? For according to you, सर्ववस्तुज्ञान is नापजात्वादि-योजनोत्पन्न. The सर्ववस्तुज्ञान about घट would be घटत्ववाच् ( नै लक्षणवच् etc ) पदाय. Now I have shown above that the सामान्य is not वस्तुयुत. Hence the घटत्वसामान्य which is not वस्तुयुत can not produce any ज्ञान at all. So no सर्ववस्तुज्ञान can be had, it can never be had by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण at any rate.

Kesavamisra summarily dismisses the objection by asserting that सामान्य is वस्तुयुत and it is silly to argue that whatever exists is साक्षिक ( see section 83 for the nature of सामान्य )

( Line 1 )—सर्ववस्तुत्वम् is the शक्ति, that which possesses a peculiar characteristic of its own, that which is specially individualised ( Line 3 )—शब्द-लिङ्गवत् अनुगतताक-सवगाहित्वात्-लिङ्ग ( indicatory mark ) is explained in detail in section 18, and शब्द ( Word, Testimony ) in section 30. सामान्य is by its very nature अनुगतताक-सवगाहि, as it resides in all objects belonging to the same class ( see section 83 ). शब्दज्ञान is also अनुगतताक-सवगाहि, as it necessarily involves the ज्ञान of different objects possessed of सामान्य etc. लिङ्गज्ञान likewise is impossible without the knowledge of सामान्य existing in the different वस्तुवत् belonging to the same class.

( 18 ) The author now starts on the treatment of अनुमान, which forms perhaps the most important topic in the न्याय system. Sections 18-32 deal with अनुमान and should be carefully studied by the student.

अनुमिति means the cognition or, to borrow a term from western logic, the judgment, which we arrive at by means of inference and अनुमान represents inference or the process by which this cognition is obtained. Thus अनुमान is naturally the special cause or instrument of अनुमिति. Again अनुमिति is described as परामर्शोत्पन्न ज्ञानम्. From this it follows that अनुमान which produces अनुमिति, is the same as परामर्शोत्पन्न, or लिङ्गपरामर्श is obtained as लिङ्गवत् न्याय ज्ञानम्. In order to understand this, we must take a concrete instance of an अनुमान and learn the meaning of a few technical terms.

The classical instance of an अनुमान, like the celebrated illustration of Socrates and his mortality in western logic, is that in which we infer the presence of fire on a mountain by observing smoke issuing from it. This is expressed as follows: *पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमरश्वात् । यत्र धूम इव नव वह्निः । अथ पवन वह्निस्यस्य अनुमान् । तस्मात्पवनं वह्निमान् ।* Here the mountain about which we want to prove something viz *वह्निमान्* in this case, is known as *वस्तु* or the subject *वह्निः* which is the thing that we want to establish or prove, is called *साक्ष्य धूम* is designated *सम्पन्न* or *लिङ्ग* or the indicative mark because it is on account of this smoke that we are able to prove *वह्निः* on the mountain. Smoke proves the presence of fire on the mountain, because there is invariable concomitance or association between smoke and fire. Wherever there is smoke, there fire is necessarily found. This invariable association of smoke with fire is known as *व्यभिचि*.

*व्यभिचि* is one of the most important terms in Sanskrit Nyaya and long and elaborate discussions are carried on regarding its nature and definition. Our author has perhaps given the simplest definition of this difficult word, when he says that *व्यभिचि* is *सहचर्यनियम* or invariability of association or concomitance. *व्यभिचि* thus poses as two elements viz *सहचर्य* and *नियम* or *नियन्त्वद्*. Some explain *सहचर्य* as *सम्पन्नविकृत्य* or possession of the same abode. Wherever smoke is found, there fire is also present. We have noted this phenomenon by actually observing several smoky places such as the kitchen, the chimney and the steam-engine. Thus we know that between smoke and fire *सहचर्य* or *सम्पन्नविकृत्य* exists. But is this association *नियन्त्वद्* or invariable? *नियन्त्वद्* or invariability is the same as *व्यभिचि* *रामाय* or the absence of the violation of their association. If a single instance could be found where there is smoke, but no fire, the *सहचर्य* between smoke and fire would be violated or *अभिचरित*. And as no such contrary instance is available, *व्यभिचि* exists between smoke and fire and is expressed by the sentence *यत्र यत्र धूम इव नव वह्निः*. Now let us take the converse of this proposition viz *यत्र यत्र वह्निः इव नव धूम* and see whether *व्यभिचि* exists between *वह्निः* and *धूम*. Here we find that in a large number of cases such as the kitchen and the cigarette which that follow is smoking fire is associated with smoke. Thus there is general association or *सहचर्य* between fire and smoke. But this association is not invariable, because contrary instances where fire is present without smoke are found. For example, in a red-hot ball of iron or in a lighted electric bulb, there is fire, but no smoke. Hence the *सहचर्य* between *वह्निः* and *धूम* is not *नियन्त्वद्* and consequently *नोव्यभिचि* exists between fire and smoke.



In the व्याप्ति 'यत्र यत्र धूम तत्र तत्र वह्नि' धूम which is the साधन and वह्नि which is the मध्य are known as व्याप्य and व्यापक respectively. The meaning of these two terms must be clearly understood. व्याप्य and व्यापक as their grammatical formation shows, are relative terms. व्यापक means that which pervades or is more extensive and is opposed to व्याप्य which signifies that which is pervaded by or included in the व्यापक or which is less extensive than the व्यापक. वह्नि is व्यापक with reference to धूम, because besides being present in all those cases where धूम is present वह्नि is found in others where धूम is not present viz the red hot ball of iron or the lighted electric bulb. धूम is thus pervaded by वह्नि and is consequently known as व्याप्य. It will thus be seen that wherever the less extensive is present, the more extensive is bound to be there. Hence all those conclusions which are based on a व्याप्य साधन are correct. In fact the सप्तदर्शनी defines साधन and मध्य as व्याप्य and व्यापक respectively.

It should be noted that though व्यापक and व्याप्य are translated as more extensive and less extensive, the terms more extensive and less extensive mean occurring in greater and less number of cases respectively. A field of ten acres is certainly more extensive than others which extend over five acres only. But a ten acre field is not व्यापक with reference to a five-acre one, as the meaning of the term व्यापक in this Sastra is concerned. For it does not occur in greater number of cases. To explain. A five-acre field is present wherever fields extending from five to nine acres are present, besides being present in all those cases where a ten acre field is found. Thus in the terminology of साधन a five-acre field is व्यापक with reference to a ten acre field, which becomes व्याप्य. To take another illustration. The number 10, though numerically greater than 5 is only व्याप्य with reference to 5 because 5, being present in all the cases where 10 is present is in addition found in the numbers 6 to 9 and hence is व्यापक with reference to 10. It will thus be seen that व्यापक or the more extensive means that which is found in a greater number of cases than its व्याप्य and व्याप्य signifies that which occurs in a less number of cases than its व्यापक.

We have seen above that व्याप्य and व्यापक stand for साधन and मध्य respectively. But this does not mean that in every instance the साधन should be such as is found in a less number of cases and the मध्य such as is present in a greater number. For sometimes the साधन and साधन may be co-extensive or such as occur in an equal number of cases. For example in the अनुमान घटा द्रव्यम् । शुभाश्रयत्वाद् , शुभाश्रयत्व which is the

साधन or साध्य is found in exactly the same number of cases as द्रव्य  
 For, no case where द्रव्यत्व exists without गुणधरत्व can be conceived  
 Thus to be more accurate व्यपक or साध्य means that which is not found  
 in a less number of cases than the व्याप्य or साधन Similarly व्याप्य or साधन  
 means that which is not found in a greater number of cases than the  
 व्यापक or साध्य

We are now in a position to understand the author's statement  
 in section 20, अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता च (अनुमान consists of two  
 parts viz व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता) On account of व्याप्ति we understand in a  
 general way that wherever the साधन, that is smoke, is present, the  
 साध्य, that is, fire is also found साधनस्य पक्षधर्मता or the fact that the  
 साधन is an attribute of the present पक्ष viz the mountain tells us that  
 fire must also be present on this mountain Thus for a valid अनुमान  
 or परामर्श both these parts are necessary

The necessity of these two constituents of पक्षधर्मता can be easily  
 proved Take the case 'शब्द अनित्य प्रमेयत्वात्' This is not a valid  
 अनुमान, because though पक्षधर्मता is present here, that is, though प्रमेयत्व  
 resides in शब्द there is no व्याप्ति between प्रमेयत्व and अनित्यत्व We  
 cannot say एव एव प्रमेयत्व तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् because though प्रमेयत्व and  
 अनित्यत्व may be सहचर in such objects as घट and पत्र, प्रमेयत्व is not ac-  
 companied by अनित्यत्व in such substances as आर श, काल, दिग् आ मन्यु, and  
 मनस, which are all नित्य. On the other hand in 'शब्द नित्य असुतद्रव्यत्वात्',  
 we have a correct व्याप्ति but no पक्षधर्मता एव एव असुतद्रव्यत्व इत्यत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम्  
 is a correct proposition But असुतद्रव्यत्व does not reside in शब्द,  
 because शब्द is a गुण It will thus be seen that for a proper परामर्श or  
 अनुमान both व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता are necessary The सप्तम्यांशो defines अनुमान  
 as 'व्याप्तियक्षधर्मताविशटलिङ्गत्वम्'

(Lane 10)—तस्य (धूमस्य लिङ्गस्य) तृतीयं ज्ञानं लिङ्गपरामर्श—It is the third  
 ज्ञान of the indicator mark धूम, that is the instrument of अनुमानि  
 Thus first there is—

(1) The knowledge of धूम in the kitchen when by means of  
 बुद्धेर्दर्शनं, the observer is in a position to understand the invariable  
 concomitance between धूम and अग्नि This is the First ज्ञान

No inferential cognition about अग्नि can arise from this ज्ञान, as  
 the व्याप्ति between धूम and अग्नि is not yet apprehended, it is only after  
 the व्याप्ति is apprehended that अनुमानि can arise

It might be argued that we might wait for the apprehension of the  
 व्याप्ति, and after the व्याप्ति is apprehended, proceed to draw inference  
 about fire, from the first धूमज्ञान in the kitchen itself

The answer to this argument is simple enough — There can be no inference about fire in the kitchen itself. For we actually see fire there and inference has scope only when there is doubt about something.

(2) The second धुमज्ञान is the knowledge of धुम on the mountain.

It is true that when we have this second धुमज्ञान, the धुमिनि is already ascertained and there is also doubt about the presence of fire on the mountain, but this second धुमज्ञान also does not enable us to have अनुमिति, because there must be व्याप्तिरसम्भवाद् before अनुमिति can take place.

(3) The third धुमज्ञान arises after the धुमिनि originally apprehended in the kitchen, is remembered.

And it is this third धुमज्ञान that produces the अनुमिति and it is the कारण thereof, according to the modern view of कारण viz. it must be फलायोग्यवचिउक्त.

Some regard सिद्ध or सिद्धज्ञान as अनुमितिकरण. These people hold कारण to be 'धुमपरावत् अमाशरण कारणम्' and as सिद्धपरामर्श is immediately followed by अनुमिति, सिद्धपरामर्श, if regarded as अन्तर्निमित्तम्, would not be स्वपरावत्. Hence they consider सिद्ध to be अन्तर्निमित्तम्. Now सिद्ध or सिद्धज्ञान is followed by the धुमपरा वत् परामर्श, which in its turn is followed by अनुमिति. So सिद्ध is धुमपरावत् and thus the कारण of अनुमिति. Kesavamisra evidently held, in the case of अनुमान at any rate, that कारण is 'फलायोग्यवचिउक्त कारणम्'. सिद्धपरामर्श is फलायोग्यवचिउक्त, because it is immediately and invariably followed by the फल viz अनुमिति. Hence it is the कारण of अनुमिति.

तर्कशिक्षिका points out that if mere सिद्ध or सिद्धज्ञान is regarded as अन्तर्निमित्तम्, even past or future सिद्ध would lead to अनुमिति. Thus the smoke that we saw on the mountain yesterday would enable us to infer the presence of fire to-day. But this is absurd. Therefore mere सिद्धज्ञान is not enough. परमधमता is also necessary.

परामर्श, as we saw before, contains two elements धुमिनि and परमधमता. Why should we not regard these two severally as the कारणs of अनुमिति? Why should we invent a new complex term such as परामर्श and regard it as the one कारण of अनुमिति? शिक्षिका answers these questions by saying that to regard धुमज्ञान and परमधमता severally as the two कारणs of अनुमिति involves गैरत्व. So it is better to consider परामर्श which contains these two ideas, as the one कारण of अनुमिति. Read 'ननु धुमपरावत् चिन्तापरामर्श अन्तर्निमित्तत्वात् धुमपरावत् चिन्तापरामर्श इति चेन्न । सद्धुमपरावत् चिन्तापरामर्शोऽन्तर्निमित्तत्वात् । विज्ञापयमानस्य अपरिचयज्ञानेन सापेक्षेन तर्के परामर्शोऽन्तर्निमित्तत्वात् ।' शिक्षिका न फलम् । अर्थात्तत्र व्यवहारात् ।'

( Lane 14 )—यदापि यत्र एव The author now sounds a note of warning that sometimes mere युयोदर्शन is likely to deceive us in making us believe that there is *व्यभि* between two objects, when as a matter of fact, there is no *व्यभि* between them. We should of course avail ourselves of युयोदर्शन, but we must at the same time be sure that there is *स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध*. Thus we see fire and smoke together a number of times, but considering the matter further, we find there cannot be *व्यभि* between fire and smoke, for fire is not the *प्रयोजक* of smoke, but *आद्भन्धनसंयोग*, hence the *सम्बन्ध* between fire and smoke is not *स्वाभाविक*, but *सौपर्यविक*. Likewise the *सम्बन्ध* between *यज्ञिको हिंस* and *अधर्मसाधनत्व* is not *स्वाभाविक*, because *निरिद्धत्व* is the *प्रयोजक* of *अधर्मसाधनत्व* and not merely *हिंसान*, *मैत्रीतनयत्व* is not the *प्रयोजक* of *इयापन*, but *शाकाद्यन्नपरिनिमित्त*, hence there can be no *व्यभि* or *स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध* between *मैत्रीतनयत्व* and *इयापन*. (See section 26. This whole passage (lines 14-29) should be read along with section 28, after the student has mastered sections 19-27.)

( Line 42 )—*नानुपपन्न*, quoted from Vatsyayana's Bhasya, this is once again quoted in section 107

( 19 ) This section describes the two kinds of inference known as *स्वार्थ* and *पराथ*. When we want to infer something for our own benefit, we go through the process more or less mentally without caring to express in so many words the various stages through which our mind passes. But when we desire to make another comprehend the conclusion that we have formed we must state in definite terms the various stages by which we reach that conclusion. This is the distinction between these two kinds of inference. Thus, while in *स्वार्थानुमान* emphasis is laid on the sense, in *पराथानुमान* word is more important. The *सप्तवर्णा* defines them as follows—*स्वार्थत्वमास्वत्वम् । परार्थत्वं शब्दरूपत्वम् ।* *स्वार्थानुमान* is informal, *पराथानुमान* is formal and must be expressed by the use of a regular syllogism. The *व्याघ्रवेदिनी* defines them as *स्वार्थमास्वत्वम्* and *पराथमास्वत्वम्* respectively, where *व्याघ्र* means a formal syllogism. Other definitions of these two kinds of *अनुमान* are—*पराथानुमानं शब्दात्मकम् । स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकम् ।* *पञ्चावयवेन चावयेन स्वनिश्चितार्थपरिपादनं पराथानुमानम् ।*

It will be noticed that *पराथानुमान* follows and is based on *स्वार्थानुमान*. For, unless we ourselves are sure of a certain conclusion we are not likely to proceed to convince another of it. Kesavamisra thus describes the process of *स्वार्थानुमान*. Having repeatedly observed in places such as the kitchen that smoke is accompanied by fire, we realise the invariable concomitance between the two. We then approach a

mountain and wonder if it has fire on it. Then we see smoke thereon and remember the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire that we have already realised. After this the cognition that the mountain is possessed of smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire dawns on us. This cognition, as we saw before, is nothing but अनुमान or लिङ्गपरामर्श, which at once leads to the conclusion that the mountain is possessed of fire. Such is the process of inference for one elf.—It will be noticed that the various stages through which a भावमानमान passes are मूयोद्देशन, स्वात्मप्रकृष्टण, पवनसमीपगमन, सदेह, धूमदर्शन and धूमस्पर्शस्मरण. After this is produced the लिङ्गपरामर्श which is immediately followed by the अनभिनि.

(Lane 7) — अवेच्छित्तुल्यनाय — This eschews the possibility of smoke being imported there from outside.

(Lane 9) — अनु परामर्शानुमान consists in the use of a regular five-membered Sanskrit syllogism for the purpose of making another understand the presence of fire on the mountain after one has inferred it for oneself. The five sentences beginning with 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' represent the five members of a Sanskrit शय or syllogism stated in the proper form. The five membered syllogism when formally stated enables even another to infer the presence of fire on the mountain.

It will be noticed that the Sanskrit अनुमान includes in it to a certain extent what in western logic is known as Induction. This latter consists in the observation of several particular cases and inferring therefrom a general conclusion which will be found to be true in a subsequent case resembling those that we have already observed. If we were to remember the way in which we arrive at a दान in a Sanskrit अनुमान, we would find that we do so by following the Inductive method. For a दान is based on मूयोद्देशन or the repeated observation of particular cases. Thus the Sanskrit अनुमान is a mixture of Induction and Deduction. It must at the same time be admitted that Sanskrit logicians did not develop Induction as an independent process.

This division of अनुमान into स्वयं and वर्य is not known to Gautama and Kanada, who were respectively the founders of the Nyaya and the Vaisheshika systems. It is however mentioned in the Bhasya of Prasastapada on the Sūtras of Kanada and is consequently fairly old.—Gautama divides अनुमान into three kinds viz पूर्ववत्, उपवत् and समवयववत् इति. This is the oldest division available. पूर्ववत् अनुमान is that where from the cause we infer the effect, as when we infer that a shower of rain would fall when clouds threaten in the sky. उपवत् is

the opposite of this viz when we infer the cause from the effect Thus when we see a river in floods, we infer that there must have been rains somewhere up in its course All other cases of inference which are not from the cause to the effect or vice versa fall under the heading of सामान्यतो दृष्ट Thus, if after seeing a person in one place we find him in another some time later, we know that he must have gone from the first place to the other during the interval We see the sun in the morning in the east and find him in the west in the evening We therefore infer आदिदेश्य गमनम् from the east to the west during the course of the day, though his movement is not directly perceived Read 'अथ तद्वृत्तं त्रिविधमनुमन पूर्ववच्छेषवत् सामान्यतो दृष्ट च (२२ बभूव I : ०) यत्र कारणं वायननुमापते तत् पूर्ववत् । पूर्वं कारणं दूरवत् = कारणलिङ्गवत् । यथा भेषजं वा मषिष्यति वृद्धिर्नि अनपातम् । यत्र कार्येण कारणमनुमीषते तच्छेषवत् । इव स्यात् तल्लिङ्गक शेषवत् । यथा नदीरूढ्या वृत्तयानाम् । कार्यकारणभिल्लिङ्गं सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा, मज्जासूत्रकर्मण्यत्र दृष्टस्यन्त्रव द्वाभिमिति, तथा चादि-वम्, नम्यादिति अद-वत् इति आदि वस्य वज्या इति अनपातम् ।

(Line 16) - वाक्येन पतिज्ञादिगता-the syllogism containing the five members प्रतिज्ञा etc It is strange that our author who does not mind repetition, should not even give the names of the five members, here They are given and explained in section 100 below The five members are प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरणम्, उपनय and निगमनम् The समादर्शो defines them as follows 'साधयचन पक्षवचन प्रतिज्ञा । लिङ्गस्य पक्षधमन्वचन हेतु । सःशामक दृष्टान्तवत्समुदाहरणम् । परामशन्वचनमुपनय । लिङ्गस्य वयुक्त निश्चयसाधयचनचन निगमनम् । (1) प्रतिज्ञा consists in the statement of the proposition that we want to prove e g परतो वेदमान् Here we assert that the सत्य viz सति is possessed by the पक्ष viz परत (ii) हेतु consists in stating that the indicatory mark is an attribute of the पक्ष, that is, is present on it e g घूमवचनम् It should be noted that a distinction is here made between लिङ्ग and हेतु, though the two words are often used as synonyms लिङ्ग is the actual indicatory mark and हेतु is the statement that this indicatory mark is present on the subject (iii) उदाहरणम् consists of two parts viz समाधि or the statement of the invariable concomitance between the लिङ्ग and साध्य and an instance to illustrate it e g यो यो भूमयान् न स वेदियान् यथा महानस । (iv) उपनय, lit bringing near, is the application of the general statement embodied in the समाधि to the case under discussion 'तथा च अयम्' is the technical form in which उपनय is expressed तथा means सतिव्यत्यवयवयान् and अयम् means परत This is nothing but the परामर्श as we have it in section 18 (v) निगमनम् or conclusion is the re-statement of the proposition, which forms the

प्रत्यक्षः ननु प्रोक्तः by the ह्यु given. Its technical form is 'सामान्यं ननु',  
where सामान्यं = धर्मवत्त्वं ननु and ननु = प्रत्यक्षं ननु.

These five members occur by the same names in Gautama's  
sutras. Real धर्मवत्त्वं ननु प्रत्यक्षं ननु अथवा ; सामान्यं ननु प्रतीक्षा ;  
वदन् ननु सामान्यं ननु सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु ; तथा वैश्यान् ; सामान्यं ननु ननुमन्वरी ह्यु  
वदन् ननु । ननुवत्त्वं ननु विदितं ननु । इति सामान्यं ननु प्रत्यक्षं ननु ननुवत्त्वं ननु सामान्यं ननु ।  
ननुवत्त्वं ननु सामान्यं ननु प्रत्यक्षं ननु । इति सामान्यं ननु प्रत्यक्षं ननु ।

We have already seen that the third member of the syllogism  
viz वदन् ननु consists of सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु and वदन् ननु. It is difficult to see how the  
term वदन् ननु can include सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु in addition to an example which is the  
proper meaning of that term. The explanation is that originally  
वदन् ननु consisted of an example only. But in course of time the  
importance of the general proposition on which the whole process of  
inference depended came to be realised and a place had to be found  
for it in the formal syllogism with the result that the सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु  
was included under वदन् ननु. If we look to Gautama's sutras we find  
that according to him the syllogism runs as follows वदन् ननु वदन् ननु  
धर्मवत्त्वं ननु ; तथा महानम् ; तथा अन्तः सामान्यं ननु । Gautama's scheme had no  
place for the statement of the सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु. This is also proved if we under-  
stand that the word ननु is naturally construed as a co relative of वदन्  
when we drop the सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु वदन् ननु महानम् ; धर्मवत्त्वं ननु तथा सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु  
धर्मवत्त्वं ननु—this is how the वदन् ननु and वदन् ननु were to be originally understood. But  
when सारसम्पत्तिं ह्यु came to be added, ननु received a new sense, which has  
already been noted above.

• The Vaiseshikas also admit a five-membered syllogism, but they  
have different names for the various members except the first. Their  
names are प्रतीक्षा, चयनम् (mark), निश्चयम् अनुसंधानम् (retrospection)  
and प्रत्यक्षम् (re-assertion).

The five membered syllogism is the normal one in Sanskrit and  
is accepted by all Naiyayikas and Vaiseshikas. Vatsyayana in his  
Dharmya however notes that some logicians who apparently  
flourished even before Gautama, add five more and make the syllo-  
gism to consist of ten members. These five are जिज्ञासा (the desire to  
know), संशय (the doubt), शक्यमात्रि (the belief in the possibility of a  
relation), प्रयोजन (the purpose in view in attaining the conclusion)  
and सशय युदास (the removal of doubt). As विश्वनाथ points out in his  
वृत्ति, these five are not regular members of a चयन or syllogism, but  
only help us in attaining the knowledge arising from the syllogism  
and as such cannot be regarded चयनवत्. Read 'दशमवत्त्वं एकेनैवार्थेण  
चयने चयने । जिज्ञासा संशय शक्यमात्रि प्रयोजन सशय युदास इति ।' वा स्यायन's माध्य

on Nyāya I : 32, 'एतेषां च न न्यायवयवत्वं न्यायावयवत्वात् । न वा न्यायज-वधा-  
पातुङ्गत्वेनैव अयवत्वम् । अतिप्रसंगात् प्रयोजनात्प्रसङ्गे ।' विश्वनाथ s वृत्ति on the same

The five membered syllogism is not however universally accepted. The Vedantins accept only three members viz प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and उदाहरण, or उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन ('अवयवाश्च त्रय एव प्रतिज्ञाहेतु उदाहरणरूपा उदाहरणापनय-  
निगमनरूपा वा न तु पञ्च । अनयवयवत्वेन व्यापित्यर्थस्योपपत्तिर्नसम्भवेन अचिरावयवद्वयस्य  
व्यर्थत्वत् वेदा त्पारिभाषा ) The Mimamsakas also admit three viz प्रतिज्ञा,  
हेतु and उदाहरण, or हेतु, उदाहरण and उपनय. The Bauddhas on the other  
hand are satisfied with only two viz उदाहरण and उपनय, or प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु  
where व्याप्ति and दृष्टान्त are included under हेतु

Students of logic will be interested in comparing the five mem-  
bered Nyāya of Gautama with the three-membered syllogism of Aris-  
totle and the modern European logicians. It would appear at first  
sight that either some members in Gautama's Nyāya are superfluous  
or that the syllogism of Aristotle is defective. But a closer examina-  
tion will show that neither of these alternatives is true. Both the  
Gautaman Nyāya and the Aristotelian syllogism lead to valid con-  
clusions. So there is nothing essentially wrong with either. But while  
Aristotle gives us the absolutely necessary parts of an inference, Gau-  
tama's Nyāya has the form of a dialogue between two disputants.  
For example, the प्रतिज्ञा is nothing but a dogmatic statement of what  
you want to prove made with a view to excite opposition. When  
therefore the opponent questions the validity of your statement, you  
give your reason which constitutes the हेतु. The opponent then asks  
what connection there is between the हेतु and the साध्य, to which you  
reply by enunciating the व्याप्ति. And thus the dispute goes on. So  
from the point of view of the form which Gautama wanted his Nyāya  
to assume and of the purpose which he had in view viz to convince  
an opponent of the truth of the conclusion that one has reached, all  
the five members were necessary. But looked at from the point of  
absolute necessity, the first two members of Gautama's Nyāya can be  
safely dispensed with, for they are repeated in the fifth and the fourth  
member respectively. This in fact has actually been done by a section  
of the Vedantins, who admit only उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन, which corre-  
pond exactly with the three members of the Aristotelian syllogism.

Comparison of the Sanskrit Nyāya with the western syllogism  
tells us that साध्य corresponds with the major term, एव with the minor  
term and हेतु with the middle term. Similarly उदाहरण minus the दृष्टान्त  
represents the major premises, उपनय the minor premises and निगमन the  
conclusion. In converting a Sanskrit Nyāya into a western syllogism



what we should do is to ignore प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु and the दृष्टान्त of the उदाहरण. Thus the usual अनुमान about the eternal smoking mountain may thus be converted into a correct syllogism (a Universal Affirmative in *Barbara*) as follows

(प्रतिज्ञा) पवनो वह्निमान् । To be omitted

(हेतु) धूमवन्नात् । To be omitted

(उदाहरणम्) यो या धूमवान् स न  
वह्निमान् यथा महावनम् } = Whatever is smoky is fiery  
: : All smoky is fiery

(उपनय) अत्र पवन वह्निमान्धूमवान् = This mountain is smoky

(निगमनम्) तस्माद्य पवन वह्निमान् = This mountain is fiery

Similarly the hackneyed illustration of western logic about Socrates' mortality can thus be turned into a Sanskrit Nyaya

(Major premiss) All men are mortal = सर्वे मनुष्या मर्यां or यत्र यत्र मनुष्यत्व  
तत्र तत्र मर्यात् । Add to this a  
दृष्टान्त such as यथा पितृकुले and  
thus major premiss becomes a  
correct उदाहरणम्.

(Minor premiss) Socrates is a man = सँक्रेतित् मनुष्य or साक्रेतित् मर्या,  
तत्र यत्र मनुष्यत्ववान् (उपनय)

(Conclusion) Socrates is mortal = तस्मात् सँक्रेतित् मर्या or मर्यात्ववान्।  
(निगमनम्)

In order to make this conversion complete we have to add प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु, thus सर्वे मर्यात् मर्या ( मनुष्यत्वान् । And the western syllogism becomes a correct Sanskrit Nyaya

(Line 16)—पञ्चस्वापपन्नान् See section 24, for the five characteristics of a good अनुवच The reading पञ्चस्ववचैपरान्नात् is not good, as the characteristics of a सिद्ध are usually spoken of as स्वयं and not अनुवचः. An अनुमानवाक्य is पञ्चस्ववच, but a सिद्ध or हेतु ( अनुवच्यतिरेकं ) is पञ्चस्व

(20-23) These sections deal with the three fold division of सिद्ध which is based on the nature of the व्याप्ति in which it figures व्याप्ति or the invariable concomitance between the सिद्ध or साधन and साध्य, through the force of which the सिद्ध enables us to draw the conclusion, can be expressed in two ways positive and negative. When we say that a certain thing (such as fire) invariably follows the presence of another (such as smoke), we state the व्याप्ति positively (अनुवचनं). Thus 'यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः यथा महावने ।' is an instance of अनुवचनं. It is so called because अनुवच or the presence of smoke and fire is here seen in the kitchen. On the other hand when we declare that a certain thing (such as fire) being absent in a certain

place, another thing (such as smoke) is also absent from it, we state the *vyapti* negatively (*vyatirekya*). Thus 'यत्र यत्र वह्नयश्च तत्र तत्र धूमभावः । यदा न्हने ।' is an instance of *vyatirekavyapti*. It is so called because *vyatirek* or the absence of smoke and fire is here observed in the pool. It will be noticed that these two kinds of *vyapti* are just two different ways of expressing the same fact viz the invariable association between smoke and fire. For, to say that smoke is invariably associated with fire is the same thing as to say that fire being absent, smoke is also absent. The *anvaya-vyapti* can consequently be turned into the *vyatirekavyapti* by what in western logic is known as obverted conversion. For example,

यत्र यत्र धूमवत्तत्र तत्र वह्निः = 'All smoky is fiery'

By obversion, = No smoky is not-fiery

By conversion, = 'No not-fiery is smoky', that is, 'All not fiery is not-smoky

= यत्र यत्र वह्नयश्च तत्र तत्र धूमभावः ।

It will be noticed that the absence of the *कारण* (i. e. the *साधन धूम*) in the *anvaya-vyapti* becomes the *साधक* (and hence the *साधन*) in the *vyatirekavyapti* (viz धूम वाद), similarly the absence of the *फलक* (i. e. the *साम्य अग्नि*) in the *anvaya-vyapti* becomes the *साम्य* (and hence the *साम्यन*) in the *vyatirekavyapti* (viz वह्नयभावः)

The *anvaya-vyapti* and the *vyatirekavyapti* being thus two different ways of expressing the same phenomenon of the invariable concomitance between *साधन* and *साधक*, it would appear that every *साधन* or *लिङ्ग* could have these two *vyaptis*. But this is not actually the case. For the rule is that the *vyapti* is not complete unless it has a corresponding *दृष्टान्त* or example. Now it may so happen that a *लिङ्ग* may have an example for both the *anvaya* and *vyatirekavyapti*, when it is called *anvaya-vyatireki*. Another will find an example for only the *anvaya-vyapti* and none for the *vyatirekavyapti*, when it is known as *anvaya-kavi*. A third will possess an example for only the *vyatirekavyapti* and none for the *anvaya vyapti*, and it is then designated *vyatireki*.

Thus (1) धूमवत्तत्र with reference to the साम्य वह्निः is an *anvaya-vyatireki* लिङ्ग, because both kinds of *vyapti* complete with examples are possible with regard to it. Another example of an *anvaya-vyatireki* लिङ्ग is कृतक व when अनि-दत्त is सत्त्व + g शब्दाऽने य । कृतक-वत् । यत्र यत्र कृतकत्व तत्र तत्र अनि-दत्त्व यथा यत्र । यत्र यत्र अनि-दत्त्व-साधनत्व तत्र कृतकत्व-साधकत्व यथा गवने । (2) An example of *anvaya-kavi* लिङ्ग is प्रमेयत्व or knowability when अभिप्रेक्ष्यत्व or nameability is the साधन, + g यत्र अभिप्रेक्ष्यत्व-साधनत्व । यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्व तत्र तत्र

अभिधेयत्वं यथा षटे । यत्र यत्र अभिधेयत्वाभाव तत्र तत्र प्रथमत्वाभाव यथा— Here we cannot find any example for the *स्वतिरेक-प्राप्ति*, because everything under the sun is knowable and hence nameable. The peculiarity of the *केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग* lies in this that here the *साध्य* and *साधन* belong to everything in existence, so that no entity which is characterised by the *साध्याभाव* and the *साधन भाव* can be thought of. (11) An example of *केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग* is *गन्धवन्* when *इतरभेद* is *साध्य*, e.g. *पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना गन्धवन्त् । यत्र यत्र गन्धवन् तत्र तत्र इतरभिन्नत्व यथा— । यत्र यत्र इतरभिन्नत्वाभाव तत्र तत्र गन्धवन्त्वाभाव यथा जले ।* Here we notice that no example is found for the *अन्य-प्राप्ति*, for everything which has *गन्ध* is *पृथिवी* and is thus included in the *पक्ष*. The peculiarity of the *केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग* is that here the *साध्य* and the *साधन* are co-extensive with the *पक्ष*, so that no entity, other than *पत्र*, where they reside, can be found. In this case we find that *पृथिवी*, *पृथिवीतरभेद* (which by the way means nothing but *पृथिवी*) and *गन्धवन्* are all equally extensive. Another example of *केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग* is as follows *जीव-उत्थिर सा पक्ष प्रणादिमन्त्रात् । यत्र यत्र प्रणादिमन्त्र तत्र तत्र सामन्तत्व यथा— । यत्र यत्र सामन्तत्वाभाव तत्र तत्र प्रणादिमन्त्राभाव यथा षटे ।* Here we notice that no example for the *अन्यव्यतिरेकि* is available, for everything which is possessed of vital airs etc and has a soul is included in the *पक्ष* viz *जिव-उत्थिरम्* (a living body). Similarly the *पक्ष* *जीव-उत्थिर*, the *साध्य* *सामन्तत्व* and the *साधन* *प्रणादिमन्त्र* are all co-extensive.

(21) The author tells us here why it is usual to give an instance of *अन्यव्यतिरेकि* only, even in the case of an *अवयव-व्यतिरेकी हेतु*. The reason is—*There is no point in giving both positive and negative instances, when our purpose is served by an instance of one type only, and therein we prefer the अवयव instance to the स्वतिरेक one, because an अवयव instance is more easily understandable, being more straightforward. The reading यथा शब्दोऽनिय etc does not come in with propriety after the remark एवम ये द्रष्टव्या, which suggests that the argument is over.*

(22) (Lane 22)—अथ च व्यवहार साध्य The author draws our attention to the fact (which we are likely to over look) that the *साध्य* in the argument in question is *प्रमाणमिति व्यवहार* and *not प्रमाणम्*. For, if the syllogism is *प्रत्यक्षादिक प्रमाणम् । प्रमाकरणेनात्*, the position would be that the *साध्य* (प्रमाण) would be the same as the *हेतु* (प्रमाकरण=प्रमाण) and naturally no inference is possible if the *हेतु* and *साध्य* are one, if the *साध्य* is *प्रमाणमिति व्यवहार*, it is different from the *हेतु*, *प्रमाकरण*, and there would be no difficulty.

(24) In this section, Kesavamisra mentions the characteristics of a valid reason. They are five viz (1) *पक्ष-म-वम्* being present in

the पक्ष The valid reason, smoke, for example, is present in the subject, mountain (१) सपक्षे सत्त्वम् being present in a similar instance & १ the smoke is present in the kitchen (११) विपक्षद् व्याप्तुनि being absent from a dissimilar instance & १ the smoke is absent from the great pool (१४) अवाधितविषयत्वम् not having its object or साध्य disproved by a stronger proof Thus if we were to argue 'अग्निस्तुष्णं द्रव्यत्वात् जलत्वं,' the विषय or साध्य viz अग्निस्तुष्णत्वम् would be वाधित or disproved by a stronger proof viz प्रत्यक्ष or direct perception, which tells us that fire is hot So the हेतु द्रव्यत्व is not अवाधितविषय and consequently cannot be a सक्षेत् Smoke however does not possess its साध्य बहिष्कृत्य disproved in this manner and hence it is a valid reason (४) असामनिरूपकत्वम् not having a rival reason which proves the opposite of its साध्य For example, शब्द इत्यत्र आवाणत्वात् शब्दत्वत्वम्, Here the सामान्य शब्दत्व is वाण or audible because of the rule 'वेनेन्द्रियेण यद् गृह्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्गणत सामान्यं, तद्गणत समवायं, तद्गणतोऽप्यन्यद्गृह्यते' It is also इत्यत्र So वाणत्व would seem to prove the eternality of sound But we find there is a rival reason which proves just the opposite of what वाणत्व seems to prove Thus one may with equal force argue 'शब्द अनित्यं कार्यत्वात् कृतवत्' Therefore the हेतु कृतवत्त्व is said to be सामनिरूपक inasmuch as it has an equally powerful rival viz कार्यत्व which proves the opposite of its साध्य In the case of the smoke however there is no such rival and it is a valid reason consequently

These are then the five characteristics which a valid reason must possess and if a reason is deficient in one or more of these, it is fallacious It will be noticed that these five characteristics are found in an अन्वय-व्यतिरेकी हेतु only, such as घृण in the stock example is A केवलान्वयी and a केवल-व्यतिरेकी हेतु cannot by their very nature have विपक्षद् व्याप्तुनि and सपक्षे सत्त्वम् respectively, because in their case a विपक्ष and सपक्ष do not exist

(25) See section 18 above

(26) हेतुमात्र — See section 23 below A केवलान्वयी हेतु is valid though possessed of only the following four characteristics, पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्त्वम्, अवाधितविषयत्वम् and असह्यत्वविपक्षत्वम् (विपक्षद् व्याप्तुनि is impossible)

A केवल-व्यतिरेकी हेतु is valid, though possessed of only the following four characteristics, पक्षधर्मत्वम्, विपक्षद् व्याप्तुनि, अवाधितविषयत्वम् and असह्यत्वविपक्षत्वम् (सपक्षे सत्त्वम् is impossible)

(27) In this section the author is defining the terms पक्ष, सपक्ष and विपक्ष पक्ष is that with reference to which the thing to be proved is doubtful A simpler definition of पक्ष is सङ्क्षिप्तसाध्यत्वम् Thus in the usual illustration of the smoky mountain the साध्य is बहिष्कृत्य

वह्निमन्त्र is not definitely known to be possessed by the mountain i e as it is doubtful with regard to the mountain, therefore we proceed to establish it by means of a formal syllogism Hence पशु is a पशु— An objection is here raised In the case of a परापरुषान् where after ascertaining the presence of the fire on the mountain for ourselves, we proceed to convince another of that fact, the mountain is not सद्बिषयसाध्यवान्, because we know for certain that it is fiery It is thus निश्चिनसाध्यवान् How can the mountain then be a पशु in this case? The obvious answer to this is that though the mountain may be निश्चिनसाध्यवान् to us, it is certainly सद्बिषयसाध्यवान् to the man to whom we are proving its वह्निमन्त्र Hence it is a पशु all right There is also a pedantic answer to the above objection According to this पशुता is defined afresh as ' निषाद्यविषयविरहविरहितसिद्धयभाव ( सिषयविषयविशेषितसिद्धयभाव ) ' i e in order that a thing should be a पशु, it should possess the absence of definite knowledge (सिद्धे अभाव which by the way is nothing but सद्बिषयसाध्यत्वम्) characterised by the absence of a desire to prove Now in the case objected to viz where we want to prove the वह्निमन्त्र of the mountain to another after having ascertained it for ourselves, there is certainly no सिद्धयभाव with regard to the mountain, as we know definitely that it is possessed of fire But this निश्चिनसाध्यत्व, which is absent, is not characterized by निषाद्यविषयविरह, since we possess सिषयविषय or desire to prove Therefore the mountain is a पशु in spite of our definite knowledge What the new definition of पशुता means is that in order to constitute a पशु there should either be सिद्धयभाव or निषाद्यविषय Thus in the present case though निश्चिनसाध्यत्व does not exist inasmuch as we possess definite knowledge, the mountain can be a पशु because there is निषाद्यविषय

सपक्ष and विपक्ष are easily understood सपक्ष or a similar instance is that which is definitely known to possess the सपक्ष It forms the दृष्टान्त to the अन्वयवाक्य which along with it is included under उदाहरण The kitchen is the सपक्ष in the case under discussion For both parties agree that the kitchen is possessed of fire and a सपक्ष or a दृष्टान्त should be such as is acceptable to both the parties to a dispute—विपक्ष or a dissimilar instance is the opposite of सपक्ष It is that which is definitely known not to possess the सपक्ष महादुर्घ which as everybody knows does not possess fire is the विपक्ष in the present case विपक्ष constitutes the दृष्टान्त in the व्यतिरेकवाक्ये

(28) The author now proceeds to treat of हेत्वाभास The word हेत्वाभास is used in two senses First it means a fallacious reason (दुष्यद्भासासम्भे इति हेत्वाभासा दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थ १-वाचकोपिनी) ॥ हेतुलक्षणगोहिना हेतुवदपभासभासा

हेत्वभासा । p 30, foot note ) and it is in this sense that our author has used the word Secondly, it means fallacy or the defect which renders a reason fallacious ( हेतो आम्रम दोष इत्यर्थ ) The five defects which underlie the five fallacious reasons enumerated by our author are अमिद्धि, विरोध, व्यभिचार, प्रतिषेध and बाध — An objection is here raised What is the use of learning about हेत्वभासा or fallacious marks ? If one knows what a valid mark is, that is quite enough The answer is that the knowledge of fallacious marks is necessary in order to detect fallacies in the arguments of our opponents and to avoid using such invalid reasons in our own

हेत्वभासा is also defined as 'अङ्गविकली हेतुव्यापसा' i. e. a reason which is deficient in one or more of its members or characteristics ( of a valid reason mentioned in section 24 above )

The first हेत्वभासा is असिद्ध or unproven असिद्ध हेतु is that which is void of सिद्धि and सिद्धि is defined as 'व्यपन्नद हेतो पक्षधर्मता परीति' (see P 104, line 6) Now we know that this is nothing but पक्षधर्म सिद्धि like पक्षधर्मता, thus consists of two elements, व्यपन्नता and व्याप्ति and a हेतु which is deficient in one of these is असिद्ध A हेतु may lack पक्षधर्मता in two ways viz (1) when the पक्ष has no existence at all in the world of realities In this case the हेतु is known as आश्रयमिद्ध because it has no substratum or support to reside in (2) When the हेतु is not actually present in the पक्ष This is known as स्वस्वमिद्ध, because the हेतु is in its own nature unproven in the पक्ष The third variety of असिद्ध is (111) स्वस्वत्वमिद्ध, because it lacks व्याप्ति which is the second requisite of सिद्धि

(1) An instance of आश्रयमिद्ध is 'गगनारवि इ मुनिमि भवति इत्यात् । \*रोमार विन्वत्' Here we find that the पक्ष, viz a sky-lotus, simply does not exist, because it is only an imaginary thing आश्रयमिद्ध thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid हेतु viz पक्षधर्मत्वम् Another illustration of आश्रयमिद्ध is 'य व्याप्य शूर पुत्रत्वात् । कोसल्यापुत्रत्वम्'

Under आश्रयमिद्ध is also included the reasoning which is known as सिद्धसम्पन्न or establishing a thing which is already well known, e. g. 'चन्द्रविम्बं गतुलं गतुलत्वात्' That the orb of the moon is round is not questioned by anybody and need not consequently be proved This reasoning falls under आश्रयमिद्ध, because the orb of the moon, though actually existing unlike the sky lotus, is not a पक्ष in the technical sense of 'मद्विषयमाश्रयत्वात्' For about 'चन्द्रमण्डलस्य वर्तुलत्वम्' there is no सन्देह whatsoever in the mind of any one It is only in this sense that the आश्रय viz पक्ष does not exist in the case of सिद्धसम्पन्न Another illustration of सिद्धसम्पन्न is 'वेदवदो हस्तपादादेवाम् हस्तपादाद्विदमना दृश्यमानत्वात्' — It

should be noted that the stock example of western logic about Socrates and his mortality will fall under साधयासिद्ध, because Socrates cannot be considered as पक्ष, as his mortality is not a subject of doubt to any one

(11) स्वरूपासिद्ध is instanced by 'ज्ञानोद्भवित्य चाधुवत्वात् चरत्.' Here चाधुवत्वं or probability is not found in the पक्ष शब्द at all चाधुवत्वं is पक्षे स्वरूपेण असिद्ध or unproven in the subject in its own nature This हेत्वाभास all o lacks पक्षघर्ष इत् Other illustrations are 'इहो द्रव्य धूमवत्त्वात् परतवत् ।' 'अथ यत्र विपणित्वात् बलीवर्धवत् ।' 'आत्मा अनित्य इतत्तत्त्वात् षटवत् ।' 'एत नित्य विधुत्वात् व्योमवत् ।'

(12) 'व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध is the third and last variety of असिद्ध It is explained as व्याप्यत्वं ( हेतो बद्धि साध्येन धुमेन व्याप्यत्वम् ) असिद्ध यस्मिन् in which the व्याप्य of the reason is not established i e in which the reason is not व्याप्य or invariably associated with the साध्य In a valid व्याप्ति ( यत्र यत्र धूम तत्र तत्र वह्नि ) the हेतु ( धूम ) is व्याप्य or pervaded by the साध्य (वह्नि) If in an argument we find that the हेतु is not for some reason साध्यव्याप्य then that हेतु will fall under व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध Take the case 'दर्शने धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात् ' Here धूम is साध्य and वह्नि is हेतु The व्याप्ति is stated as 'यत्र यत्र वह्नि तत्र तत्र धूम ' Now we find that the हेतु वह्नि is not व्याप्य or less extensive, as a valid हेतु should be, with regard to the साध्य धूम For fire is found in more places than smoke Fire is present in all places where smoke is present and is in addition found in certain others where smoke exists not viz a red hot ball of iron or a burning electric bulb So in the above instance the व्याप्यत्व of the हेतु वह्नि is असिद्ध Consequently the हेतु वह्नि in the syllogism 'यत्रो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात् ' is a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु Here we find that the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षोद् व्याकृति is violated For the विपक्ष in this case is वह्निनतदाश्रयेणोत्क or अलङ्कितेणोत्क where धुमाभाव is definitely known to be present. But the हेतु वह्नि is not absent from these Hence the violation of विपक्षोद् व्याकृति

A व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु, as instanced in 'दर्शने धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात् involves the violation of व्याप्ति, because the हेतु वह्नि is not धूमव्याप्य or invariably associated with धूम The reason why this is so is that धूम is not naturally or by its own nature associated with वह्नि We find however that in most cases धूम is associated with वह्नि But this association is due to an extraneous factor viz आर्द्रस्थानसंयोग Only when fire is in contact with wet fuel, it will be invariably associated with smoke Thus in order that the व्याप्ति 'यत्र यत्र वह्नि तत्र तत्र धूम ' should be valid, or in order that the हेतु वह्नि in this case should be a sound one and not a हेत्वाभास, we must add to the व्याप्ति a qualification viz आर्द्रस्थानसंयोगे सति Thus

only when it is forbidden. Thus निषिद्धत्व is the उपाधि in this case. निषिद्धत्व is found in all those places where the साध्य विद् अर्धमसाधनत्व is found for निषिद्धत्व is the cause of अर्ध. Hence निषिद्धत्व is साध्यव्यापक. Further, निषिद्धत्व is not present wherever the साधन द्विजा is present, for slaughter in sacrifice is not only not निषिद्ध, but is actually विहित or enjoined. So निषिद्धत्व is साधनाव्यापक. Both the characteristics of उपाधि being thus present in it, निषिद्धत्व is a proper उपाधि and the हेतु द्विसत्व is consequently व्याप्य साक्षिद्वय or साक्षाधिक. —It will be noticed that the reason द्विजात्व lacks उपसाद् अनावृत्ति, because विपक्षे अर्धमसाधनत्वाभाववति यद्गणमात्रेण हिम चमयत्.

Another somewhat interesting example of the same हेत्वाभास is 'गणस्य निजातनय इवाम निजातनयत्वात् । इनतनयवत्' There was a lady of the name निजा who had a few dark-complexioned sons (and one or two fair ones). When Mitra conceived once more, a student of logic argued in the above manner and tried to prove that the son in the womb would also be dark. But the argument is not correct. For we find that निजातनयत्व is not the cause of इवामत्व. इवामत्व is caused in her sons because Mitra used to eat only vegetables and no ghee at the time when these dark sons were born. (According to the eugenics of the Naiyāyikas, darkness of complexion is the result of the mother's partaking of vegetables only. If the mother ate ample ghee, she would have fair children. Persons interested should note this!) Hence शास्त्राकृतत्व is the उपाधि in this case. 'यत्र यत्र इवामत्व तत्र तत्र शास्त्राकृतत्वम्'—thus शास्त्राकृतत्व is साध्यव्यापक. Further, we cannot say 'इवामत्व निजातनयत्व । तत्र तत्र सर्वत्र शास्त्राकृतत्वम्' For when her fair sons were born, she was subsisting on ghee. शास्त्राकृतत्व is thus साधनाव्यापक. Both the characteristics are thus found to be present in शास्त्राकृतत्व which consequently is a proper उपाधि.

In all these cases we have seen that the हेत्वाभास व्यपत्त्याभिद्ध involves the असिद्धि or non-establishment of स्वप्ति, because there is an उपाधि which vitiates it. The असिद्धि of स्वप्ति arises in two other ways also viz. (1) when there is no valid means of ascertaining the स्वप्ति and (2) when the स्वप्ति is inherently impossible. An example of (1) is गच्छत् क्षणिक सत्त्वात् । यत् सत्त्वं सत्त्वं क्षणिकं यथा ज्ञाप्य । This argument is based on the theory of the Buddhists who believe in the momentariness of all existing things. To the Naiyāyikas no such entity as momentariness exists, because they believe that even the most transient object lasts for at least three moments, the moment of its production, the moment of its destruction and the moment that intervenes between these two. So there is no प्रमाण that can grasp the invariable concomitance



between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्व and consequently the त्वादि is अनिद्ध. Kesavamisra mentions this variety only and remarks that शब्द क्षणिक सत्त्व must not be regarded as an instance of लोपाधिर्वाच्यत्वानिद्ध, for that would mean that we are prepared to admit the त्वादि between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्व, under certain conditions, and that there is a प्रयोजक (other than सत्त्व) for क्षणिकत्व. All this is tantamount to saying that क्षणिकत्व is a proved entity which it cannot be for an entity must remain for at least three moments (u) is illustrated by 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् काञ्चनमवधुषणम्' Here we note that though ordinary धम is वह्नि-धम, काञ्चनमवधुषणम् is not so. In fact no such thing as वाञ्चनमवधुषणम् exists. The त्वादि therefore is अनिद्ध and the हेतु काञ्चनमवधुषणम् becomes शब्दत्वानिद्ध. —It will be noticed that this variety can be included under the first by saying that there is no धम which can grasp the त्वादि between काञ्चनमवधुषणम् and वह्नि.

The above discussion will give the student a fairly correct idea of लोपाधिर्वाच्यत्वानिद्ध which of all the fallacious reasons is a bit difficult to understand. The characteristics of उपाधि viz सध्व-वाच्यत्वम् and क्षयनाश्यापत्त्वम् are best remembered by having a concrete instance of उपाधि such as आर्द्र-धनसयोग always in view. Further elaboration of उपाधि is unnecessary for a bala for whom this treatise is intended. We however quote the following passage wherein Ananabhatta mentions and illustrates four varieties of उपाधि. Read उपाधिस्तुतिः । केवलभाष्यभाषकः, पञ्चमधर्मविच्छेदनाश्यापत्त्वम्, सध्वनाश्यापत्त्वम्-भाषकः, उदासीनधर्मविच्छेदनाश्यापत्त्वम्-श्लेषः । अथ आर्द्र-धनसयोगः । द्वितीयो यदा षड् प्रत्ययः प्रवक्ष्ये-शाश्वतत्वमिति । अथ षट्-द्रव्यवाचित्त्वनाश्यापत्त्वम्-ध्वनाश्यापत्त्वम्-सुदृष्टानुसङ्गत्वम् । तृतीयो यदा-पर्वतो विनाशो जन्मवादिनि । अथ जन्मवाचित्त्वनाश्यापत्त्वम्-यथा-पञ्चमवधुषणम् । चतुर्थो यथा-प्रायमासो विनाशो धर्मवादिनि । अथ जन्मवाचित्त्वनाश्यापत्त्वम्-भाषकः भाषणम् ।' दीर्घिका

We have seen that all cases of लोपाधिर्वाच्यत्वानिद्ध involve the violation of the third characteristic of a valid reason viz विषयान् शब्दत्वानिद्ध thus resembles सध्वरण अद्वैतान्तरिक (पर्वतो वह्निमान् पञ्चमवधुषणम्) which also lacks विषयान् शब्दत्वानि (see section 30). The two must therefore be distinguished. The difference between the two is mainly based on what strikes one in each of them as prominent. Thus while in सध्वरण अद्वैतान्तरिक strikingness lies in the too wide character of the reason which, being consequently present in the विषय, violates the concomitance, in शब्दत्वानिद्ध it is the presence of the उपाधि which vitiates the concomitance, that strikes one as prominent. In सध्वरण अद्वैतान्तरिक the fact that the हेतु is associated with the सध्वराद्य is more prominent. In शब्दत्वानिद्ध on the other hand what strikes us more is the fact that the सध्वर is not due to the हेतु, but to some extraneous

ous factor There is another and more subtle point of distinction between the two, based on the nature of the *व्याप्ति*. In साधारण अनैकान्तिक the *व्याप्ति* is recognised as being positively *व्यभिचरित* or violated owing to the presence of the हेतु in the विपक्ष In व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand the *व्याप्ति* cannot be grasped at all owing to the presence of the उपधि Thus while the one is positively defective, the other is only negatively so *व्यभिचार* is a positive defect, असिद्धि represents only the negative side of the concomitance साधारण अनैकान्तिक is easily noticed owing to its positive character व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand may easily pass undetected owing to the difficulty of locating the उपधि.

It may be noted *en passant* that a view prevails among Naiyayikas which refuses to recognise व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध as a हेतुव्याप्ति For, they argue that if we keep the उपधि in mind, it is quite possible to draw a correct conclusion from what is regarded as a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतुव्याप्ति Thus 'पर्वतो धूमवान् आर्द्रैश्चनसयोगे सति वह्निपन्नात्' is a correct nyaya In the case of other fallacious reasons on the other hand no matter what you do, you will not be able to draw a correct conclusion For example, the साधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु in 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात्' cannot be rectified by the addition of a qualification or something of the kind भोवाधिक्यव्याप्यत्वासिद्ध thus stands on a different footing from the other hetvabhāsa The answer to this view is that for a proper syllogism an absolutely universal concomitance unfettered by any condition is necessary In the above example the *व्याप्ति* 'यत्र यत्र आर्द्रैश्चनसयोगे सति वह्नि तत्र तत्र धूम' is no doubt true But it will not do for a proper nyaya because it is conditioned by the उपधि आर्द्रैश्चनसयोग

(29) This section deals with the हेतुव्याप्ति विरुद्ध or contrary A valid हेतु is साध्यव्याप्ति i e invariably associated with the साध्य धूम for example is वह्निव्याप्ति i e wherever धूम is found, वह्नि is also found A विरुद्ध हेतु is just the opposite of this i e it is साध्यव्यव्याप्ति This means that instead of tending to prove its proper साध्य, it proves exactly the opposite Hence it is significantly called विरुद्ध or contrary For example, in 'शश्वदे निरव कृतकत्वात्' we find that the हेतु कृतकत्व, far from being the *व्याप्य* of निरवत्व, is the *व्याप्य* of निरवत्वाभाव Thus we cannot say, 'यत्र यत्र कृतकत्व तत्र तत्र निरवत्वम्' But we can legitimately assert 'यत्र यत्र कृतकत्व तत्र तत्र निरवत्वाभाव or अनिरवत्व यथा घटे' It will be noticed that the विरुद्ध हेतु कृतकत्व is present in the वक्ष शश्वद्, but is not found in a सपक्ष (i e any eternal thing such as आकाश), nor is it absent from a विपक्ष (i e any non-eternal thing such as घट) Consequently it lacks सपक्षे सत्त्वम् and विपक्षान् व्याप्यते The सप्ततर्कौ defines विरुद्ध as 'पक्षविरुद्धमात्रेण शीले विरुद्धत्वम्' गौतम's definition is 'निद्वन्द्वमयुक्तैव तद्विरोधो विरुद्धः स्यात् सू. I 11 6

विहङ्ग must be distinguished from साधारण अनेकान्तिक Both resemble in so far as both tend to prove the साध्याभाव But (1) while साधारण अनेकान्तिक can prove the साध्याभाव in addition to the सत्य owing to its being too wide, विहङ्ग proves the साध्याभाव only on account of its being the व्यञ्ज with regard to it (2) Secondly, while साधारण अनेकान्तिक is present in the विपक्ष in addition to the सत्य, विहङ्ग, though present in the विपक्ष, is never present in the सत्य विपक्षे सत्य is common to both But साधारण अनेकान्तिक has सत्य सत्य also, which विहङ्ग lacks

विहङ्ग need not be distinguished from असाधारण (and अनुपसङ्गही), this is not admitted by Kesavamisra; the Tarkasamgraha admits it) अनेकान्तिक because there is not much of a striking resemblance between these But one may, if one likes, say that विहङ्ग resembles असाधारण अनेकान्तिक in so far as both lack सत्ये सत्यम् But (1) while असाधारण अनेकान्तिक is not present in the सत्य because it is confined to the सत्य only, विहङ्ग is not found in the सत्य because it is associated with साध्याभाव (2) Secondly, while असाधारण अनेकान्तिक does not tend to prove anything, neither the सत्य nor the साध्याभाव, on account of its too narrow character, विहङ्ग distinctly proves the साध्याभाव

[ Similarly विहङ्ग may be said to resemble अनुपसङ्गही अनेकान्तिक in so far as both lack सत्ये सत्यम् and विपक्ष इ-वाच्ये But (1) while अनुपसङ्गही lacks these because there can be no सत्य and विपक्ष at all विहङ्ग is deficient in them because it is not present in सत्य and is not absent from विपक्ष, though सत्य and विपक्ष exist in its case (2) Secondly, अनुपसङ्गही cannot prove anything, because there is no complete व्यञ्जि for it विहङ्ग on the other hand proves the साध्याभाव ]

(30) This section treats of the अनेकान्तिक fallacy अनेकान्तिक is explained as साध्याविचार सत्यविचार means that which involves the अविचार or violation of the व्यञ्जि or the invariable concomitance between the सत्य and सत्य It will be noticed that in each of the two varieties of अनेकान्तिक, the व्यञ्जि cannot be correctly stated The term अनेकान्तिक is significant and explains the general nature of this fallacious reason It means 'नोनेकान्तिक (एक अन्त सत्य सत्य) or that which does not possess only one extreme, i. e. that which does tend to prove not only one thing, but also its opposite' अनेकान्तिक thus means inconclusive The Tarkasamgraha calls this fallacy सत्यविचार

अनेकान्तिक has two varieties, साधारण and असाधारण (1) साधारण or too wide is that सत्यविचार or discrepant reason which exists in a place that is possessed of the negation of the सत्य or the thing to be established An illustration of साधारण अनेकान्तिक is सर्वतो यद्विचार

प्रमेयत्वात् महानसत्त्वं Here we find that the reason प्रमेय व is found even in a place which is possessed of the negation of the साध्य A pool is possessed of बह्विमत्ताभाव, but it is प्रमेय all the same. Consequently प्रमेयव is an invalid or fallacious reason. It will be noticed that the reason प्रमेयव involves the violation of the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षद्-व्याप्ति—The व्यभिचार or violation of the व्याप्ति that is involved in this fallacious reason is thus explained यत्र यत्र प्रमेय न तत्र तत्र बह्विमत्त्वम् is the nature of the व्याप्ति here प्रमेयव is साधन and बह्विमत्त्व is साध्य. Now we know that in a correct व्याप्ति the साधन should be व्याप्य or less extensive and the साध्य व्याप्य or more extensive. But the साधन प्रमेय व is not व्याप्य in this case. In fact प्रमेयव is perhaps the most व्याप्य thing that we can ever conceive. Thus the व्याप्ति is व्यभिचरित or violated in the case of this हेतु viz प्रमेयव which consequently becomes a हेत्वाभास—This variety of अनेकान्तिक is called साधारण or too wide because the हेतु is not restricted to पक्ष and स्वपक्ष but extends to विपक्ष as well. The मत्तपदार्थी defines this kind of हेत्वाभास as पक्षत्रयवृत्तित्वम्—In the illustration of साधारण अनेकान्तिक given in the text शब्दो नित्य प्रमेय वात्-सोमत् the हेतु प्रमेयव is found not only in the स्वपक्ष viz-वाम but also in the विपक्ष viz any अनियं thing such as पट. It is thus पक्षत्रयवृत्ति.

A साधारण अनेक-तक हेतु should be distinguished from a valid केवलान्वयी हेतु as instanced in वट आभयेव प्रमेयवात्. Both resemble in so far as both lack the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षद्-व्याप्ति. But the difference between them is three fold (1) A केवलान्वयी हेतु does not possess the characteristic विपक्षद्-व्याप्ति, because there is no विपक्ष at all. A साधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand possesses a विपक्ष, from which however it is not absent owing to its defective nature. (2) In the case of a केवलान्वयी हेतु the अन्वय-व्याप्ति is quite sound, while with a साधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु the व्याप्ति involves व्यभिचार and is thus defective. (3) The peculiarity of a केवलान्वयी हेतु is as we saw before that the साध (अभियेयत्व) and साध्य (प्रमेय व) belong to everything in existence. Thus however is not so in the case of a साधारण अनेकान्तिक. Here the साध्य बह्विमत्त्व cannot be said to belong to all things, though the साधन प्रमेयत्व is all-extending.

(11) The second variety of अनेकान्तिक is असाधारण or too narrow. This consists in the हेतु being present in the पक्ष only. It is thus too narrow since it does not extend to स्वपक्ष where it should really be found. The example is शब्दो नित्य शब्दत्वात्. Here स्वपक्ष are constituted by नित्य things such as आकाश, काल, दिक् and अन्-विपक्ष are represented by अनित्य objects such as वट, इन्द्र. Now we find that the हेतु शब्दत्व is absent from all these नित्य things which are स्वपक्ष as well as from all the अनित्य

things which are the विषयः It exists only in the एव विद्वाद् Hence सत्यम् is असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु Here the second characteristic of a valid हेतु विद्वाद् सत्यम् is violated The वृत्तिवार consists in this that the वृत्ति ' एव यत्र शब्द इ तत्र तत्र निवृत्तम् ' is not correct For between the सत्यम् शब्दम् and the सत्यम् निवृत्तम्, शब्दव्यवहारभाव does not exist In fact there is no connection whatsoever between शब्दम् and निवृत्तम् -In the illustration of the असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु given in the text, ' धूर्तिमा गन्धवत्त्वात् ' we notice that the हेतु गन्धवत्त्वं is absent from all निवृत्तम् and अविवृत्तम् things which form the सत्यम् and विषयः respectively

The असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु must be distinguished from a valid केवल-परिरेकी हेतु, from which also the characteristic सत्यम् सत्यम् is absent An instance of the latter, as we saw before, is जीवच्छरिः स एव प्राण वि-स्यत्त्वात् Here also we find that the हेतु प्राणविद्यमानः is पञ्चमाश्रयिणी and that it is not possessed of the characteristic सत्यम् सत्यम् But the difference between the two is as follows (1) For a केवल-परिरेकी हेतु the characteristic सत्यम् सत्यम् is not possible, because there is no सत्यम् at all In the case of an असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand सत्यम् certainly exists But the हेतु is not found in them on account of its defective nature (2) The वृत्ति in the case of a केवल-परिरेकी हेतु is sound, though it is stated negatively In the case of an असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand, the वृत्ति involves वृत्तिवार or the violation of the invariable association of the सत्यम् and the सत्यम् (3) In the case of a केवल-परिरेकी हेतु the सत्यम्, सत्यम् and एव are all equally extensive Thus सत्यम् सत्यम्, प्राणविद्यमानः and जीवच्छरिः are all equally extensive In the case of an असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand this is not so For we can easily see that निवृत्तम्, शब्दम् and शब्दम् are not of equal extent

The सत्यम्-परिरेकी designates the असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु by the term अनन्वयवृत्ति and defines it as ' सत्यमासाधारणत्वे सति पञ्चमाश्रयिणी निवृत्तव्यवहारसत्त्वम् ' This is a better definition than our author's, for the expression सत्यमासाधारणत्वे सति serves to exclude a valid केवल-परिरेकी हेतु from falling within the definition of अनन्वयवृत्ति Both a केवल-परिरेकी हेतु and an अनन्वयवृत्ति or असाधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु are पञ्चमाश्रयिणी But while a केवल-परिरेकी हेतु is सत्यमासाधारण on account of the correct वृत्ति-वृत्ति with which it is connected, an अनन्वयवृत्ति is सत्यमासाधारण or cannot prove the सत्यम् owing to its defective nature Our author's definition of an असाधारण अनेकान्तिक will include a valid केवल-परिरेकी हेतु as there is nothing in it to exclude the same The definition is thus defective to that extent

{ A third variety of अनेकान्तिक, अनुपसंहरी or non exclusive, is given in the Tārka-samgraha This consists in the reason being void of a similar or dissimilar instance This can only happen when every-

thing in existence is included in the पक्ष itself, so that nothing is left out that can be considered a सपक्ष or विपक्ष. An example of अनपक्षहारी अनेकान्तिक हेतु is 'सर्वमनित्य प्रमेयत्वात्'. As 'सर्वम्' which includes everything forms the पक्ष, no similar or dissimilar instance can be thought of. Thus the peculiarity of this हेतुभास is that its पक्ष includes everything. It will be noticed that both सपक्षे सन्धम् and विपक्षान् व्यावृत्ति are wanting here. The व्यविचार consists in the fact that the व्याप्ति is incomplete in the absence of a positive or negative instance. Another example of this हेतुभास can well be 'सर्वं नित्य प्रमेयत्वात्'—अपक्षहारिन् means that which withdraws or withholds, that which excludes, exclusive अनपक्षहारी consequently means non exclusive. This हेतुभास is so called because it does not exclude anything from its पक्ष i. e. it includes everything in it so that nothing remains for being regarded as सपक्ष or विपक्ष.

(31) प्रकरणसम or स प्रतिपक्ष or counter balanced is easily understood. It is that reason for which there exists another reason proving the opposite of its साध्य. Another example is 'शब्दो निय आवणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्' and 'शब्दाग्नि व कार्पवात् पटवत्'. Here we note that while आवणत्व seems to prove the नियत्व of शब्द, कार्पवत् proves the opposite viz अनियत्व with equal force. So आवण व has a well matched rival (सम् प्रतिपक्ष वस्य) and is therefore rightly known as सप्रतिपक्ष. In order to make the definition clearer and more accurate we should add तु-पक्ष before हेत्वन्तरम्. This हेतुभास violates the fifth characteristic of a valid हेतु viz अस प्रतिपक्षत्वम्.

गीतान designates this हेतुभास by the term प्रकरणसम which has been adopted by the नर्कभाषा and सप्तार्थी (It is called सप्रतिपक्ष in the Tarka-samgraha). प्रकरण means an argument and प्रकरणसम is explained as प्रकरणेन सम or प्रकरणमनतिक्रान्त i. e. a reason which is like an argument i. e. which does not go beyond the argument. This means that the प्रकरणसम हेतु does not carry the argument any step further, but leaves it where it was, as it cannot prove definitely either this or that.

प्रकरणसम must be distinguished from विरुद्ध. In both we find that साध्यभाव is proved. Thus they resemble each other. But (1) while विरुद्ध itself proves the साध्यभाव, प्रकरणसम does not do so itself, but has another powerful rival which does it. प्रकरणसम is consequently rendered inconclusive. (2) Secondly, in विरुद्ध only the साध्यभाव is proved, in प्रकरणसम, on the other hand, the साध्य is proved by the हेतु proper, but there is also another हेतु which proves the साध्यभाव.

(32) The fifth and the last hetvabhāsa is कालादवपदिष्ट or पारि- which consists in having the negat on of its साध्य already a certain

by another proof. Its example is 'अग्निस्तुष्णं द्रवत्वात्' or 'कृतकं वात् जलवत्'. Now we know by the perceptive cognition of touch that fire is hot and as 'द्रवत्व' is a stronger proof than अनुमान उष्णत्वं which we know through it, contradicts or annuls the अनुमानत्व that is intended to be proved by the reason द्रव्यत्व or कृतकत्व. Hence द्रवत्व or कृतकत्व is a कारणव्यवहित हेतु. Here the fourth characteristic of a valid हेतु viz अव्यभिचारित्वम् is violated.—In order to make the definition of कालव्यवहित clearer and more accurate we should add कालव्यवहित before प्रमाणान्तरेण.

कारणव्यवहित must be distinguished from प्रकारणत्वम्. Both resemble in so far as in both the साध्यत्वम् is established by another प्रमाण. But (1) while in प्रकारणत्वम् the other प्रमाण which proves the साध्यत्वम् is an other हेतु of equal strength (as indicated by the term प्रतिपक्ष) in कारणव्यवहित the प्रमाणान्तरं proving the साध्यत्वम् is much stronger and is usually पक्ष. This is also indicated by the term कालव्यवहित for only a stronger प्रमाणान्तरं can annul or contradict the first. (2) Secondly in प्रकारणत्वम् the first न पक्ष is merely rendered doubtful by the existence of another reason which proves its opposite. In कालव्यवहित on the other hand the more powerful प्रमाणान्तरं completely disproves the साध्यत्वम् which consequently is rendered false.

कालव्यवहित is the term which is adopted by the सतपद्मार्थ also for this हेतु. The Tarkasamgraha calls it कालव्यवहित means that which is stated after the proper time for it has passed away. A हेतु is to be stated when the साध्यत्वम् is doubtful. In the case of a पक्ष or कारणव्यवहित हेतु the साध्यत्वम् (अव्यभिचारित्वम्) is long known. So the हेतु द्रवत्व or कृतकत्व comes a day too late. Hence the name कालव्यवहित.

Kesavamisra follows Gautama in mentioning five fallacious reasons. Gautama's names for three of them are however different. His five hetvabhasas are सवधिचार (=अनेक निरुक्त) विरुद्ध प्रकारणत्वम् साध्यत्वम् (=असिद्ध) and प्रतीतिरहित (=पक्षित). See 'साधुसूत्र' I ii 4. These are the five hetvabhasas which the Naiyayikas the followers of Gautama, admit.—The सतपद्मार्थ however enumerates six viz असिद्ध विरुद्ध पक्षित कालव्यवहित अनवहित कारणव्यवहित and प्रकारणत्वम्. But the अनेकनिरुक्त and अनवहितत्वम् are nothing but the साध्यत्वम् and अनव्यवहितत्वम् respectively of our author. So the number comes to five ultimately.—The Vaisesikas the followers of Kasapa or Kanada on the other hand admit only three hetvabhasas viz अव्यभिचारित्वम् सतिष्ठति विरुद्ध and असिद्ध ('विरुद्ध सिद्धसाध्यविरुद्ध कारणव्यवहित') and this represents one of the principal points of distinction between the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas.

(33) Now we proceed to the third kind of proof viz उदाहरण. Kesavamisra has followed Gautama in admitting four प्रमाणान्तरं. See

न्यायसूत्र I : 3 'प्रत्यक्षानुमानैवमानशब्दा प्रमाणानि' The Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise उपमान and शब्द as independent प्रमाणs. They include them under अनुमान.

उपमान is the instrument of उपमिति or analogical cognition which consists in the knowledge of the connection between a name and the object expressed by it. For producing this उपमिति, knowledge of similarity is necessary. Therefore उपमान is सादृश्यज्ञान. A man does not know the meaning of the word गवय. He is told by a forester, who often has opportunities of seeing गवयास in the forest, that a 'gavaya' is like an ox. 'यज्ञ गौ नभा गवय' or 'गोसदृशो गवय' is what the forester tells him. This sentence is known as अनिदेशवाक्य or directing sentence. —आनदेश technically means extended application, application by analogy or by transference of attributes. The sentence 'गोसदृशो गवय' directs the transference of the attributes of the known animal गौ to the unknown animal गवय and is hence known as अनिदेशवाक्यम्. —Now this ignorant fellow goes to the forest after having heard this directing sentence and sees an animal resembling an ox. Then he recollects the directing sentence after which the cognition असौ गवयशब्दश्च ' arises in him. This cognition is known as उपमिति.

It will thus be seen that for the production of उपमिति two previous cognitions are necessary viz अनिदेशवाक्यज्ञान obtained from some authoritative person and सादृश्यज्ञान obtained by actual observation. Of these सादृश्यज्ञान is the कारण of उपमिति and is therefore called उपमान. अनिदेशवाक्यवार्थ is recollected after the सादृश्यज्ञान and this recollection helps the सादृश्यज्ञान to produce the उपमिति. So the stages in the rise of उपमिति are सादृश्यज्ञान—अनिदेशवाक्य प्रमाण—उपमिति. As the अनिदेशवाक्यप्रमाण comes between the कारण सादृश्यज्ञान and the कार्य अनुमिति, it is known as अवाप्तप्रमाण or intermediates or accessory mental operation. It will be seen from this that the view about कारण that Kesavamisra takes here is 'वास्तव्य असमाधान कारण कारणम्'. But in asserting 'त्रिरूपवादी एव अनुमतिकारणम्' in section 16 our author relied on 'कथायोग्यवर्तिष्ठत कारण कारणम्'.

The purpose of उपमान is to obtain knowledge of something unknown by its similarity to something known. We know a certain term (शब्द) such as गवय. But we have never seen the object denoted by that term (वस्तु). This means we have not obtained the knowledge of the connection existing between that term and its object. This knowledge, it is argued, cannot be produced by प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान. Hence उपमान is admitted as an independent प्रामाण्य to account for its production. Read 'तत्र मूढं पंचिच्छेद (निश्चयज्ञान) मन्वाना मनिसा हृत् । प्रमाणा-  
इत्येव शब्दवचनरूपं हि ॥ कृष्णमन्त्रेण उपमानवार्थे



We have seen above that *avagāhī* or the knowledge of the connection between a term and the object denoted by it or the knowledge of something unknown from something which is known, is produced by *śabdavākyam*. But this is not, it is pointed out, the only way of producing *avagāhī*. We sometimes get the knowledge of an unknown entity by learning about its special characteristic. For example we know what a rhinoceros is when we are told that it has a horn adorning its nose. Then again we sometimes come to know an object by merely learning that it has certain characteristics not found in some entity that we are familiar with. Thus a camel might be recognised by us if we were to know that it does not possess a level back and short neck like a horse. The two cases are also included under *avagāhī* by considering the expression *śabdavākyam* in the text to be merely an *avagāhī*. Read ' *ननु यद्यत्र 'विदितम्' (1) सादृश्यात् शिष्यादिपुत्रात्मन् । यथा गोसादृश्यादि शिष्यं वदन् । (11) अज्ञातपुरुषमपेक्षितं विद्वान्मन् । यथा नास्तिमान्निजसर्वैकशब्दोऽप्यज्ञः । (111) वैशेषिकादिशास्त्रिणोऽत्र न । यथा उच्यते न्ययवत् स्यात् । इत्यर्थोऽत्र ।*

(34) The passage ३५३ (line 2) is dropped in some manuscripts.

(35) Sections 35-38 deal with the last of the four proofs, namely, *शब्दः*. Just as we obtain correct knowledge from perception, inference and analogy, in the same way we get correct knowledge from word. But such word must have been spoken by a trustworthy person and a trustworthy person is he who asserts things as they are i.e. the truth (*वचनमस्य सत्यम् इति*). I will thus be seen that the authoritativeness of word as regards the knowledge which it gives rise to is ultimately based on truth. However trustworthy a man may be supposed to be if he does not state what is exactly the truth he ceases to be *ज्ञान* and his word will have no value.

A sentence is formed by a group or collection of words. A word is defined as *शब्द* or possessed of the power of expressing its conventional meaning - *शब्दो यः । अस्मात् पशुद्वयमर्थो वादो न इत्यनेनैव न शक्तिः । 'नमस्तस्मै' । Explain शब्दम् as शब्दो शक्तिः । शब्दोऽस्य शक्तिः । अस्मात् शक्तिः इति शक्तिः पशुम् । अस्मात् शक्तिः इति शक्तिः । शक्तिः is the convention of God that a certain meaning is to be understood from a certain word. Here we get the Naiyayikas' philosophy regarding the origin of the expressive power of words. Words convey a meaning because God has willed that they should do so. *शक्ति* is the same as *शक्ति* or the expressive power of words which denotes their conventional meaning.*

Here a doubt arises. What about words like *दि* or *दिवस* *देवदत्त* and *वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्* to which meaning is assigned by the speaker or will of human

beings<sup>9</sup> All proper nouns fall under this class, for the meaning which they convey depends not on the will of God but on that of individuals To escape from this difficulty the moderns define *वक्ति* as इच्छाशक्तिम् Thus in the case of proper nouns it is human will, and in the case of other words divine will that give them their conventional meaning Others stick to the old definition of 'इच्छाशक्तेन' and account for the expressive power of proper nouns by saying that men, in designating certain individuals by such names as *विष्णु* etc., are really impelled by God and hence even proper nouns have ultimately divine will as their source ]

*वाक्य* was defined as a collection of words But in order that this collection of words should be able to convey authoritative meaning it must be possessed of three characteristics viz *आकाङ्क्षा*, *योग्यता* and *सन्निधि* *आकाङ्क्षा* or expectancy is defined in the *Tarkasamgraha* as *पदान्तरस्य अप्यपदस्य परिरेण अनावेन प्रयुक्तम् (रस्यचित् पदस्य) अन्वयान्तुसावस्तम् अत्रिन यथोपाजनरुचम् आकाङ्क्षा* thus means the inability of a word to convey a connected meaning (अन्वय) in the absence of another word Read 'रुचस्य रुचदाभावप्रयुक्तम् यवथोपाजनरुचम् न रुचसमर्थि गच्छन्त रुचम् आकाङ्क्षा' न लक्षणे Words are said to be *आकाङ्क्ष* when the expectancy created by one is satisfied by another Thus the words 'देवदत्तं ग्रामं गच्छति' are possessed of expectancy, because as soon as *देवदत्त* is uttered a desire to know something about him ('*किं तस्य*) arises in us and that desire is satisfied by the words *ग्रामं गच्छति* But disconnected words like *गी अथ पुरुषा हस्ती* are *विच्छिन्नाङ्क्षा*, because they do not mutually fulfil the expectancy created by each Therefore such a group of words, though forming a sentence technically, since it is a *पदसमुह*, is not authoritative because it lacks *आकाङ्क्षा*

The second requisite of an authoritative sentence is *वाक्यता* or compatibility defined as *बाधभाव* or absence of contradiction This means the meanings of the various words constituting a sentence must be compatible or consistent and not contradict one another Take the sentence *आम्रफलं विषति* The mango fruit is not a thing to be drunk There is therefore *बाध* or contradiction between *आम्रफल* and *पान* The sentence *आम्रफलं विषति* thus does not possess *योग्यता* and is consequently unauthoritative Similarly *अग्निना सिद्धत्* lacks *योग्यता*, because fire is incompatible with the action of sprinkling

Expectancy and compatibility are not enough to make a sentence authoritative It must have *सन्निधि* or juxtaposition as well Juxtaposition means uttering words without undue interval between them Thus in order that the sentence *देवदत्तं ग्रामं गच्छति* should be authoritative

five, you must utter the words one after another without long delay between them. If on the other hand you pronounce देवदत्त now, ग्रामम् three hours hence and मञ्जुति another three hours later, the three words would not form a sentence proper owing to the absence of सम्बन्धि between them and so would not be authoritative. Read in this connection the following 'वाक्यं स्याद् योग्यतारतम्यज्ञातस्तिदुस्त पदोच्चय ॥ योग्यता एतावता परपरसम्बन्धे प्राधान्यात् । पदोच्चयदेवदत्तान्तेषु वाक्येषु 'सद्विना सिद्धति' इत्याद्यदि वाक्यं स्यात् । आसत्त्वात् प्रतीतिपयस्त्वन्निर्ह । स च श्रेतुर्जिज्ञासाख्य । निराकारहस्य वाक्ये 'गीर्षे पुरुषो हन्ती' इत्यादिनामपि वाक्यस्य स्यात् । आसत्तिर्द्वयस्योच्चेद् । सद्विनाच्चेदेषु वाक्येषु दृष्टनीमूर्तरितस्य देवदत्तज्ञानस्य द्विगन्तरीकृतित्वेन मञ्जुतीति पदेन मगति स्यात् । अत्र आसत्त्वाद्योग्यवन्तयोऽप्यस्यस्यस्य पदोच्चयपक्षेऽप्युक्तकामात् ।' साहित्यदर्पण

(36) The matter discussed in this section may be thus summarised. Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are declared to be the characteristics of words. But expectancy is really an attribute of the human soul and compatibility a feature not of words, but of the meaning denoted by words. When the word देवदत्त is uttered, it is we who entertain expectancy to know something about देवदत्त. Similarly incompatibility exists not between the words अद्विना and सिद्धत्, but between the senses conveyed by those words. Juxtaposition alone belongs properly to words. How can we then speak of expectancy and compatibility as the characteristics of शब्दसमूह? The answer is that आसत्त्वा and योग्यता, though primarily the attributes of अन्तः and शरीरम्, are said to be शब्दसमूहव्यय only metaphorically.

The objector says—आसत्त्वा can not certainly belong to the words. When we utter the sentence नदीतरे पत्रं कल्पानि मन्ति, the word पत्र has no आसत्त्वा for the word नदी. The sense of the word पत्र may have आसत्त्वा for the sense of the word नदी. But strictly speaking, आसत्त्वा can not belong to the sense either, आसत्त्वा, being of the nature of इच्छा, is an attribute of the soul.

The siddhāntin replies—(1) अक्रान्ता should be regarded as primarily belonging to अर्थ, as they create it in the mind of the hearer, and secondarily to the words as being expressive of those अर्थ, or (2) आसत्त्वा primarily belongs to the soul and secondarily to the words, and also to the things expressed by them. Words primarily signify अर्थ and afterwards give rise to अक्रान्ता with reference to other अर्थ. That is why they are metaphorically called आसत्त्वा.

(Line 9)—इवमर्थ आसत्त्वा. It would be better if we drop आसत्त्वा, because the author is now dealing with योग्यता and has finished with the discussion about आसत्त्वा or construct एव न आसत्त्वा अर्थ.



(2) सव्य is of two kinds — (a) संबन्ध and (b) समन्त

(a) संबन्ध can exist only between द्रव्य or substances, यव is no द्रव्य, therefore there can be no संबन्ध with reference to अणु

(b) समन्त exists between अप्रुतसिद्ध objects and अणु does not figure in any of the five pairs of अप्रुतसिद्ध objects. Therefore there can not be समन्त either.

(3) As regards the विशेषणविशेष्यम्, it is no सव्य at all. It is a mere figure of the imagination of the opponent. A सव्य to be regarded as such, must satisfy three conditions —

(a) It must be different from the objects it connects (भेदीदृष्टसम्बन्ध is different from भेदी and दृष्ट)

(b) It must depend upon both the objects it connects (भेदीदृष्टसम्बन्ध depends upon both भेदी and दृष्ट)

(c) And it must be one (भेदीदृष्टसम्बन्ध is one)

विशेषणविशेष्यम् does not satisfy any one of these conditions. Thus, take the instance of दण्डपुरुष (दण्डविशिष्ट पुरुष where दण्ड is the विशेषण and पुरुष is the विशेष्य) —

(a) दण्डपुरुषभाव is not different from दण्ड and पुरुष. The विशेष्यत्व of दण्ड is not a different object but its own nature, so the विशेष्यत्व of पुरुष is not a different object but his own nature.

Similarly in अणुभावत् सुतम्, अणुभाव is the विशेषण, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object, but its own nature, in पुत्रत्वे अणुभाव, अणुभाव is the विशेष्य, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object, but its own nature. अणु also is not possessed of सव्य etc, which would have enabled us to think of its सव्य with something else.

So विशेषणविशेष्यम् is not different from विशेषण and विशेष्य

(b) विशेषणविशेष्यम् is not उपवाचिन for in the विशेषण, there is only विशेषणभाव, and no विशेष्यभाव, and in the विशेष्य, there is only विशेष्यभाव and no विशेषणभाव.

(c) विशेषणविशेष्यम् is not एक, for the compound expression, when analysed gives us the idea of two things (1) विशेषणभाव and (2) विशेष्यभाव.

This proves that विशेषणविशेष्यम् is no सव्य.

(4) विशेषणविशेष्यम् is only metaphorically called सव्य, so the use of the expression सव्य with reference to it, should not be regarded as an

(2) सञ्चय is of two kinds — (a) सञ्चय and (b) समसञ्चय

(a) सञ्चय can exist only between द्रव्य or substances सञ्चय is no द्रव्य, therefore there can be no सञ्चय with reference to प्रभाव

(b) समसञ्चय exists between अयुक्तसिद्ध objects and समसञ्चय does not figure in any of the five pairs of अयुक्तसिद्ध objects Therefore there can not be समसञ्चय either

(3) As regards the सञ्चयविशेष्यभाव it is no सञ्चय at all it is a mere figment of the imagination of the opponent A सञ्चय to be regarded as such, must satisfy three conditions—

(a) It must be different from the objects it connects (परीवृत्तसञ्चय is different from मनी and द्रव्य)

(b) It must depend upon both the objects it connects (मनी द्रव्यसञ्चय depends upon both मनी and द्रव्य)

(c) And it must be one (परीवृत्तसञ्चय is द्रव्य)

विशेष्यभावविशेष्यभाव does not satisfy any one of these conditions Thus, take the instance of दृग्द्रव्यसञ्चय (द्रव्यत्वसिद्धि दृग्द्रव्य where दृग्द्रव्य is the विशेषण and दृग्द्रव्य is the विशेष्य)—

(a) दृग्द्रव्यसञ्चय is not different from दृग्द्रव्य and दृग्द्रव्य The विशेष्यभाव of दृग्द्रव्य is not a different object but its own nature, so the विशेष्यत्व of दृग्द्रव्य is not a different object but his own nature

Similarly in अज्ञानभावत्तु अज्ञानत्वं, अज्ञानभाव is the विशेषण, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object but its own nature, in अज्ञान अज्ञानभाव, अज्ञानभाव is the विशेष्य, but its अज्ञानत्व is not a different object, but its own nature अज्ञान also is not possessed of अज्ञानत्व etc, which would have enabled us to think of its अज्ञानत्व with something else

So विशेष्यभावविशेष्यभाव is not different from विशेषण and विशेष्य

(b) विशेष्यभावविशेष्यभाव is not उभयसञ्चय for in the विशेषण there is only विशेष्यभाव, and no विशेष्यभाव and in the विशेष्य, there is only विशेष्यभाव and no विशेष्यभाव

(c) विशेष्यभावविशेष्यभाव is not द्रव्य, for the compound expression, when analysed gives us the idea of two things (1) विशेष्यभाव and (2) विशेष्यभाव

This proves that विशेष्यभावविशेष्यभाव is no सञ्चय

(4) विशेष्यभावविशेष्यभाव is only metaphorically called सञ्चय, so the use of the expression सञ्चय with reference to it, should not be regarded as an

argument in favour of its being a मन्व्य. The reason why विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is figuratively called सन्वय is this —Just as in the case of भेरीदण्डसन्वय, the सन्वय implies the cognition of both भेरी and दण्ड, so in the case of दण्डपुरुष also, the knowledge of both दण्ड and पुरुष is necessary. That is all.

( a ) As regards the so-called सन्वयः, व्याप्यव्यापकभाव, कार्यकारणभाव etc it is easy to show that they are not सन्वयः but the natures of the objects concerned viewed in a particular light. Thus—

( a ) In यत्र धूम तत्र वह्नि, वह्नि is the व्यापक, and the व्याप्यत्व of वह्नि is but its own nature capable of producing the cognition of धूम invariably associated with it. Likewise in यत्र वह्नयभाव तत्र धुमाभाव, धुमाभाव is the व्यापक and the व्यापकत्व of धुमाभाव is but its own nature and not a different thing.

( b ) तद्गुणः are the cause of घट, but this कारणत्व of the तद्गुणः is nothing but their very nature of being present or absent, when the effect घट is present or absent.

Likewise कारणत्व belongs to घटप्रमाणभाव ( which is considered to be one of the causes of the production of the घट ), but this कारणत्व of घटप्रमाणभाव is nothing but its very nature, and not a different thing.

The व्याप्यव्यापकभाव or the कार्यकारणभाव with reference to अभाव can not be explained away in any other manner, as अभाव can not possess सामान्य etc. Therefore व्यापकत्व and कारणत्व which belong to अभाव, are not different from अभाव. But they represent its very nature in a particular aspect.

All this shows that it is impossible to cognise अभाव by means of the sense-organ which could not have any contact with it.

The siddhantin replies —Your dissertation on the nature of सन्वय etc is a very learned one no doubt but unfortunately all your arguments are beside the point for they are based upon the unwarranted supposition that all cognition by प्रत्यक्ष is caused by the contact of the sense-organ with the object. As a matter of fact, the सन्वयद्वारप्रसङ्गकत्व of the sense-organs refers to भाववस्तुषु only. It is unreasonable to argue that there should be the same rule obtaining in the case of both भाव and अभाव, other kinds of objects, other methods of perception. What is true of भाव objects need not be true of अभाव also. So because भाव objects are perceived by sense organs coming into contact with them there is no earthly reason why अभाव also should be perceived exactly in the same way. We hold that अभाव is perceived by the sense-organ by means of the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव सन्वयः.

It might be argued that if the sense organ is not *सुषुप्तप्रसङ्ग* in the case of *अज्ञान*, it would cognise anything and everything. If *चक्षु* can perceive *पटाक्षर* with which it is not connected, why should not *चक्षु* then perceive at the same time *पद्मक्षर*, *अक्षयक्षर* etc. which are all unconnected with it? To this objection, our answer would be as follows—In the first place the objector is treating the matter lightly, which we strongly deprecate. For though there is no ordinary *सुषुप्त* between the sense organ and *अज्ञान*, there is the *विशेषणता* which ordains that only a particular *अज्ञान* should be perceived and not any and every *अज्ञान*. Secondly, the objector, in his malicious enthusiasm, has overlooked the fact that the same fault with which he is charging us, obtains in the case of his reasoning also. For we ask the objector who wants to admit *अज्ञान* as a separate *प्रमाण*, 'How is it that *पटाक्षर*, for example is cognised by your *अज्ञान* *प्रमाण* only in a particular place?' His answer per force has to be 'Because that particular place is qualified by that *पटाक्षर*.' So the objector is required to admit *विशेषणता*, however unwillingly. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further, for when a fault together with its removal is common to the arguments of both the disputants, none of the disputants should be huddled about it. This is the general rule about the conduct of debates. Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones at others.

( Lane 3 )—*बद्धा चक्षु भ्रमे* etc., this syllogism is given because the first syllogism *इन्द्रियणि वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशसतीति । ज्ञानकरणत्वात् । अज्ञानम् ।* may not be regarded as quite conclusive. Because the objector might argue that *ज्ञान* is also in a way *ज्ञानकरण* ( the *चक्षुः* can not function without *ज्ञान* ) and still *ज्ञान* does not come into contact with *वृत्* for *पटाक्षर*. No objection can be taken by the objector to the second syllogism, *चक्षुः श्रेते वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशसतीति चक्षुः-इन्द्रियत्वात् । यथाक्षरम् ।* for both the *हेतु* and the *दृष्टान्त* are acceptable to him.

( Lane 38 )—*बोधोपपत्ते* etc. is taken from the *भट्टकचरित* of *कुम्भारिषद्* ( circa 8th century, a commentator on *शाबरभाष्य* )

( 42 ) This section deals with the very important question whether cognition has *एतत्* *प्रमाण* or *परत्* *प्रमाण*. This a very interesting topic, though rather abstruse, and the student should study this question very carefully and remember the pros and cons thereof.

The controversy arises in this way—*I* perceive water at a distance, the same agency which enables me to perceive the water, enables me to apprehend the validity ( *प्रमाण* ) of that perception, and *then on knowing that my cognition is valid, I proceed afterwards to bring*



th *is* te This is as it should be, for if I knew that my cognition had no validity (that is, what I had perceived was not water, but merely mirage) I certainly would not take the trouble of going to that place for water. Thus the validity of any cognition must be taken to be produced by the same agency which produces that cognition. The validity does not depend upon any other factor; in other words ज्ञान has स्वतः प्रामाण्य

The other view is that ज्ञान has परतः प्रामाण्य. The चक्षुर्विज्ञान enables me to perceive the water and the cognition of water takes place by means of मनमप्रवृत्त. I then repair to the place, if I find water there I infer that my cognition is valid, if I do not find water there, I infer that my cognition is invalid. Thus cognition is due to मनमप्रवृत्त but its validity is due to ज्ञानदान. In other words ज्ञान has परतः प्रामाण्य

Kesavamisra holds the second view and controverts the argument put forth by the opponent who believes in the स्वतः प्रामाण्य of ज्ञान

## OBJECTOR

## SIDDHĀNTIN

When I secure the knowledge of वृक्ष, my cognition is वृक्ष ज्ञान, from which one can infer that the वृक्ष ज्ञानता (knownness) is produced in the वृक्ष. A वृक्ष that is not known has not this ज्ञानता. So that वृक्षज्ञान is the cause, and ज्ञानता is the effect. And as ज्ञानता cannot be accounted for otherwise by presumption we conclude that its कारण ज्ञान must have been there. Hence, even before a man proceeds to bring water, by अद्यावन्ति is proved the ज्ञानज्ञान as the ज्ञानता of the ज्ञान cannot be accounted for otherwise, and by means of the अद्यावन्ति itself the validity of that knowledge is apprehended.

ज्ञान-विषयता for the matter of that, is nothing but being the abode of ज्ञानता, produced by ज्ञान. (So you can not get rid of ज्ञानता by easily

1 We challenge your statement that ज्ञान is apprehended by अद्यावन्ति on account of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for ज्ञानता. I or, what is ज्ञानता after all? ज्ञानता is not a new attribute created in the object. ज्ञानता (knownness) is not over and above ज्ञानविषयता (being the object of knowledge, being cognised)

2 You are all wrong. You are unnecessarily making a simple thing difficult to understand. The distinction between अद्यावन्ति

by simply asserting that it is ज्ञानविषयता) You possibly cannot explain this ज्ञानविषयता in any other way

(a) ज्ञानविषयता cannot be due to तादात्म्य or identity, वस्तु and ज्ञान are not known to be identical

(b) ज्ञानविषयता of वस्तु cannot be due to the fact that वस्तु causes that knowledge for in that case the sense organs also could be called ज्ञानविषय, because they too produce the knowledge

So we infer that there must be something produced in the वस्तु by the ज्ञान, which also makes the वस्तु ज्ञानविषय. Thus owing to the impossibility of accounting for the ज्ञानविषयत्व of वस्तु otherwise the existence of ज्ञानता is established by अभावादि.

In order to avoid the अनवस्थाद्वय I say that the ज्ञानता does not require another ज्ञानता to make it ज्ञानविषय, it becomes ज्ञानविषय by its very nature

(object) and ज्ञान (knowledge) is a natural one and it is patent to every one. If ज्ञान were to produce ज्ञानता in the actual object, we can never have any knowledge of past and future objects for ज्ञानता can not be produced in objects that do not exist

Again let us suppose that ज्ञानता is produced, but how is this ज्ञानता to be known? वस्तुत्व produces ज्ञानता in the वस्तु so ज्ञानता-ज्ञान must produce another ज्ञानता 1 in ज्ञानता this ज्ञानता 1 produces ज्ञानता 2 and so on. Where is this series to end? There would thus be the fault of endlessness which cuts at the root of all your argument

3 If you are prepared to allow that ज्ञानता can become ज्ञानविषय through its very nature why do you want this ज्ञानता in the case of वस्तु itself. Let वस्तु also be admitted to be ज्ञानविषय by its very nature

Granting for argument's sake just to satisfy you that ज्ञानता is there then by ज्ञानता ज्ञान is apprehended but how is the validity of the ज्ञान apprehended by that ज्ञानता?

4 In saying this, you are giving your position away. Does this not mean that ज्ञान and its validity are not apprehended by the same agency? You are condemned out

5 I hold that ज्ञान only is apprehended by ज्ञानता, and its validity is apprehended by a ज्ञानताविशिष्ट in variably associated with validity

of your own mouth for now your position is —

(1) ज्ञान is apprehended by ज्ञानता

(2) ज्ञानप्रमाण is apprehended by ज्ञानताविशेष

ज्ञानता and ज्ञानताविशेष are obviously two different agencies

I shall amend my statement and say that both ज्ञान and ज्ञानप्रमाण are apprehended just together by ज्ञानताविशेष which is invariably associated with valid knowledge.

4 This would never do. The अज्ञानत्व of ज्ञान is apprehended by means other than the ज्ञान—this can never be disputed.

ज्ञान is apprehended by मानसप्रमाण and its प्रमाणत्व by अनुमान. The अनुमान can be put in the following कवल-प्रतिरुक्ति form, (विवादा-यामिन जज्ञान प्रमाणम् ननु प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् । यत्र प्रमाण न तद् समर्थं प्रवृत्ति जनकति यथा प्रमाणाभावे । There cannot be अनुभव-प्रमाण, as when we are going to prove the सत्य for the first time, there cannot obviously be a मरकत-प्रमाण

(Lane 58)—न तु प्रमाणं सृष्ट्या व्यभिचरति — The author wants to make it quite clear what the सत्य is in the above syllogism प्रमाणत्वम् is the सत्य, but the word प्रमाण used in the syllogism is ambiguous प्रमाणत्वम् might either mean correctness (साम्यत्वम्) or the character of being a right knowledge (प्रमातृत्वम्). It is not the प्रमातृत्व of the जज्ञान in question that he wants to establish. For if that were so, his व्यभिचरति is यत्र प्रमाण (= प्रमा) जनकति would be found violated in the case of remembrance. For, we often find that remembrance, though not a प्रमा, (as remembrance is different from सत्य-प्रमाण which is प्रमा see section 3) is सत्य-प्रमाणजनक. The reading प्रमाकृतत्वात् for प्रमाण does not appear to be satisfactory. प्रमाण does mean प्रमाकृतत्व, so प्रमाण could be understood in the sense of प्रमाकृतत्व. But as the प्रमाण are sufficiently well known no one is likely to regard जज्ञान as the प्रमाकृतत्व in its technical sense. But whether the जज्ञान is प्रमा (1.2) is

5 If we accept this absurd statement, we might as well give up our studies of Nyaya, fallacies etc., and say that ज्ञान and its invalidity also are apprehended just together by a ज्ञानताविशेष invariably associated with wrong knowledge. So that let the invalidity of knowledge be self-established!

6 If we are agreed about the प्रमाणत्व of ज्ञान, you have perforce to admit the प्रमाणत्वत्व of ज्ञान as well.

cognition) or not, may well be a matter for dispute Hence प्रमत्तम् seems to be the right reading

(Line 60) —अत्रैव केवलव्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेन अनभ्यासदशावसाय, अभ्यास-repetition, अनभ्यासदशा—unrepeated state, situation at the beginning The idea is as follows —When we are trying to find out the validity of the जलज्ञान for the first time, we shall have to make use of the प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः, but when the inference is once drawn, we can utilise the knowledge thus gained for the purpose of adducing a प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः, when we are drawing an inference in a similar case later (अभ्यासदशावसाय), so that the हतु समर्थवृत्तिजनकत्व could then be अन्यव्यतिरेकी, the अन्यव्यतिरेकी being stated in the form हतु समर्थवृत्तिजनकत्वम् And on the strength of such समानतावसाय, we can draw the inference even before the प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः The reading which refers the केवलव्यतिरेक अनुमान to the अभ्यासदशा and अन्यव्यतिरेकी प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः seems to miss the point altogether in the argument in question Dr Jha translates अभ्यासदशा पक्ष as 'after it has become rightly effective by giving rise to fruitful exertion' It is doubtful if अभ्यासदशापक्ष could possibly have that sense

(Line 65) —वचनम्—As a true Naiyāyika, Kesavamisra once again asserts that there are only four Pramānas, neither more or less

(43)—आवृत्तिरे Following Gautama, Kesavamisra mentions प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः etc as the प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः Of these प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः and प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः are mentioned again under प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः in section 47, and बुद्धि under बुद्धि ( section 74 ), so that there is a lot of overlapping and consequent absence of proper arrangement

(44) and (57)—आमन्—ज्ञानविकारमन् (the substratum of knowledge) is another definition In section 57 the definition is given as आमन्—विषयव्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेः and not as आमन्—व्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेः Apparently the author felt that after all आमन् may be rightly regarded as one, as the Vedāntins say, but विषयव्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेः If Ātman is one, there can be so सामान्य for it To make allowance for this view, the definition is also given as आमन्—व्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेः The Tarkasamgraha adds—म द्विविध परमात्मैव जीवात्मैव । नैवेद्यत्तत्र परमात्मैव एव । The way in which these definitions are explained by commentators shows that by आमन् is to be understood जीवात्मन् ( आमन् is explained as तत्राद्येन प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः ) The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras do not mention प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः, probably because they were concerned with the exposition of प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः that all would understand It is almost the king to see the प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः ( who is सत्य इत्य सत्यं भाष्यत्तत्र सत्यप्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः ) dubbed as a प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः and placed on the same level with जीवात्मन् who is different from प्रमाद्विरेकवदुपपत्तेः in many respects, only on the



The existence of ईश्वर can be inferred only thus—*क्रियद्वारा ईश्वर कृतं यत् कार्यं तादृशं तत् ।* (also *क्रियद्वारा ईश्वरः जगत् सर्वाण्युत्पादति नाम च । सिद्धमाधारसद्भावे कणादा उपपन्नते ॥* and *कार्यावयोजनप्रयोगे पदात् प्रययत् श्रुते । वाक्या नवगणविशेषान् च माध्वो विशदिदृश्य ॥*, सर्वादी *नवगणान्युत्पादयति नैवैव तत्तत्तं मायम् ।* A *पद* does require a potter to fashion itself, similarly this huge world could not have come into existence without an intelligent creator viz ईश्वर. This argument seems to be satisfactory from a common sense point of view but it can easily be shown to be fallacious. First why did the *कारणिक* ईश्वर create evil in this world (if evil is said to be due to the *प्राकार* of the जीव, we have to admit that the world is अन्याद)? Again, what is the relation between ईश्वर and the other *विद्य* objects like आत्मन्, आकाश etc? Are they independent of ईश्वर. Does every *कार्य* necessarily presuppose an intelligent agent and so on. This problem has survived the ingenuity of philosophers of all times and no satisfactory solution is yet found. Śaṅkarācārya of course regards ईश्वर, the world etc as merely phenomenal, only *निर्गुण* Brahman being real. Some Naiyayikas believe ईश्वर to be possessed of a body. Others regard *परमाणु*, आकाश, जीव etc as the body of ईश्वर (followers of Ramanuja hold this view).

(Line 6)—*वृद्धाद्य* etc Kesavamisra first shows that बुद्धि etc are गुण, and then they are विशेषगुण which cannot have the eight द्रव्य, पृथिवी etc (in section 47, nine द्रव्य are mentioned, the eight द्रव्य, पृथिवी etc are those nine minus the Ātman) as their substratum. So there must be a separate ninth द्रव्य which could be the substratum, and that is Ātman. This is proved by inference, by a *केवल* *प्रमाणिक* अनुमान of *अविद्यमान* *गुण* *व्यवस्था*—the nine qualities बुद्धि, श्रुत्य, दृश्य, इच्छा, हव, पचन, चर्माद्यर्मा, and स्पर्श (भावना). These are गुण because they are अनिन्दते सति *वैकल्य* *व्यवस्था*. This *व्यवस्था* of गुण consists of two parts अनिन्द्य and *व्यवस्था*, both these ingredients are necessary. If अनिन्द्य is dropped, *व्यवस्था* which is *व्यवस्था* by the *व्यवस्था* *व्यवस्था* would be a गुण. But *व्यवस्था* is really a *व्यवस्था*. So अनिन्दते सति excludes it, for as a *व्यवस्था*, *व्यवस्था* is eternal. Similarly if *व्यवस्था* alone constituted the definition of गुण, *व्यवस्था*, *व्यवस्था*, etc would be *व्यवस्था* because they are non eternal. So to exclude *व्यवस्था*, *व्यवस्था*, etc we put in *वैकल्य* *व्यवस्था* (but with all this *व्यवस्था*, *व्यवस्था*, etc would not be excluded, for they are *वैकल्य* *व्यवस्था*, the definition ought to be amended by reading *वैकल्य* *व्यवस्था* for *व्यवस्था*, for *व्यवस्था*, *व्यवस्था* etc are not *वैकल्य* *व्यवस्था*, they are *व्यवस्था* as well as *व्यवस्था*. Still the definition remains objectionable all the same. For *व्यवस्था* which is a गुण is not *वैकल्य* *व्यवस्था*, being capable of perception by both the *व्यवस्था* of sight and the *व्यवस्था* of touch. Again, the author himself would tell us later that the

qualities residing on the atoms are eternal, so there is no propriety in putting अनित्यत्वं सति in the definition ' )

( Lane 9 )—विशेषगुणवात्—A विशेषगुण is that which resides in one substance only at one time, e g मुख, दृक् etc A general quality is that which resides in two or more substances jointly, e g सहवा, सयोग etc

( 45 )—शरीर is the body, residing in which the आत्मन् enjoys the विश्वस ( चक्षेन्द्रियार्थाद्यं शरीरम् । गौतमः ) . It is so called because it dies away every moment ( शरीरेने इति, मनेशम शीवमाण देह शरीरम् ) . According to the Vaisesikas the human शरीर is पार्थिव only and not वाय्वभौतिक or constituted of three elements as the Vedantins say शरीर is two fold, योनिजम् ( शुक्रशोणितसनिपातान्मम् ) and अयोनिजम् ( शुक्रशोणितसनिपातान्नेपशम्, for instance, the bodies of मद्, दुर्वासम् and others ) योनिज पार्थिवशरीर is two fold, जरायुजम् ( मानवपशुपृणाम् ) अण्डज च ( पक्षिसीमृषाणाम् ), अयोनिज पार्थिवशरीर is three-fold, स्वेदजम् ( भुद्रजतूनामुष्मजानां मझरादीनाम् ) उद्भिजम् ( इन्द्रगोपमण्डूकप्रभतीनाम् ) and अट्टटविशेषजन्यम् . Though the Ātman is विभु, the उपाधि of the शरीर causes the मुखदृक्त्वदिवेचिष्य in different persons . The expression अन्वयवयवि is put in to exclude hands and feet etc which are भोगायतन, but they are not the अन्वयवयवि, for they themselves are the अवयव of the body . But the body is not the अवयव of any thing else

( 46 )—इन्द्रिय is the means by which knowledge is secured, sense-organs ( भोगसाधनानि इन्द्रियाणि ) . The sense organ comes into contact with the object of sense and carries the impressions to the mind which in its turn takes them to the Ātman who thus is enabled to have the knowledge required ( आत्मा मन्मा सयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियणा मुखबद्धवस्तुमज्ञाशक्तिरिति । ) The Tarka Dipika defines इन्द्रिय as शब्देनोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाभयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणतमभोगाद्यवत्वम् । मनस is sometimes called an अन्तरिन्द्रियम् . The बहिरिन्द्रिय ( ज्ञानेन्द्रिया ) are five प्राणम्, रसनम्, श्रोत्रम्, and त्वक् . Some admit ten इन्द्रिय, five ज्ञानेन्द्रिय and five कर्मेन्द्रिय ( वाक्प्राणपद्मगुण्यस्मानि ) इन्द्रिय are super-sensuous, that is, they cannot be perceived by the sense-organs . The tip of the nose is not the प्राणेन्द्रिय, but the abode of the imperceptible sense of smell

The propriety of each word in the definition शरीरसयुक्त ज्ञानकरणम् अतीन्द्रियम् is as follows —

( 1 ) If we drop शरीरसयुक्त and ज्ञानकरणम्, दिक्, काल, etc would be इन्द्रियम्, for they are अतीन्द्रिय . But दिक्, काल etc are साधारणकारण of ज्ञान, and not करण ( which is असाधारण and साधकतम ) . To exclude दिक्, काल etc we put in ज्ञानकरणम्

( 2 ) If we drop शरीरसयुक्तम् and अतीन्द्रियम्, इन्द्रियशक्त वेत्तृत्वं would be इन्द्रिय, so to exclude it शरीरसयुक्त is put in

(3) If we drop अर्थाद्भेदम्, अलोक (light) which is both इतिवचनम् and तानवचनम्, would be इतिवचनम्, so to exclude it, अर्थाद्भेदम् is put in

(Line 10)—रूप इत्यु पञ्चतु—रूप and others are - रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द (Line 20)—पर्यवस्यते, शब्द is nothing but आशयम् circumscribed by the उपाधि, namely the cavity of the ear (Line 27)—अनुवचनेन—As the इतिवचनम् are supersensuous, they are not प्रत्यक्ष, their existence can only be inferred

(47)—द्रव्यम्, the 6 are the six पदार्थः admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas and also अभाव (referred to in section 86) Though the sixteen पदार्थः mentioned at the beginning can be shown to be not different from these six, they are mentioned separately for a definite प्रयोजन, which is to write a manual where the tenets of both the Nyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are given and reconciled as far as possible

पदार्थ—पदार्थभेदम्, which can be expressed by a word, an object, the word is here clearly used in the sense of a category. According to the Vaiśeṣikas all things in this world together with all notions about their relationship with one another can be classed under seven independent heads or categories. Aristotle mentions the following ten categories (which can be very easily merged into the seven Padārthas of the Vaiśeṣikas) (1) Substance (द्रव्य) (2) Quantity, (3) Quality (गुण) (4) Relation, (5) Place (6) Time (7) Posture, (8) Property, (9) Activity (कर्म) and (10) Passivity. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, Place and Time are included under इतिवचनम् Relation is either a गुण (सम्बन्ध) or a पदार्थ (सम्बन्ध) Quantity and Property are गुणः, Passivity is merely the absence of activity. The Vaiśeṣikas mention only six पदार्थः excluding the अभाव, which must have been added later on in order to make the classification complete as the notion of अभाव is too important to be ignored. (Śaṅkarācārya in his Dharmya on II 2-17 refers to only six पदार्थः, अर्थाद् भेदो विज्ञेयान्तरात्पञ्चतान् पदार्थान् द्व्यष्टाङ्गकर्मसामा दभेदोपसम्बन्धव्यवधानेन विज्ञानेन विज्ञानसामान्यव्यवधानेन ।) The Nyāyācāryas mention sixteen पदार्थः (here पदार्थः obviously means merely a topic for discussion) which are very important in the eyes of a controversialist. Followers of different दृष्टान्तः postulate their own पदार्थः. पदार्थभेदेन मतभेदेन च पदार्था न भवन्ति । तथाहि विषयानन्तराद्भेदेन प्रतीत्येवमित्यादि कारण इत्यवस्यत्यन्तराद्भेदोपसम्बन्धव्यवधानेन च पदार्था इति केचन इति च । विद्वन्मिथु चरौ द्वौ पदार्थौ इति सायणादिको वेदान्तिन आह । विद्वन्मिथु चरौ द्वौ पदार्था इति सायणादीनां । स्वानन्तरात्पदार्थभेदेन च पदार्था इति सायणः । पदार्थान्तरात्पदार्थभेदेन च पदार्था इति शेषा सायणादीनाम् । (भावनेन P 461) It is possible to imagine how the Vaiśeṣikas arrived at the seven पदार्थः. Let us take the case of any object, say the cow. We want to find out what possible different notions about



the cow can be thought of. The cow as a whole is a (1) द्रव्य. It has, say a white colour (the whiteness is something distinct from and still associated with it) which is a (2) गुण. The cow moves, this action of moving which can be called a गुण in the making, is distinct from गुण and is a (3) कर्मन्. There does exist something common to different cows which enables us to recognise them as cows, this is obviously a notion different from that of गुण or कर्मन् and is the (4) सत्त्वान्य. That we are able to distinguish one individual cow from another must be due to some particularity in the individual cow itself, this is the (5) विशेष. Now there must be some special relation existing between the गोद्रव्य and the गुणक्रियासमाय वशिष्ठेय belonging to that गोद्रव्य and forming a part and parcel of itself, this is the (6) समाय. Adding the notion of negation to these six, we arrive at the seven पदार्थः. It is not intended to suggest that each and every द्रव्य can have the remaining पदार्थः in intimate relation with it. अकारा being only one cannot have सामान्य, as we shall see later on. The Vaiśeṣikas only try to show how the seven पदार्थः exhaust all possible notions of and about knowable or nameable objects in the Universe and they may be said to have fairly succeeded in their attempt.

According to some, सत्त्वा and सादृश्य are also पदार्थः. The Tarkabhāṣā regards सत्त्वा as a गुण and सादृश्य is nothing but उपाधिह्यसामान्य as the Saptapadārtha remarks. Some regard शक्ति as a different पदार्थः. Fire does not burn, if you hold the मणि in your hand in the absence of the मणि, fire possesses सादृश्यान्ति, so we must recognise this शक्ति as something distinct from the fire. It is however unnecessary to regard शक्ति as a different पदार्थः, for such शक्ति is after all द्रव्यव्यभिचय and nothing more, which manifests itself only under certain conditions. Similarly आधिपत्यशक्ति or स्वत्व need not be regarded as a पदार्थः (ननु कारणात्मसमेषां सत्त्वपि प्रतिबन्धके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तर्भवति चेन्न । प्रतिबन्धकाभावात् स्वत्वमात्र कारणत्वेन शक्तेरनुपयोगान् कारणत्वेन शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु यस्मादिवा कारणज्ञो बुद्धि-वशादाधेयशक्तिरद्वा कार्येति चेन्न । अस्मादिभयोरसमात्कार्त्वात्सादृश्यव्यभिचयमिदयो निरुपाधत्वात्-सहितमस्मादिभयोरुपगतस्य बुद्धिपदार्थत्वात् । स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थः । यथैवमिदयोऽप्यस्य स्वत्वस्यत्वात् । तद्वत्त्वेऽपि मनिप्रदादिः स्वत्वमेवेति । तदुदीचिका ) Thus there are only seven पदार्थः.

(Line 3)—प्रमाणवृत्तौ यथावद्विज्ञानमर्थानि. It is possible to show with a little exercise of ingenuity that all the sixteen different padārthas of Gaṅtama can be included under one or other of the categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. However read the following from the Nyāy-sūtra pp 463-464 'एतु सत्त्वा पदार्थो गीतमोक्तान्तं बोधशान्ति ( अथवसात्त्वान् ) एतु पदार्थसामान्य इत्यम् । प्रमाणवृत्तेः द्रव्येदे-



would be rejected by those who do not admit the existence of the समवाय relation which is the special creation of the Vaiśeṣikas and again this definition also would not extend to a द्रव्य at the first moment. In the definition गुणाभयो द्रव्यम्, it has been already remarked that गुणाभय means 'capable of being a substratum of qualities.'

The nine द्रव्य mentioned, consist of the five well known elements and काल and दिग्, two most well-known notions which we can hardly do without, and आत्मन् and मनस्. The inclusion of आत्मन् among the द्रव्य is bound to make a Vedantist shudder, but the Vaiśeṣikas had, it appears no option but to regard it as a द्रव्य or mere substance. नैवेद्य—the propriety of एव is that it is not necessary to recognise darkness and gold as additional द्रव्य as is done by the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsākas respectively. Those who regard तम as an additional द्रव्य argue as follows—We have the प्रतीति, शुद्ध गो चलनि and we recognise गो as a द्रव्य, now we have a similar प्रतीति नील तम चलनि showing that तमस् has both रूप (which is a गुण) and क्रिया—and a द्रव्य is known to be क्रियायुगलम्—so, तमस् must be a द्रव्य. It can not be included in आकाश, जल, दिग्, आत्मन् and मनस्, because these five have no रूप it cannot be वायु, as it has no स्पृश and is not always moving like वायु, it is not तेजस्, as it has no hot touch and does not give any light it is not जड as it has no cool touch and has a बलि रूप, while जड has शुद्ध रूप it is not पृथ्वी, as it has no गन्ध and is स्पृशरहित, while पृथ्वी has गन्ध and स्पृश. Therefore we must recognise तमस् as the tenth द्रव्य. This is refuted as follows: तमस् is not a द्रव्य having रूप as the opponent says, for we find that all द्रव्य having रूप in this world require the presence of light, for being perceived. Such is not the case with तमस्. Besides, the प्रतीति नील तमचलनि which is made so much of by the opponent, is a misapprehension. The तमस् does not really move and it itself is नील रूप imposed on something else. It has no positive existence it is merely the absence of प्रेक्षाकाल. Gold is nothing but तेजस्, if we grant the contention of the opponent, it may at best come under पृथ्वी but it is not necessary to regard it as a separate द्रव्य (see section 30 below).

(48) पृथिवी is defined as गन्धवती which expression is to be taken to mean गन्धमगन्धिसारणम्, otherwise वायु and देश could also be said to be गन्धवत्. गन्ध is a विशेषण of पृथिवी and so the definition is correct. The Vaiśeṣikasūtras say रूपमगन्धसारणी पृथिवी. According to the Bauddhas (सर्वं मत् क्षणिकम्) द्रव्य are उत्पन्नविनष्ट, so the definition गन्धवती would not apply to पृथिवी which would be विद्युत् at the first moment (according to the dictum प्रथम द्रव्य निवृत्तमेवोत्पद्यत एवमन्तमपवता मजा उपपद्यते) the definition should therefore be modified as गन्धमगन्धिसारणद्रव्यवशावश-

विभक्ती We find गन्ध in water sometimes, but it really belongs to the पृथिवी portion that has somehow found its way into it. In certain stones गन्ध is not perceived but it is there all the same, only it is not उद्भूत or manifest. Thus a thing having गन्ध (उद्भूत or अनुद्भूत) is पृथिवी. The objector finds fault with this definition, saying it is possible to find a thing where different conflicting गन्ध neutralise one another, with the result that the thing would be odourless. The objection is ruled out as it is possible to perceive the different गन्ध belonging to the parts of the thing (Lane 5)—विषयवित्या—वित्या एतन्नामविद्योमित्यम् । एतन्नयनियोगित्वप्रतीत्यत्त्वम् । ( नरुदीपिका ) परमाणुरूप—आलम्ब्यमरीचिश्च यन्मुह्यते दृश्यते रज । तस्य षट्पदो भाग परमाणु स उच्यते ॥ परमाणु is the atom which has no parts, and is eternal. It is the smallest part of a जन्मद्रव्य, is possessed of क्रिया and is अतीन्द्रिय. See sections 52-53 for a detailed exposition of the atomic theory (Lane 3)—प्राणशरीर, this three fold division into शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषय, which obtains in the case of आप, तेजम् and वायु also, is in accordance with the Vaisesikasūtra (IV 2-1) तत् पुन पृथिव्यादिकार्यद्र व विविध शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसम्पन्नम्

( 49 ) आप—The Vaisesikasūtras describe आप as एतस्मत्पदशत व द्वा श्लिष्या शीतपदा is the special गुण of water. We speak of a slab of stone as being cool, but the coolness really belongs to the watery element in the slab. हिमरूपाः are water solidified. शरीर बहुजलोके—बहूना is the lord of ocean in the Purānas. For the sake of symmetry some शरीर has to be spoken of in connection with water, so the नरुतपद speaks of अशरीर in the बहुजलोके, a fact which we have to take on trust. This अशरीर can be a भोगवचन with the help of some पार्थिव parts ( तन्व च शरीरस्य पार्थिवस्योपपत्त्यन्वोपयोगमवयत्त्वम् )

( 50 ) तेजम्—It is एतस्मत्पदशत ( Vaisesikasūtra ), possessed of मान्वात्म्य and अजन्मत्वम्. In the case of hot water, the heat is due to the तेजम् element. The नरुतपद says विषयश्चतुर्विध—भौमद्वि-षोद्वि-कारजमद् त् ( भौ- तेज fire is पार्थिवमभिवचन ( consuming earthly substances alone ), दिग्दम् ( सौत्रचन्द्रवि-सृष्टवचनम् ) is अग्निचनम् ( consuming water ) अद्दम् ( जाटागतम् the digestive fire, only metaphorically so called ) is पार्थिवजन्मभेद्यत्नम्, and आरुरजम् ( सुवर्णवृत्तीनां जन्मकारकाद्यत्नम् ) is अनुभवेचन तेजम्. Gold and similar shining metals in the mines were regarded as तेजम्, as unlike earthly substances, they could not be changed into vapour by the application of excessive heat by the chemists of old times. Some regard gold to be a mixture of पृथिवी and तेजम् ( सुवर्ण पार्थिवम् तेजम् चेति विद्विन् वन्दु । तत्र तेजम् अग्निहयोगान्द्रियमानद्रव्यव्यतिकरणम् । पार्थिव तु अदुर्ग वीर्यवत् इति । वस्तुन दृढ पार्थिवमेव सुवर्णम् न तु तेजमपिति । -वाचस्पति p 341 ) The Vaisesikas and Navyikas regard सुवर्ण positively as तेजम्. For, सुवर्ण

obviously cannot be वायु, अग्नि, वायु ईह, अ मन् or मनम as it has रूप It cannot be जल as its द्रवत्व is not natural It is not पार्ष्वि as its liquidity is not destroyed even by excessive heat, though there is no प्रतिबन्धक cause (we find that the liquidity of घृत is not destroyed if we pour water into it, there जल acts as a प्रतिबन्धक, but in the case of सुवर्ग no such प्रतिबन्धक exists, hence if सुवर्ग were पार्ष्वि it ought to have lost its द्रवत्व, as it does not lose its द्रवत्व and get changed into vapour, it must not be पार्ष्वि) Therefore it must be नेजम्, the only remaining substance ( ननु सुवर्ग पार्ष्वि वीतव द्रवत्वाद्वादिद्विदिशि चेत् । अत्यन्तान्तयोगे सति घृतादेशे द्रवत्वनाशदानेन, जलमन्वयघृतादेशे द्रवत्वनाशादेशानेन, असति प्रतिबन्धके पार्ष्विद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशासितयोग्ये कार्यकरणपादाचारणात् । सुवर्गस्यात्यन्तान्तयोगे सत्यदृच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकारत्वेन पार्ष्विद्रवत्वानुपपत्तेः । अत्यन्तान्तयोगे द्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवत्वान्तरासिद्धौ नैविति कद्रवत्वाधिकारणतया जलानुपपत्तेः क्लृप्ततया वायुदिव्यन्तर्भावेत् नेजसत्त्वसिद्धिः । तत्रोपलक्ष्यशक्तिरूपवैकल्यसम्भवात् पार्ष्विद्रवत्वप्रतिबन्धकतया प्रतिबन्धादुपपत्तिः । तस्मात्सुवर्गं नेजसन्निहितम् । तत्रदीपिका) The उद्यम्यज्ञ and मांसस्य (which सुवर्गं ought to have, if it is नेजम्) are not noticed as they are overpowered by the वीतरूप etc of the पार्ष्वि factors in it

The above argument to show that सुवर्ग is नेजम् can easily be shown to be fallacious First it is not true that gold cannot be changed into vapour (as modern chemists would tell us), secondly, one is not convinced that there is no प्रतिबन्धक cause in this case (it may not be जल, it may be the very स्वरूप of सुवर्ग), and thirdly, it is wrong to assert that every पार्ष्वि substance must as a rule be capable of being converted into vapour Owing to the very shining nature of सुवर्ग and other metals, the Vaisesikas were tempted into regarding them as नेजम् The नेज शरीर is found in अग्नि वायु

(51) वायु—स्पर्शद्विभक्त्यान् । (अथाग्नेः अग्निः पार्ष्वि रण्येण दर्शयामि । पृथिव्याग्नेः अग्निः पार्ष्वि रण्येण दर्शयामि । तत्रदीपिका) or व सुवर्गमात्रं वायु (why Kesavamisra says वायु पार्ष्वि रण्येण instead of व सुवर्गमात्रं वायु is not clear) Kesavamisra following the ancients says that वायु is not पार्ष्वि but only रण्येण । Thus when wind is blowing, we experience a not-hot-not-cold touch which being a रण्येण must have a substratum for it This अनुपपत्तिरिति can not have for its substratum अग्नि, वायु ईह and अ मन् (which are त्रिषु, and so the touch would be found everywhere, if it belonged to any one of them), nor मनम (which being atomic can only have an अर्वादिद्रव्यदर्श), nor जल (which has दर्शयामि), nor नेजम् (which has रण्येण), nor पृथिवी (because in the case of a पार्ष्वि object, an अनुपपत्ति or manifest touch is invariably associated with अनुपपत्ति । A table for instance has a manifest touch and also a manifest रूप but वायु has no रूप), hence a substance different from all these must be the substratum of अनुपपत्ति-

सिद्धयन्तं and it is वायु (Read also the following from the दीर्घिका, ननु वायु  
 यत्न प्रयत्नस्यार्थं यथाह्मद्वयवृत्तिनि चेतन । उद्भूतस्यैव प्रयत्नोपायिकात् । यत्र द्रव्येते सति  
 बहिर्निद्रियजन्यमत्यन्तं तत्रैतद्द्रव्यस्यैववृत्तिमिति यथादो साध्योपायिकात् । अत्र प्रयत्नस्यैवशांभवा  
 त्तदोद्भूतस्यैववृत्तं नास्ति इति पक्षे साधना यथाह्मद्वयवृत्तिनि चेतन । ननु तत्रैतद्द्रव्यजन्येद्वयवृत्तयोरुपायिकात् ।  
 इत्यन्तं । ताम्नाह्मद्वयवृत्तिसाहाय्यवृत्तयः ।) The moderns as well as the Mīmāṃ-  
 sakas however hold that वायु is प्रवृत्त as we actually experience the  
 touch of वायु प्रवृत्त is nothing but वायु and is of various kinds owing to  
 उपनिषद् ( इदं विद्यमानस्यैववृत्तिमिदं वायु विद्यमानस्यैव विद्यमानं । प्राणानामादि द्विदि प्राण  
 (द्रव्यनिद्रियान्या निद्रियजन्यवृत्तयः) मुद्देजात (मायादीनामपि नयनात्) सन्नाथे (आहारोपु  
 ष्यादि वद्वा समुदायनात्) नयनिसाधन । उदान (उर्ध्वं नयनात्) कण्ठदेशस्थो बाल  
 (नर्हमिदं) मयदासिधय ॥ The five वायु are also named differently as  
 follows, उद्गरे वायु आसुषाण ह्यम उमीरने मृत । इतर एव कयो जयो देवदूतो (विष्णुमणे ॥  
 न जहाति मृत चापि सर्वपापी धनजय ॥) The वायुसर्गः is found in बह्वृकोत्तर.

(52) The author now describes the उत्पत्तिरेवमाद्यकमं of कल्पवृक्षवृत्ति-  
 चतुष्टय, and introduces to the reader the well known atomic theory of  
 the Vaiśeṣika. We find in this world that a thing is made up of its  
 parts, the parts are made up of their own individual parts and so  
 forth. Dividing these parts further and further we come to the  
 smallest visible part (of the size of the particle of dust in the sun's  
 rays coming through the window) which may be called a अणुः  
 whose parts are the अणुः, (made up of three अणुः, or three परमाणुः)  
 The अणुः is made up of two परमाणुः which have no parts. For we  
 must stop in this process of dividing, otherwise there would be अनन्तता  
 (no exception can be taken to this reasoning of the Vaiśeṣikas, a  
 modern scientist no doubt would be able to see even a millionth part  
 of the particle of dust in the sun's ray, with his powerful microscope,  
 but even he must come to a point when further division is im-  
 possible) To Kanada, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, these  
 atoms were the beginning and the end all of life and he is reported to have  
 died with 'Tilavah Tilavah' (Til means an atom) on his lips. God (the  
 Vaiśeṣikas are not atheists, though Kanada does not expressly refer  
 to God in his sūtras) wills there should be action in the atoms and  
 two atoms coming together form a अणुः, (here the परमाणुः are the  
 सप्तविंशति, परमाणुसंज्ञक the अनन्तविकारण and अष्ट त्रिदिव्यवृत्तयः) three  
 अणुः (there is some difference of opinion as regards these details,  
 but it may be ignored here) form a अणुः, four अणुः form a अणुः  
 and in this way, gross earth, gross water, gross tejas, and gross vayu  
 are formed. The atoms have their own viśeṣas and can therefore be  
 distinguished from one another. At the time of प्रवृत्त, when God wills  
 that the creation should be destroyed, the परमाणुः begin to move away  
 from one another. The two परमाणुः that had formed the अणुः move

away (thus there is the destruction of the परमाणुसङ्घ which is the असमवायिकारण of द्रव्य) and the द्रव्य is no more the destruction of the द्रव्य (which are the समवायिकारण of the -द्रव्य) causes the destruction of the -द्रव्य and so on. According to the traditionalists द्रव्य is destroyed by the असमवायिकारणनाश, and all further creation is destroyed by the समवायिकारणनाश (This is the view referred to in the passage beginning with क्वचित् in line 10) The moderns hold that all द्रव्यनाश is caused by the असमवायिकारणनाश (This is the view of Kesavamisra). The ordinary द्रव्य causes स्रक्वायद्रव्य-वचन while the महाप्रलय causes स्रक्वाय-वचन. It would be seen that the order of विनाश given above is the same as the order of उदय. Now this is quite absurd and opposed to all common sense. The विनाशक्रम should be exactly the reverse of the उत्पत्तिक्रम you gradually commence undoing the things as finally formed at the time of destroying it. A घट is first broken into खण्ड, then these खण्ड are further broken into smaller bits and ultimately we go to the द्रव्य. One does not start at the द्रव्य, and supposing one did start like that where would the remaining घट stand when the द्रव्य is destroyed? It might be said that it would topple down like a house of cards all of a sudden but this way of destruction is opposed to all experience (Sankaracarya in his Bhasya on the Vedanta-sutras (II 3 14) says विषयवशं तु मूलवक्रमेण उपनिषत्क्रमेण विनाशमहति तथाहि लाके दृश्यते येन क्रमेण सोपानमा रुद्धस्ततो विपरीतेन क्रमजायते इति ।) The modern Naiyayikas by favouring the असमवायिकारणनाश throughout seem to hold the common sense view about the विनाशक्रम.

6. The Vaisheshika theory of atoms resembles considerably the atomic theory of Greek philosophers. Democritus believed in atoms possessing size movement etc. The Vaisheshika atoms are possessed of rupa etc. in addition. Empedocles and Anaxagoras like Kanada regarded mind also as atomic. Sankaracarya (see his Bhasya on the Vedanta-sutras II 2 11, 15) denounces this atomic theory with all his philosophical acumen showing how the first kriya in atoms is impossible, how the atoms cannot possibly be possessed of visesas etc.

The qualities रूप etc. of a product are produced by the qualities of the कारण, and they are destroyed either by the destruction of their substratum or by the appearance of contrary qualities, due to heat etc.

(53) The existence of atoms is proved by अनुमान. Everything that is a वायद्रव्य is necessarily produced by a द्रव्य of lesser magnitude and that महद्द्रव्यकार्मुक is a वाय in its turn so proceeding in this way we come to the द्रव्य (the smallest component part) and the द्रव्य is composed of still smaller parts which are called परमाणु which are

अत्रापि ( Line 9 )— अत्र पक्षेण — The objector says — How can you say that the atom is not a product, because if you said so, the general rule that a component of a product must itself be a product, would be violated?— This is answered by saying that if an atom were regarded as a product, there would result an endless series of products. And in that case, the mountain Meru ( or Sumera ) and a mustard seed would come to be regarded as of similar dimension *being equally the products of infinite component parts*. So this series of component parts must stop somewhere. The product where it stops, is the पक्षेण

The Meru ( or Sumera ) is a fabulous golden mountain, the highest of all mountains, round which the sun and the stars are supposed to revolve

( Line 13 )— The author now shows how अणुः is composed of two atoms only, and the पक्षेण of three अणुः only

अणुः is composed of two atoms only. One atom cannot obviously produce a अणुः there is no reason to suppose that three atoms are required for that purpose. So two atoms may be regarded as sufficient to produce a अणुः. The परिमाण of a अणुः is अणुः ( and अणुः ), the परिमाण of a अणुः is अणुः ( and अणुः ) as the अणुः is the smallest thing visible. The परिमाण of an अणुः is said to be परिमाणः

( Line 14 )— अणुः The question is what is the minimum number of अणुः required to produce the dimension in a अणुः. It must be remembered that the dimension of a अणुः is of an altogether different nature from that of a अणुः. The अणुः dimension in a अणुः is either produced from the अणुः dimension of the अणुः or the number of the producing factors ( or from अवयवित्वात् अणुः, अणुः, अणुः—Vaiśeṣika-sūtra VII 19 ) as circumstances permit. Now

( 1 ) One अणुः cannot obviously produce a अणुः

( 2 ) Two अणुः cannot produce a अणुः either. For the अणुः dimension in a अणुः cannot be produced by the अणुः dimension of the अणुः, which is of a different nature. Thus the dimension of a अणुः is अणुः, the dimension of two अणुः would be अणुः, instead of अणुः. So we fall back upon the अवयवित्वात् for the production of the dimension of a अणुः. The अणुः have to be अणुः to produce a अणुः

( 3 ) अणुः means any number greater than two. So we fix upon three ( which is the minimum number to make up अणुः ) as the number of अणुः required to produce a अणुः



(54) शब्दगुणम्—शब्द is the विशयगुण of आकाश, to emphasise this, the word गुण is used in the definition (अथ गुणरूपमाकाशे शब्द एव विशेषगुण इति श्लोकवचनं न त्वतिव्याप्त्यवधारणाय । समवायेन शब्दत्वमात्रस्य सम्बन्धत्वात्—दायकोपिनी ) Other definitions of आकाश are शब्दसमवायिकारणम्, सगोमात्रजन्यजन्यविशेषगुणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकारणम्. By inference we are able to prove the existence of आकाश which being विभु is अतीन्द्रिय, शब्द पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याभिनन् अष्टद्रव्यानाभितत्य सति समवायिकारणत्वात् । यन्नैव तन्नैव यथा रूपम् । It can be easily shown that शब्द cannot have the eight द्रव्य, पृथिवी and others, as its substratum, so a ninth द्रव्य आकाश must be supposed to exist. Others prove the existence of आकाश by arguing that stars and other heavenly bodies must have a resort which is आकाश. According to the Sāṃkhyaसिद्धमगादिदर्शनम् is आकाशाधुपायक (Lane 10)धेरे प्रमाणाभावात्, the divisions घटाकाश, पत्राकाश etc are due to the उपाधि विभु-सर्वभूतद्रव्यसंयोगित्वम् विभुत्वम्, । सुखं परीच्छन्परिमाणस्य क्रियावच्च वा । (तदुदीरिका) विचरन्—because all विभु things are necessarily eternal. The reading प्रवक्तव्यत्वे परिशेष gives a more or less cumbersome definition of परिशेष—When it is denied that a thing resides in certain objects out of a number of objects in which it is sure to reside, it follows that it must reside in the remainder on account of the impossibility of its remaining anywhere else. The conclusion thus arrived at, is called परिशेष (Lane 4)—सायन्त्यवच्च सति प्राकृत्य is the definition of a विशयगुण—रूपवादी व्यभिचार वासयितुं नयन्वम् । एक-द्रव्यप्राकृत्यं चकन्द्रव्यमात्रप्रकृत्यम् । नान घटादौ व्यभिचार । आत्मनि च्चमि चार वासयितुं प्राकृत्यति । ( श्लोकवचन ) जन्मदादि is put in to exclude yogins who are possessed of marvellous power.

(55) काल—Time (अ दिव्यव रिवन्तीतादवत्यापर कालमवायिकारणाधार परत्वावस्थावधिकुणकाल ।) अतीन्द्रियत्ववद्वाहेतु (the definition in the तर्कसंग्रह) cannot be regarded as a definition of काल, it only expresses in a popular manner the idea about time इत्यु must be taken here to mean 'a special cause,' for all our cognitions are based upon conceptions of time and space विभुत्वे सति दिनसमवेदपरत्वास्तमानाधिकारणाधिकारणम् would be a technically correct but practically useless definition of काल एक—The three-fold nature of काल, past, present and future, is due to उपाधि. According to the Sāṃkhyaसकाल is to be included in आकाश, others regard काल as identical with ईश्वर the different क्षण being different from him. According to the Naiyāyikas काल is अतीन्द्रिय, the followers of Prabhākara regard it as अतीन्द्रियत्व

(56) दिक्—space, other definitions of दिक् are—अकाशे समविशेषगुणमहती, विभुत्वे सति देशत्वः । अकारणमवायिकारणसंयोगावस्थाधुपायिकृत्य दिक्त्वम्, । आदिव-सर्वयोगानु साधनत्व परत्वावस्थाविकारणाधार परत्वावस्थाविकारण दिक् Space is the cause of the notion of देशक nearness or distance ( दूरात्प्रादुर्भावेन ) काल is नियतक्रियाक्षय-व्ययक, that is, its divisions are fixed (what is present

time for one is at the present time for another living at that time) but दिग् is अनियते/पादुगुणविका (for an object which is to the right of one, may be to the left of another person, or of himself if he turns about) Strictly speaking, there is no necessity of admitting both आकाश and दिग् as द्रव्य. Why should not आकाश be regarded as capable of showing direction in addition to its being समवेत् with द्रव्य? The Vaiśeṣikas apparently admitted both as आकाश could not be ignored being one of the five well known elements and दिग् could not be ignored as the notion of space is as old as the hills. आकाश is one of the five material elements, has a special quality द्रव्य and thus has an objective existence, while दिग् is not an element has no special quality is the कारण cause of all effects does the work of showing direction and is to be perceived by the mind द्रव्य—Though one दिग् owing to उपाधिभेद is regarded as four fold ( प्राची पश्चीमी उत्तरीची and दक्षिणी the four main quarters ) or ten fold ( प्राची उत्तरीची पश्चीमी दक्षिणी आसानी वैश्वानरी वायवी वेदान्त the four by quarters, इत्यादि and अष्ट these are also named दिग्बन्धनविह्वलद्रव्य as पञ्चदश, पञ्चदशी द्वाव्या वैश्वानरी वायवी वायव्य द्वावशी वेदान्त, वायवी and वायवी ) or eleven fold ( with the addition of वैश्वानरी )

(57) See section 44 above सत्त्वाद्यम्—सत्त्व परमाणुम्, रूपवत्त्वं, सत्त्वम् and त्रिषण

(58) मनस-म-वने ज्ञान इति मन , मयराहत व सति क्रियावत्त्व मनस लक्षणम् It is not clear why the author says मयाभिसम्पन्नवत् instead of मनस नामान्यवत् Though the all-pervading Ātman is always in contact with the various इंद्रियाणि, we do not have their ज्ञान always (for instance, in deep sleep) this shows that there must be some other factor essential for the production of ज्ञान and that is मनम् ( आकाशिय पक्ष वैश्वानरी ज्ञानस्य भावो भावस्य मनसो लिङ्गम् ) मनम् acts as a sort of clearing office for the various impressions for which the sense-organs are responsible. If there had been no मनम्, there would have been simultaneous knowledge through the various sense organs, which is not the case ( युक्तपञ्चानुवाजे मनसो लिङ्गम् ) मम् is निवृत्त as there is no प्रमाण to believe that it is possessed of parts. It is different for different bodies for in this way alone we can account for different cognitions in different individuals. As regards its वृत्ते, it is atomic. It cannot be मध्यमपरमाणु, for in that case it would be अविनश्य. As it is निवृत्त, it can either be विद्युत् or अणुपरमाणु (for विद्युत् and अणुपरमाणु things are always निवृत्त). We shall now show why मनस can not be विद्युत्. It has already been mentioned that according to the Vaiśeṣikas, आत्मन् comes into contact with मनम् ( आत्मा यत्नात् सद्भुवनम् ) before any cognition can be had. Ātman is definitely known to be विद्युत्, in order to make a contact between आत्मन् and मनम् possible, मनम् must

not be विबु, for how can there be a contact between two all-pervading things? मनस् therefore must be taken to be अणु, so that आत्ममन सयोग, the असमवायिकाण्य of ज्ञान may exist. If we admit the सयोग of two विबु things, then आत्मन् and मनस् would always be connected together and there would be no सुषुप्ति (where मनस् lies low and there is a cessation of knowledge). If on the other hand, मनस् is taken to be अणुपरिमाण, सुषुप्ति becomes possible when the atomic मनस् enters the पुरित्त् वेन (somewhere near the heart) where the आत्ममन सयोग comes to an end. Cognition arises when मनस् comes out of the पुरित्त् वेन. This is obviously a very weak argument of the Vaiśeṣikas. For, if Ātman is विबु, how can we assert that आत्ममन सयोग ceases in the पुरित्त् वेन? The all-pervading आत्मन् cannot surely be prevented from entering the पुरित्त् वेन. The cessation of knowledge is due to the absence of इन्द्रियमन सयोग, rather than of आत्ममन सयोग. But in that case there ought to be cessation of knowledge in dreams where also there is no इन्द्रियमन सयोग. Thus there is difficulty both ways. At any rate, the Vaiśeṣikas are right in arguing that there could not be any contact between two विबु things and so all things considered मनस् should be taken to be atomic in size. मनस् is the internal sense-organ. It is not प्रत्यक्ष, but अनुपेय. The Mīmāṃsākas regard मनस् to be विबु and the Vedāntins take it to be सत्त्वविकृतमहत्तुल्यमज्ञानरूपम्.

(Lane 3)—सहस्राष्टदण्डवत्—The eight quantities are सव्य, अणुपरिमाणम्, दृष्यस्वप्न, सयोग, विमाण, परत्वम्, अपरत्वम्, and वेग. Others say, दण्डवत्सहस्राष्टो पञ्च वेगश्च मानसे.

(59) गुणः are twenty-four. A गुणः is इदं च विदितं विदितं विदितं सिद्धं चतुर्ष्वपि (Kāvāprakāśa II). The Tarka-Dīpikā defines गुणः as द्रव्यरहितं तत्रे यदि सत्त्वव्यवत् (we shall see later how सत्त्वव्यवत् can only reside in द्रव्य, गुण and रसम्, so the expression द्रव्यरहितं तत्रे सति excludes द्रव्य and रसम् and the definition applies to गुण only) or गुणरजनिमान्. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras say द्रव्याभ्यन्तरेण (having द्रव्य as its substratum and having no qualities, for if गुण were to be possessed of गुणः there would be अनवस्था) सत्त्वव्यवत् (this expression excludes रसम् which is नो द्रव्याभ्यन्तरेण and अणुवत्, for क्रिया is the cause of सयोग and विमाण) इति सत्त्वव्यवत्. The sūtras give only seventeen Guṇas, हवस्य-धर्मज्ञान-मत्वा-परिमाण-विबु-व-सयोग-परिमाण-व-दृश्य-सुप्त-व-इन्द्रिय-व-प्रत्यक्ष-गुणः. According to the commentators the ४ in द्रव्याभ्यन्तरेण is meant to imply the seven गुणः व, द्रव्य, रसम्, दृश्य, धर्म, अर्थ and सव्य that are not expressly mentioned by name. Some add to the list the following:—लघु-व (which is but दृश्यव्यवत्), हृद्य-व and कठिन-व (which are but अर्थव्यवत्-विदितं) and मत्वा-व (which is but परिमाणव्यवत्), but it is not necessary

to recognise them as separate *gūṇa* and the number of *gūṇa* may be said to be twenty-four only. Of these *सम्बन्धा* is three-fold (वेग मापना स्थितिव्यवहारकश्चेति) and द्रव्य two-fold (सांख्यिक and भौतिक). These twenty-four *Gūṇa*s can be classified in various ways. Thus (साधनेश, p 263)

- (I) (i) *सूतृगुणा* —स्वप्न, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, पातम्, अपातम्, पुरुषम्, द्रव्यम्, स्नेह, वेग and स्थितिव्यवहारक (11)  
 (ii) *असूतृगुणा* —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्म, अधर्म, भावना and शब्द (10)  
 (iii) *सूतृसूतृगुणा* —सव्या, परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग and विभाग (5)
- (II) (i) *अवेकाभिना* —सयोग, विभाग, द्वैतचित्ता समाया, द्वैतव्यवहारक,  
 (ii) *एकाभिना* —तद्विद्या विद्या ।
- (III) (i) *विशेषगुणा* —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्म, अधर्म, स्वप्न, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, स्नेह, सांख्यिक-द्रव्यम्, भावना and शब्द (16) बुद्ध्यादिपञ्चक स्वभावा स्नेह सांख्यिकी द्रव्य । अदृष्टभावात्तद्व्यवहारकौ वैशेषिका गुणा ।  
 (ii) *सामान्यगुणा* —सव्या, परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग, विभाग, पातम्, अपातम्, भौतिकद्रव्यम्, पुरुषम् and वेग (10) समायादिवत्तन्ते द्रव्ये भौतिकव्यवहारकौ सामान्यगुणा एते पर्यायिनौ ॥
- (IV) (i) *द्वैतद्वेषगुणा* —सव्या परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग, विभाग, पञ्चम्, अपातम्, द्रव्यम्, स्नेह, वेग and स्थितिव्यवहारक (11)  
 (ii) *सांख्यिकद्वेषगुणा* —स्वप्न, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द (5)  
 (iii) *असांख्यिकद्वेषगुणा* —पुरुषम्, धर्म, अधर्म and भावना (4)  
 (iv) *अन्वयित्वेषगुणा* —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न (6)
- (V) (i) *अकारणगुणोपपत्ता* —बुद्ध्याद्यद्यत्कम्, भावना and शब्द (10)  
 (ii) *कारणगुणोपपत्ता* —अकारण स्वप्नसंयोग, अनुपपत्ता स्वप्न, अकारण द्रव्यम्, स्नेहवेगपुरुषत्वैक्येन, पृथक्त्वम्, परिमाणम् and स्थितिव्यवहारक

For further interesting details about the characteristics of different *gūṇa*, see *साधनेश*. A *सूतृगुणा* is one which resides in a *सूतृ* or corporeal substance. A *सामान्यगुणा* can exist in two or more *द्रव्या* at one and the same time, while a *विशेषगुणा* can exist in one *द्रव्य* only at one time. The *साधनेश* gives in the following verses how the various *gūṇa*s exist in the nine *द्रव्या* *संज्ञाद्विबोद्धी वेगाद्यव्यवहारकौ चतस्रो गुणा । एते एतद्वाद्या स्व द्रव्ये वेगस्य वेजाति ॥ (संज्ञाद्विबोद्धी वेगस्य पुरुषस्य च द्रव्यत्वकम् । स्व सम्भवया स्नेहो कारणवेदे चतस्रो ॥ स्नेहद्विना गन्धयुक्त स्थितिवि चतस्रो ॥ बुद्ध्यादिपञ्चक साम्यादिपञ्चक भावना तथा ॥ घनसर्वो गुणा एत आत्मन इन्द्रियवर्षा ॥ सम्बन्धादिपञ्चक कारणविशी शब्दस्य ते च स्व ॥ समायादिव*

पञ्च शुद्धिर्गुणः यः नाऽपि चैवरे । परापरत्वसह्ययाया पञ्च वेगथ मनस ॥ The Advaitav-  
dantins regard the गुणः as being अविन्न from द्रव्य

(60) रूपम्—With this section Kesavanamisra commences the  
लक्षणपरिचय of the गुणः रूपम् is usually defined as चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्तो गुणः—The  
word मात्र in the definition is necessary to exclude सह्यया which is  
चक्षुर्मात्र but not चक्षुः मात्र यः as it can be perceived by the त्वग्निन्द्रिय as well  
If the definition had been only चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्तः, it would extend to रूपम् as  
well for it is a well-known rule that तेनेन्द्रियेण यदृश्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण नद्वन्द्वं  
साक्षात् नद्वन्द्वं समाया नद्वन्द्वं अभावत्र पृथगतः So to exclude रूपम् we put in गुणः  
Still the definition चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्तो गुणः is not correct for प्रभाभित्तसयोग would  
be covered by it, to exclude that the definition should be amended as  
चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्तमिदं गुणः or चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्तो विशेषगुणः (सह्यया or सयोग is not a विशेषगुणः,  
if we say विशेषगुणः, then the word मात्र is not necessary for excluding  
सह्यया but is necessary for excluding ज्ञानमात्रवृत्तिसाक्षात्कृतम् च) तेनेन्द्रियेण यदृश्यते  
द्वन्द्वं नद्वन्द्वं साक्षात् नद्वन्द्वं समाया नद्वन्द्वं अभावत्र पृथगतः सतोविषयं चित्ररूपं is objected to by some The  
objector says it is not necessary to admit चित्ररूपं at all, रूपम् should be  
only six-fold For what after all is चित्ररूपं? It is a mixture of different  
colours When we have perceived the different colours, we surely  
have the idea of चित्ररूपं To this argument the siddhantin gives the  
following reply—It is a rule that the रूपम् of an object must cover the  
whole of the object and then we shall be able to perceive that object  
by means of this व्याप्यवृत्ति रूपम् Take the case of a piece of cloth which  
has, say, four colours, white, red, yellow and green Now the white  
colour would enable us to perceive only that portion which is covered  
by it, similar is the case with the other colours If we do not admit  
चित्ररूपं as a distinct रूपम् we shall perceive only different portions covered  
up by the different colours and would not have any idea of the वस्तु as a  
whole In other words the वस्तु as a whole (not the वस्तु as made up of  
different portions) would not be perceived at all If to avoid this  
difficulty, we say that a thing is perceived not because it is possessed  
of रूपम् (of course वस्तुम्) but because it is in intimate union with things  
that are possessed of रूपम् (a चित्ररूपं is in intimate union with its parts  
that are individually possessed of different colours, and so ought to be  
perceived, according to the change suggested), the चित्ररूपं can be per-  
ceived without the admission of a चित्ररूपं But what is gained by this  
change which involves गौरव and which makes matters unnecessarily  
complicated? Is it not simpler to admit चित्ररूपं and have done with  
the whole problem? The परमाणुमदरूपं is not प्रत्यक्ष For the चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्त  
of रूपम्, four factors are necessary—महत्परिमाण (hence परमाणुमदरूपं is not  
प्रत्यक्ष), वस्तुम् (the चक्षुर्मात्रप्राप्त रूपम् being अनद्वन्द्वं is not प्रत्यक्ष), अनभिधुनत्वम्



Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold quite different views as to how these *पारुजगुण*s are produced. The Vaiśeṣikas are called *पीडु-* (पीडित परमाणव) पाकवादिन्स, because they hold that it is the परमाणुs that are baked. Thus the application of heat causes a commotion in the atoms which become separated, and their contact—the non-intimate cause—being destroyed, the products *ग्रणुक* etc are destroyed. The whole black jar is destroyed and the atoms become baked and a new रूप (redness), गन्ध etc are created in them. Then these परमाणुs with the new qualities come together to form *ग्रणुक* etc and ultimately the new red jar is produced. The *पीडुवाक्वादिन्स* maintain that fire can not penetrate into the thick jar to create a new रूप which must be supposed to be created by the रूप of the परमाणुs which alone are fit to be operated upon by fire. It is easy to see the flaws in the above argument. Where does the *घट* stay when the परमाणुs get separated? If a new *घट* is created, how are we to account for the fact that we continue to recognise the *घट* to be the same old one though somewhat changed? The Vaiśeṣikas do try to answer these objections, but their answers are dogmatic and unconvincing. The Naiyāyikas are *विटरपाकवादिन्स* (*विटर* means कार्यकारणमनुदाय, अवयवावयविसमुदाय) and take a more sensible view of the matter. Their view is as follows—The jar is *सच्छिड*, hence fire can easily penetrate into it. The old jar is not destroyed, but fire acts upon the parts of the jar, right up to the परमाणुs, and changes their रूप. Thus as the old *घट* for all practical purposes remains in tact, we are able to recognise it.

(Line 5)—इते च सत्त्वाद्य . महत्त्वेन सह एकैर्घटादिरूपे समवेतत्वे. What this sentence means is that these four qualities must be developed (or manifested) and must inhere in an object possessed of magnitude, in order to become directly perceptible. The sentence is intended to show that these qualities, when they belong to atoms, and the *नेजस* colour of the sense of sight, are not perceived, because, in the former case, they reside in objects that do not possess magnitude, and in the latter case, the colour is *अनुद्भूत* (unmanifested or undeveloped).

(64) सत्त्वा—एकत्वादिद्वयव्यवहारहेतु is hardly a definition of सत्त्वा हेतु is used here in the sense of असत्धारणकारण. The Mīmāṃsākas regarded सत्त्वा as a separate *वदार्थ* सत्त्वा is perceived by *त्वम्* as well as by *बहु*. It is thus a सामान्यगुण एकरुव belonging to *निरय* is said to be *निरय*, and *द्वित्वादि* is अनित्य everywhere. From the passage *द्विव अयमे* it is clear that Kesavamisra had clearly grasped the nature of duality etc which are merely phenomenal, being based upon *अवेसातुद्धि*. Unity alone is real and eternal, everything else is mere relative. Thus the

idea of two can be grasped when we understand one twice, it has no independent existence. All numbers can be shown to be based upon इत्थं which alone has no relative existence, *pace* Dr Einstein अपेक्षावृद्धि-अनेकैकत्ववृद्धिर्थां सपेक्षा बुद्धिश्चक्षते—the notion which refers to many unities is called relative notion. When we see two things, the idea of their duality does not at once arise in our mind. We first apprehend the two things separately in the form 'this is one, this is one.' (इत्थं कम्, इत्थेभ्यम्) This notion which refers to many unities is called अपेक्षावृद्धिः. It is this combined notion of two unities that produces the conception of duality and then we realise the things as being two. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold different views regarding the nature of द्विग, the former hold that it is अपेक्षावृद्धिज्ञाय, and the latter अपेक्षावृद्धिजन्य.

(65) परिमाणम्-परिमाणजननिमित्तम् मानव्यवहार-इत्यवित्तमादिव्यवहार or मान परिमिति नरव यो व्यवहार इव फल इवम् अणु इत्याद्या मरु । त्रिपुराणि 13 परमाणुः, the परिमाण of an अणु is अणुत्व and that of 3 परमाणु is परिमाणजन्य निर्यात परिमाण 13 नि य, अन्वित्यवतपरिमाण 13 अन्वित्य अन्वि-परिमाण is three fold, मन्व्याज-परम्, परिमाणान्तम् मन्वज-य च । तत्रायम् परमाणुद्वि रजन्म अणुः । अणुत्ववृद्धिरजन्म च अणुके । द्वितीयं च फलपरिमाणजन्य चरपरिमाणम् । तृतीयम् तूलाव्यवहारव्यवहारय तूलपरिमाण-परिमाणम् । The Sāṃkhya and the Vedāntins do not regard द्विगत्व and द्विगत्व as separate परिमाणः

(66) पृथक्त्वम्-अथोद्भास्यव्यवहारकारणम्-The Mīmāṃsākas regard पृथक्त्वम् as identical with अन्योन्याभावः पृथक्त्वम् is different from अन्योन्याभावः, as the latter simply says that one thing is not another, but the former positively says that one thing is distinct from another अन्यो-यानाम् may tell us that घट is not घटत्व and vice versa, but पृथक्त्वम् would say that घट is distinct from घटत्व. The notions conveyed by अन्योन्याभावः and पृथक्त्वम् are different

(67) संयोग-—तदुक्तव्यवहारद्वेष्ट, the तदर्थीरिति says that the expression अष्टापरवद्वेष्ट should be used to exclude the सप्तमसंयोगः (there are eight, ईश्वर तदुक्तव्यवहारय मागवान् काल द्विग अद्वैतम् (पञ्चमै), प्रतिवचनमात्रव्यवहार in addition, according to some) The relation between two युतसिद्धः (the relation between the अणुसिद्धः is समकार) is संयोग संयोग is कर्मज and संयोगज, कर्मज again is two fold (1) अक्षरकर्मज, the contact between a vulture and a mountain, (2) उभयकर्मज, the contact between two wrestlers or rats संयोगज is अवयवसंयोगजय, इत्यद्वैतकर्मवशात् सप्तमः संयोगः (this might arise from one, two or many अवयवः) संयोगः is अन्वयवृद्धिः (that is, reaching only in a part of the thing, not covering up the whole object) or स्वात्मनाभावसहमानविरुद्धः (having the same abode as that of its absolute negation)



( 68 ) विभाग — विभक्त-व्यवहारमाधारणकारणम् would be a better definition, emphasizing the positive nature of विभाग Some do not regard विभाग as a separate गुण, calling it merely स्यात्तन्नाश Like सदेग, विभाग is कमज ( अन्यतरुमज, —द्वेषवशैल्योर्विभाग, उमयत्तमज, —मेषयोर्विभाग ) and विभागज ( कारणमात्रविभागजस्य, —कपालद्वयविभागात् करालयुवदेशविभाग, कारणकारणविभागजय —हस्तयुक्तविभागात् काययुक्तविभाग ) The Naiyayikas do not recognise thus विभागजविभाग, the Vaisesikas do

( 69 ) परत्वापरत्व—द्विकृतपरत्वापरत्व resides in गूढद्रव्य, कालकृतपरत्वापरत्व in ज्ञानद्रव्य स्थिति-व is पर-व with reference to time, विप्रकृतत्व is परत्व with reference to space

( 70 ) गुरुत्व—अस्य in the definition is put in to exclude वेग which is the असम-व्यवहारण of द्वितीयवस्तु पतनम्—अधोदेशसवैमानुभूत्ये व्यापार । The Vaisesikas obviously were ignorant of the notion of gravity, but they evidently knew that the initial पतन was not caused by वेग etc, and accounted for it by postulating the existence of the गुरुत्व quality गुरुत्व is अत्यय Some Naiyayikas consider it to be a राशिविशेष संयोगवेग, the Vaisesikasūtra is सम्कारणवे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ( V 1 7 )—The conjunction of the fruit and the stalk, the velocity of an arrow, and the conscious effort of the bird prevent the fruit, the arrow and the bird respectively from falling, and in their absence the falling is due to gravity

( 71 ) द्रवत्वम्—वेग would be the असमवायिकारण of द्वितीयस्व-पतन नैसर्गिकम् natural not caused by अ-धोदेशवेग In hail and snow there is नैसर्गिक ( or सान्निधिक ) द्रवत्व only lying low owing to excessive cold नैसर्गिक due to तत्र स्यात्

( 72 ) स्नेह —स्नेहत्वजातेमात्रं युग, it is the विशेषयुग of water स्नेह is two-fold प्रकृतस्नेह and अवकृतस्नेह, the former is found in oily substances

( 73 ) शब्द —शब्द resides in आकाश only and is perceived by only श्रोत्र It exists only for three moments and is अनिय According to the Samkhyas and Vedantins, शब्द resides in all the five elements According to our author शब्द is three-fold ( 1 ) सयोगज, भेरीदण्डसयोगजय ( 2 ) विभागज, वक्ष इ-शब्दमाने द्वाद्द्वयविभागज-वधत्तुगशब्द ( 3 ) शब्दज, भेरीदिदेशमात्रय श्रोत्रवस्तु द्वितीयदिशाश्च According to others these three varieties con titute the स्वया मरुशब्द which should be distinguished from वग मरु शब्द ( मरुहृतमावादिष्य अजातद्विर्जलजग ) Another division of शब्द is ( I ) बुद्धिहेतुक which is sub-divided into ( 1 ) सामानिक वगदिशानामेवमत्रको इमित्त्वदिगारूप, ( 11 ) कालानिक —( 1 ) वायादिशब्द, ( 2 ) गन्धस्व, ( 3 ) वग मरु and ( II ) अबुद्धिहेतुक भेरीदिशब्द वगामरुशब्द is also further sub-divided

into हृदय and शिखर The शब्दजगत् is admitted in order to account for the perception of शब्द produced at a distance. A drum is sounded at a distance, how are we able to hear the sound? The चक्षुर्द्रिय is able to perceive a jar by actually going to and coming into contact with it. But the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय cannot go to the distant sound, for the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is nothing but आकाश conditioned by the cavity of the ear, and if the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय leaves its resort, it would be no better than ordinary आकाश. So if the mountain does not go to Mahomet, Mahomet must go to the mountain. The distant sound must go to the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय in order that it might be perceived. There are two views as to how this sound reaches the ear. One view (which follows the शीघ्रगच्छ-वाद) is as follows — The first शब्द of the drum produces a second शब्द (which is दशदिग्वय विद्यमान) this second शब्द produces a similar third शब्द and so on till it reaches the ear, just as one wave in the sea produces another wave which in turn produces a third wave and so on till the shore is reached. Another view (following the चक्षुर्द्रिय-वाद) says that just as the buds of the Kadamba tree blossom forth all of a sudden the first शब्द produces not one sound, but ten sounds in the ten directions which themselves ultimately reach the ear without producing similar sounds. According to the first view what the ear actually perceives is only a similar शब्द, which may even be thousand times removed from the first शब्द while according to the second view it appears that we are able to hear just the second शब्द. The analogy of the चक्षुर्द्रिय shows that the Naiyayikas were dimly aware of the modern theory of sound being carried away by waves of air particles. Their view about the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय being अवकाश circumscribed by the ear-cavity is of course crude, modern science tells us that the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is the tympanum in the ear.

(Line 17) — इत्युद्दिश्य शीघ्रगच्छ-वाद points out that कण्ठ exists for four moments तत्राद्यस्य शब्दः। Let us suppose that a particular श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय has produced 100 शब्दः before the sound is heard by the ear (श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय सर्व-शब्दः-शब्दः-शब्दः शब्द<sub>10</sub> शब्द<sub>20</sub> शब्द<sub>30</sub> शब्द<sub>40</sub> शब्द<sub>50</sub> शब्द<sub>60</sub> शब्द<sub>70</sub> शब्द<sub>80</sub> शब्द<sub>90</sub> शब्द<sub>100</sub>-शब्दः) The objector says that शब्द<sub>2</sub> destroys शब्द<sub>1</sub>, शब्द<sub>3</sub> destroys शब्द<sub>2</sub>, and so forth till the 99th शब्द, the 99th शब्द and 100th शब्द mutually destroy each other, that is the 99th शब्द destroys the 100th and the 100th शब्द destroys the 99th like हनूयोरुद्द (हनु and उपहनु were two demon-brothers who loved each other most and together proved a terror to the gods and to the world. Brahmadeva, in order to create dissension between them, created the most lovely Aparas Tilottama and sent her to them. Both of them fell in love with her, grew jealous on her account and ultimately killed each other). The author points out that the objector's view is wrong as it is physically

impossible for both the 99th and 100th शब्द to exist till they are destroyed together. For a शब्द can exist only for three moments. When the 99th शब्द is in its third moment, ready to be destroyed, the 100th शब्द being in its second moment of existence, has yet one more moment to live and can not be destroyed for one more moment. The 100th शब्द can not be destroyed in its third moment by the 99th शब्द which cannot be in existence at that time. So we shall have to suppose that the 100th शब्द is destroyed by the destruction of the 99th शब्द and not by the 99th शब्द (According to some, शब्द exists for two moments only and not three, but this does not affect the main argument)

(Lane 22)—विनाशित्व च The destructibility of शब्द can be proved by the following syllogism—शब्द अनियः । सामा यदवने सति अस्मद्द्विकोटोद्भिव प्राह्यत्वात्; षट्पत्; (Incidentally, अनिय-व is explained as 'having a nature liable to destruction' and not 'having भावरूप ( or सत्तत्त्वोन् ) liable to destruction. For, if अनिय-व meant having भावरूप liable to destruction' प्रागभाव which is acknowledged to be अनिय-व by all would not be अनिय-व, as प्रागभाव has अय-वरूप and so the definition would not be applicable to it. But प्रागभाव has a nature liable to destruction, hence the definition विनाशावच्छिन्नत्वम् would cover it.) The author now points out how each and every word in the हेतु सामान्यवन्ने is significant. If the हेतु is simply इन्द्रियप्राह्यत्वात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य इन्द्रियप्राह्य स स अनिय-व,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, as आमन् is इन्द्रियप्राह्य (mind which cognises Ātman is also an इन्द्रिय, the internal sense organ), but निय-व. So we must amend the हेतु

If the हेतु is बाह्येन्द्रियप्राह्यत्वात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य बाह्येन्द्रियप्राह्य स स अनिय-व,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, as बाह्येन्द्रियप्राह्य ( by the yogins ), but निय-व. So the हेतु requires still further emendation [ this is rather hypercritical for in all our arguments, we tactfully rule out of order all extraordinary or supernatural considerations ]

If the हेतु is अस्मद्द्विकोटोद्भिवप्राह्यत्वात् the व्याप्ति would be

य य अस्मद्द्विकोटोद्भिवप्राह्य स स अनिय-व,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, for सामान्य is अस्मद्द्विकोटोद्भिवप्राह्य ( according to the rule येनेन्द्रियस्य यद् वृत्तये etc see section 60 above) but निय-व. So we add सामान्यवन्ने सति this effectually shuts out सामान्य, for सामान्य-व has no further व्याप्ति

Thus the हेतु, सामान्यवन्ने सति अस्मद्द्विकोटोद्भिवप्राह्यत्वात्, is an unobjectionable हेतु

(Line 32)—योगिनोऽपि ज्ञानात्—Atoms are knowable things, we might not be able to see them, but there must be some who are able to do that and they are yogins, gods etc

(Line 36)—साक्षात्प्राप्तित्वम्—साक्षात्, तिर्यक् and सव्याय (and अग्र्य) have no सामान्य See section 85

(74)—See section 87. The passage वेदी is not read in some manuscripts. As Kesavamitra has not directly mentioned ह्यत् under Ātman (as the तर्कसंग्रह, for instance, does), this passage referring to वेदी बुद्धि appears to be suspicious

(75-76)—सुख is defined as that which is experienced as agreeable by all. This is a faulty definition. For there can be nothing in this world which is experienced as agreeable by all. Even the most unalloyed pleasure in the world will be looked down upon by a philosopher as being nothing but misery. If we therefore drop सर्वत्वम् the definition will be all right. The Tarkasamgraha gives the same definition, except that it substitutes सर्वम् for सर्वत्वम्. Annambhatta evidently knew the faulty character of his definition, for in the Śūnīra he says “सुखी अहम्” इत्यादि अद्वयवसायस्य सुखत्वादिक्रमेण लक्षणम्. This means pleasure is that after experiencing which one feels the consciousness ‘I am happy’. This criticism applies *mutatis mutandis* to the definition of दुःख as well.—The सन्नवर्णो divides सुख into two varieties सात्मिक and तर्क, defining them as ‘परमेष्ठिव्यवसायनापीन सुख सात्मिकम् । इच्छायाव चीनहापनताः, सुख तर्कम् ।’

(77)—इच्छा is explained as ह्य ( इच्छा काम, Tarkasamgraha )

(78)—हेव ११ श्लोक, section 91 gives one more synonym अ-ग

(79)—प्रयत्न is उत्साह ( ह्यत् according to तर्कसंग्रह ) The word प्रयत्न is used in the sense of conscious mental effort (the word does not mean effort in general, which is the meaning of the word in Marathi)

बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, हेव and प्रयत्न are perceived by the internal sense-organ, mind, and (together with चर्मा and अग्र्य and धारतन्त्र) are the special qualities of Ātman, because they are subjective as opposed to other qualities such as रूप, रस etc which have an objective existence

Even the most ardent admirer of Kesavamitra could hardly argue that his treatment of the above six qualities बुद्धि etc is in any way illuminating. But as they are hardly of any use to a Naiyāyika proper, they are treated with such scant courtesy

Cognition, desire and effort are non eternal in the individual soul, because they are lost when the individual soul is released

But in the case of God they are permanent Note 'बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना अस्मदादिनष्टा अनि वा दुक्ततायापितेषामुच्छेदात् । इक्षरनिष्ठा धुनर्निःश्या एव तेषा सार्धविकल्पात् ।'

(80) धम and अधम are otherwise known as गुण्य and एष Kesava-misra gives only an academical definition of धम and अधम The Tarka-samgraha gives a more useful definition, विहितकर्म-वो धम, and निषिद्धकर्म-जन्वोऽधम । विहित and निषिद्ध mean वेदविहित and वेदनिषिद्ध respectively Injunctions and prohibitions occurring in works other than the Veda such as the Smritis etc receive their authority from the Veda on which they are based They are thus included under the terms वेद-विहित and वेदनिषिद्ध विहितकर्मन्स or enjoined actions are those that are laid down by Vedic injunctions such as उमेतिहोमन स्वगृहो यजेत, अहरहृत्ना वा भक्ष्यगृह्णानि These lead to merit It may be noted by the way that according to the Naiyayikas सव्याव इत is followed by a positive effect viz दुरितनिवृत्ति Actions which bring in demerit are those that are forbidden by Vedic prohibitions such as न क्लृप्त ( flesh of a deer or any other animal struck with a poisoned weapon ) भक्षयेत्, न सुग विवेत् The reading तो चाप्रत्यक्षवदात्मनाऽदावनुमानगम्भो च is clearly an improvement upon the original passage which does not refer to आगमगम्यत्व, and for that very reason is likely to be a later emendation The शरीरादिभेदश्च must obviously have been caused by something and that something is धम and अधम ( Line 8 )— प्रयत्नाद्भूतो प्रयत्न cannot produce the शरीर, because प्रयत्न becomes possible only after the body has come into existence

( 81 ) सञ्चार is the last of the 24 qualities It has three varieties, वेग or velocity, भावना or mental impression and विवर्तिशक्ति ( सञ्चार ) or elasticity Our author does not define सञ्चार in general Its first variety वेग is defined as क्रियाहेतु The सञ्चारार्थी defines वेग as 'कर्मज सञ्चारो वेग ' When an arrow is shot from a bow, the action of discharging it produces velocity in it. So velocity is born from action Velocity resides in दृष्टिनी, अन्, तेजस्, वायु and मनस् These are सूत or corporeal substances The very idea of velocity or motion implies that its abode must be of limited dimension Hence it is natural that it resides in corporeal things which are limited An all pervading thing like ether cannot have velocity or motion

भावना or mental impression is produced by apprehension Every अनुभव that we have leaves an impression on our mind That impression is known as भावना Thus भावना is the cause of producing remembrance We perceive Devadatta today That perception leaves on our mind a certain impression which lies there in a latent state A few days afterwards we happen to see a person resembling Devadatta.

This सद्भावुभव excites or awakens the latent impression left by देवदत्त-  
दर्शन and the impression thus awakened or उद्बुद्ध produces remem-  
brance Thus भावना is स्मृतिहेतु — भावना or mental impression being of a  
subjective nature belongs naturally to soul only साहचर्यादहमित्याद्य —  
न्यायसूत्र III 2 42 gives an exhaustive list of स्मृतिर्भोजोपकरण-प्रविष्यन्निर्वा-  
प्यात्स्मिद्बलवशाद्दृश्यविहाभ्याभिनस्यचानतयवियोगिकत्वात्तत्रेति, अतिशयप्रति-  
शब्दव्यवहारसुख-  
दुःखेऽनुभवेमया र्विन्नाक्रियागणवर्माभंतिमित्येव ।

स्थितिरथापक — Supply सरकार after this स्थितिरथापक सरकार means  
elasticity It is that quality which reproduces in an object its origi-  
nal condition when that condition is disturbed The best example of  
स्थितिरथापक is a dog's tail Try to straighten it in any way you like,  
it will again assume its crooked character Kesavamisra gives the  
example of a bow When a bow is straightened, it bends back again  
This is due to its स्थितिरथापकत्व After a time the bow may lose this  
characteristic But that is a different matter The Tarka-samgraha  
gives the example of a mat स्थितिरथापक belongs to earth

These three kinds of सरकार are so different in character that it is  
difficult to discover the exact reason of their inclusion under one class  
The same fact is responsible for the difficulty of giving a general  
definition of सरकार The best definition of सरकार is given by तार्किकस्य  
viz ' यज्जातोदसमुपपन्नजन्यवशकारणम् । स्वयं च न द्विजातीयं साकारं स तुल्यं च ॥'  
This means सरकार is that quality which creates an effect similar to its  
own cause though it is itself dissimilar from that cause or effect This  
definition is applicable to all the three kinds of samskara Velocity  
is produced from action and it produces action in the arrow, though  
it is itself not of the nature of action Mental impression is produced  
from सकारण and gives rise to स्मृति which is सकारणत्व or of the same kind  
as अनुभव, both being कृत्वि But mental impression is not of the nature  
of कृत्वि स्थितिरथापक is created by the action of rolling For when  
mats are kept in a roll, they become elastic स्थितिरथापक also produces  
the action of rolling when the mat is spread But स्थितिरथापक is not  
itself of the nature of action Read ' लोकादकलजालीयमेव च स्वयं च  
गद्विजातायो गुण सरकार । यथा स्मृतिहेतु सरकार, स हि अनुभवज्ञानजन्य स्मृतिहेतुहेतु  
स्वयं न ज्ञानजातीय । यथा वा वेग कमज्ज यमहेतु स्वयं स्वयं भवति । यथा च स्थिति-  
रथापक वेदनादिकमजन्य वेदनादिकर्मकारण स्वयं च न कर्मत्वा ।' लक्ष्मणम् ०३ तार्किकस्य

(82) The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras give the same divisions of कर्मत्व as in the  
text, and define कर्मत्व as दन्तत्वमगुण (residing in one substratum and  
having no गुण, as कमज्ज by its very nature is opposed to गुण कमज्ज is सत्य  
बलुपवर्त, while गुण is सिद्धबलुपवर्त) सचोक्तविभक्तिप्रयोगकारणम् (the absolute cause  
of सचोक्त and विभक्त) The तर्कसिद्धिः practically says the same thing.

सयोगभिन्नत्वे सति ( this expression is put in in order to exclude हस्तपुस्तक-सयोग which is the असमवायिकारण of कायपुस्तकसयोग, and to confine the लक्षण only to कर्मन् direct ) सयोगसमवायिकारणम्, कर्मन्जातिमद्वा The divisions of कर्मन् or motion in the text are obviously based upon the popular view, about motion in general, upwards, downwards, hitherward, thitherward and general ध्रुवण need not be a separate division as it can be included in गमन अदिभुद्रपरिमणिन सपदेन—This simply means that कर्मन् can reside in corporeal substances only

( 83 )—सामान्य generality or genus Objects which belong to the same class have something common about them, which is known as सामान्य For instance, घटः can be said to reside in all घटः howsoever they might differ in size or shape It is thus the cause of अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय It is also defined as नित्यैकमनेकानुगतम् If the definition were simply एकमनेकानुगतम् it would extend to सयोग, so to exclude सयोग etc नित्यम् is put in नित्यैकम् would extend to जलपरमाणुगणरूप which is नित्य and एक, so to exclude it अनेकानुगतम् is put in सामान्य is नित्य as even though the individual व्यक्तिः perish, the class notion would still remain The Vaisesikasutras simply say सामान्य विशेष इति ब्रुद्धरपेक्षम्, thus pointing out how the idea of सामान्य really depends upon the angle of vision of the person concerned Kesavamisra means exactly the same thing when he says तच्च व्यावृत्तेषु हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेष । Whether a quality is to be classed as सामान्य or विशेष would depend upon how you would look at it If you consider it to be something common to a class of objects, it becomes a सामान्य, if you regard it as peculiar to something, it becomes a विशेष. Later on, सामान्य seems to have come to be regarded as a positive thing residing in the first three पदार्थः viz द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्.

It is easy to see how सामान्य cannot reside in the remaining four पदार्थः, viz सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव सामान्य cannot reside in सामान्य, for there would thus be अनपरादादौष, if घटत्व has a सामान्य व घटत्वम्, this घटत्वम् should have also a सामान्य and there would be no end to this kind of argument So it is best to admit that सामान्य has no further सामान्य. सामान्य cannot reside in विशेषः, for thereby सामान्य and विशेष would both lose their very nature विशेष implying as it does particularity which enables us to distinguish one thing from another, cannot possibly have any thing to do with सामान्य which implies an absolutely contrary notion You might as well expect light to reside in darkness समवाय cannot have any सामान्य as समवाय is only one and there can not be any class notion with reference to one object *Again वृत् and its लक्षण व घटत्व are related together by the परस्पर relation, what relation can there be between समवाय and समवायत्व ? Not another*

समस्त, for there would be अनवस्था, how can we account for the existence and work of this other समस्त? अभाव cannot have a सामान्य as सामान्य is obviously मावक्ष्य and it cannot have any सख्य with an अभाव. Thus सामान्य can exist only in द्वय, गुण and कर्म. सामान्य is two fold, पर (highest, most extensive) and अवर (less extensive, or species). सत्ता is the परसामान्य as सत्ता (existence) resides in all objects द्रव्य, इन्द्रिय are अवरसामान्य as they are obviously less extensive. The Saptapadartha recognises a third division viz पक्ष. Thus द्रव्यत्व is an अवरसामान्य with reference to सत्ता, but a परसामान्य with reference to पक्षत्व. सामान्य is explained as स्यात्सामान्यं भावोनागत्युक्तं नित्यो धर्मः सामान्यम् or वा सामान्यं बुद्धिं प्रकृतं विद्वेष्यपिपाकालेषु यथा बहुन विदितरतो न व्यावर्तते बोधोऽधिकत्र प्रत्ययानुसन्धिनिमित्तम् न सामान्यम् । (वाल्मीकि २।१।६८)

It is usual to divide सामान्य into जनितसामान्य (which is also called simply जाति) and उपविहितसामान्य (which is also called simply उपधि or सामान्य). As the Saptapadartha says सामान्यं जनितसामान्यं वा । जातिं तत्सामान्यं तद्व्यवहारं वा । उपविहितं पाचकत्वादि निवृत्तक सामान्यं जातिं मन्वसकत्वादि । Though जाति and सामान्य (or उपधि) are often used promiscuously, there is a vital difference between the two notions represented by these two terms. सामान्य is more or less a loose idea of generality existing in a set of objects, while जाति represents a distinct class or genus and religiously respects the division of genus and species. Thus मनुष्यत्व would be a proper जाति representing as it does the genus of मनुष्य, but अक्षय would be a mere सामान्य, as it exists in different well defined classes of मनुष्य, पक्ष etc. In other words, a जनितसामान्य is the very essence of the class of objects to which it refers, while an उपविहितसामान्य refers to certain adventitious features which are common to widely different objects that are not homogeneous. देवत्व exists in पशु, cows, men etc, but देवत्व cannot be a जनितसामान्य, as देवत्व does not make पशु, cows or men what they are. जनितसामान्य thus comprises members of a joint family, while उपविहितसामान्य takes into account hostel boarders who are mere birds of passage brought together by accident.

The following verse of उपनिषद् mentions the circumstances which must not exist in the case of a जनितसामान्य (an उपविहितसामान्य can exist in some cases) व्यक्तैरेवेवैवमुक्तं सत्त्वैरेवैवमुक्तं । स्यान्निरसामान्यो जनितसामान्यः । Thus (1) व्यक्तैरेव — There can be obviously no जनितसामान्य or उपविहितसामान्य when there is only one व्यक्त. (2) सत्त्वैरेव — when the individual व्यक्तिस are the same only differing in name पशुत्व and पशुत्व can not be two different जातिः. (3) सत्त्वैरेव — सत्त्वैरेव and सत्त्वैरेव can not both be जातिः for both सत्त्वैरेव and सत्त्वैरेव exist in पशु, मनुष्य, राजस्य and वपु, only सत्त्वैरेव is found



in मन्त्रम् and only भूतन्त्र in आकाश. Thus if we were to regard सूत्र व and भूतन्त्र as जातिः, what becomes of the द्रव्य-वजाति which comprises all the द्रव्यः. There would be all confusion and cross division so such जातिः should not be admitted. We can have सूत्र-व and भूतन्त्र as उपाधिस्वरूपसामान्यः but not as जातिसामान्यः. It would thus be seen that a जातिसामान्य-व alone is a true full fledged सामान्य, उपाधिसामान्य-व is a सामान्य only through courtesy.

(4) अनवगमिनि — As already seen before सामान्य cannot have a further सामान्य. (5) स्वहानि — विद्वेषः cannot have a सामान्य-व, otherwise they would lose their very nature which is as poles asunder from that of सामान्य. (6) असम्बन्ध — सम्बन्ध-व cannot have सामान्य, for it cannot be in सम्बन्ध-व relation with it as every सामान्य is required to be with reference to its possessor.

(Line 6) — अत्र उच्यते. The objector says that it is unnecessary to understand मन्त्र-व as distinct from the individual व्यक्ति. The answer is that it is सामान्य alone that can properly account for the cognition of similarity or sameness in diverse, dissimilar objects. Such a cognition must depend upon something and that something is सामान्य.

(Line 9) — ननु अद्वैतज्ञानिहृतेष्वकारा बुद्धिः, this represents the view of the Banddhas who do not admit सामान्य. According to them, गो means गोत्वस्यावृत्तिः, we do not know from गो what गो is (for every thing is सादृशः), but what is different from what is not a cow. In other words, cognition takes the form of negation or exclusion, it is never positive. The एकारा बुद्धिः in गो-वक्ति is therefore merely अगोत्यावृत्ति-वचन. The answer is that what the objector represents, is opposed to all our experience and common sense. The एकारा बुद्धिः appears in a positive form. We get a positive idea of sameness from गोत्व, and not of अगोत्यावृत्ति.

(84) — विशेष Individuality or particularity. The विशेषः reside in निवृत्त-व (पूर्विकानां द्वन्द्वस्य परमाणव आकाशाद्विपञ्चक एव न ब्रह्मवाणि । नर्तक-विका) and are स्वयत्तक that is, distinguishing one thing from another. The Vaisesikasutras call these अत्यविशेषः to distinguish them from the ordinary particular characteristics that distinguish objects from one another. The Vaisesikas are said to be so called, because they admit the existence of these विशेषः, a doctrine which is repudiated by modern Naiyāyikas, Āmārika, the followers of Prabhakara and the Vedantins. The Vaisesikasutrakara Kanada also does not regard it as a characteristic doctrine of his school. But as the विशेषः alone of the seven Padarthas directly refer to the atoms of which the Vaisesikas are highly enamoured, they seem to have so much importance attached to them. The necessity of admitting these विशेषः, — every atom having its own particularity — is thus demonstrated. We are able to distinguish gross objects from one another by means

of their different sizes and shapes, but the atoms are not possessed of parts at all (as they are supposed to be niravayava), hence unless we believe that the atoms of a Ghata are possessed of Visesas different from those possessed by a Pata, all the atoms would be of the same kind and different objects would not come into existence. The Viseṣa of an atom is also capable of distinguishing itself from another atom of the same genus. According to the Vaiśeṣikas the Visesas do not stand in need of other Viseṣas for distinguishing themselves from other Visesas, for there would thus arise अनवस्था. The Viseṣa is therefore स्वत एव व्यापक. Against this it might be reasonably argued that if the Viseṣa is स्वत एव व्यापक what harm is there in supposing that a द्रव्य is also स्वत एव व्यापक on account of its अवयवः or सत्त्वान्वितत्वम्? What need is there to postulate the existence of a separate Viseṣa at all? (The Vaiśeṣikas have no satisfactory explanation to offer on this point. Read the following from प्रज्ञानपादभाष्य, अपान्तव्यतिरेकविशेषणम्) स्वत एव व्यापकत्वस्य प्रथमिज्ञाने वा कालेन इति चेत् न । तद्व्यापकत्वं । इह तादात्म्यजननविभिनयस्यो भवति । यथा अनासक्तिना स्वत एवाज्ञानविशेषणं तद्व्यापकत्वमाह । तेषां हि तादात्म्यान्वितेषु स्वत एव व्यापकत्वस्य । तद्व्यापकत्वपरमात्मविशेषणम् ।) The द्रव्याणां are प्रयुक्त to the Yogins so these Visesas reading as they do in the द्रव्याणां are useful to them only in distinguishing the atoms from one other. The विशिष्टा reside in the विशिष्टवत्तत्वात् by the समवाय relation and have no उत्पत्ति.

(85)—See section 7 (Lane 1)—न-परमव-युक्त-ने—The objector says—The अवयवम् is not different or distinct from the द्रव्यात् so we cannot speak of any relation such as समवाय between them. For a relation exists only between those objects which are different. The answer is—When we perceive a jar, our cognition is that one gross object is perceived and not that hundreds of minute imperceptible atoms come in close connection are perceived. You cannot argue that this cognition is wrong, for that is not contradicted in any way. We can actually make use of that एतद् for purposes for which it is intended, with this very cognition.

(Lane 7)—विशिष्ट-having a positive form of a positive nature.

(86) अज्ञान—It has been remarked before that the Vaiśeṣikas do not explicitly recognize अज्ञान as a distinct पदम् and that Śaṅkarācārya also who is very scrupulous in giving the views of his opponent correctly, mentions only six Padarthas as having been admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas. अज्ञान is usually explained as भावविशेषणं पदम्. अज्ञानविशेषणं, that is the knowledge of अज्ञान can be had only when we have the knowledge of its counter entity ( प्रतिरोधिन् ). Thus

घटाभाव can only be known if we have the knowledge of घट which is the प्रतियोगिन् of घटाभाव असमवायत्वे सयसमवाय or समवायभेदेन सन्नि समवायशून्य are mere technical definitions There are in all four varieties of अभाव, अभाव is first divided into two (1) सहाभाव and (2) अन्योन्याभाव, and सहाभाव is further sub-divided into प्रागभाव, प्रवृत्ताभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव

प्रागभाव - Before the घट is produced, the घटप्रागभाव exists and has been existing from times immemorial ( घटप्रागभाव is thus अनादि ) When the घट is produced घटप्रागभाव comes to an end

घटप्रवृत्ताभाव is produced when the घट is destroyed (it is thus उत्पात्तमान् ) and this प्रवृत्ताभाव would continue till eternity, hence it is अविनाशी प्रागभाव and प्रवृत्ताभाव have the idea of समय with reference to future time and past time respectively and so are varieties of समाभाव

अत्यन्ताभाव refers to a समय with eternity or त्रिकाल

अत्यन्ताभाव is defined in the text as त्रैकालिकाभाव which is a very simple definition The Tarkasamgraha defines it as त्रैकालिकसहाभाव-द्विउत्तरप्रतियोगितात् ( the Dipikā says अ-योण्याभावप्रतिव्याप्तिगणनाय सहावधि-उत्प्रेति-व्यसप्रागभावयोगनिव्याप्तिगणनाय त्रैकालिकेति ) It is absolute negation or non-existence शशशङ्ख, व-वायु etc are popular instances of this अभाव But they are not correct, as every अभाव must have a प्रतियोगिन् which exists. Now in the case of शशशङ्ख etc , what प्रतियोगिन् could possibly be there? Annambhatta gives घृतले घटो नास्ति as an instance of अत्यन्ताभाव It is difficult to reconcile this instance with the expression त्रैकालिकसहाभावकत्वेन in the definition given above For though the घट might not be on the घृतल at the time of speaking, there is nothing to prevent the घट from being there at any subsequent time Annambhatta seems to have been forced to include घृतले घटाभाव under अत्यन्ताभाव, for it could not be included under प्रागभाव ( unless we take the अभाव to refer to घृतले अस्तित्व of the घट and not to the उत्पात्ति of घट, but there is गौरव in regarding घृतले अस्तित्व as a कार्य ) or प्रवृत्ताभाव or अन्योन्याभाव ( for here we have घटाभाव on घृतल but not घटसुखभाव, thus there is no mutual negation ) So all cases of अभावs not covered up by प्रागभाव, प्रवृत्ताभाव and अन्योन्याभाव, have to be included under अत्यन्ताभाव As regards प्रवृत्ताभाव, Annambhatta says सादितेन प्रवृत्तः । उच्यतेनन्तर काव्यम्, about प्रागभाव he says उत्पन्नं पृथ काव्यम् प्रागभाव is always there before the कार्य is produced, but प्रवृत्ताभाव can occur only after the कार्यविनाश which would necessarily be after उत्पात्ति, but any length of time may intervene between उत्पात्ति and विनाश- It would have been better therefore if the expression विनाशावन्तर had been used instead of उत्पन्नवन्तरम् Kesavamisra's illustrations and explanation of the different varieties of अभाव are distinctly better and simpler than those of Annambhatta



The siddhāntin simply brushes aside these views, declaring that as the *वृक्ष इव* is directly perceived by *प्रत्यक्ष*, it is futile to deny its existence [ The matter, however, is not so simple as to be dismissed in one sentence. The difference between the view point of the Naiyāyikas and that of the idealists, is fundamental and philosophically, the view of the Advaitavedāntins is the only correct one. The whole problem is exceedingly complex and cannot and need not be presented here even briefly ]

(87)—*बुद्धि*—*ज्ञानम्*, *उपनिवे* are synonymous terms with *बुद्धि* according to Gautama, *बुद्धित्वसाधायिणी, जानामि* उपन्यस्यसाधगम्यज्ञानम् (अनुप्यस्य- subsequent cognition in the form *घटज्ञानवानहम्*. When we perceive a घट, the चक्षुर्निद्रिय comes into contact with the घट and the impressions are carried to the mind which transfers them to the *Ātman* in whom the प्रतीति घटज्ञानवानहम् or घटमह जानामि arises. This प्रतीति is called अनुप्यस्य. Without this प्रतीति perception does not become complete) are other definitions of बुद्धि बुद्धि is स्वव्यवहारहेतु as contrasted with लक्ष्मि, स्वयोग etc which are the हेतुs of some particular व्यवहार. It is clear that without cognition no व्यवहार (बुधोभयिवाहुरीकत्वत्वययोगे or आहाराविहासदय) of any kind is possible. According to the Sankhyas बुद्धि is महत्त्व, the first product of प्रकृति, it is निश्चया परब्रह्मिण्युपगतम् according to the Vedāntins. The बुद्धि of ईश्वर is निर, that of जीवामन् is अनित्य. See section 6 for the meaning of यथाय

(Line 6)—अदृष्टे, because a diseased eye would give wrong knowledge. यथायुक्तम् is four fold, referring to the four प्रधानाः

(Line 9)—अथवा अनुभव is अग्रमा, सुक्ते इव रजनम्, रजनत्वभावन नि सुक्ते रजनत्वकाके अग्रमा तदभावानि तत्रकारकेहेतुव as a definition of अग्रमा is taken exception to by an objector in this way. A monkey is in contact with the top of a tree, the cognition वृक्ष कविसंयोगी is therefore correct. Now applying the above definition of अग्रमा we can say कविसंयोगभावन नि ( for the whole of the tree excepting the कविसंयुक्त portion is कविसंयोगभावनम् ) कविसंयोगकारक अनुभव exists in the case of the tree. So here यथा becomes अग्रमा. The answer is obvious. If there had been the अनुभव of कविसंयोग in those portions where there is no कविसंयोग, then alone the cognition would be अग्रमा. We are not concerned with the rest of the tree at all. The cognition concerns only with the portion where there is contact between the monkey and the tree. The objector is thinking of वृक्ष as a whole one time ( when he talks of the वृक्ष as कविसंयोगभावनम् ) and then only the कविसंयुक्त portion of it (when he talks of the वृक्ष as having कविसंयोगकारक अनुभव ). Thus he takes वृक्ष in two different senses which is responsible for the confusion in his mind.

Read the following from the तर्कसूत्रिका नन्दि सयोगीति प्रमायाप त्रिभ्यामिति चेन्न । सवद्युतेन च उच्यते शक्यते तदुच्यते न तस्य प्रमायाप निर्माणात् सयोगमात्र-उच्यते सयोगे न तस्य प्रमायाप उच्यते सयोगमात्र-इत्येव स्यात्प्रतिपत्तिरिति ।

(Line 9) - सयोगेन च उच्यते - in sections 96 and 101, below

(Line 11) - विषय or error is really the proper incorrect apprehension. When we cognate a thing to be what it is not, we commit error as when we mistake a rope for a serpent or a mother-of-pearl for silver.

(Line 14) - द्रोषवद्भवेन तदिति In एष we see things as though they are actually happening before our eyes, even though they are वदेत. Thus when we see a horse in a dream, our knowledge ought to be in the form म अयं (because the अयं is वदेत) but actually it is in the form अयं अयं. What should have been in the form of एषयं takes the form of अयं.

(88) (Line 2) - ह्येव च ज्ञान निराकारेण - This is intended to refute the Bauddha view (साकारज्ञानवाद) that cognition takes the form of the object, owing to the object producing its form in the cognition (जने ह्यनेनैव स्वाकारेण ज्ञान इत्येव पक्षः । स्वाकारादिज्ञाने ज्ञानेन ज्ञान इत्यस्य) This has been already refuted in section 86 when the siddhāntin showed that अयं was distinct from ज्ञान.

When the साकारज्ञानवाद is refuted, it follows that the view (पक्षेन वदेतेन ज्ञान ज्ञानेन तत्र च कार्येण पक्षे लुप्यते इति) that the existence of अयं is to be proved by inference from the form of अयं which the cognition, actually perceived by us, and all cognition can be had as proceeding from the object and connected with the object. The cognition takes the form 'I know a jar' and not simply 'I know'. If cognition were unconnected with the अयं the cognition ought to have been simply 'I know'.

(89) - See section 98

(90) - यथाशक्तमसौ - यथाशक्तमिति वापि चेत् - The Nyayasūtra is प्रवृत्ति-संश्लेषात्प्रतीत्येव इति । (I 1 17) The reading वापि चेत् is therefore to be rejected as it is not warranted by the sūtra.

(91) - एषा अयं प्रतीत्येव इति । (Nyayasūtra, I 1 18)

(92) - इति चेत् - (Nyayasūtra I 1 19) - एषा बुद्धयस्य, नोप-जानमानस्य च अयं प्रतीत्येव इति । (Nyayasūtra I 1 20)

(93) - अयं च - (Nyayasūtra I 1 21)

(94) - अयं च - (Nyayasūtra, I 1 21)

(95) — नञ्चल्लभोऽज्ञानम् । (Nyaya-sutra I 1 22). तेन दुष्टेन ज वना  
 अथवा विदुःकरणम् । कथम् । अथवा ज वना इत्यम् । अथवा अदुःखिनम् । एतन्मया-  
 मपर्यन्तमपार्थं वैदिक-वेदान्तमिति । अथवा अज्ञानम् इति । (अज्ञानमपार्थम्)

मक्ष is the absolute cessation of the twenty one fold दुःख, the  
 twenty one divisions are (1) Body, + (6) sense organs + (6) objects  
 of sense corresponding to the six sense organs + (6) likewise, six  
 cognitions, (1) दुःख and (1) सुख (Line 1) — नञ्चल्लभोऽज्ञानम्-दुःख is  
 मक्ष-दुःख सुख is मोक्ष दुःख That सुख also is दुःख is a characteristic  
 doctrine of the Vedantins and Indian philosophy generally For  
 सुख is as mu li an obstacle to मक्ष as दुःख is (Line 1) — अथवा  
 figurative use, honey mixed with poison is figuratively called poison,  
 and does act as such similarly सुख being alloyed with दुःख is figura-  
 tively called दुःख and does act as such

Desavamisra is not satisfied with the bald statement in Nyaya  
 sutra I 1 1 that मक्ष results from the समाप्त of the sixteen topics  
 He thinks that निष्कामकर्मवृत्त as well as ध्यान (specially referred to in  
 the Yogasutras) are necessary before one can secure salvation

The process is as follows — The true knowledge of the sixteen  
 topics makes a person disgusted with the world of विदुः as thereby  
 he knows what value he should attach to the विदुः then he takes to  
 meditation on the Eternal one, and gradually, through the efficacy of  
 meditation he becomes free from केशि (मक्ष-दुःखे) As he is free from  
 all मक्ष, he goes on doing his tasks without any desire for fruit so  
 that कर्म no longer can bind him down and as regards the सच्चिदानन्द,  
 he by his yogic power manages to enjoy the fruit of it all together in  
 this very birth So when he departs this body there can be no  
 re-birth or union with another body for him (as all सच्चिदानन्द is  
 already exhausted and there is no fresh कर्म) and he becomes free  
 from the twenty-one fold दुःख In other words he is Mukta

(96) — We have now to look back a little to section 87 where the  
 quality बुद्धि was first divided into स्पष्ट and अस्पष्ट अनुभव was then  
 divided into सत्य and असत्य सत्य-अनुभव is four fold corresponding to  
 the four pramānas and these four varieties of correct apprehension  
 have been already dealt with We now turn back to असत्य-अनुभव or  
 incorrect apprehension which has three varieties सशय विषय and तर्क

सशय is defined as एतस्मिन् यमदा विदुःकामना अपा नेवा अनमता ।  
 A simpler definition is 'एतस्मिन् यमिषा विदुःकामना वा तर्क ज्ञानम्' where एतदि  
 means alternative Three characteristics are necessary to constitute  
 doubt proper First the यमिषा or the entity with reference to which  
 doubt arises must be one Secondly the attributes must be

different and thirdly, they must be contradictory. Thus 'इषी घटपटी' is no doubt, because though the attributes or alternatives, घटत्व, and पटीत्व, are different and contradictory (they are contradictory because they can never be समानाधिकरण or reside in the same entity), the धर्मत्व is not one. For we are here speaking of two entities, घट and पटी. Similarly, 'एत एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् अथ एत' is no doubt, because though the धर्मत्व एत is one, the धर्म or attributes are not many. For एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् is just one attribute. Lastly, 'अथ एत भेत द्रव्यम्' is also no doubt, because, though the entity is one and the attributes, घटत्व भेत एत and द्रव्यत्व, different, they are not contradictory. For they can all reside in one abode as they do in a घट. So it will be seen that the words 'एतस्मिन्' 'माना' and 'विद्वत्' have each special significance attached to it. Read 'घटपटी इति समुहात्परिच्छेदे यद्विद्वत्त्ववान् एकेति । एते द्रव्यम्' इत्यादौ अतिव्याप्तिरत्राय विरुद्धेति । 'एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान्' इत्यत्र अतिव्याप्तिरत्राय नानेति ।' इतिपिका. A proper instance of सशय is the cognition 'एतद्युक्तं पुरुषो वा' arising with reference to one dimly visible entity. Here एतद्युक्तं and पुरुषत्व are different attributes. They are contradictory because they cannot reside in the same object. One and the same धर्मत्व cannot both be a pillar and man.

According to Gautama, सशय is समाननिकषधर्मैव चरित्वित्यनेकानाम् एतद्वत्त्ववान् अथ एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् विज्ञेयवैज्ञेय विवक्षितम् । (Nyāyasūtra, I 1 23)

सशय is three-fold — विज्ञेयवैज्ञेये सति

(1) समानधर्मसंज्ञक — The stock instance is एतद्युक्तं पुरुषो वा. The doubt arises owing to the fact that we are conscious of the common features (द्रव्यत्वविद्वत्त्व) of एतद्युक्तं and पुरुष, but are not aware of any special feature such as एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् belonging to एतद्युक्तं alone or एतद्युक्तं belonging to पुरुष alone, which would enable us to resolve our doubt.

(2) विप्रतिपत्तिज्ञ — When doctors differ the lay man is naturally puzzled. Some one says एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् इति एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् इति. Thus doubt arises and can be resolved only when one of the assertions is proved to be wrong.

(3) समानधर्मसंज्ञक — When it is possible to draw any conclusion you like, from a peculiar characteristic of an object, this doubt arises. From एतद्युक्तं, you can not say anything definitely, for as एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् is a peculiar property of एतद्युक्तं alone, it is not a safe guide for postulating anything about पुरुष, as there can be no similar instance.

(97) प्रयोजनम् — यथार्थमपि एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् इति प्रयोजनम् । (Nyāyasūtra, I 1 24)

(98) एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान् इति प्रयोजनम् इति । (Nyāyasūtra, I 1 25) It is necessary that both the disputants must accept the एतद्विद्वत्त्ववान्,



otherwise no inference can be drawn. Of course, it is presumed that none of the disputants is deliberately perverse. *मात्रसंज्ञानम्* is in accordance with *अवयवसिद्धिः*, *विषयसंज्ञानम्*, in accordance with *एवमित्यस्यादि*.

(99) सिद्धान्त — We quote here the relevant Nyāyasūtras in this connection, together with the *वस्तुवाच्यमाप्य* on them.

Gautama defines सिद्धान्त as *तन्त्राधिष्ठरणाभ्युपगममभिधितिः सिद्धान्तः* (I 1 26), *सर्वतन्त्राधिष्ठरणाभ्युपगमसत्त्वित्ययान्तरभावात्* (I 1 27)

[ सिद्धान्त is a category, on the nature of which the difference of view between *प्राचीन* and *उपनिषद्* is clearly noticed. Kesava-misra follows Vātsyāyana, the Bhāṣyakāra of Gautama who follows the old view. Govardhana the commentator on the Tarkabhāṣā follows Viśvanātha, the Vṛttikāra on Gautama the representative of the old school ]

The four kinds of Siddhānta are as follows —

(1) सर्वतन्त्राधिष्ठरणाभ्युपगमसत्त्वित्ययान्तरभावात् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, I 1 28)

भाष्यम्—यथा प्राणादीनीन्द्रियाणि मन्दाद्य इन्द्रियाणां पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि, प्रमागेरप्यस्य महत्त्वमिति ।

This means, according to Vātsyāyana and our author, a principle which is admitted by all schools. According to Vātsyāyana, the example of a सर्वतन्त्राधिष्ठरणाभ्युपगमसत्त्वित्ययान्तरभावात् is the existence of the five senses and their objects etc. शब्द would be an example, according to our author. People may have a doubt as to the eternal or non-eternal character of शब्द. But all admit that there exists such a thing as शब्द.

According to the modern school, सर्वतन्त्राधिष्ठरणाभ्युपगमसत्त्वित्ययान्तरभावात् possesses a special and restricted sense, being applicable to a principle which has been accepted by two disputants as the basis of their discussion. Thus when two parties dispute regarding the nature of sound, whether it is eternal or non-eternal they mutually admit the existence of sound as such. Or when they dispute as to whether darkness is *अवयव* or *अभावावयव*, they have already admitted that there is such a thing as तमसः.

(2) समानतन्त्राधिष्ठरणाभ्युपगमसत्त्वित्ययान्तरभावात् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, I 1 29)

भाष्यम्—यथा नासन नामलाभ, न सन आत्महान, निगतिशब्दाश्चेतना देहेन्द्रियमनसु विषयेषु मत्तत्कारणेषु च विशेष इति साहचर्यानाम्, पुरुषरूपमिति निमित्तो भूतसर्ग कर्महेतुको द्वेषः प्रकृतिस्य, स्वयुगावशिष्टाश्चेतना, अनदुराधने उत्पन्न विकल्पने इति योगानाम् ।

Tarkabhāṣā . Section 99

Older view —A doctrine, which, though not established in one's own school, is proved in another which is similar to it Thus the Naiyāyikas hold mind to be a sense organ But it has actually been proved to be such in the Vaiśeṣika system Other illustrations may be drawn from साहचर्य and योग that hold common views

Modern view —A doctrine which is accepted by one school and rejected by another Thus शब्दनिश्चय is admitted by the मीमांसका and rejected by the नैयायिकाः

( 3 ) यत्सिद्धावन्वयप्रकरणासिद्धि साधधिकरणसिद्धान्त । (Nyayasūtra, I 1 30 )

भाष्यम्—यस्यार्थस्य सिद्धान्तनेत्या अनुषङ्ग्यते न तैर्विना स ऽप सिध्यति तेषा बहुषु धाना सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्त । यथा बहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो ज्ञाता दर्शनस्यशान्त्यामेक धर्महृणादिनि । अत्रानुषङ्गोऽप्या इन्द्रियनान च नियतविषयाणांन्द्रियाणि स्वविषयप्रहृणादिङ्गानि नातुज्ञानसाधनानि, गन्धादिगुण व्यतिरिक्त द्रव्य गणाविकाराणाम नियतविषयाश्चेतना इति पूर्वाय सिद्धान्तेनेत्या सिद्धान्त न तैर्विना सोऽर्थ समवर्तानि ।

Regarding this variety, the प्राचीन and the अशकीन views are the same It means a principle which follows the establishment of another principle Thus when it is established that the earth etc being a product, must have a creator, it follows the creator of such earth etc must be omniscient

( 4 ) अपीक्षितानुपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त । ( Nyayasutra, I 1 31 )

भाष्यम्—यत्र किञ्चिदर्थज्ञानमपरीक्षितमभ्युपगम्यते अस्ति द्रव्य शब्द स तु वि याप्यानि य इति, द्रव्यस्य सतो नियता अनियता वा तद्विशेष परीक्ष्यते सोऽप्युपगमनिश्चय एवमुद्भवानिश्चय चित्त्यापविषया परबुद्धचवज्ञानाच्च प्रवर्तत इति ।

On the nature of this variety, the difference between the older and modern नैयायिकाः, is most marked

Older view —When in arguing with an opponent one admits his view without question, and proceeding to draw a conclusion there from, shows that the conclusion contradicts another view of the opponent, such admission is called अभ्युपगमनिश्चय । Thus a निर्गन्तुक is arguing with a नैयायिक regarding the nature of sound He admits sound is a quality Then he proceeds to say that as sound is a quality of the all pervading ether, according to the नैयायिकाः, it must be without parts, and so it cannot grow in size But this conclusion is against the Naiyāyika view of the non eternity of sound, which is based exactly on the fact that it grows and diminishes in intensity

[ This process has some common features with Tarka or hypothetical reasoning See section 101 below ]

Now arises the occasion for using तर्क. We admit for a moment his contention बह्निर्वानु. We thus deliberately suppose बह्निर्वानु which is व्यापक or less extensive and thereby force on him ब्रह्मवानु which is व्यापक or more extensive by saying ' यदि अत्र बह्निर् व्याप्तं तर्हि ब्रह्मवानु न त्वत् ' But the presence of smoke is directly perceived. Our opponent is thus reduced to the position of either pointing out an instance where there is smoke, but no fire, or of admitting that his assertion ' बह्निर्वानु ' was wrong. And as no such instance can be found, he admits the falsity of the contention ' बह्निर्वानु ' and thus indirectly accepts the presence of fire on the mountain. In this way by the supposition of the व्यापक ( बह्निर्वानु ) we impose the व्यापक ( ब्रह्मवानु ) तर्क is therefore व्यापकोपेक्षया व्यापकत्वैव. The मन्वन्तर्क defines तर्क as ' अविद्यमानकप्रसंगेन तर्क '.

It will thus be seen that तर्क is quite a legitimate method of forcing a conclusion on an inconvenient opponent by making him admit व्यभिचरत्वमिति ( यत्र यत्र बह्निर्वानु तत्र तत्र ब्रह्मवानु ) when he is unwilling to accept the अ-ब्रह्मवानु. But why तर्क should be regarded as a variety of अद्वयब्रह्मवानु does not appear to be at first clear. The reason however is that because in तर्क we make the admission of the अद्वय thing viz ब्रह्मवानु, it must be considered as a variety of अद्वय. Looked at from another point of view तर्क would appear to be a kind of अद्वयब्रह्मवानु, because the ब्रह्मवानु which is forced is अद्वयत्व, since ब्रह्म is actually seen.—It must be confessed that the reasons advanced for regarding तर्क as a division of अद्वयब्रह्मवानु do not appear to us to be convincing. For neither the ब्रह्मवानु nor the ब्रह्मवानु which we hypothesize or force on the opponent can by any stretch of imagination be regarded as अद्वय ब्रह्मवानु and ब्रह्मवानु are अद्वयत्व we admit. But that does not make तर्क which only deals with them in a hypothetical manner, assume the character of अद्वयब्रह्मवानु.

तर्क and विषयव्यभिचर resemble in so far as in both something opposed to truth is realised. But while in तर्क the incorrect admission made is deliberate or volitional, in विषयव्यभिचर the incorrect apprehension received is through some defect and we are not conscious of its incorrectness as long as we are labouring under the error.


Ancient Naiyāyikas admit eleven kinds of तर्क, of which only five are accepted by the moderns viz चरमत्व or *ignoratio elenchis*, सम्योक्तत्व or dilemma, चक्रत्व or reasoning in a circle, अद्वयत्व or *regressus ad infinitum* and प्रसंगिकनिर्णयत्व or *reductio ad absurdum*. Only the last has been mentioned and defined by Keśavamitra.

Tarka is different from मन्वन्तर्क, as the latter is इत्युपेक्षित ( व्यापकत्वानुसारेण ) यत्र यत्र—here the cognition oscillates between the two कथित or alterna-

tives म्याणु and गुरुषु ), while तर्क comprises only one कोटि, namely the चार्तिट The सप्ततर्कार्थी includes तर्क in भूशय

(102) विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षान्वाद्यवधारणं निवृत्तम् । ( Nyayasūtra, I 1 41 )

(103) प्रमाणतर्कमाद्यनोपलम्भे सिद्धान्तविरुद्धे पञ्चावयवावयवस्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षप्रसङ्गो वादः । ( Nyayasūtra, I 2 1 ) वास्यायन says, निम्न कथा भवन्ति, वादी जल्पो विनष्टा चेति । ( कथा is defined in section 105 ) Thus—



कथा or discussion can be carried on either (1) for finding out the truth or (2) for checkmating or triumphing over the opponent by means fair or foul [ The second alternative is of course of inferior value and deserves to be discouraged ] For निग्रह, see section 117

(104-105) यद्येवतावयवस्य उच्यते तन्निर्गमप्रसङ्गं न स्यात्तथापि जल्पः । न प्रतिपक्षं स्वपक्षेति विनष्टा । ( Nyayasūtra, I 2 2-3 ) उभयसाधनम् । A जल्पवादिन् aims at परपक्षदुष्पण as well as स्वपक्षसाधनम्, a विनष्टवादिन् is merely concerned with परपक्षदुष्पण, and does not care for स्वपक्षसाधनम् If in the course of discussion, a विनष्टवादिन् finds that he can demolish his opponent's arguments by giving up his प्रतिपक्षा, he would certainly do so

(106) In sections 106-114, the author is covering the same ground he had covered in sections 28-32 There he dealt with the हेतुमास्य as a constituent part of अनमान, here they are treated of independently as a separate topic The treatment here is naturally more detailed, but follows the same lines and most of the illustrations given are also the same A student who has mastered sections 28-32 thoroughly would be able to follow sections 106-114 very easily As sufficiently exhaustive notes have been given on sections 28-32, we shall only touch the new and important points in our notes on sections 106-114

(Line 2) — न चार्तिट, the Nyayasūtra names the हेतुमास्य differently स यमिच विरुद्धप्रकरणसमसमासस्यसमासार्थाः हेतुमास्य । ( I 2 4 ) and defines them as follows — अनैकान्तिकं सयमिचारः । सिद्धान्तमायुक्तं तद्विरोधी विरुद्धादस्य प्रकरणेति ता स निजार्थमपदादिन् प्रकरणसमः । साध्यापिगतं सध्यात् सध्यासम् । स्यात्तथापि कालाति । ( I 2 5-9 )

(Lane 4)—अत्रोदयनेन सुक्तम्—The reference is to उदयन's कल्पमहासूत्रम् which is an important name in the history of Nyaya and Vaisheshika systems. He flourished in the last quarter of the 10th century. His most famous work is कुहुनाञ्जलि which is 'the classic exposition of the proof of the existence of God' (Kaith).

Udayana's definition of सिद्धि lays down two characteristics for सिद्धि, namely व्यभिचारेण and पक्षपर्यवसानेन, and the absence of these is असिद्धि. Now this असिद्धि must exist in some way or other in all हेतुभाषणम्. The objector's contention therefore is, that all हेतुभाषणम् should be called असिद्धि. The division into five हेतुभाषणम् is incorrect, for surely the सिद्धि or अनेकान्तिक हेतुभाषणम् does contain असिद्धि, why then are these different divisions made, with different names?

The answer is the 'प्रधानत्वेन व्यवस्था भवन्ति न्यायः'. It is perfectly true that असिद्धि in a general sense exists in all the five varieties. But we are perfectly justified in ascertaining what kind of असिद्धि strikes us more, and then we name the हेतुभाषणम् accordingly. When the striking feature of the असिद्धि is known and the हेतु proved to be a हेतुभाषणम्, we do not bother ourselves about the less prominent features of असिद्धि existing in the हेतुभाषणम् which depend upon or are subaltern to the more prominent ones. When, for instance, the व्यभिचारेण strikes us more prominently, we dub the हेतुभाषणम् अनेकान्तिक, when the feature साधकवैपर्यवसायेन is prominent we call the हेतुभाषणम् सिद्धि and so on.

(Lane 15)—यत्र गुणः सौम्यता इति उच्यते—The author says in line 14 that व्यभिचार and others give rise to अनेकान्तिक and other fallacies. The reading ते गुणः would refer to व्यभिचारम् or अनेकान्तिकम्, in either case, that would come into conflict with असिद्धि इत्यम्, etc. in line 16. It is more natural that the author should explain in this part some असिद्धि वादः as he explains व्यभिचारम् in line 14. On these grounds, we have read यत्र गुणः for न पदम्.

(107)—In गणनादिषु सुखेभ्यः अस्तिव्यवहारः, the हेतुः सः प्राच्यव्यवहारः because its आशयः, गणनादिषु does not exist at all.

(Lane 7)—अत्रोदयनेन सुक्तम्—This is given as an instance of आशयव्यवहारः. Now, unlike गणनादिषु, यत्र actually exists, how can we then regard this as an instance of आशयव्यवहारः? The answer is—यत्र might be existing in reality, but for purposes of the above अनुमानः, it does not exist. For अनुमानः has scope for something about which there is a doubt. The अस्तित्वम् of यत्र is beyond all doubt, therefore यत्र is an अस्तिव्यवहारः for this अनुमानः and so does not exist for the purposes of the अनुमानः. Con-

existence of the अमय therefore also means non existence for the purposes of the अनयान

(108) — समान्यम् अनित्यम् । इतस्तत्त्वात्—Here the हेतु, इतस्तत्त्वात् does not exist in सामान्य, so this is an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध

तृष्वप्यदवधत्वर परमाणवा नित्या गधवत्त्वात्—

Here ग-प्रवचन does not exist in the atoms of water fire and wind (existing only in the atoms of earth) thus the हेतु is not to be found in a part of the पक्ष, so this is an instance of भागानिद्ध

(109) (1) शब्दो नित्य । द्वय विशिष्टाभ्युपगमत्त्वात्, this is also an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध ( विशेषणासिद्ध variety ) For द्रव्यत्व ( the विशेषण ) does not exist in शब्द, as शब्द is a गुण It cannot be argued that a part of the हेतु, अमयवचन ( विशेष्य ) exists in शब्द, therefore it cannot be स्वरूपासिद्ध The answer is द्रव्यविशिष्टाभ्युपगमत्त्वात् is one idea, and even if only द्रव्यत्व or only अमयवचन does not exist in a particular object, the whole द्रव्यविशिष्टाभ्युपगमत्त्वात् does not exist there For instance, दण्डवत्त्वमय must be said to exist, even if only दण्ड ( विशेषण ) or only वृक्ष ( विशेष्य ) does not exist

(2) शब्दो नित्य । अमयवचने सति द्रव्यत्वात्, that is अमयवचनविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वात् .

Here the विशेष्य, द्रव्यत्व does not exist in शब्द, therefore it is an instance of the विशेष्यासिद्ध variety

(3) शब्दो नित्य । गुणत्वविशिष्टाभ्युपगमत्त्वात् ।

Here the विशेषण, गुणत्व is like अजागन्तव्य, it serves no purpose, the विशेष्य, अजागन्तव्य is quite capable of proving the नित्यत्व of शब्द The addition of the विशेषण, गुणत्व, far from helping the विशेष्य, अजागन्तव्य, actually makes the हेतु fallacious For the हेतु गुणत्वविशिष्टाभ्युपगमत्त्वात् is a विशिष्ट हेतु, and any lapse on the part of either the विशेषण or the विशेष्य, reflects on the whole

One peculiarity must be noted here Here the विशेषण, गुणत्व does exist in शब्द, (so also the विशेष्य, अजागन्तव्य, at least according to some) how can then this be an instance of a स्वरूपासिद्ध ? The answer is — It is true that गुणत्व exists in शब्द, but our contention is that गुणत्व being impotent cannot be regarded as a विशेषण at all That alone can rightly be called a विशेषण of the हेतु, which serves the purpose of excluding others by particularising it But here गुणत्व serves no purpose, as it is incapable, and is therefore useless like the हेतु या न स्ये न दण्डात् The above शब्दो नित्य etc is therefore an instance of असमर्थविशेषणासिद्ध variety of स्वरूपासिद्ध

(4) शब्दो नित्य । अजागन्तव्य सति अमयत्वात्—Here the विशेष्य अजागन्तव्य is impotent, the विशेषण alone being capable of proving the नित्यत्व The विशेष्य being असमर्थ is as good as not existing in शब्द, so the विशिष्ट हेतु

does not exist in शब्द, hence this is an instance of अनर्थविशेषात्तद्व्यतिरिक्त  
variety of व्याप्यत्वनिष्ठ

(110) There are two varieties of व्याप्यत्वनिष्ठ —

(1) मान्येनारुह्यति, where there is no प्रमाण to apprehend the व्याप्य  
between the हेतु and the साध्य विपश्चाल्यहीनता इत्येव शब्दः । मन्वद्—Here  
there is no प्रमाण to show that there is व्याप्य between मन्व and अग्निः ।

(2) साध्याधिक्यता यत्नयन्ती—

(a) स इवाम् । मेवैतन्नयत्—Now मेवैतन्नयत् is not the cause of  
व्याप्यत्व but शास्त्राद्यन्वयिणाम् । And प्रयोजक is the उपाधि, hence  
here the व्याप्य would be correct only when this उपाधि, शास्त्र  
अन्वयिणाम् is tacked on to the हेतु  
(The definition of उपाधि, साध्याधिक्यताये स घन-साधक उपाधि can  
be shown to be satisfied thus —

यत्र यत्र इवामत् तत्र तत्र शास्त्राद्यन्वयिणाम् । (शास्त्राद्यन्वयिणाम्, the उपाधि  
is the साध्य of the साध्या, इवामत्), but यत्र यत्र मेवैतन्नयत् तत्र  
तत्र शास्त्राद्यन्वयिणाम् (this व्याप्य cannot be correct as some of  
मेवैतन्नयत् are not इवामत् so शास्त्राद्यन्वयिणाम्, the उपाधि, is  
साध्यासाधक )

(b) वर्तते धूमवात् । वद्विभवत्—Here अग्निश्चरसंयोग is the उपाधि, being  
the प्रयोजक of वद्विभवत् । Thus यत्र यत्र धूमवात् तत्र तत्र अग्निश्चर-  
संयोग (अग्निश्चरसंयोग, the उपाधि is the साध्य of the साध्या,  
धूमवात्) but यत्र यत्र वद्विभवत् तत्र तत्र अग्निश्चरसंयोग (this is not  
correct, as the साध्या is यत्र मेवैतन्नयत् in the case of red hot iron  
ball where there is fire, but no smoke, so अग्निश्चरसंयोग is  
साध्यासाधक )

(c) मन्वत्तर्जिणी हिंसा अथर्मसाधनम् । हिंसात्—Here निविद्धत्, being  
the प्रयोजक of अथर्म, is the उपाधि

Thus, यत्र यत्र अथर्मसाधनम् तत्र तत्र निविद्धत् । (निविद्धत्, the उपाधि is  
the साध्य of the साध्या, अथर्मसाधनम्) but यत्र यत्र हिंसात् तत्र तत्र निवि  
द्धत् (this is not correct, as the व्याप्य is व्यभिचारिण्य in the case of मन्वद्-  
हिंसा where there is हिंसात्, but no निविद्धत्, the killing in sacrifices being  
sanctioned by the Sastra. So निविद्धत् is साध्यासाधक )

(111) शब्दो नित्य । इत्यन्वयत् । Here the व्याप्य is not between the हेतु  
इत्यन्वयत् and नित्यत्व (the साध्य), but between the हेतु and साध्यात्मनः (अनित्यत्व) —  
यत्र यत्र इत्यन्वयत् तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् ।—This is an instance therefore of निविद्ध  
हेतुत्वनिष्ठ.

(112) अवैकान्तिक has two varieties—साध्यात्मनः and असाध्यात्मनः

(1) शब्दो नित्य । प्रमेयत्वम् ।—Here the हेतु, प्रमेयत्व exists in the यत्र,  
(शब्द), in the सत्य (वाच्यम्) and in the विषय (घन) । It is इत्यन्वयत् प्रमेयत्वनिष्ठ  
and so this is an instance of साध्यात्मनःसाध्यात्मनः हेतुत्वनिष्ठ

(2) अत्र विनाऽस्यवत्त्वात्—Here the हेतु exists in the मन्त्र (द्विती) alone, it does not exist either in the मन्त्र (प्राथम्य) or in the विषय (अत्र)—This is therefore an instance of अत्र वरणवैकल्यम्

(Line 14)—व्यभिचारम् Kesavamisra is now defining what व्यभिचार is (as the हेतु अनेकान्तरु is also called सव्यभिचार he points out how the two varieties of अनेकान्तरु illustrated by him are possessed of व्यभिचार, and so can rightly be called सव्यभिचार) For मन्त्रस्यस्यवत्त्वात् हेतोः, there is the reading नियमान्मन्त्रात् सव्यभिचारहेतुते हेतोः It appears to us that the proper reading here should be व्यभिचारो नियमान्मन्त्रस्य सव्यभिचारहेतुते हेतोः सव्यभिचारहेतुते सति विरशाद्वाक्यव्यभिचारो नियमो गम्यत्वात् । तत्र च साध्य

What is meant is this — व्यभिचार means violation of the rule. The rule is that an अन्वयान्तरिणी हेतु should be present in the मन्त्र and absent from the विषय, because that alone enables us to arrive at a correct conclusion. The violation of the rule is possible in three ways —

(1) When the हेतु is absent in the मन्त्र and present in the विषय (This type of व्यभिचार is the proper province of the विरुद्ध हेत्वानाम, and so it need not be taken into consideration. Strictly speaking this cannot be called a व्यभिचार. To exclude this type from the province of अनेकान्तरु, the expression सव्यभिचारविनाशः has been used in line 10, for a विरुद्ध हेत्वानाम is सव्यभिचारविनाशः)

(2) When it is present in the मन्त्र as well as in the विषय (This is साधारणवैकल्यम्)

(3) When it is absent from the मन्त्र as well as from the विषय (This is अक्षरव्यभिचारवैकल्यम्)

The second variety and the third variety alone can legitimately be called व्यभिचार. For व्यभिचार undoubtedly presupposes that there is सव्यभिचार between the हेतु and the साध्य, only that this सव्यभिचार is not invariable. In the case of the first variety, there is सव्यभिचार between the हेतु and the साध्य, with which the question of the original व्यभिचारवैकल्यम् is not concerned. That is why Kesavamisra rightly speaks of व्यभिचार being two-fold. To take a more familiar instance. Suppose we issue an order to a person in Poona. On arriving at Bombay, purchase a Rolls Royce. Now this order can be violated in the following two legitimate ways —

(1) On arriving at Bombay, he purchases not a Rolls Royce but a Ford

(2) On arriving at Bombay, he does not purchase the car

Here we presume that the man would go all right to Bombay. In the same way, when a man tries to state a व्यभिचार, we



presume that the man is on right lines in having noticed some connection between the हेतु and the सत्य, only that he may be wrong in imagining an invariable connection between them in some cases. But when a man states a हेतु which has व्यभिचारे with the साध्याया, he is not playing the game, as far as the व्यभिचार idea in the व्यभिचारे is concerned. He is either a downright knave or a fool. Similarly in the above familiar instance, if the person goes to Mysore and purchases an elephant, that would be technically a violation of our order, but that would not be what we had bargained for in this case.

(113) शब्द अनित्य क्रियार्थानुपलब्धि, has for its rival the equally powerful शब्द निव अनित्यवर्णानुपलब्धि । What is essential in the case of the परमाणुमय हेतुभास is that its प्रतिपक्ष हेतुभास must be equally powerful, for if the rival हेतुभास were stronger, the original हेतु would go to the wall, if the rival हेतुभास were weaker it itself would go to the wall. In either case, there would be no rival हेतु in the field at all.

उपजीव्यम्—That on which something else depends, the stronger one

उपजीव्यम्—That which depends on something else, the weaker one

The author shows how the so called rival हेतु for अनिवार्य परमाणु । युक्तम् । is उपजीव्य or वापक । In other words the मुख्य हेतु can not be regarded as a परमाणुसमहेतुभास । The so called rival हेतु is stated to be अनासक्तम्, as in परमाणु निय । अनासक्तम् । (see section 53) Now this अनासक्तम् हेतु, while proving the निय of the परमाणु proves the existence of the परमाणु as well. So that when the मुख्य हेतु is put forward to prove the अनिवार्य of the परमाणु, the person in question has tacitly admitted the existence (and along with it, the नियम्) of the परमाणु । For, unless the existence of the परमाणु is admitted, there cannot be any question as to whether परमाणु are निय or अनिय । Any discussion as to whether the बन्धुत्व is fit for marriage or not is absurd. The मुख्य हेतु thus has for its उपजीव्य, the अनासक्तम् हेतु on which it depends. अनासक्तम् हेतु is not its rival, but its task-master. अनित्य परमाणु । युक्तम् । is thus उपजीव्यम् or a मुख्य हेतु ।

(114) अग्निं अनुपलब्धि । अनुपलब्धि । अनुपलब्धि—Here अनुपलब्धि is अनुपलब्धि because the अनुपलब्धि or अनुपलब्धि of अग्नि is actually directly perceived by the sense of touch, and so the अनुपलब्धि is definitely contradicted by a stronger proof.

एतं समानं । अनुपलब्धि—Here the अनुपलब्धि, अनुपलब्धि is actually cognized by the recognition-perception. We recognise the एतं as the same which we had seen before. Now this cannot happen unless the एतं is not अनुपलब्धि ।

In the case of this हेतुमान the मन्त्र must be contradicted by a stronger proof, usually the प्रत्यक्ष. The reading प्रथमिज्ञानकारिण्यजन seems to be suspicious as it is more elaborate the emendator being anxious to state in detail how the perception of घट is characterised by recognition and hypothetical reasoning such as 'If the घट had been different, it would not have been recognised

(Line 14) - येदपि लक्षणम्. The author now shows how the fallacies due to wrong definitions could be included in the five fallacies already described (For the three टाका of लक्षण see section 3)

अनिर्वाहः—इयं गौ गोत्वजातिमती । पशुत्वात्—Here the हेतु पशुत्व exists in the पशु (गौ), in the मन्त्र (another cow) and in the विषय (अध). So this is an instance of अनिर्वाहिरु हेतुमान

Or this might be a case of सोपादिस्वरूपसाधिका, for पशुत्व is not the cause of गोत्वजातिमती but साक्षादिमती (which being the प्रयोजक, is the उपाधि)

अवधि—If the हेतु is शाश्वदेवम् (this might also mean being descended from शक्य the कामधेय) it exists only in some cows hence this is an instance of मागमिदं हन्त्यामास

असम्भवं—The हेतु, एतन्नाशक does not exist at all in cows so this is an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध हेत्यामास

(115) उलम् वचनविद्योऽथ विरूपोपाया उलम् ।

(Nyayasutra, I 2 10)

उल consists in purposely perverting the meaning of the opponent and finding fault with his argument. It is three fold, thus (Nyaya sutra I 2 11)—तद् विविध उल उल साधाय उलम् उपचार उल च त्रि ।

(1) उल उलम्—आवज्ञाथ अहितेऽपि वक्तुमिच्छामि त्वं नरक्यता ।

(Nyayasutra, I 2 12)

This is the only variety referred to in the text नरकम्बलेऽपि देवदत्त is the instance. Unless we dissolve the compound in a particular way, we cannot know what the expression means. The speaker uses it in the sense नर (new) कम्बल अस्य the उपाधिः विरूप purposely understands it in the sense नर (nine) कम्बला अस्य, and takes the opportunity to preach a sermon to his opponent. 'What rot are you talking? Devdatta is known to be quite poor, he cannot afford to have even two कम्बला? How can he have nine? Do you mean to tell us that he is a thief?' and so on

(2) सत्मा वच उलम्—सम्भवात्प्रमथानि सत्मा वदो गदसमुत्ताप कल्पना ।

(Nyayasutra I 2 12)

सम-वन्नेदिन उल्लम्—When the speaker remarks about some one, ब्रह्मणो न विद्यावाचकस्य च, the उल्लम् purposely misunderstands it to mean that the speaker wants to state a general proposition that a ब्रह्मण is सदाचारस्य च, and goes on to say 'How could you say that a Brāhmana is सदाचारस्य च? Then a शब्द ( a सत्कर्महीन ब्रह्मण ) also would be सदाचारस्य च This is absurd' and so on

(3) उपचरन्तुम्—अविवक्ष्यन्निर्दिष्टं तद्वाच्यमित्येष ।

(Nyayasūtra, I 2 14)

A word has three meanings, वाच्य लक्ष्य and अर्थम् When the speaker uses a word, say in a वाच्य sense, the उल्लम् purposely misunderstands it in a sense other than वाच्य, and finds fault with the speaker's statement Thus, the speaker says मञ्जु ब्राह्मण, using the word मञ्जु in its लक्षणिक sense मञ्जुया वाचा The उल्लम् understands मञ्जु in its वाच्य sense and goes on to say 'How can the inanimate मञ्जु cry?' It is a novel discovery that you have made for which the world ought to be grateful to you' and so on

It would be seen that उपचरन्तुम् is not the same as अवल्लम् In अवल्लम्, the word has two वाच्य meanings in उपचरन्तुम् the word is used in a figurative sense So the two have their respective spheres, ( वाच्यलक्षणात् उल्लम् तदाचारस्य च ) न तदर्थं तस्मात् । अविधि वा विधि स च यदुच्यते लक्षणम् । Nyayasūtra, I 2 15-17 ) The reading वाच्य would mean 'Thus the उल्लम् comes to grief and is made to eat his words, when the proper meaning is pointed out to him

(116) सप्तविंशत्यन्तं प्रत्ययान्तरानि । (Nyayasūtra I 2 18) जति is futile objection सप्तविंशत्यन्तं—of twenty-four kind. Nyayasūtra V 1 explains all of them Our author mentions only two

उपचरन्तुम् consists in attributing some वच which is not concomitant with the हेतु, to the वच on the strength of the इति न being possessed of that वच Thus, when the syllogism is इति वच इति वच इति वच, the opponent says if इति वच is possessed of इति वच like वच, then इति वच should be regarded as being सप्तविंशत्यन्तं, because वच is सप्तविंशत्यन्तं

अवचरन्तुम् consists in attributing some वच मय which is not concomitant with the हेतु, to the वच on the strength of the इति न being possessed of that वचमय Thus in the same syllogism, सप्तविंशत्यन्तं इति वच इति वच, the opponent says if इति वच is possessed of इति वच, like वच then इति वच should be taken to be not audible, as वच is not audible

(117) निवृत्तानि—Occasions for reproof Nyayasūtra mentions and describes the following twenty two of them —

प्रतिज्ञाहृति प्रतिज्ञान्नर प्रतिज्ञाविरोध प्रतिज्ञासन्ध्यास हेतुमन्तर अर्थान्तर निरर्थकम्  
अविज्ञानार्थम् अर्थान्तरम् अपातकात् न्यूनम् अधिरु पुनरुक्तम् अननुभवणम् अज्ञानम् अप्रतिभा  
विशेष मनावृत्ता पर्यवृत्तयोपक्षेण निरनुयोग्यावृत्तौ अपसिद्धान्त हेतुवापत् ।

These are the pitfalls against which the disputant must guard himself if he wishes to carry his point. Our author mentions only seven of them

(1) न्यूनम्—हीनमन्वयनेनाल्पवयेन -न्यूनम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V. 2 12)

A syllogism must be put forth in a proper form, all complete with the five members. If the disputant gives only four members or less, the निग्रहस्थान 18 -न्यून

(2) अधिरुम्—हेतुवाहणार्थिरुम् अधिरुम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 13)

Adding unnecessary adjuncts to the हेतु or उदाहरण etc (हेतुवाहणोत्प-  
पत्नगम् । धमाशक्तौकात् महानमवज्ञानत्वोदित्वादिकं तु विना समनन्वय दादयोदिभ्रमा  
दुस्वमधिकम्-न्यायसूत्रानि )

(3) अपसिद्धान्त—सिद्धान्तव्युत्पेय अनिश्चयत् कथापसम अपसिद्धान्त ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V. 2 24).

When a disputant, having agreed to discuss according to the tenets of a particular system of philosophy, agrees, in the course of the discussion, to something contrary to those tenets, there is the निग्रहस्थान called अपसिद्धान्त

• (4) अर्थान्तरम्—अहतादर्थप्रतिपत्तिसमर्थान् अर्थान्तरम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 7)

When a disputant talks at random about something not connected with the ग्रह, there is the निग्रहस्थान called अर्थान्तर.

Thus after stating the syllogism, शब्दोऽनेन च कृत्वा कदात्, the disputant goes on saying 'Sabda is a special quality of ether, the word Sabda begins with the letter sa, and ends with the letter da'-all of which is quite true, but has nothing to do with the matter in hand

(5) अप्रतिभा—अज्ञानस्य अप्रतिपत्ति अप्रतिभा ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 19).

Being dumb-founded, or non-plussed or unable to answer the opponent

(6) मनावृत्ता—अवृत्ते शीतानुभवत् पर्यवृत्ते शीतवसने मनावृत्ता ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 31)

य एतेन चोदित दोष स्वपक्षेऽभ्युपगम्यान्नुभयं वदन्ति भवपक्षेऽपि समानो दोष इति स स्वपक्षे  
 क्षाम्युपगम्यात् परपक्षे दोष प्रसज्यन्त्यस्मत्तदुक्तानामतीति मतातज्ञा वाप्य विप्रहस्यानपापयत इति ।  
 (वास्त्यायनभाष्य) यथात्वं चोर इत्युक्ते त्वमपि चोर इति कथनम् । (मोक्षधन)

(7) (प्रतिज्ञा) विरोध — प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोध प्रतिज्ञाविरोध ।

(Nyayasutra, V 2 4)

एतन्व्यतिरिक्त द्रव्यमिति प्रतिज्ञा, स्वपक्षिनोऽप्यान्तरस्यान्वयव्यव्येति हेतु सोऽय प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वो  
 विरोध । कथम् । यदि एतन्व्यतिरिक्त द्रव्यम् स्वपक्षिनोऽप्यान्तरस्यान्वयव्यव्येतिर्विरोधयते । अथ  
 स्वपक्षिनोऽप्यान्तरस्यान्वयव्यव्येति एतन्व्यतिरिक्त द्रव्यमिति नास्त्वयति । (वास्त्यायनभाष्य)

(Line 11)—इहा This sentence aptly describes the characteristic  
 feature of the Tarkabhāṣa as a manual of Logic. Kesavamisra says  
 that he has described the important topics in all their characteristics,  
 even rendering himself liable to the charge of repetition what is  
 unimportant has been passed over without much ado. This is the  
 policy he has followed in writing this treatise, for that is the only  
 one which would benefit the beginners, who are otherwise likely to  
 be scared away by a scrappy treatment of important topics, and  
 unnecessary stress on unimportant points.

## INDEX

[ of important words and topics ]

References are to sections

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Abhava-36<br/>           „ (Pramana)-40<br/>           Adharma-80<br/>           Ākāṅkṣa-30<br/>           Ākasa-54<br/>           Anvikantika-30, 112<br/>           Anubhava-5, 87<br/>           Anumana-18-32,<br/>           Anvaya vyapti-20, 21<br/>           Anvaya vyatireki-21, 24<br/>           Anyathasiddha-8<br/>           Anyonyabhava-86*<br/>           Īp-49<br/>           Aparatva-69<br/>           Apavarga-90<br/>           Āpta-35<br/>           Artha-47<br/>           Arthapatti-39<br/>           Asādharana anvikantika-30 112<br/>           Asmartha visesanaiddha-109<br/>           „ visesyaiddha-109<br/>           Asamavayi karana-10<br/>           Asiddha-28, 106-110<br/>           Āsrayaiddha-28, 107<br/>           Atidesavakya-33<br/>           Ativyapti-114<br/>           Ātman-44, 57<br/>           Atomic theory-52-53<br/>           Atvanatibhava-80<br/>           Avyapti-114<br/>           Ayathartha-anubhava-87<br/>           Ayutasaiddha-8<br/>           Bhagasaiddha-108<br/>           Bhavana-81<br/>           Buddha-74 87</p> | <p>Caksa-46<br/>           Chala-116<br/>           Dharmā-80<br/>           Duk-56<br/>           Dosa-91<br/>           Dravatva-71<br/>           Dravya-47<br/>           Duhkha-75, 94<br/>           Dvesa-78 91<br/>           Dvaitva-54<br/>           Dvyanuka-52-53, 65<br/>           Ekatva-64<br/>           Fallacies-28-32, 106-114<br/>           Gandha-62<br/>           Ghrāṇa-46<br/>           Guṇa-59<br/>           Guratva-70<br/>           Heta-100<br/>           Hetvabhāsa-28-32, 106-114<br/>           Ichha-77<br/>           Indriya-46<br/>           Jalpa-104<br/>           Jati-83<br/>           Jnana-10, 86-88<br/>           Kadambamukulanyāya-73<br/>           Kala-50<br/>           kalatya padusta-32, 114<br/>           Karana-6, 13<br/>           Karana-6-12<br/>           Karma-82<br/>           Kārya-6<br/>           Kevalanvayi-23, 26<br/>           Kevāli vyatireki 22, 26 114<br/>           Lakṣana 3 114<br/>           Lānga-18</p> |
|--|---|

# INDEX

[ of important words and topics ]

References are to sections

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>Athava-80<br/>         " (Pramana)-10<br/>         Adharma-80<br/>         Ākaṅkā-30<br/>         Ākasa-04<br/>         Anukantika-30, 112<br/>         Anubhava-0, 87<br/>         Anumana-18-32,<br/>         Anvaya vyapti-20, 21<br/>         Anvaya vyatireki-21, 24<br/>         Anyathasiddha-6<br/>         Anyonyabhava-86<sup>a</sup><br/>         Āp-49<br/>         Aparatva-69<br/>         Apavarga-90<br/>         Āpta-30<br/>         Artha-47<br/>         Arthapatti-39<br/>         Asādhārana-anukantika 30 112<br/>         Asamartha viśeṣanasiddha-109<br/>         , viśeṣyasiddha-109<br/>         Asamavayi karaṇa-10<br/>         Asiddha-28, 106-110<br/>         Āśravaśiddha-28, 107<br/>         Atidesivākya-33<br/>         Ativyapti-114<br/>         Ātman-44, 57<br/>         Atomic theory-52-03<br/>         Atvantabhava-86<br/>         Avyapti-114<br/>         Ayathartha-anubhava-87<br/>         Ayatasiddha-8<br/>         Bhāgasiddha-108<br/>         Bhavana-81<br/>         Buddhi-74, 87</p> | <p>Cakṣu-46<br/>         Chala-115<br/>         Dharma-80<br/>         Dik-56<br/>         Doṣa-91<br/>         Dravatva-71<br/>         Dravya-47<br/>         Duḥkha-76, 94<br/>         Dvāsa-78, 91<br/>         Dvīva-64<br/>         Dvyanuka-02-03, 65<br/>         Ekatva-64<br/>         Fallacies-22-32, 106-114<br/>         Gandha-62<br/>         Ghrāṇa-46<br/>         Guṇa-59<br/>         Guratva-70<br/>         Hetu-100<br/>         Hetvabhāṣas-28-32, 106-114<br/>         Icchā-77<br/>         Indriya-46<br/>         Jalpa-104<br/>         Jati-83<br/>         Jñāna-10, 86-88<br/>         Kāṇvabamukulanyāya-73<br/>         Kala-50<br/>         Kālatyāyapadīta-72, 114<br/>         Karaṇa-6, 13<br/>         Karaṇa-6-12<br/>         Karma-82<br/>         Kārya-6<br/>         Kevalanvayi-27, 26<br/>         Kevala vyatireki-90<br/>         Lakṣaṇa-3, 114<br/>         Lūṅga-18</p> |
|--|--|

- Liṅga parāmāsa-18  
 Manas-46, 58, 89  
 Nigamaṅa-100  
 Nigraha-śhāna-117  
 Nimitta karaṅa-11-12  
 Nirṇaya-102  
 Nirvikalpaka-15  
 Pada-30, 37  
 Pādārtha-47  
 Paka-48  
 Pakṣa-27  
 Pakṣa-dharmatā-20  
 Pañcavayavavākya-19, 100  
 Paramāṅu-52, 53  
 Parārtha anumāna-19  
 Paratva-69  
 Parimāṅa-60  
 Phala-93  
 Pilūpūksavāda } -52  
 Pītharapakavāda }  
 Pradhvamsūbhava } -86  
 Prāgabhava }  
 Prakaraṅasama-hetvābhāsa-  
 31, 113  
 Pramā-5  
 Pramāṅa-4, 13  
 Prāmāṅya vada-42  
 Prameya-43  
 Prāṅa-51  
 Pratijñā-100  
 Pratyakṣa-10  
 Pravṛtti-90  
 Prayatna-79  
 Prayojana-97  
 Prthaktva-66  
 Prthivi-48  
 Pretyabhava-92  
 Raṣa-61  
 Rasānendriya-46  
 Rūpa-60  
 Sabda-73  
 Śabda-pramāṅa-45-36  
 Śādhārāṅa-anaikāntika-30, 112  
 Sāmāṅya-83  
 Samavaya-8, 16, 85  
 Samavāyikāraṅa-7, 9  
 Samkhyā-64  
 Samnidhi-35, 36  
 Samuikarṣa-16  
 Samsaya-87, 96  
 Samskāra-81  
 Samyoga-67  
 Sapakṣa-27  
 Śarīra-45  
 Śatpratipakṣa-31, 113  
 Savikalpaka-15  
 Savyabhicāra-30, 112  
 Siddhānta-99  
 Smṛti-5, 87  
 Srotra-46  
 Sneha-72  
 Sopādhika-28, 110  
 Sparsa-63  
 Stūti-śhāpaka-81  
 Sukha-75  
 Suvarṅa-50  
 Svārthāṅumāṅa-19  
 Svarūpasiddha-28, 108-109  
 Tarka-101  
 Tejas-50  
 Tryaṅuka-52-53, 65  
 Tvak-46  
 Udaharaṅa-100  
 Udayana-106  
 Upādhi-28, 110  
 Upajīvaka } -113  
 Upajīvyā }  
 Upamāṅa-33  
 Upanaya-100  
 Vada-103  
 Vākya-35  
 Vakya pratīti-37



Varna-37	Visesana-siddha	} -109
Vayu-51	Visesyasiddha	
Vega-91	Visesana visesyabhava-16, 41	
Vibhaga 68	Vitanda-100	
Vibhva-04	Vyabhicara-112	
Vicitaraṅganyaya-73	Vyapara-15	
Vipakṣa-27	Vyapti-18	
Viparyaya 87 91	Vyaptivasiddha-28, 110	
Viruddha hetvabhāsa-29 111	Vyatireka-vyapti-20	
Viseṣa-84	Yathārtha-5	
Viseṣa-guṇa-44	Yogin-73	

---